Report evidence summary
Concerns raised 12 Limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code to high-speed passenger craft View source Lack of proper protection for passengers and crew from impact and vibration hazards View source Non-uniform risk management for high-speed rides View source Confusing and inconsistent requirements and guidance for small-craft operators View source Insufficient crewing for lookout and skipper workload control View source Delays in revising codes of practice for high-speed craft View source Loss of situational awareness during RIB operations View source Inadequate seating and collision-impact mitigation in RIBs View source Inadequate forward visibility from passenger-carrying RIBs View source Failure to ensure timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations View source Unavailability of AIS capability for monitoring RIB operations View source Excessive piloting workload during high-speed RIB operations View source See 9 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised. 26
Action
Create and maintain the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice as a safety standard for the sector.
Stated by RYA Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Release a revised edition of the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice after the final MCA Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code is available.
Stated by RYA Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Assess each model’s field of vision in accordance with ISO 11591.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Test Red Bay vessel seating and handholds for collision loads and applicable safety standards to inform safer designs.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Complete an external naval-architect audit of all Red Bay-built vessels, including technical documentation, calculations and stability tests.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Commission new seating designs informed by testing results and retest them for safety.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Decline commissions for thrill-seeking passenger RIBs and thrill-seeking market vessels.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Commission and complete an anthropometric assessment of safety requirements for small high-speed passenger craft, including seating, handholds and restraints.
Stated by Maritime and Coastguard Agency Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Advance legislation and an updated Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code through consultation and Parliamentary processes.
Stated by Maritime and Coastguard Agency Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Commission an anthropometric assessment of safety requirements for small high-speed passenger craft, including seating, restraints, impacts and whole-body vibration.
Stated by Department for Transport Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Advance replacement legislation and an updated Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code through consultation and Parliamentary processes.
Stated by Department for Transport Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Publish the draft Statutory Instrument and draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code for public consultation.
Stated by Department for Transport Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Conduct the 12-week public consultation on the draft Statutory Instrument and Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code.
Stated by Department for Transport Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Propose including small-commercial-craft guidance in the Port Marine Safety Code guidance review and place the proposal on the working group agenda.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Participate in the Port Marine Safety Code guidance review and contribute to developing guidance for small commercial craft operating in harbour areas.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Bring the investigation report, issues and recommendations to the Port Marine Safety Code steering group and contribute to discussions on incorporating learning into revised guidance.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Continue engaging with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Marine Accident Investigation Branch on certification, operation and enforcement of coded craft and passenger vessels in statutory harbour areas.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Refer the Report to the relevant technical committee for consideration.
Stated by British Standards Institution Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Produce, publish and revise the HSPV code to address evolving high-speed passenger vessel safety concerns.
Stated by British Marine Federation Limited Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Require relevant member operators to use the HSPV code through the Marine constitution.
Stated by British Marine Federation Limited Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Disseminate current safety guidance to members through Marine Talk articles and direct emails.
Stated by British Marine Federation Limited Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Ensure industry awareness of new guidance, including MGN 436, through industry-association activity.
Stated by British Marine Federation Limited Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Issue a general direction supporting the AIS requirement after the harbour revision order application concludes.
Stated by Associated British Ports Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Implement a register requiring commercial vessel operators in the Southampton statutory harbour area to provide vessel details.
Stated by Associated British Ports Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Amend the high-speed vessel collision risk assessment and introduce a separate assessment for vessels over 20 metres.
Stated by Associated British Ports Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source
Action
Require operational AIS transponders on commercial vessels operating in the Southampton statutory harbour area, subject to exemptions.
Stated by Associated British Ports Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source See 23 more actions Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action. 24
Position
Operational standards for small commercial vessels fall to the MCA or, in some circumstances, the relevant port or local authority.
Stated by RYA Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
Temporary safety measures are not feasible because they could confuse operators before the finalised Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code.
Stated by RYA Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
AIS is not a suitable blanket requirement or substitute for appropriate training and safety management systems.
Stated by RYA Disputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it. View source
Position
Revising the voluntary code before the MCA legislation is finalised could create conflicts, gaps and confusion, so revision is delayed.
Stated by RYA Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
Setting and enforcing operational standards for small commercial vessels is outside the authority of the respondent.
Stated by RYA Outside remitThe respondent said that this matter was outside its role or authority. View source
Position
Retrospective safety changes for existing craft are considered unworkable and unviable, with likely unintended consequences.
Stated by RYA Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
The MCA Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code should not apply blanket requirements to all small commercial vessels operating in categorised waters.
Stated by RYA Disputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it. View source
Position
Passenger RIB commissions will not be accepted until the Marine and Coastguard Agency updates its regulations for this area.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
Interim measures to manage high-speed RIB experience-ride risks cannot be implemented before the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code takes effect.
