4 Jan 2016 Peter Barnes and Matthew Wood · Prevention of Future Deaths report Inner South London
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Concerns raised 5 Failure to ensure in-depth consultation between the Heliport and planning authorities about developments affecting air-service safety View source Failure to enable pre-permission CAA assessment of new en route obstacles View source Failure to ensure safe and sufficiently clear flying rules for helicopter route H4 View source Failure to establish adequate Heliport safeguarding arrangements View source Failure to adequately consider Heliport and Thames helicopter aviation safety in tall-building planning processes View source See 2 more concerns
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Peter Barnes and Matthew Wood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
A helicopter crashed into a crane at St George’s Wharf, causing non-survivable injuries to the pilot and non-survivable burns to a pedestrian after falling debris and fuel ignited. The report raised concerns about the safety of helicopter routes along the Thames, the planning and safeguarding of tall buildings near the heliport, and the lack of implementation of AAIB Safety Recommendation 2014-30.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The London Heliport Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to ensure in-depth consultation between the Heliport and planning authorities about developments affecting air-service safety
Wider context from the report “Despite a good safety record, it would seem that the relevant bodies in relation to aviation safety along the Thames need to expedite a specific review of H4 and consider any need to alter flying rules, to assure the public of ongoing safety given the current concerns of pilots about the difficulties of flying along the Thames. It is not clear that helicopter aviation considerations for the Heliport or more widely for flights along the Thames are adequately considered in the planning processes for tall buildings. It appears that little or no progress has been made in considering the need to safeguard the heliport or implement AAIB Recommendation 2014-30, which the court heard would potentially save future lives.
1. London Tall Buildings Policy, implemented after planning permission for St George’s Wharf was approved, required reporting of any buildings over 1000 ft, which is the appropriate consideration for Heathrow and City Airport flight paths. In a previous application to development on the site the CAA responded that 575ft would not impact on integrated airspace management and advised consultation with the Heliport. There is no equivalent policy of reporting considering the flight paths to the Heliport.
2. The Head of Safety at Department of Transport advised that aerodrome licence holders should conduct an in depth consultation with local planning authorities about any proposed developments that may affect the safety of air services. No in depth consultation did take place between the Heliport and planning authority about the construction of St George’s Tower, to which was attached the crane. A retired official from the Civil Aviation Authority had expressed the view that the London Heliport should be a safeguarded aerodrome. The Head of Safety in Department of Transport advised that in an official safeguarding regime one can be sure that such consultation takes place, which one cannot in an unofficial process, where it depends on the local system and players.
3. The Heliport manager was concerned that the erection of St George’s Wharf would affect passing air traffic on helicopter route H4. He stated that there was an apparent conflict between maintaining en route standard altitudes and complying with Rule 5, especially in reduced cloud base. He had some informal discussions with the CAA, but the local planning authority did not respond to his concerns. He did not take the matter further as the proposed building was just outside the area designated in the map of his local plan. It is not clear of whether this local plan or the local process is adequate to assure safety. He remained of the view that the tall building created a risk as it was more difficult to operate helicopters in poor visibility.
4. Captain ████████ who was called as an independent expert pilot, gave an opinion that establishing a minimum altitude would assist pilots and promote safety and that the H4 route required review, to make it safer, to reduce future deaths. Other pilots testified to the challenges of flying along the Thames with the proliferation of tall buildings in less good weather.
5. The Air Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB) made a Safety Recommendation 2014-30 in August 2014. It read:
It is recommended that the Department of Transport implement measures that enable the Civil Aviation Authority to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential implications of new en route obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures.
The Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Operations) AAIB said that if this recommendation was not implemented lives would be put at risk. The Head of Airspace, Air Traffic Management and Procedures at the CAA supported this recommendation, saying it would be a safety back up. The Department of Transport has not implemented this recommendation, and reported in December 2014 that it was consulting, which was still the position a year later. This was explained by the Head of Aviation Safety Policy at the Department of Transport as initially due to lack of resources. He said that there was not an intention to implement this recommendation, in particular noting that it may be contrary to government proposals for the planning process.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The London Heliport Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to enable pre-permission CAA assessment of new en route obstacles
Wider context from the report “Despite a good safety record, it would seem that the relevant bodies in relation to aviation safety along the Thames need to expedite a specific review of H4 and consider any need to alter flying rules, to assure the public of ongoing safety given the current concerns of pilots about the difficulties of flying along the Thames. It is not clear that helicopter aviation considerations for the Heliport or more widely for flights along the Thames are adequately considered in the planning processes for tall buildings. It appears that little or no progress has been made in considering the need to safeguard the heliport or implement AAIB Recommendation 2014-30, which the court heard would potentially save future lives.
1. London Tall Buildings Policy, implemented after planning permission for St George’s Wharf was approved, required reporting of any buildings over 1000 ft, which is the appropriate consideration for Heathrow and City Airport flight paths. In a previous application to development on the site the CAA responded that 575ft would not impact on integrated airspace management and advised consultation with the Heliport. There is no equivalent policy of reporting considering the flight paths to the Heliport.
2. The Head of Safety at Department of Transport advised that aerodrome licence holders should conduct an in depth consultation with local planning authorities about any proposed developments that may affect the safety of air services. No in depth consultation did take place between the Heliport and planning authority about the construction of St George’s Tower, to which was attached the crane. A retired official from the Civil Aviation Authority had expressed the view that the London Heliport should be a safeguarded aerodrome. The Head of Safety in Department of Transport advised that in an official safeguarding regime one can be sure that such consultation takes place, which one cannot in an unofficial process, where it depends on the local system and players.
3. The Heliport manager was concerned that the erection of St George’s Wharf would affect passing air traffic on helicopter route H4. He stated that there was an apparent conflict between maintaining en route standard altitudes and complying with Rule 5, especially in reduced cloud base. He had some informal discussions with the CAA, but the local planning authority did not respond to his concerns. He did not take the matter further as the proposed building was just outside the area designated in the map of his local plan. It is not clear of whether this local plan or the local process is adequate to assure safety. He remained of the view that the tall building created a risk as it was more difficult to operate helicopters in poor visibility.
4. Captain ████████ who was called as an independent expert pilot, gave an opinion that establishing a minimum altitude would assist pilots and promote safety and that the H4 route required review, to make it safer, to reduce future deaths. Other pilots testified to the challenges of flying along the Thames with the proliferation of tall buildings in less good weather.
5. The Air Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB) made a Safety Recommendation 2014-30 in August 2014. It read:
It is recommended that the Department of Transport implement measures that enable the Civil Aviation Authority to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential implications of new en route obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures.
The Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Operations) AAIB said that if this recommendation was not implemented lives would be put at risk. The Head of Airspace, Air Traffic Management and Procedures at the CAA supported this recommendation, saying it would be a safety back up. The Department of Transport has not implemented this recommendation , and reported in December 2014 that it was consulting, which was still the position a year later. This was explained by the Head of Aviation Safety Policy at the Department of Transport as initially due to lack of resources. He said that there was not an intention to implement this recommendation, in particular noting that it may be contrary to government proposals for the planning process.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The London Heliport Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to ensure safe and sufficiently clear flying rules for helicopter route H4
Wider context from the report “Despite a good safety record, it would seem that the relevant bodies in relation to aviation safety along the Thames need to expedite a specific review of H4 and consider any need to alter flying rules , to assure the public of ongoing safety given the current concerns of pilots about the difficulties of flying along the Thames. It is not clear that helicopter aviation considerations for the Heliport or more widely for flights along the Thames are adequately considered in the planning processes for tall buildings. It appears that little or no progress has been made in considering the need to safeguard the heliport or implement AAIB Recommendation 2014-30, which the court heard would potentially save future lives.
1. London Tall Buildings Policy, implemented after planning permission for St George’s Wharf was approved, required reporting of any buildings over 1000 ft, which is the appropriate consideration for Heathrow and City Airport flight paths. In a previous application to development on the site the CAA responded that 575ft would not impact on integrated airspace management and advised consultation with the Heliport. There is no equivalent policy of reporting considering the flight paths to the Heliport.
