PFD report

David Chandler · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 5 Jul 2018•Northamptonshire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
6

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

Open published report

Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Failure to establish clear responsibility for ensuring compressor isolation
    Part of recurring concern: Unclear accountability for health and safety controls
  2. Failure to complete the Permit To Work accurately with current isolation information
  3. Failure to identify hazardous substances in the Permit To Work
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.5

  1. Action

    Review the permit-to-work system and verify previous isolations against the enhanced isolation procedure when referenced by subsequent permits.

    Stated by Carlsberg Supply Company UK LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 August 2018.
  2. Action

    Enhance project pre-construction information so hazards and isolation responsibilities are identified, and require assigned parties to acknowledge them through a client brief checklist.

    Stated by Carlsberg Supply Company UK LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 August 2018.
  3. Action

    Implement long-term isolation controls, including colour-coded lock-off and tag-out identification, a long-term isolation register, quarterly review, and Head of Engineering re-validation.

    Stated by Carlsberg Supply Company UK LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 August 2018.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.3

  1. Position

    The response rejects that the permits caused confusion, stating that Crowley Carbon understood the isolation and ammonia risks.

    Stated by Carlsberg Supply Company UK LimitedDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to establish clear responsibility for ensuring compressor isolation

Wider context from the report

“(1) The isolation for the 2014 work was still in place and does not appear to have been reviewed in the intervening period. The 2014 work was of a different nature and did not require physical removal of the whole compressor. There does not appear to have been any formal review of the appropriate isolation standard for the work in November 2016 to be performed safely. (2) Carlsberg contracted the work to Crowley Carbon who employed specialist refrigeration engineers. The evidence at the inquest suggested that Crowley Carbon and Carlsberg were each relying on the other to ensure that the compressor was safely isolated. (3) The Permit To Work (PTW) issued by Carlsberg to allow Speedrite to remove the compressor made reference to the 2014 PTW isolation, was completed incorrectly, and made no reference to hazardous substances. (4) Relying on the isolation from previous work on the compressor appears to have caused confusion as to the safe level of isolation necessary for work of a different nature two years later. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unclear accountability for health and safety controls.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to complete the Permit To Work accurately with current isolation information

Wider context from the report

“(1) The isolation for the 2014 work was still in place and does not appear to have been reviewed in the intervening period. The 2014 work was of a different nature and did not require physical removal of the whole compressor. There does not appear to have been any formal review of the appropriate isolation standard for the work in November 2016 to be performed safely. (2) Carlsberg contracted the work to Crowley Carbon who employed specialist refrigeration engineers. The evidence at the inquest suggested that Crowley Carbon and Carlsberg were each relying on the other to ensure that the compressor was safely isolated. (3) The Permit To Work (PTW) issued by Carlsberg to allow Speedrite to remove the compressor made reference to the 2014 PTW isolation, was completed incorrectly, and made no reference to hazardous substances. (4) Relying on the isolation from previous work on the compressor appears to have caused confusion as to the safe level of isolation necessary for work of a different nature two years later. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to identify hazardous substances in the Permit To Work

Wider context from the report

“(1) The isolation for the 2014 work was still in place and does not appear to have been reviewed in the intervening period. The 2014 work was of a different nature and did not require physical removal of the whole compressor. There does not appear to have been any formal review of the appropriate isolation standard for the work in November 2016 to be performed safely. (2) Carlsberg contracted the work to Crowley Carbon who employed specialist refrigeration engineers. The evidence at the inquest suggested that Crowley Carbon and Carlsberg were each relying on the other to ensure that the compressor was safely isolated. (3) The Permit To Work (PTW) issued by Carlsberg to allow Speedrite to remove the compressor made reference to the 2014 PTW isolation, was completed incorrectly, and made no reference to hazardous substances. (4) Relying on the isolation from previous work on the compressor appears to have caused confusion as to the safe level of isolation necessary for work of a different nature two years later. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to review and determine the appropriate isolation standard for changed work

