PFD report

Alexander Rhys Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 24 Oct 2025•Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
3

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
4

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Concerns raised3

  1. Failure to communicate dynamic risk assessments to the control centre during pursuits
  2. Single-manning of pursuit crews requiring one officer to undertake all pursuit tasks
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable police pursuit management and authorisation
  3. Failure to identify vital risk information during pursuits because of competing driving tasks
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.3

  1. Position

    Single-crewed pursuit training and national standards are considered sufficient to prepare officers for live operations and dynamic risk decisions.

    Stated by South Wales PoliceExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to communicate dynamic risk assessments to the control centre during pursuits

Wider context from the report

“During the course of the inquest evidence was heard regarding the circumstances that the pursuit occurred and the events that unfolded. One such instance was that the pursuing police officer did not observe Alex contravening a red light due to having to control his vehicle as well as negotiating the other traffic and he would have had to be looking around to do this, whereas the dashcam fitted to the car that picked up the contravention of the red light continued to point straight ahead. The impact of this was that had he seen it, it may have raised the dynamic risk assessment to high and may have caused him to stand the pursuit down. The pursuing driver also stated that given the driving responsibilities there was no opportunity to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, although he would have been undertaking a dynamic risk assessment throughout. The evidence of the officer in charge of driver training confirmed the evidence of the pursuing officer in that the pursuing officer would have to do a number of things including declaring a pursuit and negotiating the traffic. In his words “...there would be a lot going on in the car...”. He stated that the pursuing officer would be on their own in the car and as such have to undertake all the tasks involved in a pursuit themselves, and acknowledged that it would be safer for the crew to be double manned so the tasks can be shared, although you are then halving the number of TPAC trained units available to assist. I am concerned that in pursuit situations, pursuit officers are required to undertake a significant number of tasks on their own, and the decisions they take as a result of undertaking those tasks can have an impact on their safety, the subject vehicle’s safety as well as the safety of other road users and the general public. 1. There was no opportunity for the pursuing driver to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, to assist the control centre in making a decision to authorise or stand down the pursuit. the control centre indicated that such information would go towards authorising the pursuit as opposed to standing it down in the present case 2. The number of tasks having to be undertaken by the pursuing driver meant that vital information as to the risks involved in continuing the pursuit were missed, in the present case that being a contravention of a red light 3. The officer in charge of driver training confirmed that from a safety perspective, it would be safer to have the crew in a pursuit situation “double manned”. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Single-manning of pursuit crews requiring one officer to undertake all pursuit tasks

Wider context from the report

“During the course of the inquest evidence was heard regarding the circumstances that the pursuit occurred and the events that unfolded. One such instance was that the pursuing police officer did not observe Alex contravening a red light due to having to control his vehicle as well as negotiating the other traffic and he would have had to be looking around to do this, whereas the dashcam fitted to the car that picked up the contravention of the red light continued to point straight ahead. The impact of this was that had he seen it, it may have raised the dynamic risk assessment to high and may have caused him to stand the pursuit down. The pursuing driver also stated that given the driving responsibilities there was no opportunity to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, although he would have been undertaking a dynamic risk assessment throughout. The evidence of the officer in charge of driver training confirmed the evidence of the pursuing officer in that the pursuing officer would have to do a number of things including declaring a pursuit and negotiating the traffic. In his words “...there would be a lot going on in the car...”. He stated that the pursuing officer would be on their own in the car and as such have to undertake all the tasks involved in a pursuit themselves, and acknowledged that it would be safer for the crew to be double manned so the tasks can be shared, although you are then halving the number of TPAC trained units available to assist. I am concerned that in pursuit situations, pursuit officers are required to undertake a significant number of tasks on their own, and the decisions they take as a result of undertaking those tasks can have an impact on their safety, the subject vehicle’s safety as well as the safety of other road users and the general public. 1. There was no opportunity for the pursuing driver to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, to assist the control centre in making a decision to authorise or stand down the pursuit. the control centre indicated that such information would go towards authorising the pursuit as opposed to standing it down in the present case 2. The number of tasks having to be undertaken by the pursuing driver meant that vital information as to the risks involved in continuing the pursuit were missed, in the present case that being a contravention of a red light 3. The officer in charge of driver training confirmed that from a safety perspective, it would be safer to have the crew in a pursuit situation “double manned”. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable police pursuit management and authorisation.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to identify vital risk information during pursuits because of competing driving tasks