Stated by Maritime and Coastguard Agency Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
Interim measures for high-speed RIB experience ride risks cannot be implemented before the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code comes into effect.
Stated by Department for Transport Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is responsible for publishing guidance as the appropriate regulatory and enforcement body.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
Responsibility for the technical content and revision of the standard rests with the relevant technical committee, not the organisation.
Stated by British Standards Institution Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
Regulatory advice about forward visibility and craft safety falls outside the organisation’s role as a non-regulatory standards body.
Stated by British Standards Institution Outside remitThe respondent said that this matter was outside its role or authority. View source
Position
Developing guidance or interpreting requirements falls outside the trade associations’ role and authority.
Stated by UK Major Ports Group Outside remitThe respondent said that this matter was outside its role or authority. View source
Position
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency must own the guidance and lead the responsive work.
Stated by UK Major Ports Group Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
The Association is not insured to set safety-critical guidelines or provide safety advice itself, but can promote and amplify guidance.
Stated by British Ports Association Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
The MCA is considered the suitable body to prepare the safety guidance, which should be government-written and owned.
Stated by British Ports Association Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
Guidance expectations should not be placed on individual harbour authorities because approaches are inconsistent across different areas.
Stated by British Ports Association Disputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it. View source
Position
Licensing authorities and operators should determine AIS carriage requirements through operational and navigational risk assessments.
Stated by British Marine Federation Limited Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
Licensing and port authorities must establish and implement licensing arrangements, including any HSPV licensing requirement.
Stated by British Marine Federation Limited Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
Generally monitoring AIS tracks and intervening is impractical because it requires dedicated resources and may not materially improve harbour safety.
Stated by Associated British Ports Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action. View source
Position
Changes to regulation of high-speed experience-ride RIBs should be implemented nationally by the MCA, rather than locally.
Stated by Associated British Ports Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action. View source
Position
The assertion that ABP had not assessed high-speed commercial passenger craft risks before the incident is incorrect.
Stated by Associated British Ports Disputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it. View source
Position
Separate risk assessments for commercial and non-commercial high-speed vessels are unnecessary because their navigational risks are substantially the same.
Stated by Associated British Ports Existing arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed. View source See 23 more positions
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code to high-speed passenger craft
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of proper protection for passengers and crew from impact and vibration hazards
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Non-uniform risk management for high-speed rides
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides .
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Confusing and inconsistent requirements and guidance for small-craft operators
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient crewing for lookout and skipper workload control
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Delays in revising codes of practice for high-speed craft
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back : the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond . The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Loss of situational awareness during RIB operations
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate seating and collision-impact mitigation in RIBs
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions , noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate forward visibility from passenger-carrying RIBs
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to ensure timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Unavailability of AIS capability for monitoring RIB operations
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS) . There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Excessive piloting workload during high-speed RIB operations
Wider context from the report “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides.
In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.”
My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved
” Is this part of a recurring concern? No recurring-concern membership is currently published.
Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Create and maintain the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice as a safety standard for the sector.
Verbatim wording from the response “That said, the RYA has always had a primary focus on safety and for that reason we take a proactive approach to influencing change where we can, either through behaviour of the boating public and commercial operators, or through work with organisations such as the MAIB and MCA, and others. This can be seen for example in our creation of the “Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice” 15 years ago, now in its 3rd edition.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Release a revised edition of the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice after the final MCA Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code is available.
Verbatim wording from the response “f) The RYA fully supports the timely implementation of MAIB recommendations. We achieve this ourselves by maintaining a close working relationship with the MAIB and, where possible, by being involved in the recommendations consultation process. I note that the current MAIB recommendation for a review by the RYA of the existing “Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice” has been delayed due to the need to await the outcome of the MCA legislation for this sector of the industry. We felt, and the MAIB agreed, that releasing an amended version of the Voluntary Code of Practice at this point, where there was real risk of it either conflicting with or leaving unintended gaps, ran the risk of creating confusion within the sector and potentially undermining the “revised “Sport and Pleasure Code”, which we anticipate will address the majority of these issues.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Assess each model’s field of vision in accordance with ISO 11591.
Verbatim wording from the response “g. Field of Vision Compliance:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Test Red Bay vessel seating and handholds for collision loads and applicable safety standards to inform safer designs.
Verbatim wording from the response “c. Seating and Handhold Testing:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete an external naval-architect audit of all Red Bay-built vessels, including technical documentation, calculations and stability tests.
Verbatim wording from the response “b. External Naval Architect Audit:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Commission new seating designs informed by testing results and retest them for safety.
Verbatim wording from the response “i. A testing company has been commissioned to assess the designs of the seating and handholds on Red Bay vessels. The loads on the pod seats will be tested to determine their endurance in the event of a collision. Test results are expected by the end of February 2025. These results will help set load factor and stress conditions on future vessels, influencing the design of new seating, which will be commissioned by the end of May 2025 and re-tested thereafter.” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Decline commissions for thrill-seeking passenger RIBs and thrill-seeking market vessels.
