PFD report

Darren James Powney · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 10 Nov 2017•Sunderland

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
7

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
14

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised7

  1. Failure of emergency staff to be aware of the applicable protocol
    Part of recurring concern: Unsafe management of operational protocol changes
  2. Process confusion causing delays in emergency response
  3. Lack of a firm, clear training programme for the new protocol
    Part of recurring concern: Unsafe management of operational protocol changes
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.9

  1. Action

    Review and update Special Patient Notes and Frequent Caller standard operating procedures through the appointed specialist team.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 February 2018.
  2. Action

    Audit frontline staff knowledge and awareness of the Joint Operating Procedure.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 February 2018.
  3. Action

    Provide operational staff with statutory and mandatory dynamic-risk-assessment, conflict-resolution and breakaway training.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 February 2018.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.1

  1. Position

    Formal collective launch of the Joint Operating Procedure was considered ceremonial because stakeholders had already agreed and used it in daily routines.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of emergency staff to be aware of the applicable protocol

Wider context from the report

“The safety of our emergency responders is very important, and sadly they appear to be the subject of violence or the threat of it. Darren’s death has highlighted the process our emergency responders now have to go through. I heard evidence about the reviews of procedures undertaken since Darren’s death, but I still have concerns. I was dismayed to hear about the confusion that arose, and that some NEAS staff were still not aware of the Protocol dated August 2016. It appeared that the dynamic risk assessment undertaken did not facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification, as the markers could unintentionally build a picture about an individual. In Darren’s case I was surprised there was not a bespoke policy for him given that he had called 21 times since May 2016. I heard evidence about the proposed escalation to senior managers should such confusion reoccur, but with an 8 minute response time that escalation must be rapid. Although a lot of work has been done, I am concerned there appears to me more to be done, implemented and trained upon sooner, rather than later. Nearly a year on and, although the new protocol may be on the cusp of being agreed, there is nothing firm enough in my view in place with a clear training programme. In any event I hope my Report will give the necessary impetus to conclusion and implemention. For Darren the confusion, which led to delay, made no difference, but for someone else it might. As this issue may have more than implications locally I have copied in others who may have an interest. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unsafe management of operational protocol changes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Process confusion causing delays in emergency response

Wider context from the report

“The safety of our emergency responders is very important, and sadly they appear to be the subject of violence or the threat of it. Darren’s death has highlighted the process our emergency responders now have to go through. I heard evidence about the reviews of procedures undertaken since Darren’s death, but I still have concerns. I was dismayed to hear about the confusion that arose, and that some NEAS staff were still not aware of the Protocol dated August 2016. It appeared that the dynamic risk assessment undertaken did not facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification, as the markers could unintentionally build a picture about an individual. In Darren’s case I was surprised there was not a bespoke policy for him given that he had called 21 times since May 2016. I heard evidence about the proposed escalation to senior managers should such confusion reoccur, but with an 8 minute response time that escalation must be rapid. Although a lot of work has been done, I am concerned there appears to me more to be done, implemented and trained upon sooner, rather than later. Nearly a year on and, although the new protocol may be on the cusp of being agreed, there is nothing firm enough in my view in place with a clear training programme. In any event I hope my Report will give the necessary impetus to conclusion and implemention. For Darren the confusion, which led to delay, made no difference, but for someone else it might. As this issue may have more than implications locally I have copied in others who may have an interest. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of a firm, clear training programme for the new protocol

Wider context from the report

“The safety of our emergency responders is very important, and sadly they appear to be the subject of violence or the threat of it. Darren’s death has highlighted the process our emergency responders now have to go through. I heard evidence about the reviews of procedures undertaken since Darren’s death, but I still have concerns. I was dismayed to hear about the confusion that arose, and that some NEAS staff were still not aware of the Protocol dated August 2016. It appeared that the dynamic risk assessment undertaken did not facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification, as the markers could unintentionally build a picture about an individual. In Darren’s case I was surprised there was not a bespoke policy for him given that he had called 21 times since May 2016. I heard evidence about the proposed escalation to senior managers should such confusion reoccur, but with an 8 minute response time that escalation must be rapid. Although a lot of work has been done, I am concerned there appears to me more to be done, implemented and trained upon sooner, rather than later. Nearly a year on and, although the new protocol may be on the cusp of being agreed, there is nothing firm enough in my view in place with a clear training programme. In any event I hope my Report will give the necessary impetus to conclusion and implemention. For Darren the confusion, which led to delay, made no difference, but for someone else it might. As this issue may have more than implications locally I have copied in others who may have an interest. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unsafe management of operational protocol changes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to ensure sufficiently rapid escalation to senior managers

