PFD report

Jody Lee ROBB · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 1 Jul 2025•County Durham and Darlington

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
8

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised3

  1. Limited visibility of people in the hazardous area from passing trains and station platforms
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable supervision of members of the public on station premises
  2. Insufficient physical barriers or impediments preventing public access from the platform to the hazardous area
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to prevent public access to closed or restricted hazardous sitesPart of recurring concern: Inadequate physical barriers preventing access to dangerous drops or areas
  3. Failure of safety features to prevent, impede or discourage suicide attempts
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.6

  1. Action

    Operate an automatic warning message directing people away from the platform end.

    Stated by Network Rail Infrastructure LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 July 2025.
  2. Action

    Install and maintain Samaritans signage encouraging people in distress to seek help.

    Stated by Network Rail Infrastructure LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 July 2025.
  3. Action

    Install anti-trespass rubber pyramid mats along the track and viaduct edges as physical and visual deterrents.

    Stated by Network Rail Infrastructure LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 July 2025.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.1

  1. Position

    Permanent viaduct lighting is not considered appropriate because it may impair drivers’ vision and increase trespassing.

    Stated by Network Rail Infrastructure LimitedNo action considered necessaryThe respondent said that no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Limited visibility of people in the hazardous area from passing trains and station platforms

Wider context from the report

“I read and heard evidence from the investigating CID officer who had reviewed all available CCTV in relation to the incident. She reported that Jody had arrived on the south bound platform just over an hour before she jumped. She sat on a bench for a few minutes before making her way onto ████████. She was on the ████████ for about one hour before she actually did so. A total of 11 trains passed her, north and southbound, during that hour. No report was made or received of her presence there by train crews of station staff attending on the station platforms for arrivals and departures. ████████. My concerns are: 1. Access to the ████████ from the platform is not sufficiently barred or impeded to the public. It is clear by means of signage that the public must not go beyond the end of the platform. There are what appear to be some sort of wheeled access steps overs on the platform at and around the fence at its end. But there is nothing to prevent even a moderately mobile person from going around the fence and ████████. The main resource preventing access is human by means of station staff intervention, which is necessarily reliant on their presence at the relevant time; 2. ████████ are not ones designed to prevent, impede or discourage attempts at suicide ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ 3. Eleven trains passed Jody, from north and south, while she was on ████████ during the hour before she jumped. No reports were made by any train crew of her presence. It would be exceedingly the available evidence and unfair to infer that train crews and/or station staff deliberately or negligently ignored her presence there. More likely is that she was simply not visible. It was dark, being at night in April, and Jody was wearing relatively dark clothing. However, she seems to have been discernible on CCTV and from the British Transport Police images I have seen taken from approximately where a driver might have been placed, it is plausible to suggest that she might have been visible, even laterally, from the cab of a train either slowing to stop at the station or pulling out from it, even in deliberately enhanced lighting on the viaduct. Obviously, had a report been made of her presence, some type of intervention could have been attempted ████████████████████ ████████. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable supervision of members of the public on station premises.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Insufficient physical barriers or impediments preventing public access from the platform to the hazardous area

Wider context from the report

“I read and heard evidence from the investigating CID officer who had reviewed all available CCTV in relation to the incident. She reported that Jody had arrived on the south bound platform just over an hour before she jumped. She sat on a bench for a few minutes before making her way onto ████████. She was on the ████████ for about one hour before she actually did so. A total of 11 trains passed her, north and southbound, during that hour. No report was made or received of her presence there by train crews of station staff attending on the station platforms for arrivals and departures. ████████. My concerns are: 1. Access to the ████████ from the platform is not sufficiently barred or impeded to the public. It is clear by means of signage that the public must not go beyond the end of the platform. There are what appear to be some sort of wheeled access steps overs on the platform at and around the fence at its end. But there is nothing to prevent even a moderately mobile person from going around the fence and ████████. The main resource preventing access is human by means of station staff intervention, which is necessarily reliant on their presence at the relevant time; 2. ████████ are not ones designed to prevent, impede or discourage attempts at suicide ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ 3. Eleven trains passed Jody, from north and south, while she was on ████████ during the hour before she jumped. No reports were made by any train crew of her presence. It would be exceedingly the available evidence and unfair to infer that train crews and/or station staff deliberately or negligently ignored her presence there. More likely is that she was simply not visible. It was dark, being at night in April, and Jody was wearing relatively dark clothing. However, she seems to have been discernible on CCTV and from the British Transport Police images I have seen taken from approximately where a driver might have been placed, it is plausible to suggest that she might have been visible, even laterally, from the cab of a train either slowing to stop at the station or pulling out from it, even in deliberately enhanced lighting on the viaduct. Obviously, had a report been made of her presence, some type of intervention could have been attempted ████████████████████ ████████. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to prevent public access to closed or restricted hazardous sites; Inadequate physical barriers preventing access to dangerous drops or areas.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of safety features to prevent, impede or discourage suicide attempts

