PFD report

Brian Mitchell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 29 Dec 2025•East London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
3

Named on the report

Responses found
3

Of 3 recipients

Stated actions
23

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Lack of clear data demonstrating improved expedition and clarity of station staff communication in emergencies
  2. Lack of clear evidence that risks of fatal harm have been mitigated
  3. Lack of clear data demonstrating improved train-operator concentration and track observation during ATO operation
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.8

  1. Action

    Audit the effectiveness of in-service train-operator competence assessments.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  2. Action

    Remove the remote Stratford platform bench associated with the incident.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  3. Action

    Trial CCTV and sensor-based technology across three services to detect track access, falls between trains and platforms, and train-door entrapment.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 January 2026.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.5

  1. Position

    London Underground is responsible for operational safety, accountable to Transport for London and ultimately the Mayor of London.

    Stated by Department for TransportRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of clear data demonstrating improved expedition and clarity of station staff communication in emergencies

Wider context from the report

“4. No clear data is available to demonstrate that station staff training has improved expedition or clarity of communication in emergency circumstances. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of clear evidence that risks of fatal harm have been mitigated

Wider context from the report

“1. In the two years that have elapsed since Brian’s death investigations have been conducted by the British Transport Police, The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (“RAIB”) and TFL into the circumstances that led to this incident. There is no clear evidence to demonstrate that risks of fatal harm have been mitigated. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of clear data demonstrating improved train-operator concentration and track observation during ATO operation

Wider context from the report

“3. No clear data is available to demonstrate that training provided to train operators (drivers) to ensure that they concentrate and look at the tracks before them whilst operating trains using ATO has resulted in positive improvement in performance. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to implement technological measures detecting and alerting staff to persons on the tracks at Stratford station

Wider context from the report

“2. Recommended technological measures to detect and alert staff to the presence of persons on the tracks have not been implemented at Stratford station. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Audit the effectiveness of in-service train-operator competence assessments.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Our Operational Training and Skills Development Team have completed a review of in-service competence assessments of train operators over the last 12 months. This has provided us with evidence that train operators are observing both the PTI and the track when they are berthing in platforms. As a result of this review, we have identified further improvements relating to how these assessments are recorded and by the end of April 2026, we will provide further advice and guidance to our internal competence assessors. This will strengthen the focus on PTI and track observations during train operator competence assessments. Monitoring of assessments will continue as part of our business-as-usual processes and a more detailed audit on the effectiveness of the approach we are taking on in-service competence assessments will be completed by September 2026.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 8 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Remove the remote Stratford platform bench associated with the incident.

Verbatim wording from the response

“While recognising the benefits of providing seating for customers in our stations, we are finalising plans to remove the specific bench on which Mr Mitchell sat from this location, given that it is a location which is not regularly frequented by customers and there are other benches on the platform, which are less remote from passage of other customers and staff. We have started plans to remove the bench and this will be completed by 6th March. These steps will hopefully mitigate the risk of a similar incident happening at Stratford station.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 3 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Trial CCTV and sensor-based technology across three services to detect track access, falls between trains and platforms, and train-door entrapment.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We shared information on TfL’s PTI New Technology Programme in TfL’s witness evidence for the inquest. We are actively trialling technology to allow us to detect someone in the track environment - whether they fall unintentionally or access the track deliberately. I have set out an update on the PTI new technology trials below.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 6 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement an evaluation framework measuring safety-critical communication learning and workplace transfer for train operators and station staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We undertake routine monitoring of safety critical communications which includes recordings of safety critical communications used during day-to-day activities as well as during incident scenarios. We monitor the communications from both routine and incident situations to make sure that the appropriate communications protocols are used during both.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 9 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Update security rules and training to require frontline track checks when items near the track are declared non-suspicious.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We have also updated our security rules for station colleagues and train operators to help them identify whether lost property is suspicious or not. Our rules now require our front-line teams to visually check the track for unauthorised persons (once an item has been declared non-suspicious) when items are discovered near the track (including platforms and overbridges). This also includes appropriate checking when a train is berthed in a platform. All stations, trains and service control colleagues had been fully briefed on these rules by 12 May 2025 and the Rule Book and associated training updated in line with the change. The change has also been incorporated into training for new station colleagues and train operators.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 3 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Increase station visual checks and formalize the changes in operational safety rules and training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We have taken clear action so that, should a similar incident occur, our station staff and train operators are more likely to identify unattended property and potentially the length of time a customer may be waiting on a platform. This includes changes to our operational procedures and staff training, which are detailed below.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 2 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Update train-operator training to improve concentration and observation of the platform-train interface and track when berthing.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3. No ©Hear data is available to demonstrate that training provided to train operators (drivers) to ensure that they concentrate and look at the tracks before them whilst operating trains using ATO has resulted in positive improvement in performance”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 8 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide competence assessors with further guidance strengthening assessment of platform-train interface and track observations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Our Operational Training and Skills Development Team have completed a review of in-service competence assessments of train operators over the last 12 months. This has provided us with evidence that train operators are observing both the PTI and the track when they are berthing in platforms. As a result of this review, we have identified further improvements relating to how these assessments are recorded and by the end of April 2026, we will provide further advice and guidance to our internal competence assessors. This will strengthen the focus on PTI and track observations during train operator competence assessments. Monitoring of assessments will continue as part of our business-as-usual processes and a more detailed audit on the effectiveness of the approach we are taking on in-service competence assessments will be completed by September 2026.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 8 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

