PFD report

Alice Poppy Madeleine Gross · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 12 Jul 2016•Inner West London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
9

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
11

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised9

  1. Lack of contingency planning for post-EU management of the watch list and Operation Nexus
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable cross-border information arrangements for the UK watch list and Operation Nexus
  2. Failure to undertake foreign-conviction checks on UK nationals
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to reliably identify foreign convictions
  3. Failure to detain persons with serious convictions at UK borders
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.6

  1. Action

    Encourage EU and international partners to retain serious criminal records for longer periods.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 12 July 2016.
  2. Action

    Promote greater criminality-information sharing within the EU and establish robust criminal-record-sharing arrangements for the UK’s future relationship with the EU.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 12 July 2016.
  3. Action

    Promote daily use of Interpol I-24/7 by UK law-enforcement agencies for foreign criminality searches.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 12 July 2016.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.3

  1. Position

    Decisions on police operational checks rest with individual chief constables, with police and crime commissioners responsible for holding them to account.

    Stated by Home OfficeRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of contingency planning for post-EU management of the watch list and Operation Nexus

Wider context from the report

“(5) That contingency plans are considered as to how to manage the “watch list” and Operation Nexus when and if the UK leaves the EU, both in respect of how systems operate when no longer resting on EU Directives and how to maintain international communication and cooperation. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable cross-border information arrangements for the UK watch list and Operation Nexus.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to undertake foreign-conviction checks on UK nationals

Wider context from the report

“(2) That checks for foreign convictions are not undertaken on UK nationals given the current levels of international travel and the potential relevance for such convictions to the matter for which that person may have been arrested. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably identify foreign convictions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to detain persons with serious convictions at UK borders

Wider context from the report

“(8) That systems of audit are in place that would allow regular checking of whether (i)checks for foreign convictions are being carried out by all UK police forces on arrest; (ii) that "watch and warning lists" are up to date; (iii) and that persons with serious convictions are detained at UK borders and their potential criminal propensity thus appropriately managed. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of audit systems for regular checking of foreign-conviction and border-control processes

Wider context from the report

“(8) That systems of audit are in place that would allow regular checking of whether (i)checks for foreign convictions are being carried out by all UK police forces on arrest; (ii) that "watch and warning lists" are up to date; (iii) and that persons with serious convictions are detained at UK borders and their potential criminal propensity thus appropriately managed. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably identify foreign convictions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deletion of serious convictions from international databases

Wider context from the report

“(4) That the Home Office continues to encourage both EU and non EU countries not to delete serious convictions such as murder from their data bases. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably identify foreign convictions; Unreliable cross-border information arrangements for the UK watch list and Operation Nexus.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of a readily referenced international-border database of serious convictions

Wider context from the report

“(3) That the Home Office continues to encourage both EU and Non EU countries to update the “watch list” such that there is a readily referenced computer database at international borders of matters such as murder convictions. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably identify foreign convictions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to mandate foreign-conviction checks on arrest across all UK police forces

Wider context from the report

“(1) That checks for foreign convictions on arrest are not mandatory in all police forces across the UK. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably identify foreign convictions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Non-automated identification of foreign convictions for non-EU foreign nationals

Wider context from the report

“(7) Whether non- EU foreign nationals need special consideration in respect of how to identify their foreign convictions and thus for the UK to manage their criminal propensity, since I understand from the evidence that their convictions are most likely identified by non-automated Interpol or police to police queries. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably identify foreign convictions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Risk of loss of access to Europol intelligence

Wider context from the report

“(6) That the UK does not lose access to Europol intelligence when and if the UK leaves the EU. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to maintain and share security and offender risk intelligence.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Encourage EU and international partners to retain serious criminal records for longer periods.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As you suggest, the UK continues to encourage EU Member States to commit to longer retention periods of criminal records, particularly where the offence is serious. Likewise, the UK continues to encourage our international partners to consider longer retention periods of criminal records for serious offences, setting out the clear public protection arguments as to why this information is needed. However, these matters are of course ultimately for individual countries to decide.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 4 · response
Published 12 July 2016

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Promote greater criminality-information sharing within the EU and establish robust criminal-record-sharing arrangements for the UK’s future relationship with the EU.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Within the EU the UK has been a leading proponent of greater information exchange between countries for public protection reasons, including at the border, supporting an EU ‘Roadmap’, endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in June this year, which seeks to enhance the sharing and management of criminality information systems. This envisages exchanges of data between the Schengen and non-Schengen countries, which includes the UK.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 3 · response
Published 12 July 2016

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Promote daily use of Interpol I-24/7 by UK law-enforcement agencies for foreign criminality searches.