2. The Head of Safety at Department of Transport advised that aerodrome licence holders should conduct an in depth consultation with local planning authorities about any proposed developments that may affect the safety of air services. No in depth consultation did take place between the Heliport and planning authority about the construction of St George’s Tower, to which was attached the crane. A retired official from the Civil Aviation Authority had expressed the view that the London Heliport should be a safeguarded aerodrome. The Head of Safety in Department of Transport advised that in an official safeguarding regime one can be sure that such consultation takes place, which one cannot in an unofficial process, where it depends on the local system and players.
3. The Heliport manager was concerned that the erection of St George’s Wharf would affect passing air traffic on helicopter route H4. He stated that there was an apparent conflict between maintaining en route standard altitudes and complying with Rule 5, especially in reduced cloud base. He had some informal discussions with the CAA, but the local planning authority did not respond to his concerns. He did not take the matter further as the proposed building was just outside the area designated in the map of his local plan. It is not clear of whether this local plan or the local process is adequate to assure safety. He remained of the view that the tall building created a risk as it was more difficult to operate helicopters in poor visibility.
4. Captain ████████ who was called as an independent expert pilot, gave an opinion that establishing a minimum altitude would assist pilots and promote safety and that the H4 route required review, to make it safer , to reduce future deaths. Other pilots testified to the challenges of flying along the Thames with the proliferation of tall buildings in less good weather.
5. The Air Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB) made a Safety Recommendation 2014-30 in August 2014. It read:
It is recommended that the Department of Transport implement measures that enable the Civil Aviation Authority to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential implications of new en route obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures.
The Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Operations) AAIB said that if this recommendation was not implemented lives would be put at risk. The Head of Airspace, Air Traffic Management and Procedures at the CAA supported this recommendation, saying it would be a safety back up. The Department of Transport has not implemented this recommendation, and reported in December 2014 that it was consulting, which was still the position a year later. This was explained by the Head of Aviation Safety Policy at the Department of Transport as initially due to lack of resources. He said that there was not an intention to implement this recommendation, in particular noting that it may be contrary to government proposals for the planning process.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The London Heliport Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to establish adequate Heliport safeguarding arrangements
Wider context from the report “Despite a good safety record, it would seem that the relevant bodies in relation to aviation safety along the Thames need to expedite a specific review of H4 and consider any need to alter flying rules, to assure the public of ongoing safety given the current concerns of pilots about the difficulties of flying along the Thames. It is not clear that helicopter aviation considerations for the Heliport or more widely for flights along the Thames are adequately considered in the planning processes for tall buildings. It appears that little or no progress has been made in considering the need to safeguard the heliport or implement AAIB Recommendation 2014-30, which the court heard would potentially save future lives.
1. London Tall Buildings Policy, implemented after planning permission for St George’s Wharf was approved, required reporting of any buildings over 1000 ft, which is the appropriate consideration for Heathrow and City Airport flight paths. In a previous application to development on the site the CAA responded that 575ft would not impact on integrated airspace management and advised consultation with the Heliport. There is no equivalent policy of reporting considering the flight paths to the Heliport.
2. The Head of Safety at Department of Transport advised that aerodrome licence holders should conduct an in depth consultation with local planning authorities about any proposed developments that may affect the safety of air services. No in depth consultation did take place between the Heliport and planning authority about the construction of St George’s Tower, to which was attached the crane. A retired official from the Civil Aviation Authority had expressed the view that the London Heliport should be a safeguarded aerodrome. The Head of Safety in Department of Transport advised that in an official safeguarding regime one can be sure that such consultation takes place, which one cannot in an unofficial process, where it depends on the local system and players.
3. The Heliport manager was concerned that the erection of St George’s Wharf would affect passing air traffic on helicopter route H4. He stated that there was an apparent conflict between maintaining en route standard altitudes and complying with Rule 5, especially in reduced cloud base. He had some informal discussions with the CAA, but the local planning authority did not respond to his concerns. He did not take the matter further as the proposed building was just outside the area designated in the map of his local plan. It is not clear of whether this local plan or the local process is adequate to assure safety. He remained of the view that the tall building created a risk as it was more difficult to operate helicopters in poor visibility.
