PFD report

Sgt Mark Colin Foley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 1 Jun 2015•Cumbria

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
6

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Concerns raised3

  1. Failure of vehicle commanders to wear safety harnesses
  2. Insufficient driver experience in controlling vehicles during difficulties
    Part of recurring concern: Insufficient driver experience for safe vehicle control
  3. Failure of senior officers to enforce safety harness standing orders
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate vehicle occupant restraint systems
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.4

  1. Action

    Develop an online defensive-driver training package covering road awareness, vehicle control, driving styles and vehicle technology.

    Stated by Ministry of DefenceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 1 June 2015.
  2. Action

    Review the feasibility of additional inexperienced-driver training for vehicle loss-of-control scenarios.

    Stated by Ministry of DefenceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 1 June 2015.
  3. Action

    Issue safety directions to commanding officers of units equipped with wheeled armoured vehicles.

    Stated by Ministry of DefenceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 1 June 2015.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.2

  1. Position

    Existing safety-harness policy and commander training were treated as sufficient to reinforce compliance, subject to tactical exceptions and reassessment.

    Stated by Ministry of DefenceExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of vehicle commanders to wear safety harnesses

Wider context from the report

“2. Although standing orders had been in place following a previous similar accident there was a practice among commanders of vehicles not to wear safety harnesses and failure to enforce such standing orders by senior officers. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Insufficient driver experience in controlling vehicles during difficulties

Wider context from the report

“1. Although the Army has taken action following a land accident prevention and investigation team report I was concerned although ████████ was qualified to drive the vehicle he had insufficient experience in encountering difficulties in controlling the vehicle. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Insufficient driver experience for safe vehicle control.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of senior officers to enforce safety harness standing orders

Wider context from the report

“2. Although standing orders had been in place following a previous similar accident there was a practice among commanders of vehicles not to wear safety harnesses and failure to enforce such standing orders by senior officers. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate vehicle occupant restraint systems.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop an online defensive-driver training package covering road awareness, vehicle control, driving styles and vehicle technology.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We are currently looking at a potential requirement to create an online defensive driver training package to improve safety through inclusion of road awareness, vehicle control, driving styles and vehicle technology.”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 1 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review the feasibility of additional inexperienced-driver training for vehicle loss-of-control scenarios.

Verbatim wording from the response

“With regard to driver training, defensive driving is an integral element of all our vehicle instructor, commander and driver training. We have reviewed the feasibility of providing additional training for inexperienced drivers in case of the loss of control of vehicles, and concluded that it would be exceptionally difficult to replicate such circumstances without introducing a high degree of risk to those within the vehicle.”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 1 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Issue safety directions to commanding officers of units equipped with wheeled armoured vehicles.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As you are aware, on conclusion of the Land Accident Investigation Team investigation into Sgt Foley’s death, a letter was sent to the Commanding Officers of all units equipped with wheeled armoured vehicles highlighting a range of safety concerns and directing the adoption of a number of measures to improve safe operation. Evidence from training suggests that this direction is being followed by both the chain of command and the user, with a negligible number of related incidents reported. Linked to these changes in course content (including placing greater emphasis on the training of commanders) and training delivery, I am assured that the chain of command is meeting its responsibilities for the safe and effective operation of wheeled armoured vehicles.”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 2 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Reinforce safety-harness requirements through commander instruction, revised driver and commander training, and annual mandated currency training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As you have recognised, the policy for the wearing of seatbelts and safety harnesses is clearly set out in Armoured Vehicle Standing Orders, which are to be complied with by all crew members, regardless of rank. Commanders of wheeled armoured vehicles are now taught that they are responsible for ensuring that members of their crew wear safety harnesses at all times unless directed otherwise in relation to a specific tactical situation. Commanders are taught to reassess this as soon as the tactical situation”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 1 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing safety-harness policy and commander training were treated as sufficient to reinforce compliance, subject to tactical exceptions and reassessment.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As you have recognised, the policy for the wearing of seatbelts and safety harnesses is clearly set out in Armoured Vehicle Standing Orders, which are to be complied with by all crew members, regardless of rank. Commanders of wheeled armoured vehicles are now taught that they are responsible for ensuring that members of their crew wear safety harnesses at all times unless directed otherwise in relation to a specific tactical situation. Commanders are taught to reassess this as soon as the tactical situation”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 1 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Additional training to replicate vehicle loss-of-control situations was not pursued because doing so would create a high degree of risk to vehicle occupants.

Verbatim wording from the response

“With regard to driver training, defensive driving is an integral element of all our vehicle instructor, commander and driver training. We have reviewed the feasibility of providing additional training for inexperienced drivers in case of the loss of control of vehicles, and concluded that it would be exceptionally difficult to replicate such circumstances without introducing a high degree of risk to those within the vehicle.”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 1 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. 1

    Increase emphasis on commander training and related training delivery to support safe operation of wheeled armoured vehicles.

    Stated by Ministry of DefenceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 1 June 2015.
  2. 2

    Complete revised safety training for all crew members of wheeled armoured vehicles by April 2016.

    Stated by Ministry of DefenceStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 1 June 2015.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Increase emphasis on commander training and related training delivery to support safe operation of wheeled armoured vehicles.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As you are aware, on conclusion of the Land Accident Investigation Team investigation into Sgt Foley’s death, a letter was sent to the Commanding Officers of all units equipped with wheeled armoured vehicles highlighting a range of safety concerns and directing the adoption of a number of measures to improve safe operation. Evidence from training suggests that this direction is being followed by both the chain of command and the user, with a negligible number of related incidents reported. Linked to these changes in course content (including placing greater emphasis on the training of commanders) and training delivery, I am assured that the chain of command is meeting its responsibilities for the safe and effective operation of wheeled armoured vehicles.”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 2 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Complete revised safety training for all crew members of wheeled armoured vehicles by April 2016.

Verbatim wording from the response

“changes. For Revised Weapons Mounted Installation Kit + vehicles, this policy has been reinforced during new individual driver and commander training since December 2013, and then annually through mandated currency training. I recognise that it has taken some time to address legacy users (such as those involved in this tragic incident), due to the number of drivers and availability of courses, however our current aim is for all crewman of all wheeled armoured vehicles to have received the revised training by April 2016.”

Source location

2015-0204-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 2 · response
Published 1 June 2015

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026