PFD report

Kyron Marcus HIBBERT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 27 Feb 2023•Bedfordshire and Luton

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
4

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

Open published report

Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Failure to manage known water-entry locations and rope-swing access hazards
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate controls for drowning risks at open-water locations
  2. Lack of information about varying and sudden changes in water depth
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate controls for drowning risks at open-water locationsPart of recurring concern: Inadequate warnings about location-specific hazards at public waterside locations
  3. Insufficient surveillance of lake areas and visitor hazards
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate surveillance of swimmers and water users
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. Action

    Issue warm-weather warnings about lake access dangers to local schools for dissemination to pupils.

    Stated by Forest of Marston Vale TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 10 March 2023.
  2. Action

    Install additional unlocked throw lines and accompanying safety signage near the high-water mark at Locations 5 and 7 and other previously affected locations.

    Stated by Forest of Marston Vale TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 10 March 2023.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.5

  1. Position

    The Trust considers its existing risk assessment and safety arrangements suitable and sufficient to address drowning risks.

    Stated by Forest of Marston Vale TrustExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to manage known water-entry locations and rope-swing access hazards

Wider context from the report

“At the Inquest hearing, The Forest of Marston Vale Trust ('the Trust') stated that since Kryon's death they had taken no further action to address the risks of children drowning at Stewartby Lakes. However, it was clear from the evidence provided that: (1) The specific location where the incident occurred was well known to local children; the Head Ranger also admitted that this location, known as 'Location 5' along with 'Location 7' was known as an area where people would/could enter the water (albeit that there were signs at both locations indicating that swimming was prohibited. Furthermore, during the recent heatwave, (albeit this was not known to the Trust) local children had been regularly going to Location 5 and using a rope swing they knew to be located there ████████. (2) On Friday 29 July 2022, children had been present at the location using the rope swing since at least 20pm and yet their presence and/or the presence of the rope was not discovered ████████ - whilst Rangers do check all areas of the park, including Stewartby Lake this is only incidental to their other duties on any given day and checks are not increased around the lake during hot weather (Head Ranger's evidence); (3) At the location where the incident occurred, there are varying depths of water but (other than the general 'No Swimming' Safety Boards) there was no indication of these relative depths provided to visitors. Investigating police observed that there is a ledge of the lake that was waist height on the children (this was seen the video footage taken by the children on the day of the incident) and that this shallow ledge drops away suddenly into deep water which is believed to be 13 metres deep. It was believed that Kyron had fallen beyond the edge of the shallow area. (4) At the time of the incident, safety/life-saving equipment at the location of the incident was limited to a Safety Board consisting of a throwline in a locked box which required a code from Emergency Services (necessitating a 99 call) to release it. The Head Ranger explained that the previous life safety rings (costing approx. £40.00 each) had not been replaced once the locked throw lines had been installed. The locked throw line was not accessible to the children; although, they had seen the Safety Board as they had approached Location 5 and noted that there was some kind of float inside it, when they had gone to access it when Kyron went into the water they couldn't get the code as their phone battery had died. They reported that the box (Safety Board) "felt very far away from where we were down at the water" ████████. Although since the Inquest, the Trust have indicated that in addition to the locked throw lines on the Safety Boards, traditional safety lines are also to be installed again at Locations 5 and 7; I am concerned that these are to be placed next to the Safety Boards rather than closer to the lakeside. Whilst prompt access to further life-saving equipment may not have altered the outcome in this incident, it might in future incidents. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate controls for drowning risks at open-water locations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of information about varying and sudden changes in water depth

Wider context from the report

“At the Inquest hearing, The Forest of Marston Vale Trust ('the Trust') stated that since Kryon's death they had taken no further action to address the risks of children drowning at Stewartby Lakes. However, it was clear from the evidence provided that: (1) The specific location where the incident occurred was well known to local children; the Head Ranger also admitted that this location, known as 'Location 5' along with 'Location 7' was known as an area where people would/could enter the water (albeit that there were signs at both locations indicating that swimming was prohibited. Furthermore, during the recent heatwave, (albeit this was not known to the Trust) local children had been regularly going to Location 5 and using a rope swing they knew to be located there ████████. (2) On Friday 29 July 2022, children had been present at the location using the rope swing since at least 20pm and yet their presence and/or the presence of the rope was not discovered ████████ - whilst Rangers do check all areas of the park, including Stewartby Lake this is only incidental to their other duties on any given day and checks are not increased around the lake during hot weather (Head Ranger's evidence); (3) At the location where the incident occurred, there are varying depths of water but (other than the general 'No Swimming' Safety Boards) there was no indication of these relative depths provided to visitors. Investigating police observed that there is a ledge of the lake that was waist height on the children (this was seen the video footage taken by the children on the day of the incident) and that this shallow ledge drops away suddenly into deep water which is believed to be 13 metres deep. It was believed that Kyron had fallen beyond the edge of the shallow area. (4) At the time of the incident, safety/life-saving equipment at the location of the incident was limited to a Safety Board consisting of a throwline in a locked box which required a code from Emergency Services (necessitating a 99 call) to release it. The Head Ranger explained that the previous life safety rings (costing approx. £40.00 each) had not been replaced once the locked throw lines had been installed. The locked throw line was not accessible to the children; although, they had seen the Safety Board as they had approached Location 5 and noted that there was some kind of float inside it, when they had gone to access it when Kyron went into the water they couldn't get the code as their phone battery had died. They reported that the box (Safety Board) "felt very far away from where we were down at the water" ████████. Although since the Inquest, the Trust have indicated that in addition to the locked throw lines on the Safety Boards, traditional safety lines are also to be installed again at Locations 5 and 7; I am concerned that these are to be placed next to the Safety Boards rather than closer to the lakeside. Whilst prompt access to further life-saving equipment may not have altered the outcome in this incident, it might in future incidents. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate controls for drowning risks at open-water locations; Inadequate warnings about location-specific hazards at public waterside locations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Insufficient surveillance of lake areas and visitor hazards