4. Captain ████████ who was called as an independent expert pilot, gave an opinion that establishing a minimum altitude would assist pilots and promote safety and that the H4 route required review, to make it safer, to reduce future deaths. Other pilots testified to the challenges of flying along the Thames with the proliferation of tall buildings in less good weather.
5. The Air Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB) made a Safety Recommendation 2014-30 in August 2014. It read:
It is recommended that the Department of Transport implement measures that enable the Civil Aviation Authority to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential implications of new en route obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures.
The Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Operations) AAIB said that if this recommendation was not implemented lives would be put at risk. The Head of Airspace, Air Traffic Management and Procedures at the CAA supported this recommendation, saying it would be a safety back up. The Department of Transport has not implemented this recommendation, and reported in December 2014 that it was consulting, which was still the position a year later. This was explained by the Head of Aviation Safety Policy at the Department of Transport as initially due to lack of resources. He said that there was not an intention to implement this recommendation, in particular noting that it may be contrary to government proposals for the planning process.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The London Heliport Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to adequately consider Heliport and Thames helicopter aviation safety in tall-building planning processes
Wider context from the report “Despite a good safety record, it would seem that the relevant bodies in relation to aviation safety along the Thames need to expedite a specific review of H4 and consider any need to alter flying rules, to assure the public of ongoing safety given the current concerns of pilots about the difficulties of flying along the Thames. It is not clear that helicopter aviation considerations for the Heliport or more widely for flights along the Thames are adequately considered in the planning processes for tall buildings. It appears that little or no progress has been made in considering the need to safeguard the heliport or implement AAIB Recommendation 2014-30, which the court heard would potentially save future lives.
1. London Tall Buildings Policy, implemented after planning permission for St George’s Wharf was approved, required reporting of any buildings over 1000 ft, which is the appropriate consideration for Heathrow and City Airport flight paths. In a previous application to development on the site the CAA responded that 575ft would not impact on integrated airspace management and advised consultation with the Heliport. There is no equivalent policy of reporting considering the flight paths to the Heliport.
2. The Head of Safety at Department of Transport advised that aerodrome licence holders should conduct an in depth consultation with local planning authorities about any proposed developments that may affect the safety of air services. No in depth consultation did take place between the Heliport and planning authority about the construction of St George’s Tower, to which was attached the crane. A retired official from the Civil Aviation Authority had expressed the view that the London Heliport should be a safeguarded aerodrome. The Head of Safety in Department of Transport advised that in an official safeguarding regime one can be sure that such consultation takes place, which one cannot in an unofficial process, where it depends on the local system and players.
3. The Heliport manager was concerned that the erection of St George’s Wharf would affect passing air traffic on helicopter route H4. He stated that there was an apparent conflict between maintaining en route standard altitudes and complying with Rule 5, especially in reduced cloud base. He had some informal discussions with the CAA, but the local planning authority did not respond to his concerns. He did not take the matter further as the proposed building was just outside the area designated in the map of his local plan. It is not clear of whether this local plan or the local process is adequate to assure safety. He remained of the view that the tall building created a risk as it was more difficult to operate helicopters in poor visibility.
4. Captain ████████ who was called as an independent expert pilot, gave an opinion that establishing a minimum altitude would assist pilots and promote safety and that the H4 route required review, to make it safer, to reduce future deaths. Other pilots testified to the challenges of flying along the Thames with the proliferation of tall buildings in less good weather.
5. The Air Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB) made a Safety Recommendation 2014-30 in August 2014. It read:
It is recommended that the Department of Transport implement measures that enable the Civil Aviation Authority to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential implications of new en route obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures.
The Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Operations) AAIB said that if this recommendation was not implemented lives would be put at risk. The Head of Airspace, Air Traffic Management and Procedures at the CAA supported this recommendation, saying it would be a safety back up. The Department of Transport has not implemented this recommendation, and reported in December 2014 that it was consulting, which was still the position a year later. This was explained by the Head of Aviation Safety Policy at the Department of Transport as initially due to lack of resources. He said that there was not an intention to implement this recommendation, in particular noting that it may be contrary to government proposals for the planning process.
