Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical handover processes

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 27 Nov 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical handovers between healthcare staff, teams, wards or hospitals where the handover process is intended to transfer patient information, risks, concerns, responsibilities or required actions for safe ongoing care, including inadequate content, unclear standards, omission of key information, ineffective challenge and poor risk prioritisation.

Not included

  • Excludes non-clinical handovers, such as fire-and-rescue incident-role handovers or transport crew drop-off and pick-up handovers.
  • Excludes failures limited to retaining, reviewing or acting on information after an otherwise adequate clinical handover, unless the handover process itself is also deficient.
  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, training or documentation deficiencies not directly tied to a clinical handover.
  • Excludes the narrower shift-handover process where the assertion is confined to shift-change handover and does not support the wider clinical-handover condition.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway or system where that pathway provides the more specific supported parent boundary.
Reports
67

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
74

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
107

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England7
Care Quality Commission5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board2
General Medical Council2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust2
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists2
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Marsland · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs. Marsland died in hospital on 14 November 2025 after a urinary infection progressed to sepsis, septic shock and multiorgan failure. The principal concerns were that abnormal blood results were not reviewed or escalated, she was discharged without antibiotics, and key action-plan measures for structured handover and named clinical responsibility had not been implemented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a structured cross-team handover from ED to speciality departments

    Wider context from the report

    “4) ████████ evidence was that key aspects of the PSII action plan that are intended to mitigate the risk of future deaths are yet to be implemented by the Trust. In particular addressing the need for a structured cross-team handover from ED to speciality departments capturing clinical concerns, abnormal results, escalation plans, and creating named responsible clinicians. ”

    Source location

    Judith Marsland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Viviana-Ray Winnie Elsie Wendy Butnaru · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Viviana-Ray Winnie Elsie Wendy Butnaru attended the Children’s Emergency Department on 24 October 2024 and died at Basildon Hospital on 25 October 2024 after cardiac arrest. The stated cause of death was myocarditis caused by Parvovirus, contributed to by bronchiolitis and bronchopneumonia. Concerns included delayed reporting of chest X-rays showing cardiomegaly, incomplete exploration of metabolic acidosis, failures in escalation and review processes, and incomplete documentation and handovers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incomplete recording of medical-team handovers

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) Incomplete documentation to be addressed to include all updates from nursing staff in relation to observations and escalations; and handovers from the medical team to one another to be clearly recorded. ”

    Source location

    Viviana-Ray Winnie Elsie Wendy Butnaru · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    James Fitzpatrick · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Fitzpatrick, an 89-year-old man with decompensated heart failure and respiratory illness, became unresponsive after coughing and was found with food material in his mouth; his death was confirmed on 14 February 2024. The principal concerns were the lack of written national and local guidance for care handovers, and the risk that incomplete or incorrect handover information could affect patient care and contribute to a future death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure accurate and complete handover information

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Two weeks prior to his death, Jim was moved to another ward within Alderney Hospital. There was a verbal handover undertaken which was recorded in the electronic patient records. No written handover was provided. The patient records referred to him being a “high risk of choking” and “on an unofficial soft diet”. This information was not true and was not recorded anywhere else in his records or risk assessments. (5) Further evidence was given that at the time of Jim’s death there were a number of agency workers at Alderney Hospital, and they would rely on information provided to them at the start of their shift during the handover as they would not have time to go through each patient’s records to appraise themselves of the patient’s history and risks. A daily written handover sheet was provided at the beginning of each shift which would be updated during the day, however from the daily handover sheet provided to the Court for the day of Jim’s death, pertinent general information about Jim was missing from that handover sheet. (6) The lack of written local and national guidance on the handover of a patient’s care creates a risk that incorrect or incomplete information can be passed to those caring for an individual which may impact upon the patient’s care and may lead to a future death. ”

    Source location

    James Fitzpatrick · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of written national guidance for handovers across healthcare settings

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There is a lack of written national guidance on how handovers between Doctors, Nurses and support staff should be undertaken either when a patient is moved between wards or hospitals, or when there is the handover to staff starting a shift who will be taking over the care of the person. Whilst it is acknowledged that each Trust has different policies and procedures in place, there is no generic national guidance to assist in ensuring relevant, pertinent and critical information is passed on to those who will be caring for the patient. (2) Evidence was provided that national guidance currently exists in England and Wales for handovers relating to emergency care in acute hospitals, however there is no other guidance for other healthcare settings as to what a handover should include or how it should be undertaken. ”

    Source location

    James Fitzpatrick · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen Good medical practice standards on continuity of care, information sharing, safe delegation and handover responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We recently completed a review of Good medical practice and the latest version (effective from 30 January 2024) was developed following an extensive public consultation process, involving members of the professions, the public, patients and other stakeholders. Analysis of the responses revealed that team working and continuity of care were priority themes and we strengthened the guidance in several areas to reflect this.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from General Medical Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Analyse consultation responses on Leadership and management and Raising concerns guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our review of our guidance on Leadership and management and Raising concerns”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from General Medical Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop updated Leadership and management and Raising concerns guidance following the consultation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have recently conducted a public consultation on these two pieces of guidance, and we are in the process of analysing the results. We intend to publish a report on the findings of the consultation later this year and will go on to develop an updated version of the guidance. We will consider the concerns raised in your report as part of this review process.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from General Medical Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver outreach talks and workshops supporting implementation of professional standards, including communication, teamwork, information sharing and patient safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our Outreach teams across the UK regularly give talks and run workshops on the implementation of our guidance to our registrants. These workshops will often highlight the importance of communication, teamwork, ensuring effective information sharing and prioritising patient safety.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from General Medical Council
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore opportunities to promote handover, continuity of care, teamwork and communication expectations through Outreach when promoting updated guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will explore opportunities to promote our expectations regarding handovers, continuity of care, team working and communication with our Outreach team as we look to promote and implement our updated guidance on Leadership and management and Raising concerns.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from General Medical Council
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish a guideline recommending structured patient handovers during transitions of care for adults receiving emergency and acute medical care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NICE has published limited guidance in this area. NICE guideline Emergency and acute medical care in over 16s: service delivery and organisation (NG94) covers organising and delivering emergency and acute medical care for people aged over 16 in the community and in hospital, and recommends the use of structured handovers during transitions of care. The NICE quality standard Emergency and acute medical care in over 16s (QS174) states in quality statement 4 that ‘Adults admitted with a medical emergency have a structured patient handover during transitions of care’. However, these recommendations do not quite apply to the circumstances of this report”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish a quality standard requiring structured patient handovers during transitions of care for adults admitted with a medical emergency.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NICE has published limited guidance in this area. NICE guideline Emergency and acute medical care in over 16s: service delivery and organisation (NG94) covers organising and delivering emergency and acute medical care for people aged over 16 in the community and in hospital, and recommends the use of structured handovers during transitions of care. The NICE quality standard Emergency and acute medical care in over 16s (QS174) states in quality statement 4 that ‘Adults admitted with a medical emergency have a structured patient handover during transitions of care’. However, these recommendations do not quite apply to the circumstances of this report”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and take SBAR-based inpatient handover guidance through internal governance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are committed to ensuring that the development and implementation of the new pan-Dorset electronic health record in 2028 prioritises a robust, accurate, and live handover function to support safe and consistent practice across all services.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prioritise a robust, accurate, live handover function in the pan-Dorset electronic health record planned for 2028.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are committed to ensuring that the development and implementation of the new pan-Dorset electronic health record in 2028 prioritises a robust, accurate, and live handover function to support safe and consistent practice across all services.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Scope handover processes across all mental health inpatient units by June 2026 to identify required changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alongside this immediate action to develop this guidance we have adopted a focus on handovers as a Trust Quality Priority for 2026/27. As part of this work, the first action is to scope the handover processes across all mental health inpatient units by June 2026. This will allow us to understand current approaches, the reasoning behind them, and what changes are required in light of the learning from this inquest whilst we await the new electronic health record. Establishing the Quality Priority for “Improving Inpatient and Transfer of Care Handovers”, means that audits of any incidents relating to concerns regarding handover processes will be reviewed and reported through the Directorate Management Groups for oversight and assurance. The auditing processes will be undertaken between June 2026 and March 2027.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit handover-related incidents across inpatient wards, report findings through governance groups, and monitor progress quarterly through March 2027.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alongside this immediate action to develop this guidance we have adopted a focus on handovers as a Trust Quality Priority for 2026/27. As part of this work, the first action is to scope the handover processes across all mental health inpatient units by June 2026. This will allow us to understand current approaches, the reasoning behind them, and what changes are required in light of the learning from this inquest whilst we await the new electronic health record. Establishing the Quality Priority for “Improving Inpatient and Transfer of Care Handovers”, means that audits of any incidents relating to concerns regarding handover processes will be reviewed and reported through the Directorate Management Groups for oversight and assurance. The auditing processes will be undertaken between June 2026 and March 2027.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing guidance from the NMC, GMC, NHS England and CQC is sufficient, so further NICE guidance on handovers is unlikely to improve safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have carefully considered this request, and our conclusion is that further NICE guidance in this area would not add to the guidance already available from other organisations such as the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) the General Medical Council (GMC) and NHS England and overseen by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). I have explained our reasoning for this below”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The NMC is responsible for responding to concerns about incorrect information handed over during a previous patient transfer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. In a previous transfer, incorrect information was handed over about the person concerned This area of concern is for the NMC to respond to.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An additional general recommendation to include all pertinent information in written handover sheets is unlikely to be effective.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Staff relied on information provided to them at the start of their shift during the handover and a daily written handover sheet, provided at the beginning of each shift and updated during the day I have addressed this point above in explaining the various guidelines that exist for healthcare practitioners. We do not feel that an additional general recommendation to ‘ensure all pertinent information is included in written handover sheets’ is likely to prove effective.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing professional standards adequately address communication, handover, record keeping, risk escalation and safe transfer of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While we recognise the concerns raised, we consider that communication, handover, record keeping, escalation of risk, and the safe transfer of responsibility for care are already addressed adequately within the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s professional standards, including The Code: Professional standards of practice and behaviour for nurses, midwives and nursing associates and the Standards of proficiency for registered nurses.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from Nursing and Midwifery Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinical standards and clinical advice on handovers fall outside the respondent’s professional-regulatory functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We do not set clinical standards or give clinical advice to our registrants. This is the role of a wide range of other bodies, such as the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), government health departments and the medical royal colleges. I can see that you have sent your report to NICE.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from General Medical Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinical standards and advice on handovers are assigned to bodies such as NICE, government health departments and medical royal colleges.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We do not set clinical standards or give clinical advice to our registrants. This is the role of a wide range of other bodies, such as the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), government health departments and the medical royal colleges. I can see that you have sent your report to NICE.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from General Medical Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Detailed handover guidance for every healthcare facility would be impractical for a central organisation and unsuitable for differing local contexts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We believe that detailed specific guidance for every individual healthcare facility on patient handover would be very challenging for a central organisation to produce and would not be well adapted to the local setting and context. Instead, each organisation should produce local, relevant guidance based on the resources outlined above.”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National bodies are responsible for issuing any future community and mental health handover guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Trust Response: Following the concerns raised, we undertook a further review to determine whether any national guidance was in development. At present, we are not aware of any proposed updates or new guidance documents regarding community and mental health handover processes. We await the response from the National Bodies identified in your Regulation 28 report (NICE, GMC,”

    Source location

    2026-0087 - Response from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  4. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Colin Richard BROWN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Colin Richard Brown attended York Hospital Emergency Department on 28 March 2025 and choked on food provided by the hospital, leading to a cardiac arrest and transfer to intensive care. He died on 31 March 2025. The concerns were that his care plan was not transported to hospital and that information about his choking risk might not be reliably communicated or checked during the handover period.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely check for patients' choking risks during handovers

    Wider context from the report

    “During the inquest I heard evidence that confirmed that a copy of Mr Brown's care plan was not transported with him to hospital. There was mention in the notes from Yorkshire Ambulance Service (YAS) that Mr Brown was a choking risk but there was a delay of approximately 25 minutes between Mr Brown being verbally handed across to hospital staff and the YAS Electronic Patient Form being uploaded to the Core Patient Database and accessible to staff dealing with Mr Brown. Such a delay is usual and inevitable in these circumstances, allowing time, for example, to access a device to action the upload. However, during this 25 minutes the only information that is available is what is shared orally in the handover and noted down by hospital staff. This may not include reference to a patient being a choking risk either because it is not mentioned by the ambulance crew or, because it is not deemed necessary by the hospital staff to check or to note, particularly in circumstances where this is entirely unrelated to the presenting concern. The evidence before me was that a patient being a choking risk is not routinely checked during all handovers. It was accepted in evidence that patients may not reliably draw attention to this crucial information themselves, as was the case here. ”

    Source location

    Colin Richard BROWN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a sip-testing procedure and staff training, with Speech and Language Therapy referral after failed tests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where new concerns are identified about a patient’s swallowing ability, the Trust has a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Sip Testing in place along with training. This provides staff with guidance around how to complete a sip test to determine whether the patient is safe to eat and drink normally. If they fail the sip test e.g. due to coughing, no swallow, delayed or multiple swallows then they are referred to the Speech & Language Therapy (SALT) team for further advice and assessment to determine the most appropriate diet options for the patient.”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out Nervecentre with prominent alerts for recorded swallowing difficulties and recommended texture-modified diets.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The introduction of the Trust’s new electronic patient record (Nervecentre) is being rolled out from next month with expected completion in the autumn. This will include the option to have a prominent alert to highlight if a patient has a previously identified swallowing difficulty recorded in the system and what their recommended texture-modified diet should be. This information will therefore be clearly available at future attendances.”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a clinical alert reinforcing explicit handover of known high-impact risks and documentation of verbal handover content.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Clinical emphasis within handover guidance: YAS will issue a clinical alert to all staff to reinforce that known high-risk features not directly related to the presenting complaint (for example swallowing/choking risk, severe cognitive impairment, or behavioural risk) should be considered for explicit verbal handover where omission could reasonably result in harm and that clinicians document the contents of the verbal handover.”

    Source location

    Response from Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update handover protocols where appropriate to reflect contemporary practice and learning from the case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Review of handover protocols: YAS will review its handover protocols and update where appropriate to reflect contemporary practices and learning from this tragic case.”

    Source location

    Response from Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate case learning into the monthly Patient Safety Bulletin and support local educational sessions for clinical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Targeted learning and awareness: Learning from this case will be incorporated into the monthly YAS Patient Safety Bulletin accessible to all clinical staff. These materials will also support local educational sessions (termed internally as ‘investment days’) and will emphasise professional judgement, advocating for the continued use of structured, succinct and clinically pertinent handover conversations.”

    Source location

    Response from Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Emergency Department action for swallowing or choking risks is limited by patients’ clinical needs and what is operationally deliverable in a busy department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We follow principles of safe handover practice and balance all information received with the immediate emergency needs of the patient. If we are in receipt at handover of information regarding a significant risk such as severe previous swallowing difficulties or choking risk this will be considered within the assessment of any immediate care needs to help manage the emergency situation. Action will be taken which is proportionate to the patient’s clinical needs in balance with what is operationally deliverable in a busy Emergency Department. Such a significant risk would be recorded in the patient’s record to ensure continuity of care throughout the patient’s journey.”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The crew appropriately recorded and verbally handed over swallowing difficulty; it was historical background rather than an identified active or immediate choking risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““The information I have been provided shows the attending crew reported that Mr Brown did not disclose any requirement for a modified or soft diet to them, nor was any care plan or supporting documentation reported as existing or being provided, despite care notes within the bundle provided by HM Coroner stating Mr Brown required a modified diet. Furthermore, a collateral history was not obtainable as no carers or family members were at the scene. The ePR completed by the crew does include a past medical history entry noting previous swallowing difficulty. This reflects historical medical background obtained through them accessing the Summary Care Record for Mr Brown. This is part of routine history-taking and information gathering rather than identification of an active or clinically apparent risk at the time of ambulance assessment.”

    Source location

    Response from Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Routine verbalisation of choking risk for every patient is not operationally deliverable or proportionate and could cause information overload and missed pertinent details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““It is not feasible, nor clinically proportionate, for ambulance clinicians to identify and verbally communicate all potential secondary risks for every patient during every handover, particularly where these are longstanding conditions documented elsewhere and unrelated to the reason for conveyance. Adopting an approach such as this increases risk of key clinical information being missed and prolongs the handover process, meaning crews will be unable to respond to further emergencies. This is reflected in national guidance and contemporary literature advocating for structured, succinct handover. Structured handover therefore represents a balance between completeness and safety, aligned with human-factors principles and the avoidance of information overload.”

    Source location

    Response from Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Neil John Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Neil John Clarke, aged 81, died at Stepping Hill Hospital on 26 February 2024 after vomiting, aspiration and a cardiac arrest following a right hemicolectomy. The report raises concerns about the safety and wellbeing considerations for surgical procedures involving elderly patients, documentation and guidance about treatment choices, and the accuracy of handover communications when patients return to the main ward from HDU.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate handover communications for patients returning from HDU to the main ward

    Wider context from the report

    “The considerations given to the appropriateness, from a safety and well-being perspective, of surgical procedures involving elderly patients who may benefit from more conservative measures and the associated documentation and guidance advising patients of different treatment choices. My second concern arising from this interest was the accuracy of hand over communications between clinical staff in respect of patients returning to the main ward from HDU. ”

    Source location

    Neil John Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use an updated ICU/HDU-to-ward discharge checklist requiring dual signatures from the transferring and receiving nurses, with implementation auditing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ Divisional Nursing Director, together with ████████ would like to assure you that changes to process had been implemented prior to Mr Clarke’s inquest and these changes continue to be embedded throughout the Division of Surgery and the wider Trust. Examples of the changes implemented are outlined below:”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require ICU and receiving ward nurses to attend the first post-transfer observations and audit those observations as part of the safety strategy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. In addition, as part of the joint handover, when the ICU nurse arrives with a patient who is being transferred to a ward both nurses will be in attendance for the first set of observations, which are recorded on Patientrack. Observations done at the point of transfer are being audited for our internal data capture and this remains part of the Trust’s Quality Safety Improvement Strategy and will remain an ongoing audit and key performance indicator.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold weekday multidisciplinary transfer meetings to identify suitable ICU step-down patients, support core-hours transfers and prompt ward communication when beds become available.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. The Division of Surgery, are focused on supporting transfers within core hours, and before 17:00 hours, to ensure that we avoid any handover period on the main wards. A daily meeting has been established (Monday to Friday) at 14:00 hours where General Surgical Elective wards including ICU, HDU and theatres, together with site coordinators and manager of the day for surgery, meet to identify appropriate patients who can be stepped down from ICU care to ward level care. The expectation is that once the patient has been identified for transfer, the main ward will actively communicate once that bed has become available. The aim is to improve communication and ensure the timely transfer of patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Stockport NHS Foundation Trust is responsible for responding to concerns about handover communications at Stepping Hill Hospital.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your second concern focused on the accuracy of handover communications between clinical staff regarding patients returning to the main ward from the High Dependency Unit (HDU) at Stepping Hill Hospital.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response
  6. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Nora Elizabeth YOUNG · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Susan Nora Elizabeth Young was admitted to hospital after taking overdoses of prescription medication on 22 and 23 August 2024. She was transferred to a ward with directions for cardiac monitoring, but no clinical handover or monitoring instructions were provided. She was later found unresponsive and not attached to monitoring, and resuscitation failed; unused medication was subsequently found among her belongings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clinical handover to receiving wards

    Wider context from the report

    “NO clinical handover to receiving ward. No instructions passed on from the doctor re cardiac monitoring. Patients own medication found in her belongings which had been with her, after her death allowing her the opportunity to take another overdose. ”

    Source location

    Susan Nora Elizabeth YOUNG · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a standard ED-to-EADU handover process and form that includes specialist requirements such as cardiac monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “vi. As a Trust, we are developing a communication process for handover with a task and finish group commencing 23rd May 2025. This includes leads from each department including ED and EADU. The flow chart is in the design phase, with an aim to commence the new process mid-June. Specialist requirements for the patient including cardiac monitoring will be included in the handover template. Once embedded, an audit will take place to monitor compliance and identify gaps needing further education and support.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit the implemented ED Patient Handover Form monthly from September until consistent compliance is demonstrated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support and evidence our addressing of all three matters of concern raised, we have included the updated Trust Transfer Policy, including the trust handover process which has been communicated and promoted to staff, the summary of the policy expectations that has been communicated to ED staff, evidence of the associated staff training undertaken and a copy of the ED Patient Handover Form now in use for all patient transfers. An audit of the implemented ED Patient Handover Form is scheduled in September and will be ongoing monthly until results demonstrate good and consistent compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 11 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the ED patient handover process and form for transfers, including communication of cardiac monitoring and other specialist requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “vi. As a Trust, we are developing a communication process for handover with a task and finish group commencing 23rd May 2025. This includes leads from each department including ED and EADU. The flow chart is in the design phase, with an aim to commence the new process mid-June. Specialist requirements for the patient including cardiac monitoring will be included in the handover template. Once embedded, an audit will take place to monitor compliance and identify gaps needing further education and support.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit compliance with the ED patient handover form monthly after the scheduled September audit until consistent compliance is demonstrated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support and evidence our addressing of all three matters of concern raised, we have included the updated Trust Transfer Policy, including the trust handover process which has been communicated and promoted to staff, the summary of the policy expectations that has been communicated to ED staff, evidence of the associated staff training undertaken and a copy of the ED Patient Handover Form now in use for all patient transfers. An audit of the implemented ED Patient Handover Form is scheduled in September and will be ongoing monthly until results demonstrate good and consistent compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 11 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response
  7. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Katrina Veronica Francesca Insley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katrina Insley died on 1 January 2024 at Alexandra Hospital, Redditch, from sepsis due to an infected pressure sore and pneumonia. The report identified concerns about the absence of a formal, documented handover system between hospital and the Neighbourhood Team, limited access to hospital records, and the resulting risk of delayed recognition and treatment of pressure sores, infection and sepsis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a formal, documented handover system between hospital and Neighbourhood Team

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The absence of a formal, documented handover system between hospital and Neighbourhood Team and the fact that the NT cannot simply check hospital records of patients with pressure sores to verify their condition without specifically requesting records creates the potential for the NT to fail to appreciate the true condition of a patient’s pressure sores when they are discharged from hospital and follow up to be delayed. This increases the risk of wound infection and consequent sepsis. (2) I am informed (letter received from HWHT on 31.1.25) that there are established handover procedures and that a statement of practice is being drafted to “formalise” the referral requirements between hospital and NT. I am informed also that an App is being developed which can be used to record and check the condition of pressure sores and that it has the potential to be used across acute and community services. I do not consider that these proposals are sufficiently detailed, precise and concluded to address the concerns that I have expressed. ”

    Source location

    Katrina Veronica Francesca Insley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a handover form containing wound-care advice drawn from electronic patient-record and Tissue Viability records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, the Acute Trust have developed a handover form (copy attached), which will detail wound care advice taken from the information on ‘Sunrise’ within the nursing and Tissue Viability records. This will be sent home with the patient and therefore will be available for them to share with professionals who attend their home, as an additional source of information alongside the Electronic Patient Record system.”

    Source location

    Response from Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust and Worcestershire Acute Hospitals Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send the wound-care handover form home with discharged patients for sharing with professionals providing care at home.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, the Acute Trust have developed a handover form (copy attached), which will detail wound care advice taken from the information on ‘Sunrise’ within the nursing and Tissue Viability records. This will be sent home with the patient and therefore will be available for them to share with professionals who attend their home, as an additional source of information alongside the Electronic Patient Record system.”

    Source location

    Response from Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust and Worcestershire Acute Hospitals Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 February 2025

    Open published response
  8. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    LAURA-JANE KIRSTEN NICOLE SEAMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laura-Jane Seaman died at Broomfield Hospital on 23 December 2022 following a massive intra-abdominal haemorrhage after a recent vaginal delivery, with subsequent disseminated intravascular coagulation. The principal concerns were failures to recognise and escalate maternal collapse and hypovolaemia, obtain and record vital signs and blood-test results, examine for covert bleeding, activate the major haemorrhage protocol, and provide appropriate senior review. The inquest concluded that her death was avoidable and contributed to by neglect.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate key information during staff handovers

    Wider context from the report

    “(10) Quality of communication and handovers between Trust staff key information was omitted in handovers between staff at all levels including when Laura-Jane was taken to theatre as a medical emergency. ”