Wider context from the report

“At the Inquest hearing, The Forest of Marston Vale Trust ('the Trust') stated that since Kryon's death they had taken no further action to address the risks of children drowning at Stewartby Lakes. However, it was clear from the evidence provided that: (1) The specific location where the incident occurred was well known to local children; the Head Ranger also admitted that this location, known as 'Location 5' along with 'Location 7' was known as an area where people would/could enter the water (albeit that there were signs at both locations indicating that swimming was prohibited. Furthermore, during the recent heatwave, (albeit this was not known to the Trust) local children had been regularly going to Location 5 and using a rope swing they knew to be located there ████████. (2) On Friday 29 July 2022, children had been present at the location using the rope swing since at least 20pm and yet their presence and/or the presence of the rope was not discovered ████████ - whilst Rangers do check all areas of the park, including Stewartby Lake this is only incidental to their other duties on any given day and checks are not increased around the lake during hot weather (Head Ranger's evidence); (3) At the location where the incident occurred, there are varying depths of water but (other than the general 'No Swimming' Safety Boards) there was no indication of these relative depths provided to visitors. Investigating police observed that there is a ledge of the lake that was waist height on the children (this was seen the video footage taken by the children on the day of the incident) and that this shallow ledge drops away suddenly into deep water which is believed to be 13 metres deep. It was believed that Kyron had fallen beyond the edge of the shallow area. (4) At the time of the incident, safety/life-saving equipment at the location of the incident was limited to a Safety Board consisting of a throwline in a locked box which required a code from Emergency Services (necessitating a 99 call) to release it. The Head Ranger explained that the previous life safety rings (costing approx. £40.00 each) had not been replaced once the locked throw lines had been installed. The locked throw line was not accessible to the children; although, they had seen the Safety Board as they had approached Location 5 and noted that there was some kind of float inside it, when they had gone to access it when Kyron went into the water they couldn't get the code as their phone battery had died. They reported that the box (Safety Board) "felt very far away from where we were down at the water" ████████. Although since the Inquest, the Trust have indicated that in addition to the locked throw lines on the Safety Boards, traditional safety lines are also to be installed again at Locations 5 and 7; I am concerned that these are to be placed next to the Safety Boards rather than closer to the lakeside. Whilst prompt access to further life-saving equipment may not have altered the outcome in this incident, it might in future incidents. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate surveillance of swimmers and water users.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of promptly accessible lifesaving equipment at the lakeside

