PFD report

Matthew Joseph O’Reilly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 23 May 2025•Manchester West

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
9

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised9

  1. Online availability of instructions for administering lethal poisons
  2. Online availability of information on sourcing lethal poisons and medicines
  3. Lack of specific seller guidance and training for one-off online marketplace purchases for self-harm
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to ensure substance vendors recognise suicide and self-harm misuse risksPart of recurring concern: Inadequate controls on the sale and online access to highly toxic substances
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements

No respondent-stated action or position is clearly linked to these concerns.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Online availability of instructions for administering lethal poisons

Wider context from the report

“3. The police investigation revealed the ability of members of the public to access a number of websites, primarily created in the USA, Canada and Mexico that promoted information as to how to access: a. Poisons that could bring about death b. How, in what way and with other necessary preparations (in particular -antiemetic medications) the poisons should be administered. c. Sourcing such poisons/chemicals/medicines in the UK and abroad. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Online availability of information on sourcing lethal poisons and medicines

Wider context from the report

“3. The police investigation revealed the ability of members of the public to access a number of websites, primarily created in the USA, Canada and Mexico that promoted information as to how to access: a. Poisons that could bring about death b. How, in what way and with other necessary preparations (in particular -antiemetic medications) the poisons should be administered. c. Sourcing such poisons/chemicals/medicines in the UK and abroad. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of specific seller guidance and training for one-off online marketplace purchases for self-harm

Wider context from the report

“1. ████████ is a reportable poison as well as a reportable explosives precursor within the terms, meaning and effect of Part 4 of Schedule 1A of the Poisons Act 1972 with the consequence that: a. The Poisons Act 1972 sets out the legal obligations in relation to the sale, purchase, and use of these chemicals for suppliers, professional users and members of the public. b. The published Guidance (commenced in 2014 and updated in August 2024) does not give specific guidance or suggested training for sellers, particularly ████████ acquired by members of the public, particularly over ‘online marketplaces’ in circumstances of the purchase on a ‘one off’ basis for the means of self-harm. c. Whilst there is a legal duty on persons selling this substance to report “suspicious” transactions within 24 hours to the Home Office, the purchase of small quantities is being presumed to be connected to the many legitimate uses of the substance (such as food preservation, fertilizer etc) rather than in fact, being evaluated as a member of the public seeking purchase of modest quantities used as their chosen means by which to end life. d. The current Home Office guidance and supporting video, leaflet and posters do not reference ████████ as a specific example of concern and focuses on the phenomenon of ‘malicious’ misuse and not deliberate misuse in the sense of suicide/self-harm. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure substance vendors recognise suicide and self-harm misuse risks; Inadequate controls on the sale and online access to highly toxic substances.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to evaluate small-quantity purchases for possible self-harm

Wider context from the report

“1. ████████ is a reportable poison as well as a reportable explosives precursor within the terms, meaning and effect of Part 4 of Schedule 1A of the Poisons Act 1972 with the consequence that: a. The Poisons Act 1972 sets out the legal obligations in relation to the sale, purchase, and use of these chemicals for suppliers, professional users and members of the public. b. The published Guidance (commenced in 2014 and updated in August 2024) does not give specific guidance or suggested training for sellers, particularly ████████ acquired by members of the public, particularly over ‘online marketplaces’ in circumstances of the purchase on a ‘one off’ basis for the means of self-harm. c. Whilst there is a legal duty on persons selling this substance to report “suspicious” transactions within 24 hours to the Home Office, the purchase of small quantities is being presumed to be connected to the many legitimate uses of the substance (such as food preservation, fertilizer etc) rather than in fact, being evaluated as a member of the public seeking purchase of modest quantities used as their chosen means by which to end life. d. The current Home Office guidance and supporting video, leaflet and posters do not reference ████████ as a specific example of concern and focuses on the phenomenon of ‘malicious’ misuse and not deliberate misuse in the sense of suicide/self-harm. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate control of access to means of self-harm; Uncontrolled promotion and supply of substances for suicide.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to correctly evaluate small-quantity purchase patterns