    Source location

    LAURA-JANE KIRSTEN NICOLE SEAMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide structured handover guidance using SBAR and SHARING tools to improve communication of critical information between maternity teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Improving patient handover⁸ (Good Practice Paper No. 12). States that it is important to optimise communication of critical information as an essential component of risk management and patient safety. It goes on to describe two structured tools to use for effective communication between teams to improve the efficiency of communication. The two structured tools described by the RCOG are SBAR (situation – background – assessment – recommendation) and SHARING (Staff, High risk, Awaiting theatre, Recovery ward, Inductions, NICU, Gynaecology). These act as an aide memoir to provide appropriate team updates during handovers.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
    Page 4 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Teach and practise SBAR escalation during annual multidisciplinary PROMPT training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The obstetric, midwifery and anaesthetic teams have yearly Practical Obstetric Multi Professional Training (PROMPT) training sessions as an MDT where they role play emergency scenarios. Since Laura-Jane’s death, during PROMPT, the teams are taught about the SBAR tool, (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation). Escalation via the use of the SBAR tool is practiced teaching the quality and effectiveness of good communication. SBAR is an easy to remember mechanism to use to frame communications or conversations. It is a structured way of communicating information that requires a response from the receiver. As such, SBAR can be used very effectively to escalate a clinical problem that requires immediate attention, or to facilitate efficient handover of patients between clinicians or clinical teams.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch the RCOG escalation toolkit, including AID language, conflict-resolution teaching and team-of-shift handover practices.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the Each Baby Counts initiative, the maternity service is launching the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists’ (RCOG) ‘Escalation Toolkit’ in February 2025. This toolkit is designed to enhance escalation and improve patient safety and consists of three key components:”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue escalation work and audit compliance with expected communication standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue with this work and monitor compliance with the expected standards by audit.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response
  9. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Regan Smith died at Kings College Hospital on 31 January 2023 after previously undiagnosed diabetes led to severe metabolic acidosis, multiorgan failure and acute liver failure. An abnormal blood glucose reading obtained by ambulance staff was not effectively handed over or recorded at hospital, resulting in his discharge without further glucose testing or treatment. The report identifies concerns about incompatible information systems, reliance on verbal handover during a period of high acuity, and the absence of national standards for emergency department handovers and confirmation of basic observations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of directly compatible ambulance and hospital IT systems for immediate availability of clinical information

    Wider context from the report

    “The information to save Regan’s life (his abnormal blood glucose reading) was in the possession of the NHS at a time when lifesaving treatment could have been given to him on the 25th January 2023. Regan’s death occurred as the result of an identifiable single point of failure (the ineffective handover process), as this led to a significant and known clinical finding being unavailable to his treating clinicians. Evidence heard that the handover system in Regan’s case was reliant on both ambulance and Accident and Emergency personnel making and receiving a verbal handover. The IT systems used by the Ambulance and Hospital Trusts are not directly compatible, and therefore clinical information (such as blood glucose level test results) are not immediately available to hospital personnel in every case. It was heard that Regan’s verbal only handover occurred during a period of very high acuity. On the 25th January 2023 the unit was exceptionally busy, the staff there had a high number of other sick children to care for, there was no cubicle space available, and the staff had not been able to take any of their scheduled breaks. When Regan did see a clinician, it was in the corridor. It was heard in evidence that there was no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, in relation to the conduct of patient handovers at Accident and Emergency Units. In addition, there is no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, to ensure basic observations are confirmed as being received by the receiving Accident and Emergency personnel. ”

    Source location

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of patient handover processes to ensure significant clinical findings are available to receiving clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “The information to save Regan’s life (his abnormal blood glucose reading) was in the possession of the NHS at a time when lifesaving treatment could have been given to him on the 25th January 2023. Regan’s death occurred as the result of an identifiable single point of failure (the ineffective handover process), as this led to a significant and known clinical finding being unavailable to his treating clinicians. Evidence heard that the handover system in Regan’s case was reliant on both ambulance and Accident and Emergency personnel making and receiving a verbal handover. The IT systems used by the Ambulance and Hospital Trusts are not directly compatible, and therefore clinical information (such as blood glucose level test results) are not immediately available to hospital personnel in every case. It was heard that Regan’s verbal only handover occurred during a period of very high acuity. On the 25th January 2023 the unit was exceptionally busy, the staff there had a high number of other sick children to care for, there was no cubicle space available, and the staff had not been able to take any of their scheduled breaks. When Regan did see a clinician, it was in the corridor. It was heard in evidence that there was no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, in relation to the conduct of patient handovers at Accident and Emergency Units. In addition, there is no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, to ensure basic observations are confirmed as being received by the receiving Accident and Emergency personnel. ”

    Source location

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop IT support linking ambulance and emergency department systems to improve electronic clinical information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The rapid exchange of clinical information verbally remains an integral part of communication. However, work is ongoing with NHSE to provide IT support that can deliver improved sharing of electronic information across systems. Linking the ambulance computer aided despatch system and electronic patient record collected by ambulance services with emergency departments data will provide better information about the patient journey.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out an ambulance dataset linking ambulance-service and emergency-department data through the emergency care data set.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, to support learning and system improvement, an ambulance data set is also currently being rolled out across England. This will be achieved by linking patient data collected by ambulance services with data collected by emergency departments through the emergency care data set.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local process improvements and ambulance information systems provide an adequate response to clinical handover and patient-record concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding the formal clinical handover of patients, there are a number of protocols that should be followed. This includes standards set out by the General Medical Council on how patient information should be shared, and the NHS standard contract which sets out targets on handover delays. The responsibility for the implementation and oversight of protocols across England is at a local level. I understand that ESNEFT submitted evidence during the inquest which set out actions being taken locally to improve processes which you have considered and were content with. EEAST advise that in the East of England, all hospital A&Es have information systems to provide records of patients arriving by ambulance and that they are ensuring that ambulance patient care records are available as part of the assessment of patients who arrive at A&E by ambulance.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implementation and oversight of clinical handover protocols across England are the responsibility of local organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding the formal clinical handover of patients, there are a number of protocols that should be followed. This includes standards set out by the General Medical Council on how patient information should be shared, and the NHS standard contract which sets out targets on handover delays. The responsibility for the implementation and oversight of protocols across England is at a local level. I understand that ESNEFT submitted evidence during the inquest which set out actions being taken locally to improve processes which you have considered and were content with. EEAST advise that in the East of England, all hospital A&Es have information systems to provide records of patients arriving by ambulance and that they are ensuring that ambulance patient care records are available as part of the assessment of patients who arrive at A&E by ambulance.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response
  10. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Michael HUGGON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Huggon, who had declining health and profound anaemia, became seriously unwell on 6 February 2024. After delays in obtaining urgent medical assistance and a hospital admission was declined, he collapsed in cardiac arrest shortly after midnight and died in hospital on 7 February 2024. The principal concerns were delays and an inadequate handover in responding to the urgent request for help, with concern that earlier assessment and admission might have enabled a blood transfusion and prevented his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide a rapid and secure handover of unfinished work when practice workload cannot be managed

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I was told at the hearing that it is now normal practice for any work unfinished by surgery closing time is left to the after hours service and that GPs no longer "call in on the way home". In this case there was no handover and the Huggons had to start their patient journey all over again -with a long delay to even speak to 111. The process was slow and inefficient with multiple doctors on call handlers involved [by my calculation 4 call handlers/receptionists, 1 nurse and 3 doctors]. I was previously aware that many ambulance calls promised by 111 are sent to Cumbria Health for re-triage to try to prioritize resources. The response from Carlisle Healthcare to a request for urgent help was in my view inadequate, however when Cumbria Health were eventually involved their response was timely. I suspect Michael was exhausted and almost beyond caring when he declined admission in the evening, but feel it is most likely that had he been seen and admitted to hospital earlier he could have received a blood transfusion and would not have died. (2) Given the above I am concerned that future deaths may occur if urgent requests are not dealt with more promptly, and that if a practice can not deal with its workload a rapid and secure handover process is put in place. I am also concerned that referral to 111 will continue to bring delays and place undue pressure on that service. ”

    Source location

    Michael HUGGON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate guidance to all GP practices on options for discussing and handing over cases of concern, including standalone communication and website publication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We will ensure that the information in the section above is communicated to the GP practices through all of Cumbria on the options Cumbria Health has for discussing and handing over cases of concern if they are unable to manage them within the constraints of their capacity, particularly at that shoulder time period of when they close and the Cumbria Health opens. This will be achieved by a standalone communication and guidance will be entered onto our newly developed website for ease of access.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pass triaged cases requiring same-day clinical input after closure directly to Cumbria Health by telephone.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following discussion with Cumbria Health, we have agreed that any cases that have already been triaged and need same day clinical input after we have closed will be passed directly to Cumbria Health via telephone, instead of asking the patient to contact 111. This should improve the patient experience of care and reduce delay in response times.”

    Source location

    Response from Carlisle Healthcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing information-sharing and clinical handover processes are considered sufficient to mitigate communication risks between healthcare organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Cumbria Health has for many years had processes in place to allow the exchange of clinical information between organisations that include not only daytime primary care but other organisations such as community nurses, hospice, and secondary care. We are very aware that communication issues are often the cause of situations where things could have gone better for patients and the measures, we already have in place are there to mitigate this risk. We also fully recognise the pressures on daytime practice which include capacity to address all the patient queries that arrive at the practice before the 18.30pm handover to Cumbria Health.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026