Verbatim wording from the response

“For non-EU nationals, police forces are increasingly using Interpol I-24/7, a browser-based system, which was made available to the 190 Interpol members in 2002, to search police information across the globe on a 24/7 and 365 days a year basis. Police forces in the UK are able to access information via the secure Police National Network. Usage of the system has rapidly increased in the last few years and work continues with UK law enforcement to promote its use on a daily basis.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 2 · response
Published 12 July 2016

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide UK police with mechanisms to conduct foreign criminal-record checks on arrested foreign nationals through ECRIS and related systems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Since 2010 however, mechanisms have been put in place to allow the police to conduct criminal records checks on all foreign nationals who are arrested in the UK. Since 2012 the European Criminal Record Information System (ECRIS) has provided police forces with access to criminal records information quickly and through an automated system via the ACRO Criminal Records Office (ACRO), which manages criminal records exchange across the European Union for the UK.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 1 · response
Published 12 July 2016

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Operate the Warnings Index and connect UK law-enforcement and border authorities to SISII criminality information.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The UK maintains its own domestic ‘watch list’ known as the Warnings Index and information on that system can and is used to refuse entry to individuals who pose a risk to the UK public. Indeed, over 6,500 individuals from the EU and wider European Economic Area have been refused entry since 2010. Furthermore, the UK’s connection to the EU second generation Schengen Information System (SISII) in April 2015 has enhanced the amount of criminality information which the police and border officers can access. SISII helps to track the movements around Europe of over 10,000 people convicted of sexual or violent offences in the UK as and when they come into contact with law enforcement across the EU, with over 6,000 hits received on these individuals.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 3 · response
Published 12 July 2016

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Promote foreign criminal-record checks in all relevant cases and improve criminality-data quality with police and police and crime commissioners.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Government sees the use of criminality information as an important tool in protecting the public and continues to engage with law enforcement agencies to ensure that this information is used to the fullest. It is, however, ultimately for individual chief constables to decide how their police force should conduct operational matters. Furthermore it is for police and crime commissioners, as the elected persons responsible for police governance under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, to hold their chief constables to account for their performance in combating crime. That is not to say that there is not more that can be done which is why ACRO has worked with police forces and chief constables to promote the importance of conducting checks in all cases.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 2 · response
Published 12 July 2016

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Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Decisions on police operational checks rest with individual chief constables, with police and crime commissioners responsible for holding them to account.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Government sees the use of criminality information as an important tool in protecting the public and continues to engage with law enforcement agencies to ensure that this information is used to the fullest. It is, however, ultimately for individual chief constables to decide how their police force should conduct operational matters. Furthermore it is for police and crime commissioners, as the elected persons responsible for police governance under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, to hold their chief constables to account for their performance in combating crime. That is not to say that there is not more that can be done which is why ACRO has worked with police forces and chief constables to promote the importance of conducting checks in all cases.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 2 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Specific future security and intelligence-sharing arrangements cannot be addressed before negotiations with European partners.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Prime Minister has put the whole machinery of Government behind getting the best deal as the UK leaves the EU. A great deal of work is going on across Government to ensure that happens. The Prime Minister has made clear that whilst we are leaving the EU, cooperation on security with our European and global allies will continue and we will do whatever is necessary to keep our citizens safe. Clearly it would be wrong to be drawn on the specifics of any future arrangements in advance of negotiations with our EU partners.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 4 · response
Published 12 July 2016

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Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Retention periods for serious criminal convictions are ultimately matters for individual countries to decide.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As you suggest, the UK continues to encourage EU Member States to commit to longer retention periods of criminal records, particularly where the offence is serious. Likewise, the UK continues to encourage our international partners to consider longer retention periods of criminal records for serious offences, setting out the clear public protection arguments as to why this information is needed. However, these matters are of course ultimately for individual countries to decide.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 4 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.5

  1. 1

    Strengthen the statutory public-interest basis for deporting non-EU foreign national offenders through the Immigration Act 2014.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 12 July 2016.
  2. 2

    Maintain border-control arrangements that check arriving passengers against watch lists and enable refusal of entry where risks are identified.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 12 July 2016.
  3. 3

    Communicate the coroner’s concerns to the National Police Chiefs’ Council through departmental officials.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 12 July 2016.
  4. 4

    Support ACRO to increase criminal-record information exchanges with non-EU countries.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 12 July 2016.
  5. 5

    Expand international criminal-record information sharing by pursuing agreements and supporting improvements to partner countries’ criminal registers and fingerprint systems.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 12 July 2016.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.2

  1. 1

    Relevant data holders are responsible for ensuring that Warnings Index information remains up to date.