Verbatim wording from the response “e. Commissioning of Passenger RIBs:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Commission and complete an anthropometric assessment of safety requirements for small high-speed passenger craft, including seating, handholds and restraints.
Verbatim wording from the response “Furthermore, the MCA has begun the procurement process to commission an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety and the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact. This will require, among other things; assessment of the full anthropometric range of passengers and crew, the operational profile of the vessels, including the range of speeds, as well as crash protection and general protection of the seating arrangements including the design and use of handholds and restraints” Source location Response from Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Advance legislation and an updated Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code through consultation and Parliamentary processes.
Verbatim wording from the response “Staff at MCA have prioritised work to replace the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280(M) (Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards). We are focussing on bringing forward new legislation and an updated Code of Practice for Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure (the “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code”) as soon as practical, in line with the required consultation and Parliamentary processes.” Source location Response from Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Commission an anthropometric assessment of safety requirements for small high-speed passenger craft, including seating, restraints, impacts and whole-body vibration.
Verbatim wording from the response “In response to the MAIB recommendations raised, I have tasked the MCA to begin the procurement process to commission an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety and the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact.” Source location Response from Department for Transport
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Advance replacement legislation and an updated Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code through consultation and Parliamentary processes.
Verbatim wording from the response “I would like to take this opportunity to reassure you that the work currently being undertaken by the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) to replace the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280(M) (Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) is a priority of mine and we are working hard to bring forward new legislation and an updated Code of Practice for Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure (the “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code”) as soon as practicable, in line with the required consultation and Parliamentary processes.” Source location Response from Department for Transport
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Publish the draft Statutory Instrument and draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code for public consultation.
Verbatim wording from the response “To this end, a draft new Statutory Instrument and draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code was published for a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect.” Source location Response from Department for Transport
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Conduct the 12-week public consultation on the draft Statutory Instrument and Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code.
Verbatim wording from the response “To this end, a draft new Statutory Instrument and draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code was published for a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect.” Source location Response from Department for Transport
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Propose including small-commercial-craft guidance in the Port Marine Safety Code guidance review and place the proposal on the working group agenda.
Verbatim wording from the response “20. The UKHMA’s formal response to recommendation 2023/14 was sent to the MAIB on 12th January 2024 and was as follows, “The UK Harbour Masters’ Association (UKHMA) will propose to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) that guidance regarding small commercial craft operating within harbour areas is developed as part of the review of the Port Marine Safety Code Guide to Good Practice (GTGP). UKHMA are participating in the current review of the GTGP and will contribute to the development of such guidance, which will be published by the MCA as the appropriate regulatory and enforcement body.”” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Participate in the Port Marine Safety Code guidance review and contribute to developing guidance for small commercial craft operating in harbour areas.
Verbatim wording from the response “20. The UKHMA’s formal response to recommendation 2023/14 was sent to the MAIB on 12th January 2024 and was as follows, “The UK Harbour Masters’ Association (UKHMA) will propose to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) that guidance regarding small commercial craft operating within harbour areas is developed as part of the review of the Port Marine Safety Code Guide to Good Practice (GTGP). UKHMA are participating in the current review of the GTGP and will contribute to the development of such guidance, which will be published by the MCA as the appropriate regulatory and enforcement body.”” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Bring the investigation report, issues and recommendations to the Port Marine Safety Code steering group and contribute to discussions on incorporating learning into revised guidance.
Verbatim wording from the response “23. The MAIB report, and the issues and recommendations arising from it, were brought to the PMSC steering group where the UKHMA contributed to discussions around how the learnings could be considered for inclusion in the new edition of the PMSC and the GTGP.” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue engaging with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Marine Accident Investigation Branch on certification, operation and enforcement of coded craft and passenger vessels in statutory harbour areas.
Verbatim wording from the response “24. There has also continued to be engagement by UKHMA with the MAIB and MCA regarding the certification, operation and enforcement of MCA Coded craft and passenger vessels within SHAs.” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Refer the Report to the relevant technical committee for consideration.
Verbatim wording from the response “8. In order to assist the Coroner, BSI has referred the Report to GME/33. The committee has explained:” Source location Response from British Standards Institution
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Produce, publish and revise the HSPV code to address evolving high-speed passenger vessel safety concerns.
Verbatim wording from the response “We as an industry association take the safety of all the activities carried out by the industry and our members as a primary concern. This is why prior to the Seadogz accident, in 2010 as part of an industry collaboration, and on the evidence outlined by previous MAIB reports, we helped produce and publish the HSPV code which was made available to industry. Due to further concerns and developments in the type of craft used and activities being carried out this was further revised and republished in 2019. As stated in the MAIB report, one contributing factor to this tragic accident is that the operator was found not to be implementing either the HSPV code or the PCA’s (not British Marine affiliated) code of conduct.” Source location Response from British Marine
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Require relevant member operators to use the HSPV code through the Marine constitution.