Wider context from the report

“During the course of the inquest evidence was heard regarding the circumstances that the pursuit occurred and the events that unfolded. One such instance was that the pursuing police officer did not observe Alex contravening a red light due to having to control his vehicle as well as negotiating the other traffic and he would have had to be looking around to do this, whereas the dashcam fitted to the car that picked up the contravention of the red light continued to point straight ahead. The impact of this was that had he seen it, it may have raised the dynamic risk assessment to high and may have caused him to stand the pursuit down. The pursuing driver also stated that given the driving responsibilities there was no opportunity to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, although he would have been undertaking a dynamic risk assessment throughout. The evidence of the officer in charge of driver training confirmed the evidence of the pursuing officer in that the pursuing officer would have to do a number of things including declaring a pursuit and negotiating the traffic. In his words “...there would be a lot going on in the car...”. He stated that the pursuing officer would be on their own in the car and as such have to undertake all the tasks involved in a pursuit themselves, and acknowledged that it would be safer for the crew to be double manned so the tasks can be shared, although you are then halving the number of TPAC trained units available to assist. I am concerned that in pursuit situations, pursuit officers are required to undertake a significant number of tasks on their own, and the decisions they take as a result of undertaking those tasks can have an impact on their safety, the subject vehicle’s safety as well as the safety of other road users and the general public. 1. There was no opportunity for the pursuing driver to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, to assist the control centre in making a decision to authorise or stand down the pursuit. the control centre indicated that such information would go towards authorising the pursuit as opposed to standing it down in the present case 2. The number of tasks having to be undertaken by the pursuing driver meant that vital information as to the risks involved in continuing the pursuit were missed, in the present case that being a contravention of a red light 3. The officer in charge of driver training confirmed that from a safety perspective, it would be safer to have the crew in a pursuit situation “double manned”. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Single-crewed pursuit training and national standards are considered sufficient to prepare officers for live operations and dynamic risk decisions.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Training and Operational Practice Police pursuit training, as delivered under the College of Policing’s Police Driving National Policing Curriculum (PDNCP) to all national forces, reflects real-world operational conditions. During both Initial Phase Pursuit (IPP) and Tactical Phase Pursuit (TPP) training, officers operate single-crewed, even when accompanied by an instructor, so that they replicate day-to-day working practices. This approach ensures officers are fully prepared for the responsibilities they will assume in live operations. While single-crewed, officers are trained to:”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 1 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Default double-crewing for pursuits cannot be adopted because available resources would reduce specialist roads-policing coverage across the wider network.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Resourcing and Operational Realities Adopting a default position of double-crewing vehicles for pursuits would significantly reduce South Wales Police’s ability to maintain specialist roads policing coverage across the wider network. Our challenge is to fully address the concerns raised in the Reg 28 notice while safeguarding our statutory duty to serve the broader South Wales community and manage wider risk. When setting crewing models, we must strike a balance between operational effectiveness and resource availability. To sustain a strong capability for pursuits and TPAC tactics across the road network, single crewing remains the most practical option given the number of vehicles and trained officers required. This approach enables us to respond effectively to both planned and spontaneous incidents while maintaining public safety and operational resilience.”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 2 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Chief Constables are responsible for operational crewing decisions and deployment of available police resources, based on local problems and demands.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Crewing Decisions on crewing are operational matters and at the discretion and judgement of Chief Constables who determine how to deploy available resources to deal with issues for which the force is responsible, considering specific local problems and demands.”

Source location

Response from Minister of State for Policing and Crime
Page 3 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.4

  1. 1

    Continue focusing on pursuit-related continuous improvement following the independent investigation.

    Stated by South Wales PoliceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 28 October 2025.
  2. 2

    Conduct post-pursuit reviews with driving trainers and operational teams, examining tactics and circumstances and embedding learning.

    Stated by South Wales PoliceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 28 October 2025.
  3. 3

    Continually assess resources to maintain roads-policing capability and capacity across the area.

    Stated by South Wales PoliceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 28 October 2025.
  4. 4

    Amend the Road Traffic Act 1988 to apply a trained-constable standard when assessing designated police drivers.

    Stated by Home OfficeStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 28 October 2025.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.2

  1. 1

    Local authorities are responsible for assessing junction visibility and deciding the extent of yellow-line protection.

    Stated by Department for TransportRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.
  2. 2

    The Welsh Government is responsible for matters concerning traffic signing because traffic signing is devolved.

    Stated by Department for TransportRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue focusing on pursuit-related continuous improvement following the independent investigation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Post-Pursuit Review and Continuous Learning South Wales Police have robust post-pursuit review processes, bringing together the Driving Training Unit (DTU) and operational teams to examine tactics and circumstances and embed learning. This ensures continuous improvement and reinforces our commitment to public safety and officer professionalism. In addition, following the Independent Office for Police Conduct investigation into Mr Lewis’ death, the investigation was not subject to special procedures, however we will continue to focus on continuous improvement in relation to pursuits as highlighted above.”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 2 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Conduct post-pursuit reviews with driving trainers and operational teams, examining tactics and circumstances and embedding learning.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Post-Pursuit Review and Continuous Learning South Wales Police have robust post-pursuit review processes, bringing together the Driving Training Unit (DTU) and operational teams to examine tactics and circumstances and embed learning. This ensures continuous improvement and reinforces our commitment to public safety and officer professionalism. In addition, following the Independent Office for Police Conduct investigation into Mr Lewis’ death, the investigation was not subject to special procedures, however we will continue to focus on continuous improvement in relation to pursuits as highlighted above.”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 2 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continually assess resources to maintain roads-policing capability and capacity across the area.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As a force, we continually assess resources to ensure capability and capacity are maintained across the area. We are confident in the national training both initial and refresher undertaken by our officers, which equips them to carry out Dynamic Risk Assessments and make informed decisions, including standing down when risk outweighs benefit. We fully support officers in exercising this professional judgment.”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 2 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Amend the Road Traffic Act 1988 to apply a trained-constable standard when assessing designated police drivers.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This Act amended the Road Traffic Act 1988 to require that an assessment of whether a constable or other ‘designated person’ has driven carelessly or dangerously compares their standard of driving against that of a competent and careful constable who has undertaken the same prescribed training, rather than with a member of the public, as was the case previously.”

Source location

Response from Minister of State for Policing and Crime
Page 1 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Local authorities are responsible for assessing junction visibility and deciding the extent of yellow-line protection.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Ultimately, it is for the local authority to assess that the visibility of the junction is sufficient and to determine how much they want to protect with yellow lines.”

Source location

Response from Department of Transport
Page 1 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The Welsh Government is responsible for matters concerning traffic signing because traffic signing is devolved.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As you may be aware, traffic signing is now devolved and would be a matter for the Welsh Government.”

Source location

Response from Department of Transport
Page 1 · response
Published 28 October 2025

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026