PFD report

Robert Spring · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 23 Mar 2015•Central Lincolnshire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
4

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 4 recipients

Stated actions
5

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Failure of the Air Liquide notification system to transmit smoking-related risk information to LFRS
  2. Failure by LFRS to assess high-risk Home Oxygen users for safety equipment
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate controls for oxygen-related fire risks
  3. Lack of direct notification of heightened Home Oxygen and smoking risks to LFRS
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate controls for oxygen-related fire risks
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. Action

    Incorporate a process for sharing information with Lincolnshire Fire & Rescue and Air Liquide into Trust policy.

    Stated by United Lincolnshire Teaching Hospitals NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 March 2015.
  2. Action

    Include a documented fire-risk assessment in the standard operating procedure to identify patients at increased risk.

    Stated by United Lincolnshire Teaching Hospitals NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 March 2015.
  3. Action

    Define an agreed communication process between the relevant parties in the standard operating procedure.

    Stated by United Lincolnshire Teaching Hospitals NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 March 2015.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of the Air Liquide notification system to transmit smoking-related risk information to LFRS

Wider context from the report

“(I) Mr Spring was identified at the initial hospital assessment as being at high risk by virtue of his use of Home Oxygen and also by virtue of his smoking habit. There was no mechanism in place whereby such risk could be notified directly to LFRS notwithstanding that Mr Spring had expressly consented to his personal information being shared with them. Such reporting was deferred to Air Liquide. (II) The fact that Mr Spring, as a smoker, was considered to be high risk was confirmed by risk assessments undertaken by representatives of Air Liquide, the Home Oxygen supplier, upon the installation of the Home Oxygen on 27 March 2013 and upon subsequent service visits undertaken on 19 June 2013 and 8 January 2014. (III) Although a mechanism existed for the communication of that increased risk to LFRS by Air Liquide, a facet of their system, designed to prevent duplicate notifications being delivered, operated to prevent notification of his status as a smoker and LFRS were notified only that Mr Spring was a user of Home Oxygen. (IV) Evidence was given at Inquest that LFRS have available, free of charge, a variety of safety equipment for those most at risk of such incidents. Such equipment comprises both smoke and carbon monoxide alarms, flame retardant bedding and portable “misting systems”. (V) The absence of full notification to LFRS meant that the extent of the risk to which Mr Spring was exposed was not identified. As a consequence, he was not assessed by LFRS for the provision of the safety equipment described above. (VI) Whilst a number of Properly Interested Persons have already met to discuss the concerns raised by this death, and whilst Air Liquide have already taken steps to ensure that their internal systems are more robust, there remains a need to put in place more extensive lines of communication between all relevant agencies, to ensure that the heightened risks posed by such patients are drawn to the attention of LFRS at the earliest opportunity. (VII) Evidence was also given at Inquest that the availability of such safety equipment is not well known, and that by increased publicity to the relevant agencies in relation to their availability, there may be a wider distribution of such material with a consequential saving of lives. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure by LFRS to assess high-risk Home Oxygen users for safety equipment

Wider context from the report

“(I) Mr Spring was identified at the initial hospital assessment as being at high risk by virtue of his use of Home Oxygen and also by virtue of his smoking habit. There was no mechanism in place whereby such risk could be notified directly to LFRS notwithstanding that Mr Spring had expressly consented to his personal information being shared with them. Such reporting was deferred to Air Liquide. (II) The fact that Mr Spring, as a smoker, was considered to be high risk was confirmed by risk assessments undertaken by representatives of Air Liquide, the Home Oxygen supplier, upon the installation of the Home Oxygen on 27 March 2013 and upon subsequent service visits undertaken on 19 June 2013 and 8 January 2014. (III) Although a mechanism existed for the communication of that increased risk to LFRS by Air Liquide, a facet of their system, designed to prevent duplicate notifications being delivered, operated to prevent notification of his status as a smoker and LFRS were notified only that Mr Spring was a user of Home Oxygen. (IV) Evidence was given at Inquest that LFRS have available, free of charge, a variety of safety equipment for those most at risk of such incidents. Such equipment comprises both smoke and carbon monoxide alarms, flame retardant bedding and portable “misting systems”. (V) The absence of full notification to LFRS meant that the extent of the risk to which Mr Spring was exposed was not identified. As a consequence, he was not assessed by LFRS for the provision of the safety equipment described above. (VI) Whilst a number of Properly Interested Persons have already met to discuss the concerns raised by this death, and whilst Air Liquide have already taken steps to ensure that their internal systems are more robust, there remains a need to put in place more extensive lines of communication between all relevant agencies, to ensure that the heightened risks posed by such patients are drawn to the attention of LFRS at the earliest opportunity. (VII) Evidence was also given at Inquest that the availability of such safety equipment is not well known, and that by increased publicity to the relevant agencies in relation to their availability, there may be a wider distribution of such material with a consequential saving of lives. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate controls for oxygen-related fire risks.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of direct notification of heightened Home Oxygen and smoking risks to LFRS