Verbatim wording from the response “Further to the development of the HSPV code we made the use of the code a requirement of our membership for any operator carrying out his type of activity, this has been done through our Marine constitution.” Source location Response from British Marine
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Disseminate current safety guidance to members through Marine Talk articles and direct emails.
Verbatim wording from the response “We are now expecting the new Sport and pleasure code to come into legislation later this year. We have taken interim measures by reminding our members of all the current available guidance through our Marine Talk articles. We have also sent direct emails to the appropriate members as well as mandated our members to use the HSPV code.” Source location Response from British Marine
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Ensure industry awareness of new guidance, including MGN 436, through industry-association activity.
Verbatim wording from the response “As an industry association we aim to implement all MAIB recommendations that we have been given as quickly as possible and have acted on each MAIB report, either helping produce guidance (and revising said guidance where necessary) such as the HSPV code or ensuring that industry is aware of new guidance such as MGN 436.” Source location Response from British Marine
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Issue a general direction supporting the AIS requirement after the harbour revision order application concludes.
Verbatim wording from the response “ABP supports the use of AIS transponders by all commercial vessels and has taken steps to promote their use by vessels operating in the Southampton SHA through issuing the NtMs, which require all commercial vessels operating in the Southampton SHA to have an operational AIS transponder fitted unless they have been granted an exemption.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Implement a register requiring commercial vessel operators in the Southampton statutory harbour area to provide vessel details.
Verbatim wording from the response “In addition, ABP, in consultation with the MAIB, issued notice to mariners no.52 of 2024, which has been reissued as no. 22 of 2025 (the “NtMs”) to implement a register of commercial vessel operators in the Southampton SHA.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Amend the high-speed vessel collision risk assessment and introduce a separate assessment for vessels over 20 metres.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following a review of the risk assessments in place after the SEADOGZ incident, we amended SOT – 133-4 to specifically apply to vessels of less than twenty metres in length and introduced a new risk assessment, SOT – 153-3, which applies to vessels greater than twenty metres in length.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Require operational AIS transponders on commercial vessels operating in the Southampton statutory harbour area, subject to exemptions.
Verbatim wording from the response “- have issued a notice to mariners stating that AIS transponders are required for all vessels being used commercially in the Southampton SHA from 1 January 2025.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Operational standards for small commercial vessels fall to the MCA or, in some circumstances, the relevant port or local authority.
Verbatim wording from the response “Whilst the RYA has the authority to determine the standards for its courses and for the conditions under which RYA Recognised Training Centres operate, it does not have the authority to determine or enforce standards for operations within the small commercial vessel sector (and indeed the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector). This responsibility falls of course to the MCA as the UK maritime regulator, or in some circumstances to the relevant port or local authority.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Temporary safety measures are not feasible because they could confuse operators before the finalised Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code.
Verbatim wording from the response “b) The RYA notes that a draft “Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code” was recently released for consultation, and it is our understanding that the finalised version of the code will follow in 2025. Whilst there is certainly benefit in promoting safety and key messages within the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector (direct to the operators of those craft) in the interim, we do not believe it is feasible to develop and implement temporary measures without the risk of causing confusion for operators.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation AIS is not a suitable blanket requirement or substitute for appropriate training and safety management systems.
Verbatim wording from the response “e) Technology such as AIS is likely to increase the visibility of commercial vessels and may allow vessel tracks to be analysed more clearly after an incident, however while remote oversight may have some deterrent effect, the RYA questions the benefit of such technology for proactive monitoring on the basis that few harbour authorities will have the resource to proactively monitor all movements of Small Commercial High Speed Passenger vessels, while identifying speed and course may not allow an informed decision to be made merely as to the safety implication of that behaviour in respect of a particular vessel, or enable intervention unless the vessel is operating in breach of legislation. Accordingly, the RYA does not believe that the use of technology is a substitute for appropriate training and safety management systems.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Revising the voluntary code before the MCA legislation is finalised could create conflicts, gaps and confusion, so revision is delayed.
Verbatim wording from the response “f) The RYA fully supports the timely implementation of MAIB recommendations. We achieve this ourselves by maintaining a close working relationship with the MAIB and, where possible, by being involved in the recommendations consultation process. I note that the current MAIB recommendation for a review by the RYA of the existing “Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice” has been delayed due to the need to await the outcome of the MCA legislation for this sector of the industry. We felt, and the MAIB agreed, that releasing an amended version of the Voluntary Code of Practice at this point, where there was real risk of it either conflicting with or leaving unintended gaps, ran the risk of creating confusion within the sector and potentially undermining the “revised “Sport and Pleasure Code”, which we anticipate will address the majority of these issues.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Setting and enforcing operational standards for small commercial vessels is outside the authority of the respondent.
Verbatim wording from the response “Whilst the RYA has the authority to determine the standards for its courses and for the conditions under which RYA Recognised Training Centres operate, it does not have the authority to determine or enforce standards for operations within the small commercial vessel sector (and indeed the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector). This responsibility falls of course to the MCA as the UK maritime regulator, or in some circumstances to the relevant port or local authority.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Retrospective safety changes for existing craft are considered unworkable and unviable, with likely unintended consequences.
Verbatim wording from the response “c) The RYA would support a revision to the ISO Standard. However, this should not be seen as a solution for existing craft. Retrospective steps for existing craft would undoubtedly be unworkable, unviable and are likely to have unintended consequences. Operators of existing craft should instead be educated to have safety management systems, conduct appropriate risk assessments and take the necessary steps to mitigate against any identified risks.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The MCA Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code should not apply blanket requirements to all small commercial vessels operating in categorised waters.
Verbatim wording from the response “Accordingly, the RYA believes there is an opportunity to review the position and either align the requirements of various harbour or local authorities in their treatment of commercial craft, or for the MCA to consider the issue on a national basis, however the RYA does not believe that it would be appropriate for the MCA’s “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code” which is currently out for public consultation, to be applied on a blanket basis to all small commercial vessels only used within categorised waters. The RYA recommends that any uniform standard must be proportionate and take into account the nature of vessels and risk profile of operating within categorised waters.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Passenger RIB commissions will not be accepted until the Marine and Coastguard Agency updates its regulations for this area.
Verbatim wording from the response “e. Commissioning of Passenger RIBs:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Interim measures to manage high-speed RIB experience-ride risks cannot be implemented before the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code takes effect.
Verbatim wording from the response “is currently at the midpoint of a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted however, that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect.” Source location Response from Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Interim measures for high-speed RIB experience ride risks cannot be implemented before the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code comes into effect.
Verbatim wording from the response “To this end, a draft new Statutory Instrument and draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code was published for a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect.” Source location Response from Department for Transport
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is responsible for publishing guidance as the appropriate regulatory and enforcement body.
Verbatim wording from the response “20. The UKHMA’s formal response to recommendation 2023/14 was sent to the MAIB on 12th January 2024 and was as follows, “The UK Harbour Masters’ Association (UKHMA) will propose to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) that guidance regarding small commercial craft operating within harbour areas is developed as part of the review of the Port Marine Safety Code Guide to Good Practice (GTGP). UKHMA are participating in the current review of the GTGP and will contribute to the development of such guidance, which will be published by the MCA as the appropriate regulatory and enforcement body.”” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Responsibility for the technical content and revision of the standard rests with the relevant technical committee, not the organisation.
Verbatim wording from the response “5. Each individual standard is the responsibility of one technical committee. It is the committee who is responsible for the technical content of the standard, not BSI. In this case the relevant standard (BS EN ISO 11591) is an international standard, developed by an international committee managed by the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) to which BSI contributes through a local (British) ‘mirror committee’. Such mirror committees consist primarily of experts who are independent of BSI, and who are often nominated by trade associations, professional bodies, research/scientific institutions, government or other entities. They have an independent chair and BSI provides a committee manager and other support including an editorial project manager for national standards.” Source location Response from British Standards Institution
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Regulatory advice about forward visibility and craft safety falls outside the organisation’s role as a non-regulatory standards body.
Verbatim wording from the response “3. BSI’s role as the National Standards Body is to facilitate expert committees to achieve consensus on industry standards and best practice and to act as the publisher of standards.” Source location Response from British Standards Institution
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Developing guidance or interpreting requirements falls outside the trade associations’ role and authority.
Verbatim wording from the response “UKMPG and the British Ports Association are trade associations who support their members to interface with government and respond on behalf of the sector to emerging policy. We are not a regulator of our members and we do not feel it is for our organisations to clarify requirements or develop guidance to be followed. As an organisation we do champion the sharing of information and best practice to members, but that does not extend to developing guidance or interpretation of requirements.” Source location Response from UK Major Ports Group
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The Maritime and Coastguard Agency must own the guidance and lead the responsive work.
Verbatim wording from the response “We will support any guidance and actions suggested, but this must be led by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) with input from industry associations. We are, of course, wholly ready to work in conjunction with industry partners and government, on the basis that the MCA own the guidance and lead on this work.” Source location Response from UK Major Ports Group
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The Association is not insured to set safety-critical guidelines or provide safety advice itself, but can promote and amplify guidance.
Verbatim wording from the response “• That the BPA was not insured to set safety critical guidelines or give advice itself but could instead assist by promoting and amplifying guidance and would look forward to being constructively engaged;” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The MCA is considered the suitable body to prepare the safety guidance, which should be government-written and owned.
Verbatim wording from the response “• That in general terms the BPA was not opposed to guidance and confirmed that it can participate in the process of developing a common resource. The BPA’s view was that it is clear that there is not a consistent approach across all areas and so the focus and/or expectations should not be on any individual harbour authority;” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Guidance expectations should not be placed on individual harbour authorities because approaches are inconsistent across different areas.
Verbatim wording from the response “• That in general terms the BPA was not opposed to guidance and confirmed that it can participate in the process of developing a common resource. The BPA’s view was that it is clear that there is not a consistent approach across all areas and so the focus and/or expectations should not be on any individual harbour authority;” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Licensing authorities and operators should determine AIS carriage requirements through operational and navigational risk assessments.
Verbatim wording from the response “Some port authorities are starting to implement this already such as ABP Southampton - SOU-LNTM-2025-022 Commercial Craft Operators.pdf. It is our opinion that carriage requirements should be based on the licencing authorities and operators risk assessments taking into consideration the type of craft, operations being carried out, operational area including navigational risks, traffic density etc and resources of the licencing authority to monitor and make us of the AIS data.” Source location Response from British Marine
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Licensing and port authorities must establish and implement licensing arrangements, including any HSPV licensing requirement.
Verbatim wording from the response “This would be down to the individual licencing and port authorities to establish, British Marine are happy to collaborate if requested to help set the framework up. Industry is currently waiting for the new sport and pleasure code to be bought into legislation, (this is currently in an industry consultation and is expected that the legislation will be passed later this year) which will go a long way to addressing many of the concerns although it recognised there will be an implementation period of the new code. In the meantime British Marine’s suggested interim step would be for the HSPV to become a licencing requirement, but this would be down to the licencing authorities to implement.” Source location Response from British Marine
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Generally monitoring AIS tracks and intervening is impractical because it requires dedicated resources and may not materially improve harbour safety.
Verbatim wording from the response “While AIS is an important aid to navigational safety, monitoring the AIS tracks of vessels (or a specific class of them), identifying whether they are operating safely or not, and potentially intervening in their operation in the Southampton SHA would be very challenging for ABP, require dedicated resources (with associated costs), and may not materially increase the safety of harbour users. Statutory harbour authorities do not have the powers, expertise or resources to generally police all vessels in their SHA and bring enforcement action in the event of non-compliance.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Changes to regulation of high-speed experience-ride RIBs should be implemented nationally by the MCA, rather than locally.
Verbatim wording from the response “As such, any changes to the regulatory regime would be best implemented through a consistent national approach, led by the MCA, as the national marine regulator, to ensure that there is a uniform, consistent and comprehensible framework in all UK waters that is properly communicated to the relevant commercial vessel operators.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The assertion that ABP had not assessed high-speed commercial passenger craft risks before the incident is incorrect.
Verbatim wording from the response “In section 4 of the Report, you state that “ABP (the harbour authority) had not assessed the risks of high-speed commercial passenger craft operations in its area”. That is not correct.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Separate risk assessments for commercial and non-commercial high-speed vessels are unnecessary because their navigational risks are substantially the same.
Verbatim wording from the response “The size of vessels is considered to be the appropriate determining factor as it is a suitable analogue for passenger capacity. The risk profile, and therefore the control measures, for large and small high-speed passenger vessels are materially different. ABP considers the navigational risk posed by commercial and non-commercial high-speed passenger vessels operating in the Southampton SHA to be substantially the same and therefore does not have separate risk assessments for them as it would not materially improve navigational safety in the SHA.” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised. 18 1 Maintain a close working relationship with the MAIB to support timely implementation of recommendations.
Stated by RYA Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 2 Review owner’s manuals and update and recertify the business to ISO 9001 following the vessel compliance review.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 3 Recruit a compliance officer to maintain ISO and MCA management systems and track MAIB guidance.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 4 Test and verify each model’s maximum manoeuvring speed against ISO 6185-4.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 5 Maintain compliance of all Red Bay vessels with Marine Guidance Note 436.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 6 Monitor MCA studies, regulatory reviews and legislative changes to maintain future compliance.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 7 Review and update all vessel owner’s manuals to confirm ISO 10240:2022 compliance and tailor them to each customer and vessel.
Stated by Red Bay Boats Limited Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 8 Use assessment data to provide updated passenger safety guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector.
Stated by Maritime and Coastguard Agency Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 9 Continue working to ensure owners and operators fulfil their responsibilities for the safety of people onboard vessels.
Stated by Maritime and Coastguard Agency Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 10 Use assessment data to provide updated passenger safety information guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector.