London Underground is responsible for operational safety, accountable to Transport for London and ultimately the Mayor of London.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Any death on the transport network is a tragedy, and I express my sincere condolences to Mr Mitchell’s family for their loss. Whilst a likely contributory factor to Brian’s death was alcohol intoxication, the fact that three separate train operators failed to notice him on the tracks is extremely serious and lessons must be learnt. Relevant transport operators need to ensure that they have systems in place to protect staff, travellers and the wider public, in line with their duties under the Health and Safety at Work Act (etc.) 1974. London Underground Ltd, as the safety duty holder in this case, is wholly responsible for the operational safety of the London Underground network. It is accountable for this to Transport for London and, ultimately, to the Mayor of London.”

Source location

Response from Department for Transport
Page 1 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Station staff competence data and routine communications monitoring indicate strong understanding and use of core safety-critical communication requirements.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We undertake routine monitoring of safety critical communications which includes recordings of safety critical communications used during day-to-day activities as well as during incident scenarios. We monitor the communications from both routine and incident situations to make sure that the appropriate communications protocols are used during both.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 9 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Incidents are not location-specific; falls on track can occur anywhere on the network, so Stratford does not present a uniquely identifiable risk profile.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As well as the measures identified above, since the inquest, we have reflected on the controls in place at Stratford station. We have reviewed incidents of falls on track at terminus platforms (such as platform 13 at Stratford station). This has not identified any location specific trends in relation to incidents of this nature. This is reflective of the analysis we have also undertaken at all platforms (e.g. terminus and non-terminus platforms). Incidents by platform are low level and can occur anywhere on the LU network without platform edge doors.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 6 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Technology to detect track incidents is not yet readily available or sufficiently accurate and reliable for immediate implementation at Stratford station.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We recognised at the time that the mitigations needed to further reduce this risk are not readily available to the rail industry. We consider that technology has a role to play in, for example, detecting someone on the track which would allow us to take action to stop train movements. We have set out details below on the action we have taken, and our plans, in our response to the Senior Coroner’s second area of concern.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 3 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Because accidental falls are infrequent, the absolute impact of train-operator training cannot be quantified; effectiveness is assessed through competence reviews instead.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Following this tragic incident at Stratford station, we recognised the need to improve training for train operators. During 2024, we updated our training and started delivering this training in November 2024. It takes a year to completely refresh and train our existing 3500 train operators, and delivery of this training was completed in December 2025. New train operators are also receiving this as part of their training.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 8 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.15

  1. 1

    Ensure that relevant lessons are disseminated to the wider railway industry through the Office of Rail and Road.

