Sebastian Benjamin OLIVER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 30 Oct 2024•Birmingham and Solihull

Published report and response evidence

This report’s concerns and statements found in recipients’ published responses. Statements are included even where no link to an individual concern is recorded. A link shows an evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
12

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised3

  1. Failure to account for current and fluctuating capacity when closing incident logs
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to recognise impaired decision-making capacity in care decisions
  2. Failure to seek clarification and communicate effectively with medical colleagues about fluctuating or lacking capacity
    Part of recurring concern: Failure of police operational communications to reliably share safety-critical informationPart of recurring concern: Unreliable information sharing for people with fluctuating mental capacityPart of recurring concern: Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures
  3. Shortcomings in training for incidents involving fluctuating or lacking capacity and absconding from treatment centres
    Part of recurring concern: Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crises

Stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.12

  1. West Midlands Police

    Maintain a Vulnerability Desk staffed by mental health, missing-person and supervisory specialists to support escalations and quality-assure related deployment decisions.

  2. West Midlands Police

    Update training lesson plans and inputs on the Mental Capacity Act, capacity assessments and partner-agency assessments for all staff.

  3. West Midlands Police

    Require officers to obtain, record and share treating-clinician rationale when partner risk assessments differ, with learning fed into relevant working groups.

  4. West Midlands Police

    Continue Re-THRIVE quality assurance and communications requiring rationalised decision-making in THRIVE records, with particular focus on dispatch.

  5. West Midlands Police

    Reinforce through training that staff must re-THRIVE and record a full rationale when recommending non-police attendance.

  6. West Midlands Police

    Adopt “welfare check” and “proof of life” terminology instead of describing people as “safe and well”.

  7. West Midlands Police

    Develop a hospital-absconder question set and related Force Contact training to gather information supporting deployment decisions without treating medical capacity as determinative.

  8. West Midlands Police

    Refresh force-wide communications instructing staff to use only the latest medical capacity assessment in decision making.

  9. West Midlands Police

    Remind ControlWorks users to record meaningful updates when departing locations so later decision makers can access attendance outcomes.

  10. West Midlands Police

    Review the Force Contact Departmental Improvement Plan to incorporate the specified changes and initiatives.

  11. West Midlands Police

    Implement all four phases of the Right Care, Right Person model across West Midlands partner agencies.

  12. West Midlands Police

    Provide mandatory Right Care, Right Person training to Force Contact staff and relevant frontline officers, including decision-support materials and phase-specific training.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.3

  1. West Midlands Police

    Police cannot define individuals as safe and well because that is medical terminology requiring qualifications they do not possess.

    Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.
  2. West Midlands Police

    Police cannot determine deployment solely from capacity status because officers are not medically trained to assess its implications.

    Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.
  3. West Midlands Police

    Where no immediate life or serious-harm risk exists, WMAS or the hospital should locate absconded patients under their statutory obligation.

    Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to account for current and fluctuating capacity when closing incident logs

Wider context from the report

“3. WMAS notified West Midlands Police ("WMP") and requested a "safe and well check". After determining he was not at the last known location, the decision was made by officers of WMP to close the log because WMAS had earlier deemed him to have capacity (following the 22:18 call). 4. However, the decision to close the log was an error - as a person's capacity can fluctuate, it was inappropriate for WMP to rely upon a past capacity assessment taken hours earlier in the evening, particularly when a more recent capacity assessment indicated that he lacked capacity and where WMAS were concerned enough to request a "safe and well check". 5. I stress that the evidence was clear at inquest that even if WMP had not closed the log, they may not have been able to find Mr Oliver as it was not known where he went in the two hours or so after he left hospital, before being recorded on CCTV at 02:55 at ████████, and being subsequently found unresponsive at 06:21. On the balance of probabilities therefore, it cannot be said that Mr Oliver would have been found had the log not been closed. 6. However, I am concerned that the decision to not seek clarification from WMAS as to Mr Oliver's capacity represents shortcomings in training and/or a failure to ensure that WMP properly and effectively communicate with medical colleagues in WMAS when dealing with incidents where patients have fluctuating or lack capacity and abscond from treatment centres. It is not clear whether this was a "one-off" issue localised to a specific officer, or whether it represents a larger or institutional issue. 7. It is easy to anticipate a similar situation occurring in the future which leads to a death that is preventable, particularly those involving vulnerable persons and those lacking capacity. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to recognise impaired decision-making capacity in care decisions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to seek clarification and communicate effectively with medical colleagues about fluctuating or lacking capacity