Wider context from the report

“The safety of our emergency responders is very important, and sadly they appear to be the subject of violence or the threat of it. Darren’s death has highlighted the process our emergency responders now have to go through. I heard evidence about the reviews of procedures undertaken since Darren’s death, but I still have concerns. I was dismayed to hear about the confusion that arose, and that some NEAS staff were still not aware of the Protocol dated August 2016. It appeared that the dynamic risk assessment undertaken did not facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification, as the markers could unintentionally build a picture about an individual. In Darren’s case I was surprised there was not a bespoke policy for him given that he had called 21 times since May 2016. I heard evidence about the proposed escalation to senior managers should such confusion reoccur, but with an 8 minute response time that escalation must be rapid. Although a lot of work has been done, I am concerned there appears to me more to be done, implemented and trained upon sooner, rather than later. Nearly a year on and, although the new protocol may be on the cusp of being agreed, there is nothing firm enough in my view in place with a clear training programme. In any event I hope my Report will give the necessary impetus to conclusion and implemention. For Darren the confusion, which led to delay, made no difference, but for someone else it might. As this issue may have more than implications locally I have copied in others who may have an interest. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to take timely escalation action when safety thresholds are breached.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of dynamic risk assessments to facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification

Wider context from the report

“The safety of our emergency responders is very important, and sadly they appear to be the subject of violence or the threat of it. Darren’s death has highlighted the process our emergency responders now have to go through. I heard evidence about the reviews of procedures undertaken since Darren’s death, but I still have concerns. I was dismayed to hear about the confusion that arose, and that some NEAS staff were still not aware of the Protocol dated August 2016. It appeared that the dynamic risk assessment undertaken did not facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification, as the markers could unintentionally build a picture about an individual. In Darren’s case I was surprised there was not a bespoke policy for him given that he had called 21 times since May 2016. I heard evidence about the proposed escalation to senior managers should such confusion reoccur, but with an 8 minute response time that escalation must be rapid. Although a lot of work has been done, I am concerned there appears to me more to be done, implemented and trained upon sooner, rather than later. Nearly a year on and, although the new protocol may be on the cusp of being agreed, there is nothing firm enough in my view in place with a clear training programme. In any event I hope my Report will give the necessary impetus to conclusion and implemention. For Darren the confusion, which led to delay, made no difference, but for someone else it might. As this issue may have more than implications locally I have copied in others who may have an interest. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable transfer of safety-critical patient information within ambulance services.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of a bespoke policy for frequent callers

Wider context from the report

“The safety of our emergency responders is very important, and sadly they appear to be the subject of violence or the threat of it. Darren’s death has highlighted the process our emergency responders now have to go through. I heard evidence about the reviews of procedures undertaken since Darren’s death, but I still have concerns. I was dismayed to hear about the confusion that arose, and that some NEAS staff were still not aware of the Protocol dated August 2016. It appeared that the dynamic risk assessment undertaken did not facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification, as the markers could unintentionally build a picture about an individual. In Darren’s case I was surprised there was not a bespoke policy for him given that he had called 21 times since May 2016. I heard evidence about the proposed escalation to senior managers should such confusion reoccur, but with an 8 minute response time that escalation must be rapid. Although a lot of work has been done, I am concerned there appears to me more to be done, implemented and trained upon sooner, rather than later. Nearly a year on and, although the new protocol may be on the cusp of being agreed, there is nothing firm enough in my view in place with a clear training programme. In any event I hope my Report will give the necessary impetus to conclusion and implemention. For Darren the confusion, which led to delay, made no difference, but for someone else it might. As this issue may have more than implications locally I have copied in others who may have an interest. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Violence or threats of violence against emergency responders