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Work with CAA, DfT, NATS and DCLG to develop an appropriate safeguarded area reflecting heliport traffic routes and approaches.
Verbatim wording from the response “I have also discussed with CAA how the safeguarded area, currently centred on the London Heliport Air Traffic Zone with the main focus on the immediate approaches and climb-out area along the river front within the heliport “circuit”, might be developed to reflect better the important routes where heliport traffic approaches and departs the London Heliport Air Traffic Zone. This could involve extending the coverage to include not only to the east and west along the heli-route structure where it coincides with the course of River Thames through London including the increasingly high-rise Vauxhall/Nine Elms area but also away from the river directly to the north and south of the heliport.” Source location Peter-wood-Response2
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue working with CAA and DfT to pursue official safeguarding of the heliport and support implementation of relevant AAIB recommendations.
Verbatim wording from the response “Since the inquest the London Heliport has continued its correspondence with both CAA and DfT in order to provide information to progress consideration of official safeguarding of the London Heliport and assist them with implementation of AAIB report recommendations 2014-30.” Source location Peter-wood-Response2
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete consultation on obstruction-lighting arrangements for the approved tall-building development near the heliport.
Verbatim wording from the response “The most in depth work to date began in 2015 on a development (now approved) at 12-14 Lombard Road of a 90 metre tall building around 300 metres from the heliport located on the southern riverside. Due to its size and proximity to the heliport and its approach and climb-out areas along the river objection to the project involved insistence on in depth wind-tunnel, reflected glare and technical (including building lighting and impairment of radio communications) assessments at the additional expense of the developer since the planning application included only desk-based assessments. Due to the unofficial safeguarding status of the London Heliport there was no mechanism for referral of the planning application and heliport objection to the CAA who were also therefore unable to make comment.” Source location Peter-wood-Response2
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide CAA with information on developer consultations and planning applications affecting the heliport’s operating area.
Verbatim wording from the response “I have also provided to CAA information on the level of pre-planning consultation made by developers under current arrangements and the number actual planning applications upon which the London Heliport has been required to make comment or raise objections since the local authorities were advised in 2009. There have been 10 major projects during this time, including tall buildings, large-site projects with multiple buildings of mixed height, river piers and a modification to the Cremorne railway bridge involving a cantilevered foot-bridge addition. All of these projects have been concentrated in the vicinity of the heliport and its air traffic critical which extends approximately 1 kilometre in either direction along the River Thames from the London Heliport.” Source location Peter-wood-Response2
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Maintain planning-application notification arrangements with local authorities and pre-planning consultation with the Port of London Authority for nearby river works.
Verbatim wording from the response “At a meeting on 29th January with the London Heliport designated CAA Aerodrome Principal Inspector and in subsequent correspondence I have set out our current requirements and guidance for notification to the London Heliport of planning applications. This process consists of an annotated map and accompanying guidance letter sent to all planning departments of the Local Government authorities which fall within the London Heliport safeguarded area in 2009. A pre-planning consultation arrangement is in place with the Port of London Authority for any works or development in the River Thames within 250 metres of the London Heliport landing platform which extends on concrete piling from the river wall over the tidal waters.” Source location Peter-wood-Response2
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The heliport would not solely undertake wider safeguarding; responsibility should increasingly pass to NATS and CAA beyond its immediate air traffic zone.
Verbatim wording from the response “Whilst I would not argue that the London Heliport becomes solely responsible for the onerous task of safeguarding such a large area, I believe it would be a logical area within which CAA/NATS and London Heliport could work together with the DGLC to protect London-wide low-level helicopter and other fixed wing air traffic (since not all of it uses London heliport). The focus for the London Heliport would be the area within and immediately adjacent to its ATZ, with a wider “on-route” and “off-route” responsibility passing increasingly to NATS and CAA further away from the London Heliport ATZ.” Source location Peter-wood-Response2
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations