Ross Stephen Ballatine and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

On 14 July 2023, sitting with a jury, I heard simultaneously the inquests into the deaths of three men (Ross Stephen Ballatine, Carl Stephen McGrath, Alan Wallace Minard), each of whom died from immersion/drowning after the fishing vessel on which they were working (Nicola Faith) capsized off the coast of North Wales on 27 January 2021.

In each case the jury returned a narrative conclusion in the same terms: "[The Deceased] died from immersion/drowning after the capsizing of the fishing vessel which he was working on. The boat capsized due to the combination of the modifications of the vessel, the weight and distribution of the catch and equipment and its effect on the stability of the vessel".

The vessel set sail on the morning of 27 January 2021 with its skipper and two other fishermen (the three deceased) on board. Their intention was to collect whelks for sale. The vessel capsized at around 18:00. The bodies of the three men were washed ashore at various points around the coast of North West England around 7 weeks later.

The vessel had been given a safety certificate following an inspection by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency in September 2017. Thereafter the vessel was modified in a number of ways, to improve functionality. The changes adversely affected the stability of the vessel. The vessel was inspected again twice by the same inspector from the Agency, in May 2019 and December 2020, following incidents which had been brought to the Agency's attention by the Holyhead Coastguard. The inspector did not consider that the changes he witnessed warranted a formal stability assessment. He placed great weight upon his impression of the skipper's competence and intentions concerning operational procedures.

It is likely that the vessel could have operated safely (in relatively calm waters, such as existed on the day of its capsize) with a load of up to 1 Tonne; but its actual load (which had not been distributed appropriately) was calculated to be closer to 4.6 Tonnes.

Although I was somewhat reassured to learn that the relevant Regulations have been revised and strengthened since these events, I am concerned that in this case (and, therefore, possibly in other cases) the Agency did not establish or apply a clear threshold in determining the need for a full stability assessment to be performed following significant modifications to the vessel. Too much reliance was placed on: (1) reassurances offered by the skipper of the vessel in relation to his appreciation of risk and/or his operational intentions (notably about the size and distribution of the load); and (2) informal visual assessments of the impact of the modifications which were undertaken whilst the vessel was in dock and was not under loaded conditions.

In addition, insufficient concern arose from the issues identified on the two occasions when Holyhead Coastguard advised the Agency of the need to rescue the vessel following breakdowns at sea.

I am concerned that other vessels (whether or a similar size or otherwise) may be operating, which have been modified since the issue of the original safety certificate and which require a full stability assessment before their operational safety can be properly evaluated.