Stated by Department for Transport Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 11 Introduce and maintain the non-mandatory Harbour Master Certificate reflecting the National Occupational Standards for Harbour Masters.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 12 Hold an expert panel session on investigation findings and future best practice for coded craft in statutory harbour areas.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 13 Disseminate the interim and final investigation reports and findings to members through internal email and eNews, enabling member feedback.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 14 Contribute as a key consultee to the investigation of the incident and associated safety recommendations.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 15 Promote Port Marine Safety Code principles and increase awareness of them across the port industry.
Stated by British Ports Association Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 16 Organise recurring Port Marine Safety Code duty-holder workshops for port operators.
Stated by British Ports Association Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 17 Provide a new introductory Port Marine Safety Code course developed with specialist consultants.
Stated by British Ports Association Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source 18 Continue working with government and industry bodies to address safety issues and prevent similar incidents.
Stated by British Ports Association Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 20 November 2024. View source Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action. 3 1 The association has no statutory powers or regulatory functions to represent or regulate statutory harbour authorities directly.
Stated by The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man Outside remitThe respondent said that this matter was outside its role or authority. View source 2 The Association has no regulatory functions or statutory powers and cannot compel organisations to take safety action.
Stated by British Ports Association Outside remitThe respondent said that this matter was outside its role or authority. View source 3 Requiring SCV Code-certified vessels to obtain additional local licences could place SCC and its agent outside their statutory powers.
Stated by Associated British Ports Outside remitThe respondent said that this matter was outside its role or authority. View source
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Maintain a close working relationship with the MAIB to support timely implementation of recommendations.
Verbatim wording from the response “f) The RYA fully supports the timely implementation of MAIB recommendations. We achieve this ourselves by maintaining a close working relationship with the MAIB and, where possible, by being involved in the recommendations consultation process. I note that the current MAIB recommendation for a review by the RYA of the existing “Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice” has been delayed due to the need to await the outcome of the MCA legislation for this sector of the industry. We felt, and the MAIB agreed, that releasing an amended version of the Voluntary Code of Practice at this point, where there was real risk of it either conflicting with or leaving unintended gaps, ran the risk of creating confusion within the sector and potentially undermining the “revised “Sport and Pleasure Code”, which we anticipate will address the majority of these issues.” Source location Response from Royal Yachting Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Review owner’s manuals and update and recertify the business to ISO 9001 following the vessel compliance review.
Verbatim wording from the response “13. To ensure thoroughness, and as stated above, we have appointed external naval architects, McCollum Marine, to review all of our documentation to aid in ensuring our Owner’s Manuals are fully compliant. This process is expected to be completed by the end of January 2025.” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Recruit a compliance officer to maintain ISO and MCA management systems and track MAIB guidance.
Verbatim wording from the response “g. Recruitment of Compliance Officer:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Test and verify each model’s maximum manoeuvring speed against ISO 6185-4.
Verbatim wording from the response “f. Manoeuvring Speed Testing:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Maintain compliance of all Red Bay vessels with Marine Guidance Note 436.
Verbatim wording from the response “d. Compliance with Marine Guidance Note 436:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Monitor MCA studies, regulatory reviews and legislative changes to maintain future compliance.
Verbatim wording from the response “f. Monitoring Legislation Changes:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Review and update all vessel owner’s manuals to confirm ISO 10240:2022 compliance and tailor them to each customer and vessel.
Verbatim wording from the response “away unexpectedly in February 2024. However, action had already been taken before his untimely death, and these efforts have continued since. The following steps have been implemented:” Source location Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Use assessment data to provide updated passenger safety guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector.
Verbatim wording from the response “This research project will commence by April 2025, and then the final report is likely to be available in late spring/early summer 2026. The outputs of this report will be incorporated, as appropriate, into the next version of the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code. We will also use the information and data gathered to provide updated guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector on passenger safety information.” Source location Response from Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue working to ensure owners and operators fulfil their responsibilities for the safety of people onboard vessels.
Verbatim wording from the response “As well as the proactive steps to improve small commercial vessel safety with the amendments made in the draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code we will continue to work to ensure that owners and operators take seriously their responsibilities for ensuring the safety of those onboard their vessels.” Source location Response from Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Use assessment data to provide updated passenger safety information guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector.
Verbatim wording from the response “The outputs from this assessment are expected in late spring/early summer 2026 and will be incorporated, as appropriate, into the next version of the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code. The MCA will also use the information and data gathered to provide updated guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector on passenger safety information.” Source location Response from Department for Transport
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Introduce and maintain the non-mandatory Harbour Master Certificate reflecting the National Occupational Standards for Harbour Masters.