Wider context from the report

“I read and heard evidence from the investigating CID officer who had reviewed all available CCTV in relation to the incident. She reported that Jody had arrived on the south bound platform just over an hour before she jumped. She sat on a bench for a few minutes before making her way onto ████████. She was on the ████████ for about one hour before she actually did so. A total of 11 trains passed her, north and southbound, during that hour. No report was made or received of her presence there by train crews of station staff attending on the station platforms for arrivals and departures. ████████. My concerns are: 1. Access to the ████████ from the platform is not sufficiently barred or impeded to the public. It is clear by means of signage that the public must not go beyond the end of the platform. There are what appear to be some sort of wheeled access steps overs on the platform at and around the fence at its end. But there is nothing to prevent even a moderately mobile person from going around the fence and ████████. The main resource preventing access is human by means of station staff intervention, which is necessarily reliant on their presence at the relevant time; 2. ████████ are not ones designed to prevent, impede or discourage attempts at suicide ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ 3. Eleven trains passed Jody, from north and south, while she was on ████████ during the hour before she jumped. No reports were made by any train crew of her presence. It would be exceedingly the available evidence and unfair to infer that train crews and/or station staff deliberately or negligently ignored her presence there. More likely is that she was simply not visible. It was dark, being at night in April, and Jody was wearing relatively dark clothing. However, she seems to have been discernible on CCTV and from the British Transport Police images I have seen taken from approximately where a driver might have been placed, it is plausible to suggest that she might have been visible, even laterally, from the cab of a train either slowing to stop at the station or pulling out from it, even in deliberately enhanced lighting on the viaduct. Obviously, had a report been made of her presence, some type of intervention could have been attempted ████████████████████ ████████. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Operate an automatic warning message directing people away from the platform end.

Verbatim wording from the response

“There is an automatic voice message released from a speaker, when individuals get within 14 metres of the end of the platform. This tells people to move away from the platform end.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 1 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Install and maintain Samaritans signage encouraging people in distress to seek help.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We understand that Ms Robb accessed the viaduct from the platform. Over the last 6 years or so, the station and the viaduct have been the subject of significant investment, introducing multiple anti-suicide and trespass measures.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 1 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Install anti-trespass rubber pyramid mats along the track and viaduct edges as physical and visual deterrents.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Near the end of the platform and at the side of the gate referred to above there are anti-trespass rubber pyramid mats (“witches hats”) which extend along the edge of the railway track onto the viaduct for approximately 60 metres, on each side of the station platform. This is beyond what is required by Network Rail’s standards. The intention of the witches hats is to make access difficult for anyone intending to trespass by acting as both a physical and visual deterrent.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 1 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide a locked, climb-resistant gate restricting unauthorised access from the platform toward the track and viaduct.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The end of the platform is fitted with a locked gate, and beyond this, there is a drop off the edge of the platform to track level, to deter individuals from walking beyond the platform’s edge and onto the track. Access via the locked gate is granted only for authorised personnel. The gate is the standard design and has pointed tops, to make it difficult for individuals to climb over the gate. The gate does not extend to the platform edge, as this is in compliance with Network Rail’s national standards.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 1 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop and secure remaining approval for mesh safety panels to increase and curve the viaduct parapet inward.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As the viaduct is a Grade 2 listed structure, Network Rail is required to submit a listed building consent application and prior approval planning application before it can undertake any work to physically alter the existing viaduct structure. Without the Council’s approval, we would be unable to carry out any works to the existing viaduct structure which alter its appearance.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 2 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain a yellow cross-hatched exclusion and visibility area near the platform end.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Near the end of the platform, there is also a yellow cross-hatched box. The main intention is to deter individuals from going within the box, as well as making anyone within the box more visible.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 2 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Permanent viaduct lighting is not considered appropriate because it may impair drivers’ vision and increase trespassing.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In respect of the lighting on the viaduct, I can confirm that temporary lighting is only used where works to the railway are taking place; however, it is not usual to permanently light the railway. There are various safety reasons for this, including lighting potentially inhibiting driver’s vision and ability to see signals.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 2 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. 1

    Fund and provide Samaritans-led distress-response training for station staff and station businesses.

    Stated by Network Rail Infrastructure LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 July 2025.
  2. 2

    Continue monitoring the implemented anti-trespass and suicide-prevention measures.

    Stated by Network Rail Infrastructure LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 July 2025.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.1

  1. 1

    Physical alterations to the listed viaduct cannot be undertaken without the Council’s required planning and listed-building approvals.

    Stated by Network Rail Infrastructure LimitedUnable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Fund and provide Samaritans-led distress-response training for station staff and station businesses.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Network Rail has also funded training for station staff, led by the Samaritans, to help them engage with persons presenting at the station in distress. This training is offered not just for employees of LNER, but also employees of businesses within the station.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 2 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue monitoring the implemented anti-trespass and suicide-prevention measures.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In addition, there are concerns that lighting the structure may increase trespassing incidents as access may become more visible. As such, whilst we do not consider it appropriate to install lighting on the viaduct, we remain committed to restricting trespassing on the railway infrastructure as far as reasonably practicable, and will therefore continue to monitor the steps which have been implemented as described above.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 2 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Physical alterations to the listed viaduct cannot be undertaken without the Council’s required planning and listed-building approvals.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As the viaduct is a Grade 2 listed structure, Network Rail is required to submit a listed building consent application and prior approval planning application before it can undertake any work to physically alter the existing viaduct structure. Without the Council’s approval, we would be unable to carry out any works to the existing viaduct structure which alter its appearance.”

Source location

2025-0330 Response from Network Rail
Page 2 · response
Published 14 July 2025

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026