Wider context from the report

“At the Inquest hearing, The Forest of Marston Vale Trust ('the Trust') stated that since Kryon's death they had taken no further action to address the risks of children drowning at Stewartby Lakes. However, it was clear from the evidence provided that: (1) The specific location where the incident occurred was well known to local children; the Head Ranger also admitted that this location, known as 'Location 5' along with 'Location 7' was known as an area where people would/could enter the water (albeit that there were signs at both locations indicating that swimming was prohibited. Furthermore, during the recent heatwave, (albeit this was not known to the Trust) local children had been regularly going to Location 5 and using a rope swing they knew to be located there ████████. (2) On Friday 29 July 2022, children had been present at the location using the rope swing since at least 20pm and yet their presence and/or the presence of the rope was not discovered ████████ - whilst Rangers do check all areas of the park, including Stewartby Lake this is only incidental to their other duties on any given day and checks are not increased around the lake during hot weather (Head Ranger's evidence); (3) At the location where the incident occurred, there are varying depths of water but (other than the general 'No Swimming' Safety Boards) there was no indication of these relative depths provided to visitors. Investigating police observed that there is a ledge of the lake that was waist height on the children (this was seen the video footage taken by the children on the day of the incident) and that this shallow ledge drops away suddenly into deep water which is believed to be 13 metres deep. It was believed that Kyron had fallen beyond the edge of the shallow area. (4) At the time of the incident, safety/life-saving equipment at the location of the incident was limited to a Safety Board consisting of a throwline in a locked box which required a code from Emergency Services (necessitating a 99 call) to release it. The Head Ranger explained that the previous life safety rings (costing approx. £40.00 each) had not been replaced once the locked throw lines had been installed. The locked throw line was not accessible to the children; although, they had seen the Safety Board as they had approached Location 5 and noted that there was some kind of float inside it, when they had gone to access it when Kyron went into the water they couldn't get the code as their phone battery had died. They reported that the box (Safety Board) "felt very far away from where we were down at the water" ████████. Although since the Inquest, the Trust have indicated that in addition to the locked throw lines on the Safety Boards, traditional safety lines are also to be installed again at Locations 5 and 7; I am concerned that these are to be placed next to the Safety Boards rather than closer to the lakeside. Whilst prompt access to further life-saving equipment may not have altered the outcome in this incident, it might in future incidents. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate public water-rescue equipment and arrangements; Inadequate water rescue provision for recreational water activities.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Issue warm-weather warnings about lake access dangers to local schools for dissemination to pupils.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As well as installing the new throw lines and signage referred to above , the Trust has resolved to issue messages to local schools in periods of warm weather warning of the dangers of accessing the lake, and encouraging them to share this information with their pupils. This will supplement information already provided by the Trust via social media.”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 4 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Install additional unlocked throw lines and accompanying safety signage near the high-water mark at Locations 5 and 7 and other previously affected locations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Whilst it is not accepted the secure throw lines were “very far away” from the water , in order to deal with HM Senior Coroner’s concern on this issue the Trust will install additional unlocked lines closer to the high water mark of the lake at locations 5 and 7 , and at the other points around the lake and closer to the edge of the lake in locations where there have been previous incidents of swimming.”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 3 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The Trust considers its existing risk assessment and safety arrangements suitable and sufficient to address drowning risks.

Verbatim wording from the response

““The Trust had a duty under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999 to review its risk assessment and safety arrangements in the light of Kyron’s death. The Trust carried out this review and its conclusion was that the risk assessment in place at the time of the incident met the legal duty under Regulation 3 in that it was both suitable and sufficient. Having reviewed matters the Trust decided to continue with the roll out of the new safety boards around the lake after Kyron’s death. “”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 1 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The Trust disputes that locked throwlines were inaccessible, stating that children could obtain the access code through emergency services.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Head Ranger’s evidence at inquest was that locked throw lines in a number of locations had replaced unlocked throw lines, not life rings. There were therefore a combination of locked and unlocked throw lines around the lake at the time of this incident. The design of the locked throw lines was arrived at following consultation with Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue and reflects that used by the local authority in the Bedford area. The locked line was accessible to the children if one of them had followed the instructions on the signage to obtain the access code from the emergency operator. The written evidence on the issue was that one of the children had no battery power in her phone. It is highly likely others had mobile phones that were working.”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 3 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The lake’s size, topography and restricted sight lines make routine visual checks impracticable and ineffective.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The sheer size ,topography and restricted sight lines render routine visual checks impracticable and ineffective.”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 2 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing no-swimming and hidden-hazard signage is considered preferable to signs identifying individual deep-water areas.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Trust has not seen the video footage referred to but is aware of this issue at very many points around the lake . This is one of several reasons why entering the water is forbidden . The risk of “Hidden Hazards” is specifically identified on safety signage around the lake. As indicated in our written submission the Trust’s view is that placing signs in the very many deep water areas will create the impression that those areas that not signage are somehow safe for swimming.”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 2 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The Trust considers that changing lifesaving-equipment positioning would not have altered the fatal outcome in this case.

Verbatim wording from the response

“All at the Trust was devastated by Kyron’s death and it will go above and beyond its legal duty to try and avoid a similar incident. That said the Trust believes the evidence in this case sadly confirmed the positioning or availability of life saving equipment would not have altered the fatal outcome of this case.”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 4 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. 1

    Review the lake risk assessment and safety arrangements following the death.

    Stated by Forest of Marston Vale TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 March 2023.
  2. 2

    Continue rolling out new safety boards around the lake.

    Stated by Forest of Marston Vale TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 10 March 2023.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review the lake risk assessment and safety arrangements following the death.

Verbatim wording from the response

““The Trust had a duty under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999 to review its risk assessment and safety arrangements in the light of Kyron’s death. The Trust carried out this review and its conclusion was that the risk assessment in place at the time of the incident met the legal duty under Regulation 3 in that it was both suitable and sufficient. Having reviewed matters the Trust decided to continue with the roll out of the new safety boards around the lake after Kyron’s death. “”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 1 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue rolling out new safety boards around the lake.

Verbatim wording from the response

““The Trust had a duty under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999 to review its risk assessment and safety arrangements in the light of Kyron’s death. The Trust carried out this review and its conclusion was that the risk assessment in place at the time of the incident met the legal duty under Regulation 3 in that it was both suitable and sufficient. Having reviewed matters the Trust decided to continue with the roll out of the new safety boards around the lake after Kyron’s death. “”

Source location

Response from DAC Beachcroft
Page 1 · response
Published 10 March 2023

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026