Verbatim wording from the response “12. Currently, there are no mandatory qualifications to hold the position of Harbour Master. It is a decision for the port, or more specifically the port’s Duty Holders, to satisfy themselves that the Harbour Master is suitably qualified to carry out their responsibilities under the terms of the Port Marine Safety Code (“PMSC”). In 2012 (and reviewed in 2019), National Occupational Standards for Harbour Masters (“NOS”) were published which set out the basic knowledge, understanding and experience required for Harbour Masters to comply with the PMSC. NOS is overseen by the industry body, Port Skills and Safety.” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Hold an expert panel session on investigation findings and future best practice for coded craft in statutory harbour areas.
Verbatim wording from the response “25. During the 2024 UKHMA Autumn conference (November 2024, London) an expert panel session was held to discuss and consider the Seadogz report outcomes and future best practice of Coded craft within SHAs. The panel included senior officers of the MCA, MAIB and the UKHMA.” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Disseminate the interim and final investigation reports and findings to members through internal email and eNews, enabling member feedback.
Verbatim wording from the response “22. As a professional members association, the UKHMA communicated and engaged with its membership regarding the interim MAIB report, the final report and its findings via its internal email porthole and eNews letters, allowing for feedback and response to the UKHMA Officers and Council.” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Contribute as a key consultee to the investigation of the incident and associated safety recommendations.
Verbatim wording from the response “19. During the period up to the issue of the MAIB’s final report and recommendations, the UKHMA contributed to the investigation as a key consultee. A number of on-line meetings between the MAIB and the Incident report consultees were held to discuss both the report’s findings and the MAIB’s recommendations.” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Promote Port Marine Safety Code principles and increase awareness of them across the port industry.
Verbatim wording from the response “The BPA recognises its roles in contributing to safe operational activities within ports and as set out in our latest Annual Report, in 2023 we were closely involved in the reviews of the Port Marine Safety Code (the ‘PMSC’) and the associated Guide to Good Practice by the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). These are important guidance resources produced by HM Government and we have continued to promote the principles of the Code and worked with government to increase its awareness. Indeed the BPA is an active member of the MCA’s PMSC Steering Group and separate MCA navigational safety committees. The BPA understands the revised PMSC and Guide are due to be published imminently and the next MCA compliance review is to be undertaken in 2025.” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Organise recurring Port Marine Safety Code duty-holder workshops for port operators.
Verbatim wording from the response “Further, we continue to organise online PMSC duty holder workshops, which we provide free to BPA member ports but encourage non-members to join for a small fee. We also introduced a new introductory course version in conjunction with specialist consultants in 2023 and organised more workshops in 2024. These will continue in 2025.” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide a new introductory Port Marine Safety Code course developed with specialist consultants.
Verbatim wording from the response “Further, we continue to organise online PMSC duty holder workshops, which we provide free to BPA member ports but encourage non-members to join for a small fee. We also introduced a new introductory course version in conjunction with specialist consultants in 2023 and organised more workshops in 2024. These will continue in 2025.” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue working with government and industry bodies to address safety issues and prevent similar incidents.
Verbatim wording from the response “I can confirm that the BPA will continue to work with other the UK government, as well as with industry bodies and to participate in the industry’s efforts to ensure that the issues which contributed to the tragic events of 22 August 2020 are suitably addressed with a view to avoiding any future incidents.” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The association has no statutory powers or regulatory functions to represent or regulate statutory harbour authorities directly.
Verbatim wording from the response “10. As the UKHMA is an unincorporated representative body, it has no statutory powers or regulatory functions. The UKHMA is principally a professional members Association and represents the views and interests of UK Harbour Masters. It does not represent the statutory harbour authority entities for which the Harbour Masters work.” Source location Response from The Harbour Masters' Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The Association has no regulatory functions or statutory powers and cannot compel organisations to take safety action.
Verbatim wording from the response “In terms of our structure the BPA is an unincorporated organisation and it has no regulatory functions or statutory powers. We exist as a representative body for ports. We are therefore unable to compel any person or organisation to take action but we can advocate and promote safety issues within the industry, which we do, primarily through the promotion of PSS, who we consider is doing a good job of driving positive change in skills and safety in the port sector.” Source location Response from British Ports Association
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Requiring SCV Code-certified vessels to obtain additional local licences could place SCC and its agent outside their statutory powers.
Verbatim wording from the response “At the local level for Southampton, Southampton City Council (“SCC”) is the licensing authority of pleasure vessels used for carrying passengers for hire pursuant to section 94(1) of the Public Health Acts Amendments Act 1907, as amended (the “1907 Act”), with ABP acting as its appointed agent for inspecting vessels to be licenced. However, under section 94(4) of the 1907 Act, a licence is not required for vessels otherwise licenced by the Secretary of State, such as where vessels are certified to the Small Commercial Vessel Code (“SCV Code”).” Source location Response from Associated British Ports
Open published response
Pin
Get email alerts
Request correction
Information checked against the published report and official responses