Wider context from the report

“3. WMAS notified West Midlands Police ("WMP") and requested a "safe and well check". After determining he was not at the last known location, the decision was made by officers of WMP to close the log because WMAS had earlier deemed him to have capacity (following the 22:18 call). 4. However, the decision to close the log was an error - as a person's capacity can fluctuate, it was inappropriate for WMP to rely upon a past capacity assessment taken hours earlier in the evening, particularly when a more recent capacity assessment indicated that he lacked capacity and where WMAS were concerned enough to request a "safe and well check". 5. I stress that the evidence was clear at inquest that even if WMP had not closed the log, they may not have been able to find Mr Oliver as it was not known where he went in the two hours or so after he left hospital, before being recorded on CCTV at 02:55 at ████████, and being subsequently found unresponsive at 06:21. On the balance of probabilities therefore, it cannot be said that Mr Oliver would have been found had the log not been closed. 6. However, I am concerned that the decision to not seek clarification from WMAS as to Mr Oliver's capacity represents shortcomings in training and/or a failure to ensure that WMP properly and effectively communicate with medical colleagues in WMAS when dealing with incidents where patients have fluctuating or lack capacity and abscond from treatment centres. It is not clear whether this was a "one-off" issue localised to a specific officer, or whether it represents a larger or institutional issue. 7. It is easy to anticipate a similar situation occurring in the future which leads to a death that is preventable, particularly those involving vulnerable persons and those lacking capacity. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure of police operational communications to reliably share safety-critical information; Unreliable information sharing for people with fluctuating mental capacity; Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Shortcomings in training for incidents involving fluctuating or lacking capacity and absconding from treatment centres

Wider context from the report

“3. WMAS notified West Midlands Police ("WMP") and requested a "safe and well check". After determining he was not at the last known location, the decision was made by officers of WMP to close the log because WMAS had earlier deemed him to have capacity (following the 22:18 call). 4. However, the decision to close the log was an error - as a person's capacity can fluctuate, it was inappropriate for WMP to rely upon a past capacity assessment taken hours earlier in the evening, particularly when a more recent capacity assessment indicated that he lacked capacity and where WMAS were concerned enough to request a "safe and well check". 5. I stress that the evidence was clear at inquest that even if WMP had not closed the log, they may not have been able to find Mr Oliver as it was not known where he went in the two hours or so after he left hospital, before being recorded on CCTV at 02:55 at ████████, and being subsequently found unresponsive at 06:21. On the balance of probabilities therefore, it cannot be said that Mr Oliver would have been found had the log not been closed. 6. However, I am concerned that the decision to not seek clarification from WMAS as to Mr Oliver's capacity represents shortcomings in training and/or a failure to ensure that WMP properly and effectively communicate with medical colleagues in WMAS when dealing with incidents where patients have fluctuating or lack capacity and abscond from treatment centres. It is not clear whether this was a "one-off" issue localised to a specific officer, or whether it represents a larger or institutional issue. 7. It is easy to anticipate a similar situation occurring in the future which leads to a death that is preventable, particularly those involving vulnerable persons and those lacking capacity. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crises.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain a Vulnerability Desk staffed by mental health, missing-person and supervisory specialists to support escalations and quality-assure related deployment decisions.

Verbatim wording from the response

“A Vulnerability Desk was also created within Force Contact in December 2023 which operates in line with the RCRP policy allowing call handlers and operational colleagues the ability to escalate complex concerns to this team of subject matter experts consisting of Mental Health Tactical Advisors, Missing person experts and Supervisors. The Vulnerability Desk supervisors are also responsible for conducting ‘dip samples’ to quality assure the organisation’s response to RCRP related incidents ensuring the correct decisions are drawn upon in line with legal framework, policy and in the best interests of the public. The latest month’s dip samples for the month of October 2024 depict that WMP made the correct decision regarding deployment or non-deployment in 90% of cases.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 4 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Update training lesson plans and inputs on the Mental Capacity Act, capacity assessments and partner-agency assessments for all staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(vii) Training lesson plans and inputs to ensure: that the Mental Capacity Act, capacity assessments and partner agency assessments are inputted to all staff.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Require officers to obtain, record and share treating-clinician rationale when partner risk assessments differ, with learning fed into relevant working groups.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(iii) Collaboration with partners: Officers will be reminded that they must consider risk from the stakeholder/partner perspective and obtain the rationale of the treating clinician where there is a difference. This should then be recorded utilising WMP systems and fed back to WMP supervisors and shared with the reporting partner agency. Whilst WMP can professionally challenge partners it is more appropriate to follow the process in the best interest of the public and inaccuracies be fed back within working groups such as Joint Strategic Operation Groups (JSOG) to aid future learning.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue Re-THRIVE quality assurance and communications requiring rationalised decision-making in THRIVE records, with particular focus on dispatch.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In the event of a question about resourcing a log could be escalated to supervision to allocate resource and dispatch. This happened in Mr Oliver’s case following the second call from WMAS requesting a “safe and well”. A decision was then made by a supervisor not to attend. After the supervisory review it was transferred out of dispatch into the ‘FCRTF’ which is a queue for cases to be reviewed and closed. WMAS were advised WMP would not attend. The decision to close a log would be an individual decision also applying the ‘THRIVE’/RE-THRIVE risk assessment principles and a consideration of any change in circumstances which may affect a risk profile. Where a grading is changed or reviewed, in this case the supervisor, should completed a ‘Re-THRIVE’. They should detail their rational for a change in the THRIVE assessment on the log and, preferably, also in a new THRIVE form.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 2 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Reinforce through training that staff must re-THRIVE and record a full rationale when recommending non-police attendance.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(viii) Training to reinforce to staff to re-THRIVE: and a complete a full rationale if recommending non-Police attendance.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Adopt “welfare check” and “proof of life” terminology instead of describing people as “safe and well”.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(ii) Use of safe and well terminology: WMP cannot define an individual as ‘safe and well’. This is medical terminology and we are not qualified to do so, we can provide proof of life. WMP to adopt the use of phrase “welfare check” and “proof of life” in support of the Concern for Welfare Memorandum of Understanding (attached).”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop a hospital-absconder question set and related Force Contact training to gather information supporting deployment decisions without treating medical capacity as determinative.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The following measures will also be introduced within the Force Contact environment as part of the continuous improvement of the Force Contact function service within WMP. These will focus on supporting individual decision makers who are required to make decisions in cases such as Mr Oliver’s where there is a question of capacity.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Refresh force-wide communications instructing staff to use only the latest medical capacity assessment in decision making.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(vi) To refresh communications across WMP: via corporate communications, relating to medical assessment capacity on logs to use only the latest assessment in decision making.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Remind ControlWorks users to record meaningful updates when departing locations so later decision makers can access attendance outcomes.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(v) Updates within WMP systems: Reminder to all those who utilise ControlWorks to provide meaningful and diligent updates when departing a location. This will aid decision making should any future logs arise and allows efficient access to provide the outcome of previous attendance in the event originally attending officers are now off duty or non-contactable.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review the Force Contact Departmental Improvement Plan to incorporate the specified changes and initiatives.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(ix) Review of Force Contact Departmental Improvement Plan to incorporate the above changes and initiatives”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement all four phases of the Right Care, Right Person model across West Midlands partner agencies.