Wider context from the report

“The safety of our emergency responders is very important, and sadly they appear to be the subject of violence or the threat of it. Darren’s death has highlighted the process our emergency responders now have to go through. I heard evidence about the reviews of procedures undertaken since Darren’s death, but I still have concerns. I was dismayed to hear about the confusion that arose, and that some NEAS staff were still not aware of the Protocol dated August 2016. It appeared that the dynamic risk assessment undertaken did not facilitate ambulance crews requesting further information or clarification, as the markers could unintentionally build a picture about an individual. In Darren’s case I was surprised there was not a bespoke policy for him given that he had called 21 times since May 2016. I heard evidence about the proposed escalation to senior managers should such confusion reoccur, but with an 8 minute response time that escalation must be rapid. Although a lot of work has been done, I am concerned there appears to me more to be done, implemented and trained upon sooner, rather than later. Nearly a year on and, although the new protocol may be on the cusp of being agreed, there is nothing firm enough in my view in place with a clear training programme. In any event I hope my Report will give the necessary impetus to conclusion and implemention. For Darren the confusion, which led to delay, made no difference, but for someone else it might. As this issue may have more than implications locally I have copied in others who may have an interest. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review and update Special Patient Notes and Frequent Caller standard operating procedures through the appointed specialist team.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As part of the organisational restructure we have reviewed how we manage Special Patient Notes and have appointed a team focused on this and ‘Frequent Callers’. We are currently reviewing our existing Standard Operating Procedures, which will be completed by March 2018.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Audit frontline staff knowledge and awareness of the Joint Operating Procedure.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Our staff's knowledge and awareness of the JOP is to be audited;”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 6 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide operational staff with statutory and mandatory dynamic-risk-assessment, conflict-resolution and breakaway training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Operational crews receive conflict resolution training, breakaway training and dynamic risk assessment training as part of Statutory and Mandatory training, this also includes use of the joint decision making model. The Trusts data currently shows that 88% of operational staff have received statutory and mandatory training.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Disseminate Joint Operating Procedure and dynamic-risk-assessment guidance through staff briefings, memoranda, meetings, face-to-face sessions, induction and operational assurance activities.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We have undertaken a range of measures to ensure staff understand the JOP and how it applies to them in practice as follows:”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Escalate unsafe property-access decisions to senior operational managers for review and direct crew support.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In order to address this we have ensured that when a crew does not feel safe to proceed and access a property, without police support, based on the ‘flag’ this is then escalated to the Clinical Operation Manager or the Assistant Services Manager on duty so they may review all information available and speak directly to the crew on scene.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Test frequent-caller flagging and establish a multidisciplinary process to review cases and refer appropriate patients for primary-care or multidisciplinary-team involvement.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We have tested our flagging system to provide assurance that it is highlighting ‘frequent callers’ and are establishing a wider internal multi-disciplinary group, to include patient safety and safeguarding to review cases and refer on to primary care for case review / Multi-disciplinary Team involvement.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Produce and install vehicle dashboard stickers prompting dynamic risk assessment before requesting police support.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Undertaking a dynamic risk assessment is central to the work we do in delivering safe patient care as an Ambulance Trust. In order to reinforce to front line crews key areas to consider when informed that there is a flag relating to possible violence and aggression, a sticker has been developed to be placed in the front of the vehicle with prompts to consider prior to requesting police support. Following agreement with the relevant departments this is currently being produced and will be in all vehicles by the end of March 2018.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement Joint Operating Procedure version 14, including the cross-service escalation process for differing risk assessments.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As discussed at the inquest and as a result of Darren's death, the JOP was reviewed by Alan Gallagher, the Trust's Head of Risk, and Chief Superintendent Sav Patsalos, of the Northumbria Police as it was identified that clarification was required regarding who should attend patients when the risk assessments of the two services differ. This has resulted in the creation of an escalation process which was incorporated into the JOP. This enables a review of all information available, oversight of the situation and prompt action. Any cases where this situation has occurred will be reported via the Trust incident reporting system and will be brought to the attention of the Strategic Head of Operations.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Trial body-worn cameras for operational staff and review their impact on violence and aggression.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We are committed to keep our staff safe, wherever possible and we are trialling ‘Body Worn’ cameras. These are devices which will be worn by our operational staff members and the trial is to commence in early 2018. The Trust will look at the feedback and review whether the use of the cameras has had an impact on reducing violence and aggression against staff.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 5 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Formal collective launch of the Joint Operating Procedure was considered ceremonial because stakeholders had already agreed and used it in daily routines.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Trust can confirm that the JOP is currently being used by the stakeholders and will continue to evolve as part of the Trust's collaborative work with Police colleagues. Whilst the JOP has not yet been formally collectively launched, plans are being made for the various Executive teams to meet and jointly sign the current version. The dates suggested for this meeting commence on the 6th February 2018 with partners being asked to provide availability. The plans also include a joint media launch so the work can be publically shared to show the on-going collaboration between the emergency services. The Trust would however like to assure you that this is more of a ceremonial matter linked with promoting our collaboration. As stated above all three Police Forces and the Trust have agreed the JOP and use it in our daily routines.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.5

