PFD report

Patrick Stephen Moran · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 5 Jan 2018•Inner North London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
0

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised3

  1. Failure to use insulin-specific syringes when drawing up and administering insulin
    Part of recurring concern: Unsafe medication administration
  2. Lack of a process to review continued compliance with CAS alerts
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to verify compliance and effectiveness of implemented safety changes
  3. Lack of mandatory training for doctors on insulin-specific devices
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements

No respondent-stated action or position is clearly linked to these concerns.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to use insulin-specific syringes when drawing up and administering insulin

Wider context from the report

“(1) During the procedure under local anaesthetic on 25 July 2017 Mr Moran continued to bleed due to the unknown existence of the rupture at that time. He developed hyperkalaemia and was administered an insulin-dextrose infusion. He was to be infused 10 units (0.1ml) on insulin but was mistakenly infused with 100 units (1ml). The serious incident investigation identified that the ST4 Anaesthetist did not use an insulin syringe but instead used a normal 1ml syringe. The use of this syringe was common practice within the anaesthetic department in spite of the issue of alert NPSA/2010/RRR013. (2) Since 2010 diabetes was removed from the mandatory training requirements across the organisation. As a result there is currently no mandatory training provided to doctors within the Trust to advise them of use of insulin specific devices when drawing up and administering insulin. It is apparent from the action plan that emails have been sent to Consultant Anaesthetists in this regard. (3) There is currently no process across the organisation to review continued compliance with CAS alerts and ensure that changes made across the Trust still reflect the requirements of previously issued alerts. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unsafe medication administration.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of a process to review continued compliance with CAS alerts

Wider context from the report

“(1) During the procedure under local anaesthetic on 25 July 2017 Mr Moran continued to bleed due to the unknown existence of the rupture at that time. He developed hyperkalaemia and was administered an insulin-dextrose infusion. He was to be infused 10 units (0.1ml) on insulin but was mistakenly infused with 100 units (1ml). The serious incident investigation identified that the ST4 Anaesthetist did not use an insulin syringe but instead used a normal 1ml syringe. The use of this syringe was common practice within the anaesthetic department in spite of the issue of alert NPSA/2010/RRR013. (2) Since 2010 diabetes was removed from the mandatory training requirements across the organisation. As a result there is currently no mandatory training provided to doctors within the Trust to advise them of use of insulin specific devices when drawing up and administering insulin. It is apparent from the action plan that emails have been sent to Consultant Anaesthetists in this regard. (3) There is currently no process across the organisation to review continued compliance with CAS alerts and ensure that changes made across the Trust still reflect the requirements of previously issued alerts. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to verify compliance and effectiveness of implemented safety changes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of mandatory training for doctors on insulin-specific devices

Wider context from the report

“(1) During the procedure under local anaesthetic on 25 July 2017 Mr Moran continued to bleed due to the unknown existence of the rupture at that time. He developed hyperkalaemia and was administered an insulin-dextrose infusion. He was to be infused 10 units (0.1ml) on insulin but was mistakenly infused with 100 units (1ml). The serious incident investigation identified that the ST4 Anaesthetist did not use an insulin syringe but instead used a normal 1ml syringe. The use of this syringe was common practice within the anaesthetic department in spite of the issue of alert NPSA/2010/RRR013. (2) Since 2010 diabetes was removed from the mandatory training requirements across the organisation. As a result there is currently no mandatory training provided to doctors within the Trust to advise them of use of insulin specific devices when drawing up and administering insulin. It is apparent from the action plan that emails have been sent to Consultant Anaesthetists in this regard. (3) There is currently no process across the organisation to review continued compliance with CAS alerts and ensure that changes made across the Trust still reflect the requirements of previously issued alerts. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
0/1

Data last updated 7 September 2026

No official response is included in the current published snapshot.