    Stated by Department for TransportStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  2. 2

    Integrate learning from the vulnerability framework trial into London Underground safety procedures and brief operational colleagues on the framework.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  3. 3

    Brief operational colleagues on the vulnerability framework and update operational rules to reflect required responses.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  4. 4

    Develop new safeguarding and vulnerability training and make it required learning for key operational colleagues.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  5. 5

    Evaluate the vulnerable-customer station trial and integrate its learning and best practice into training.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  6. 6

    Reroute emergency Passenger Help Point calls from identified stations to a London Underground control centre when station colleagues cannot respond promptly.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  7. 7

    Continue engaging national and international transport operators to share trial insights and incorporate emerging best practice.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  8. 8

    Install track-person detection technology at DLR Custom House station to alert controllers and support protective responses.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  9. 9

    Implement a customer-safeguarding communications and culture plan defining frontline responsibilities for identifying and responding to vulnerability.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  10. 10

    Establish the Vulnerable Customers Programme and assess safeguarding risks across TfL transport modes using wider research and emergency-service learning.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  11. 11

    Trial the adapted ABCDE vulnerability assessment framework across 21 London Underground stations.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  12. 12

    Install updated Passenger Help Point signage across London Underground stations.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  13. 13

    Conduct a further trial of two-hourly scheduled station checks throughout the traffic day.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  14. 14

    Trial enhanced station checks, CCTV monitoring and Travel Support Enforcement Officer patrols to reduce harm to vulnerable customers.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 January 2026.
  15. 15

    Expand safeguarding recognition schemes to recognise staff supporting customers experiencing mental-health crises, intoxication or other vulnerability.

    Stated by Greater London Authority and Transport for LondonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 January 2026.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Ensure that relevant lessons are disseminated to the wider railway industry through the Office of Rail and Road.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We will ensure through ORR that lessons are disseminated to the wider railway industry, to the extent to which it's relevant.”

Source location

Response from Department for Transport
Page 1 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Integrate learning from the vulnerability framework trial into London Underground safety procedures and brief operational colleagues on the framework.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In October 2025 we started trialling this framework across 21 LU stations (a mix of inner-city, suburban, gateway and outlying locations) to understand the effectiveness of this approach, and we plan to integrate what we learn from this trial into LU’s safety procedures by 31 March 2026. Feedback on the framework has been positive and it builds effectively on our existing suicide prevention procedures. We will commence briefings and training for operational colleagues on the framework from April 2026.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 4 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Brief operational colleagues on the vulnerability framework and update operational rules to reflect required responses.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As outlined in workstream 1 above, we have adapted the ABCDE vulnerability assessment framework used by the emergency services. Our staff training content and briefing/communications materials were updated to reflect this at the end of December 2025. Our next steps are to brief operational colleagues (approximately 11,000 individuals) on this between 31 January to 1 October 2026 and update our operational rules by October 2026. Briefing our operational colleagues on the changes needs to take place before the rules are updated to ensure that they are aware of the actions to be taken.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 5 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop new safeguarding and vulnerability training and make it required learning for key operational colleagues.

Verbatim wording from the response

“▪ Workstream 3: Creating new training content using the outcomes of Workstream 2, updating our processes and procedures We are in the process of developing new safeguarding and vulnerability training which will be completed by the end of March 2026. This will then become required learning for key operational colleagues. This will go live by the end of April 2026. It takes a year to train our operational colleagues in line with their training cycle so this will be complete by April 2027.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 5 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Evaluate the vulnerable-customer station trial and integrate its learning and best practice into training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This trial began in October 2025 and will run until the end of February 2026 with an evaluation of impact and next steps to be completed by March 2026. Any learnings and best practice will be integrated into our training. A full assessment of this trial will be produced in March 2026 once it is completed. An initial review for November 2025 (the first full trial month) suggests that the scheduled checks by station colleagues provided a marginal increase in detecting vulnerable people. Most vulnerable people within the 22:00 and 02:00 time frame were successfully identified by station colleagues outside of the scheduled checks. This suggests that briefing station colleagues on the new framework to encourage best practice and building a culture of vigilance and proactive response generally through training would be effective.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 6 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Reroute emergency Passenger Help Point calls from identified stations to a London Underground control centre when station colleagues cannot respond promptly.

Verbatim wording from the response

“▪ Workstream 4: Updating our PHP signage and rerouting calls to one of LU’s Control Centres We put new signage in place on all PHPs at all LU stations (completed 31 December 2025). Now, apart from a very small number of help points on our network where we were not able to change the call routing system due to the age and complexity of the communications equipment associated with these PHPs, all emergency calls by customers will be rerouted from all identified stations to one of our control centres if station colleagues are unable to respond to them in time. This will allow our control centres to respond quickly in the event of a customer using the PHP to raise a safety concern.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 5 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue engaging national and international transport operators to share trial insights and incorporate emerging best practice.