  1. 1

    Roll out THRIVE training to Emergency Operations Centre staff and incorporate further training into the training plan.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 February 2018.
  2. 2

    Record police-disputed risk-assessment incidents and review resulting themes with senior operational and risk staff.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 February 2018.
  3. 3

    Disseminate the Regulation 28 Report and response to ambulance trusts nationwide and provide the response to the Care Quality Commission.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 February 2018.
  4. 4

    Reprint and reissue police advice cards updated for the Ambulance Response Programme, including copies requested by partner services.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 February 2018.
  5. 5

    Continue collaborative development of the Joint Operating Procedure with the three local police forces.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 5 February 2018.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.1

  1. 1

    Extreme operational pressures prevented delivery of planned THRIVE training during the intended November and December period.

    Stated by North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation TrustUnable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Roll out THRIVE training to Emergency Operations Centre staff and incorporate further training into the training plan.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Police use a THRIVE assessment model (Threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerability and engagement) to assist in prioritising whether a situation is a high, medium or low, with associated actions relating to each level. In order to support collaborative working based on a shared understanding the Trust has embarked on a programme of equipping Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) staff with an understanding of this model and how it can be used in practice. THRIVE is a model aimed specifically at EOC staff and not operational staff.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Record police-disputed risk-assessment incidents and review resulting themes with senior operational and risk staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“When such a situation occurs we will ensure an incident report is logged to enable a constructive conversation with the appropriate senior staff within NEAS and the Police. It will also enable the Trust to look at themes and trends relating to this situation.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Disseminate the Regulation 28 Report and response to ambulance trusts nationwide and provide the response to the Care Quality Commission.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I can also confirm that in order to improve nationwide learning, the Trust have disseminated both the Regulation 28 Report and our response to other Ambulance Trust colleagues across the country. The Care Quality Commission is also aware of the Regulation 28 Report and shall receive a copy of this letter of response.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 6 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Reprint and reissue police advice cards updated for the Ambulance Response Programme, including copies requested by partner services.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• We are in the process of arranging the re-printing and re-issuing of the advice cards previously issued to the Police following the introduction of ARP. The local Fire and Rescue Services and some Street Pastor services have also requested copies of these cards;”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 5 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue collaborative development of the Joint Operating Procedure with the three local police forces.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Trust has continued to work with the 3 local Police Forces to promote and develop the JOP. The most current version of the JOP is version 14 and includes an update in light of the new Ambulance Response Programme (ARP) which replaces previous language/terms within the new ambulance categories. The Trust can confirm that the changes are simply relating to ambulance response categories. The main content remains unchanged from that shared at the inquest. A copy of the latest JOP is enclosed.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Extreme operational pressures prevented delivery of planned THRIVE training during the intended November and December period.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Originally THRIVE training was planned to commence earlier in 2017/2018; this was however delayed due to the need to work with Northumbria Police to create a NEAS specific package. Delivery was further delayed due to previously planned priority mandatory training such as NHS Pathways updates, Safeguarding and more recently the National Ambulance Response Programme (ARP). Subsequently the Trust has planned to focus on this training during November and December, unfortunately due to the extreme pressures faced over this period it was not possible to provide the training. During this time the Trust was operating between level 3 and 4 on the Resource Escalation Action Plan (REAP), see enclosed REAP plan.”

Source location

2017-0346-Response-by-North-East-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 5 February 2018

Open published response
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