Verbatim wording from the response

“RCRP is an operational model which was initially developed by Humberside Police in relation to how emergency services respond to calls involving concerns about mental health. It is focused on the interface between policing and mental health services, although there is an acceptance that the principles can be applied more broadly. RCRP is in the process of being rolled out across the UK as part of ongoing work between police forces (including WMP), health providers and the Government.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 3 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide mandatory Right Care, Right Person training to Force Contact staff and relevant frontline officers, including decision-support materials and phase-specific training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Additional training has been provided to WMP Force Contact Call Handlers to ensure that the right deployment decisions are made when calls are received from members of the public or partners. This was in the form of a ‘Blackboard’ hybrid learning package containing informative videos, theory and knowledge checks in addition to a ‘flowchart’ decision tree to support Force Contact’s decision making; this is easily accessible to all both via a link within the ControlWorks (WMP’s command and control system) and within the WMP Intranet page. This includes consideration as to whether the call relates to an Article 2 (immediate risk to life) or Article 3 (immediate threat of serious harm) issue, and where these are present to deploy a police resource only where there is a clear policing role.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 4 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Police cannot define individuals as safe and well because that is medical terminology requiring qualifications they do not possess.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(ii) Use of safe and well terminology: WMP cannot define an individual as ‘safe and well’. This is medical terminology and we are not qualified to do so, we can provide proof of life. WMP to adopt the use of phrase “welfare check” and “proof of life” in support of the Concern for Welfare Memorandum of Understanding (attached).”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Police cannot determine deployment solely from capacity status because officers are not medically trained to assess its implications.

Verbatim wording from the response

“(i) Capacity: Vulnerability Desk to support in implementing training within Force Contact that creates a question set for Contact Handling in relation hospital absconders to assist in gaining all the appropriate information to aid decision making. The term ‘capacity’ should NOT bear relevance to WMP’s decision making on an individual as we are not medically trained to determine the potential outcome for an individual who does or does not have capacity. We cannot definitively state that we would deploy in all instances where an individual lacks capacity or not deploy if they do. Therefore, it is more appropriate to move away from this terminology so that it is not an unnecessary focal point of decision making.”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 5 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Where no immediate life or serious-harm risk exists, WMAS or the hospital should locate absconded patients under their statutory obligation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Following the implementation of RCRP, if faced with identical circumstances to Mr Oliver’s once he had absconded from the care of WMAS, WMP would not routinely respond. Following the RCRP flowchart (see page 7, below), whilst there could be a consideration to treat a patient as a missing person in line with APP guidelines, if Article 2 or 3 concerns were not present then WMAS/the hospital would be advised to take reasonable steps to locate their patient as per their statutory obligation. For example, through repeated attempts to contact the patient, their next of kin and through dispatching an ambulance to the reasonably suspected location of the patient such as a home address”

Source location

Response from West Midlands Police
Page 4 · response
Published 1 November 2024

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

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Data last updated 7 September 2026