Wider context from the report

“2. The police investigation into one UK based source of supply revealed in 247 cases separate supplies of 500 grams of less of ████████ to customers in the UK and Europe, police established that 85 of these individuals who were traceable had either died as the consequence of self-ingestion of the substance, or had purchased it with a view to having the means to use this method to end their life in circumstances where: a. the vendors of ████████ were not aware of this potential misuse of the substance. b. the small quantities being purchased had been incorrectly evaluated to be an increase in individuals pursuing recreational home-curing/food preservations as a hobby, being an artefact of ‘lockdown’ living following the COVID national pandemic emergency. c. Vendors were unaware that their website/details were being distributed as part of internet information platforms designed to aid, abet, assist or promote suicide methods. d. From the specific example of 247 supplies in a 12 month period, police established that 45 purchasers were confirmed as deceased (these deaths were in relation to supplies to UK customers and purchasers from abroad) and only 15 purchases were confirmed to have taken place for legitimate purposes (meat curing etc.). ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate controls on the sale and online access to highly toxic substances.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Online availability of information on accessing lethal poisons

Wider context from the report

“3. The police investigation revealed the ability of members of the public to access a number of websites, primarily created in the USA, Canada and Mexico that promoted information as to how to access: a. Poisons that could bring about death b. How, in what way and with other necessary preparations (in particular -antiemetic medications) the poisons should be administered. c. Sourcing such poisons/chemicals/medicines in the UK and abroad. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of vendor awareness of potential self-harm misuse

Wider context from the report

“2. The police investigation into one UK based source of supply revealed in 247 cases separate supplies of 500 grams of less of ████████ to customers in the UK and Europe, police established that 85 of these individuals who were traceable had either died as the consequence of self-ingestion of the substance, or had purchased it with a view to having the means to use this method to end their life in circumstances where: a. the vendors of ████████ were not aware of this potential misuse of the substance. b. the small quantities being purchased had been incorrectly evaluated to be an increase in individuals pursuing recreational home-curing/food preservations as a hobby, being an artefact of ‘lockdown’ living following the COVID national pandemic emergency. c. Vendors were unaware that their website/details were being distributed as part of internet information platforms designed to aid, abet, assist or promote suicide methods. d. From the specific example of 247 supplies in a 12 month period, police established that 45 purchasers were confirmed as deceased (these deaths were in relation to supplies to UK customers and purchasers from abroad) and only 15 purchases were confirmed to have taken place for legitimate purposes (meat curing etc.). ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure substance vendors recognise suicide and self-harm misuse risks.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of Home Office guidance materials to address deliberate suicide and self-harm misuse

Wider context from the report

“1. ████████ is a reportable poison as well as a reportable explosives precursor within the terms, meaning and effect of Part 4 of Schedule 1A of the Poisons Act 1972 with the consequence that: a. The Poisons Act 1972 sets out the legal obligations in relation to the sale, purchase, and use of these chemicals for suppliers, professional users and members of the public. b. The published Guidance (commenced in 2014 and updated in August 2024) does not give specific guidance or suggested training for sellers, particularly ████████ acquired by members of the public, particularly over ‘online marketplaces’ in circumstances of the purchase on a ‘one off’ basis for the means of self-harm. c. Whilst there is a legal duty on persons selling this substance to report “suspicious” transactions within 24 hours to the Home Office, the purchase of small quantities is being presumed to be connected to the many legitimate uses of the substance (such as food preservation, fertilizer etc) rather than in fact, being evaluated as a member of the public seeking purchase of modest quantities used as their chosen means by which to end life. d. The current Home Office guidance and supporting video, leaflet and posters do not reference ████████ as a specific example of concern and focuses on the phenomenon of ‘malicious’ misuse and not deliberate misuse in the sense of suicide/self-harm. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of vendor awareness of website distribution on suicide-promotion platforms

Wider context from the report

“2. The police investigation into one UK based source of supply revealed in 247 cases separate supplies of 500 grams of less of ████████ to customers in the UK and Europe, police established that 85 of these individuals who were traceable had either died as the consequence of self-ingestion of the substance, or had purchased it with a view to having the means to use this method to end their life in circumstances where: a. the vendors of ████████ were not aware of this potential misuse of the substance. b. the small quantities being purchased had been incorrectly evaluated to be an increase in individuals pursuing recreational home-curing/food preservations as a hobby, being an artefact of ‘lockdown’ living following the COVID national pandemic emergency. c. Vendors were unaware that their website/details were being distributed as part of internet information platforms designed to aid, abet, assist or promote suicide methods. d. From the specific example of 247 supplies in a 12 month period, police established that 45 purchasers were confirmed as deceased (these deaths were in relation to supplies to UK customers and purchasers from abroad) and only 15 purchases were confirmed to have taken place for legitimate purposes (meat curing etc.). ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure substance vendors recognise suicide and self-harm misuse risks.

Open source report
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026