Verbatim wording from the response

“To inform the development of our trials, we conducted research into PTI technology solutions across 10 metros, including Singapore, Sydney and Delhi. We met remotely with these transport operators to understand the range of solutions that have been tested both across the UK and internationally, and to capture lessons learnt. As our own trials progress, we will continue to engage with our national and international counterparts to share insights and ensure we incorporate emerging best practice and learning into our approach.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 7 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Install track-person detection technology at DLR Custom House station to alert controllers and support protective responses.

Verbatim wording from the response

“A small number of other railway operators around the world are using technology to identify people on the track. Most of these operators are managing smaller metro systems, in environments with fewer customers and using new digital cameras. Some have deployed it in a site-specific way, rather than across the network. TfL has done similarly - in response to a serious incident on the DLR, we installed technology at DLR Custom House station which is identifying people in the track area and allowing the control team to respond quickly to protect that person as far as possible.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 7 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement a customer-safeguarding communications and culture plan defining frontline responsibilities for identifying and responding to vulnerability.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Workstream 2: Clearly defining vulnerability for our frontline teams and how we want them to respond to vulnerable customers”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 4 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Establish the Vulnerable Customers Programme and assess safeguarding risks across TfL transport modes using wider research and emergency-service learning.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As a result, we recognised the need for a systemic, organisation-wide approach to safeguarding vulnerable customers, with a greater focus on intoxication and mental health crisis, to ensure that those who are temporarily vulnerable can travel safely. We have made clear commitments to reducing the risk of vulnerable customers coming to harm through improvement in staff awareness, competency training and updating operating procedures.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 4 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Trial the adapted ABCDE vulnerability assessment framework across 21 London Underground stations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In August 2025, we completed a comprehensive assessment of current safeguarding risks and mitigations across all TfL’s public transport modes. This included analysis of data and insight from research and benchmarking to help prioritise interventions by time/place/setting. Based on that work, and discussions with London’s emergency services to understand their approach, we have adapted the ABCDE vulnerability assessment framework (the framework used by the emergency services in the UK) for use on the LU network.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 4 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Install updated Passenger Help Point signage across London Underground stations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“▪ Workstream 4: Updating our PHP signage and rerouting calls to one of LU’s Control Centres We put new signage in place on all PHPs at all LU stations (completed 31 December 2025). Now, apart from a very small number of help points on our network where we were not able to change the call routing system due to the age and complexity of the communications equipment associated with these PHPs, all emergency calls by customers will be rerouted from all identified stations to one of our control centres if station colleagues are unable to respond to them in time. This will allow our control centres to respond quickly in the event of a customer using the PHP to raise a safety concern.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 5 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Conduct a further trial of two-hourly scheduled station checks throughout the traffic day.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Travel Support Enforcement Officers reported supporting numerous customers during on-train patrols during the trial, and the benefits of this approach will be reviewed further. A further trial assessing the benefit of 2-hourly scheduled checks throughout the traffic day is planned to begin in March 2026.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 6 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Trial enhanced station checks, CCTV monitoring and Travel Support Enforcement Officer patrols to reduce harm to vulnerable customers.

Verbatim wording from the response

“▪ Workstream 5: Trials ©DiLU stations with Customer Operations and SPE teams working together and assessing the impact of Workstreams 1-4, and from that make recommendations about new ways of working to keep vulnerable customers safe In October 2025 we started a trial on 20 LU stations on the east end of the Central line to assess the feasibility and potential impact of additional interventions to reduce the risk of customers coming to harm when intoxicated or vulnerable for other reasons, building on the foundational response of awareness raising and training. This includes:”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 5 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Expand safeguarding recognition schemes to recognise staff supporting customers experiencing mental-health crises, intoxication or other vulnerability.

Verbatim wording from the response

“o Developing a plan for colleague communications to raise awareness of customer safeguarding and the role of operational customer-facing staff in supporting vulnerable customers and raising awareness of the support available for staff who have been involved in managing stressful and traumatic situations. o Expanding our TfL Safeguarding Award recognition scheme and police commendations to recognise staff actions in supporting customers who are in mental health crisis or at risk of harm due to intoxication or other vulnerability.”

Source location

Response from TfL and Mayor of London
Page 5 · response
Published 5 January 2026

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026