    Stated by Home OfficeRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.
  2. 2

    Each country is responsible for deciding how to operate its own domestic watch-list system.

    Stated by Home OfficeRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Strengthen the statutory public-interest basis for deporting non-EU foreign national offenders through the Immigration Act 2014.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Government took firm action during the last Parliament to ensure that the public interest in seeking to deport non-EU foreign national offenders was clearly set out in statute in the Immigration Act 2014. My Department also continues to actively support ACRO to increase the volume of criminal records information exchanged with non-EU countries. The increase in criminal records sharing agreements signed with other countries since 2010 has helped support a very significant increase in the number of checks made by the police of non-EU nationals in the last four years, from 644 requests for overseas criminal convictions made in 2011 to 44,695 requests in 2015.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 4 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain border-control arrangements that check arriving passengers against watch lists and enable refusal of entry where risks are identified.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(iii) With regard to this last matter, Border Force has arrangements in place to identify criminal, security and immigration concerns. All passengers arriving at UK passport controls have their identity and travel documents checked against ‘watch lists’, and, as I have noted, where it is believed an individual poses a risk, Border Force Officers can, and do, refuse them entry. The Government places the highest priority on ensuring that the law enforcement community has as much information as possible to do their jobs and keep our citizens safe, whether at the border or in-country, and is committed to building on the good progress that has been made in recent years.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 5 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Communicate the coroner’s concerns to the National Police Chiefs’ Council through departmental officials.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In light of your comments I have asked officials to ensure your concerns are communicated to the National Police Chiefs’ Council.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 2 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Support ACRO to increase criminal-record information exchanges with non-EU countries.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Government took firm action during the last Parliament to ensure that the public interest in seeking to deport non-EU foreign national offenders was clearly set out in statute in the Immigration Act 2014. My Department also continues to actively support ACRO to increase the volume of criminal records information exchanged with non-EU countries. The increase in criminal records sharing agreements signed with other countries since 2010 has helped support a very significant increase in the number of checks made by the police of non-EU nationals in the last four years, from 644 requests for overseas criminal convictions made in 2011 to 44,695 requests in 2015.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 4 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Expand international criminal-record information sharing by pursuing agreements and supporting improvements to partner countries’ criminal registers and fingerprint systems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is of course a matter for each country to decide how to operate their own domestic ‘watch list’ systems. However, the UK is actively working to expand information sharing with other partners such as India and our “Five Eyes” partners (the USA, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada), to promote greater criminal records exchange and encourage other countries to do more to update their ‘watch lists’ to further protect the public. This includes pushing for bilateral agreements to underpin the efficient and prompt exchange of information - the UK has signed ten such agreements since 2010 - and supporting countries to improve their criminal register and fingerprint systems, which in turn, enhances the criminality information which can be exchanged with the UK.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 3 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Relevant data holders are responsible for ensuring that Warnings Index information remains up to date.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(ii) The UK’s Warnings Index system is an aggregated database of adverse immigration information, criminality and intelligence data. The responsibility for ensuring the Warnings Index information is up to date rests with the relevant data holders.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 5 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Each country is responsible for deciding how to operate its own domestic watch-list system.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is of course a matter for each country to decide how to operate their own domestic ‘watch list’ systems. However, the UK is actively working to expand information sharing with other partners such as India and our “Five Eyes” partners (the USA, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada), to promote greater criminal records exchange and encourage other countries to do more to update their ‘watch lists’ to further protect the public. This includes pushing for bilateral agreements to underpin the efficient and prompt exchange of information - the UK has signed ten such agreements since 2010 - and supporting countries to improve their criminal register and fingerprint systems, which in turn, enhances the criminality information which can be exchanged with the UK.”

Source location

2016-0488-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 3 · response
Published 12 July 2016

Open published response
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