Wider context from the report

“(1) The isolation for the 2014 work was still in place and does not appear to have been reviewed in the intervening period. The 2014 work was of a different nature and did not require physical removal of the whole compressor. There does not appear to have been any formal review of the appropriate isolation standard for the work in November 2016 to be performed safely. (2) Carlsberg contracted the work to Crowley Carbon who employed specialist refrigeration engineers. The evidence at the inquest suggested that Crowley Carbon and Carlsberg were each relying on the other to ensure that the compressor was safely isolated. (3) The Permit To Work (PTW) issued by Carlsberg to allow Speedrite to remove the compressor made reference to the 2014 PTW isolation, was completed incorrectly, and made no reference to hazardous substances. (4) Relying on the isolation from previous work on the compressor appears to have caused confusion as to the safe level of isolation necessary for work of a different nature two years later. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review the permit-to-work system and verify previous isolations against the enhanced isolation procedure when referenced by subsequent permits.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Carlsberg has reviewed the PTW system and has concluded that it is fit for purpose. The Health and Safety Executive attended the site on 15 August 2017. The permit system was reviewed during that visit and it made no recommendations for improvement.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 3 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Enhance project pre-construction information so hazards and isolation responsibilities are identified, and require assigned parties to acknowledge them through a client brief checklist.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Since the incident, Carlsberg has enhanced its suite of documentation concerning the provision of pre-construction information to relevant parties. This documentation was and is specific to each project and will identify the hazards relevant to the works being undertaken. As part of this communication the responsibility for isolations is clearly defined. To ensure all parties understand the role that they are assigned specific to CDM15 Carlsberg continues to require those parties to sign a “client brief checklist”.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 2 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement long-term isolation controls, including colour-coded lock-off and tag-out identification, a long-term isolation register, quarterly review, and Head of Engineering re-validation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As noted above, the isolations implemented in 2014 were effective between that date and the Works (in that they did not allow ammonia to pass). Nevertheless, Carlsberg has implemented a system to ensure that long-term isolations are reviewed in accordance with HSG253. It has implemented a colour co-ordinated ‘Lock-Off and Tag Out’ procedure so that long-term isolations are easily distinguished from short-term isolations. Carlsberg has also introduced a long-term isolation register, which is reviewed on a quarterly basis and re-validated by the Head of Engineering.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 2 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review and strengthen isolation policies and procedures using HSG253, including risk assessment, defined isolation procedures, and refresher training for relevant personnel.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Since the incident the isolation policy and procedures across Carlsberg have been reviewed using the HSE guidance document entitled “The safe isolation of plant and equipment” (HSG253). The policy and procedures now in place require any isolation to be risk assessed and implemented in accordance with HSG253. For each isolation, there is a defined procedure to enable trained individuals to apply an isolation suitable to protect against the hazardous energy source. All relevant personnel have received refresher training.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 2 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review the competence of personnel responsible for completing permits to work and provide specific HSG253 training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Since the incident, Carlsberg has reviewed the competence of individuals with responsibility for completing PTWs. To further enhance competency, specific HSG253 training was conducted post incident.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 3 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The response rejects that the permits caused confusion, stating that Crowley Carbon understood the isolation and ammonia risks.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We do not accept that there was confusion caused by the permit issued in respect of either the 2014 or 2016 works. Crowley Carbon was aware of the nature of the isolation performed in 2014. The evidence clearly demonstrated that Crowley Carbon personnel were fully aware of the presence of ammonia in the discharge pipework beyond the isolation on the discharge side of the compressor unit. See the response to point 1 above. Carlsberg expected the work to be planned, managed and monitored by Crowley Carbon so as to control those risks. See the response to point 2 above.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 3 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Crowley Carbon, as Principal Contractor and Principal Designer, was responsible for planning and controlling isolation risks during the works.

Verbatim wording from the response

“During the course of 2016 Crowley Carbon Limited (Crowley Carbon), a specialist energy efficiency company with expertise in industrial ammonia refrigeration plant systems, conducted an energy efficiency study and concluded that Carlsberg could make significant improvements. Carlsberg accepted Crowley Carbon's recommendations and appointed them as Principal Contractor and Principal Designer (within the meaning of the Construction Design and Management Regulations 2015) for the project.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 1 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The permit-to-work system is considered fit for purpose, and external review identified no recommendations for improvement.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Carlsberg has reviewed the PTW system and has concluded that it is fit for purpose. The Health and Safety Executive attended the site on 15 August 2017. The permit system was reviewed during that visit and it made no recommendations for improvement.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 3 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.1

  1. 1

    Require prospective Principal Contractors and Principal Designers to demonstrate competence and exclude non-approved safe-contractor companies from tendering for those roles.

    Stated by Carlsberg Supply Company UK LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 August 2018.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.1

  1. 1

    Even if the 2014 isolations had failed, the closed ammonia system would not have allowed ammonia to escape to atmosphere.

    Stated by Carlsberg Supply Company UK LimitedDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Require prospective Principal Contractors and Principal Designers to demonstrate competence and exclude non-approved safe-contractor companies from tendering for those roles.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Carlsberg requires all potential Principal Contractors and Principal Designers to adequately demonstrate competency in undertaking said duties and any companies not approved under the safe contractor scheme for these critical roles are not invited to tender.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 2 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Even if the 2014 isolations had failed, the closed ammonia system would not have allowed ammonia to escape to atmosphere.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Those isolations remained in situ between 2014 and 2016. However, even if the isolations had failed in some way, which they did not, ammonia would not have escaped to atmosphere because the ammonia system was closed. In other words, even if one of the isolations failed, ammonia would have progressed into the compressor unit only rather than to atmosphere.”

Source location

2018-0215-Response-by-Carlsberg-UK
Page 1 · response
Published 14 August 2018

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026