PFD report

John Christopher Armstrong · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 12 Jan 2018•Leicester City and South Leicestershire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
3

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised3

  1. Limitations of visual collision avoidance in certain weather conditions
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate visual collision-avoidance controls for aircraft in flight
  2. Absence of air traffic control over an airfield with multiple aircraft in the vicinity
  3. Lack of effective, compatible and mandatory aircraft collision-position and warning systems
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate visual collision-avoidance controls for aircraft in flight
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. Action

    Publish CAP1391 specifications and requirements for electronic conspicuity devices.

    Stated by Civil Aviation AuthorityStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 7 March 2018.
  2. Action

    Encourage licensing and carriage of compatible electronic conspicuity equipment to reduce mid-air conflicts.

    Stated by Civil Aviation AuthorityStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 7 March 2018.
  3. Action

    Drive the plan for operators to become electronically conspicuous through the MAC programme’s continuing collaborative safety improvements.

    Stated by Civil Aviation AuthorityStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 7 March 2018.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.1

  1. Position

    Strobe lighting is not a realistic conspicuity solution because glider weight and power-consumption constraints prevent its wider use.

    Stated by Civil Aviation AuthorityUnable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Limitations of visual collision avoidance in certain weather conditions

Wider context from the report

“(1) A ‘see and avoid’ principle of avoiding collisions is subject to limitations of the human eye and may be a significant problem in certain weather conditions (as in this case, a low sun eye): 2) There is no effective way of one aircraft ascertaining another aircraft’s position in flight or have any warning of an impending collision. Some aircraft have alarms and/or anti-collision devices but (a) they are not necessarily compatible with other systems that are used and (b) they are not mandatory; (2) There was no Air Traffic control over Husbands Bosworth airfield even though there is a gliding club at the airfield and therefore, one would assume, a higher usage of airspace and likelihood of a collision. There were seven aircraft in the vicinity at the time of the accident (including the two aircraft involved in the accident) but no-one controlling the position of the aircraft. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate visual collision-avoidance controls for aircraft in flight.

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Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Absence of air traffic control over an airfield with multiple aircraft in the vicinity

Wider context from the report

“(1) A ‘see and avoid’ principle of avoiding collisions is subject to limitations of the human eye and may be a significant problem in certain weather conditions (as in this case, a low sun eye): 2) There is no effective way of one aircraft ascertaining another aircraft’s position in flight or have any warning of an impending collision. Some aircraft have alarms and/or anti-collision devices but (a) they are not necessarily compatible with other systems that are used and (b) they are not mandatory; (2) There was no Air Traffic control over Husbands Bosworth airfield even though there is a gliding club at the airfield and therefore, one would assume, a higher usage of airspace and likelihood of a collision. There were seven aircraft in the vicinity at the time of the accident (including the two aircraft involved in the accident) but no-one controlling the position of the aircraft. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of effective, compatible and mandatory aircraft collision-position and warning systems

Wider context from the report

“(1) A ‘see and avoid’ principle of avoiding collisions is subject to limitations of the human eye and may be a significant problem in certain weather conditions (as in this case, a low sun eye): 2) There is no effective way of one aircraft ascertaining another aircraft’s position in flight or have any warning of an impending collision. Some aircraft have alarms and/or anti-collision devices but (a) they are not necessarily compatible with other systems that are used and (b) they are not mandatory; (2) There was no Air Traffic control over Husbands Bosworth airfield even though there is a gliding club at the airfield and therefore, one would assume, a higher usage of airspace and likelihood of a collision. There were seven aircraft in the vicinity at the time of the accident (including the two aircraft involved in the accident) but no-one controlling the position of the aircraft. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate visual collision-avoidance controls for aircraft in flight.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Publish CAP1391 specifications and requirements for electronic conspicuity devices.

Verbatim wording from the response

“7. You also mention in your letter that the CAA has published CAP1391. This document is the result of many years of work of the Electronic Conspicuity Working Group (ECWG), that has striven to overcome the challenges of the need for low power consumption, portability and affordability to encourage the wider use of electronic conspicuity devices. The CAA, alongside the ECWG, has provided specifications to industry for such devices and is actively encouraging the licensing and equipage of such equipment, to minimise the incidents of mid-air conflict. There are several trials currently being run in the UK airspace to examine the efficacy of this equipment.”

Source location

2018-0008-Response-by-CAA
Page 2 · response
Published 7 March 2018

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Encourage licensing and carriage of compatible electronic conspicuity equipment to reduce mid-air conflicts.

Verbatim wording from the response

“7. You also mention in your letter that the CAA has published CAP1391. This document is the result of many years of work of the Electronic Conspicuity Working Group (ECWG), that has striven to overcome the challenges of the need for low power consumption, portability and affordability to encourage the wider use of electronic conspicuity devices. The CAA, alongside the ECWG, has provided specifications to industry for such devices and is actively encouraging the licensing and equipage of such equipment, to minimise the incidents of mid-air conflict. There are several trials currently being run in the UK airspace to examine the efficacy of this equipment.”

Source location

2018-0008-Response-by-CAA
Page 2 · response
Published 7 March 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Drive the plan for operators to become electronically conspicuous through the MAC programme’s continuing collaborative safety improvements.

Verbatim wording from the response

“12. The CAA will continue to drive forward the plan to ensure operators are ‘electronically conspicuous’ which will help to reduce the incidence of such events as those at Husbands Bosworth and others more recently. The risk of mid-air collision is a complex and long-term challenge and as such the CAA’s MAC programme aims to reduce the risk of mid-air collision by pursuing targeted and continuous improvements in systems, cultures, processes and capability. The MAC programme works closely and collaboratively with the UK Airprox Board, UK Flight Safety Committee, Military Aviation Authority and industry stakeholders to understand and assess risk and identify effective and collaborative mitigations. This programme also meets the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) requirement for Member States to address MAC in their safety plans.”

Source location

2018-0008-Response-by-CAA
Page 3 · response
Published 7 March 2018

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Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Strobe lighting is not a realistic conspicuity solution because glider weight and power-consumption constraints prevent its wider use.

Verbatim wording from the response

“use of stripes and bands of colour, but the key contributor to visual acuity is the use of strobe lighting and, due to weight and power consumption constraints, this has not proven to be a realistic solution. Some modern, high-end gliders are fitted with powerful batteries and in some cases even, a small engine to help sustain flight, but this is in a very small section of the gliding community.”

Source location

2018-0008-Response-by-CAA
Page 2 · response
Published 7 March 2018

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.1

  1. 1

    The airfield operator is responsible for deciding whether to provide radar facilities; the CAA may require this only at busier airports.

    Stated by Civil Aviation AuthorityRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The airfield operator is responsible for deciding whether to provide radar facilities; the CAA may require this only at busier airports.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The provision of radar facilities at an aerodrome is a decision for the operator of the airfield, although it does have a role to play at busier airports where commercial air transport operates and where the CAA may require the operator to provide radar service provision as part of the airport’s safety management system. This is not the situation in the case of Leicester aerodrome due to the small scale of their operation and the absence of public transport flights.”

Source location

2018-0008-Response-by-CAA
Page 3 · response
Published 7 March 2018

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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026