Wider context from the report

“(I) Mr Spring was identified at the initial hospital assessment as being at high risk by virtue of his use of Home Oxygen and also by virtue of his smoking habit. There was no mechanism in place whereby such risk could be notified directly to LFRS notwithstanding that Mr Spring had expressly consented to his personal information being shared with them. Such reporting was deferred to Air Liquide. (II) The fact that Mr Spring, as a smoker, was considered to be high risk was confirmed by risk assessments undertaken by representatives of Air Liquide, the Home Oxygen supplier, upon the installation of the Home Oxygen on 27 March 2013 and upon subsequent service visits undertaken on 19 June 2013 and 8 January 2014. (III) Although a mechanism existed for the communication of that increased risk to LFRS by Air Liquide, a facet of their system, designed to prevent duplicate notifications being delivered, operated to prevent notification of his status as a smoker and LFRS were notified only that Mr Spring was a user of Home Oxygen. (IV) Evidence was given at Inquest that LFRS have available, free of charge, a variety of safety equipment for those most at risk of such incidents. Such equipment comprises both smoke and carbon monoxide alarms, flame retardant bedding and portable “misting systems”. (V) The absence of full notification to LFRS meant that the extent of the risk to which Mr Spring was exposed was not identified. As a consequence, he was not assessed by LFRS for the provision of the safety equipment described above. (VI) Whilst a number of Properly Interested Persons have already met to discuss the concerns raised by this death, and whilst Air Liquide have already taken steps to ensure that their internal systems are more robust, there remains a need to put in place more extensive lines of communication between all relevant agencies, to ensure that the heightened risks posed by such patients are drawn to the attention of LFRS at the earliest opportunity. (VII) Evidence was also given at Inquest that the availability of such safety equipment is not well known, and that by increased publicity to the relevant agencies in relation to their availability, there may be a wider distribution of such material with a consequential saving of lives. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate controls for oxygen-related fire risks.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of awareness among relevant agencies of available safety equipment for high-risk patients

Wider context from the report

“(I) Mr Spring was identified at the initial hospital assessment as being at high risk by virtue of his use of Home Oxygen and also by virtue of his smoking habit. There was no mechanism in place whereby such risk could be notified directly to LFRS notwithstanding that Mr Spring had expressly consented to his personal information being shared with them. Such reporting was deferred to Air Liquide. (II) The fact that Mr Spring, as a smoker, was considered to be high risk was confirmed by risk assessments undertaken by representatives of Air Liquide, the Home Oxygen supplier, upon the installation of the Home Oxygen on 27 March 2013 and upon subsequent service visits undertaken on 19 June 2013 and 8 January 2014. (III) Although a mechanism existed for the communication of that increased risk to LFRS by Air Liquide, a facet of their system, designed to prevent duplicate notifications being delivered, operated to prevent notification of his status as a smoker and LFRS were notified only that Mr Spring was a user of Home Oxygen. (IV) Evidence was given at Inquest that LFRS have available, free of charge, a variety of safety equipment for those most at risk of such incidents. Such equipment comprises both smoke and carbon monoxide alarms, flame retardant bedding and portable “misting systems”. (V) The absence of full notification to LFRS meant that the extent of the risk to which Mr Spring was exposed was not identified. As a consequence, he was not assessed by LFRS for the provision of the safety equipment described above. (VI) Whilst a number of Properly Interested Persons have already met to discuss the concerns raised by this death, and whilst Air Liquide have already taken steps to ensure that their internal systems are more robust, there remains a need to put in place more extensive lines of communication between all relevant agencies, to ensure that the heightened risks posed by such patients are drawn to the attention of LFRS at the earliest opportunity. (VII) Evidence was also given at Inquest that the availability of such safety equipment is not well known, and that by increased publicity to the relevant agencies in relation to their availability, there may be a wider distribution of such material with a consequential saving of lives. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Incorporate a process for sharing information with Lincolnshire Fire & Rescue and Air Liquide into Trust policy.

Verbatim wording from the response

“1. ULHT have met with Lincolnshire Fire & Rescue (LF&R) and Air Liquide to agree a process for sharing information. This is described in a new document which has been incorporated into Trust policy (see Attachment A).”

Source location

2015-0123-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 23 March 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Include a documented fire-risk assessment in the standard operating procedure to identify patients at increased risk.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3. As part of our standard operating procedure we have included a documented risk assessment designed by LF&R to identify patients who are at increased risk of fire (see Appendix 1 within the above attachment). The standard operating procedure also outlines a clear and agreed communication process between all parties. This will provide LF&R an opportunity to conduct a home assessment, and install any required safety equipment.”

Source location

2015-0123-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 23 March 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Define an agreed communication process between the relevant parties in the standard operating procedure.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3. As part of our standard operating procedure we have included a documented risk assessment designed by LF&R to identify patients who are at increased risk of fire (see Appendix 1 within the above attachment). The standard operating procedure also outlines a clear and agreed communication process between all parties. This will provide LF&R an opportunity to conduct a home assessment, and install any required safety equipment.”

Source location

2015-0123-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 23 March 2015

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. 1

    Clarify in the standard operating procedure when oxygen should be withdrawn because of unacceptable, unmitigated fire risks.

    Stated by United Lincolnshire Teaching Hospitals NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 March 2015.
  2. 2

    Formalise and implement the discharge process for this patient group across the Trust.

    Stated by United Lincolnshire Teaching Hospitals NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 March 2015.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Clarify in the standard operating procedure when oxygen should be withdrawn because of unacceptable, unmitigated fire risks.

Verbatim wording from the response

“4. There is now increased clarity detailed within the standard operating procedure for when it is appropriate to withdraw oxygen from patients due to unacceptable and unmitigated risks of fire.”

Source location

2015-0123-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 23 March 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Formalise and implement the discharge process for this patient group across the Trust.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2. ULHT have formalised the discharge process for this group of patients. These steps are also detailed in the same document and is now in place across the Trust.”

Source location

2015-0123-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 23 March 2015

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026