Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical handover processes

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First reported 27 Nov 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical handovers between healthcare staff, teams, wards or hospitals where the handover process is intended to transfer patient information, risks, concerns, responsibilities or required actions for safe ongoing care, including inadequate content, unclear standards, omission of key information, ineffective challenge and poor risk prioritisation.

Not included

  • Excludes non-clinical handovers, such as fire-and-rescue incident-role handovers or transport crew drop-off and pick-up handovers.
  • Excludes failures limited to retaining, reviewing or acting on information after an otherwise adequate clinical handover, unless the handover process itself is also deficient.
  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, training or documentation deficiencies not directly tied to a clinical handover.
  • Excludes the narrower shift-handover process where the assertion is confined to shift-change handover and does not support the wider clinical-handover condition.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway or system where that pathway provides the more specific supported parent boundary.
Reports
67

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
74

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
107

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England7
Care Quality Commission5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board2
General Medical Council2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust2
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists2
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth Goodwin was admitted to hospital with severe abdominal pain and was being treated for sepsis from gall stones and cholecystitis. After being transferred between wards at night, he fell before a falls risk assessment had been completed on the new ward, developed an acute subdural haematoma, and died on 9 June 2022. Concerns included the lack of required written confirmation of falls-risk handover, the delay in completing the new ward’s falls risk assessment, and inconsistent use of visual falls-risk signs on beds.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of specific written confirmation of falls-risk handovers between wards

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Inquest heard that the transfer process between wards for patients at risk of falls does not require a specific written confirmation that a handover in relation to that risk has taken place. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Relaunch the formal patient handover document across the Trust through weekly bulletin and targeted governance-team emails.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action – The Trust’s formal patient handover document was re-launched across the Trust on 15 November 2022, via the Trust’s ‘Risky Business’ weekly bulletin and also via targeted e-mails from the divisions governance teams. Alongside this all unauthorised handover documents have been removed from use. The use of the handover document will be audited by the senior nursing team during their ward audit programme to ensure that the correct handover document is reliably utilised. The patient handover document will also be a focus of a senior nurse walkround led by the Chief Nurse to highlight the importance of communication upon transfer of all appropriate risks.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove all unauthorised patient handover documents from use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action – The Trust’s formal patient handover document was re-launched across the Trust on 15 November 2022, via the Trust’s ‘Risky Business’ weekly bulletin and also via targeted e-mails from the divisions governance teams. Alongside this all unauthorised handover documents have been removed from use. The use of the handover document will be audited by the senior nursing team during their ward audit programme to ensure that the correct handover document is reliably utilised. The patient handover document will also be a focus of a senior nurse walkround led by the Chief Nurse to highlight the importance of communication upon transfer of all appropriate risks.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit use of the correct patient handover document through the senior nursing team’s ward audit programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action – The Trust’s formal patient handover document was re-launched across the Trust on 15 November 2022, via the Trust’s ‘Risky Business’ weekly bulletin and also via targeted e-mails from the divisions governance teams. Alongside this all unauthorised handover documents have been removed from use. The use of the handover document will be audited by the senior nursing team during their ward audit programme to ensure that the correct handover document is reliably utilised. The patient handover document will also be a focus of a senior nurse walkround led by the Chief Nurse to highlight the importance of communication upon transfer of all appropriate risks.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the patient handover document in a Chief Nurse-led senior nurse walkround to reinforce communication of risks during transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action – The Trust’s formal patient handover document was re-launched across the Trust on 15 November 2022, via the Trust’s ‘Risky Business’ weekly bulletin and also via targeted e-mails from the divisions governance teams. Alongside this all unauthorised handover documents have been removed from use. The use of the handover document will be audited by the senior nursing team during their ward audit programme to ensure that the correct handover document is reliably utilised. The patient handover document will also be a focus of a senior nurse walkround led by the Chief Nurse to highlight the importance of communication upon transfer of all appropriate risks.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust’s formal handover document records falls risk for all transferred patients, contrary to the concern that no specific written confirmation is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Inquest heard that the transfer process between wards for patients at risk of falls does not require a specific written confirmation that a handover in relation to that risk has taken place.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The six-hour assessment standard is retained because it allows admission and accurate documentation, while formal handover provides immediate risk communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust can confirm that there is a six hour standard for risk assessments to be completed following transfer of a patient to a ward. This window allows the receiving team to admit the patient into their care, undertake”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Ernest Bacon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ernest Thomas Bacon suffered an accidental fall at home, sustained a fractured neck of femur, and was admitted to Tameside General Hospital, where he subsequently had an ischaemic stroke. After triggering for sepsis on 16 January 2022, he was not reviewed face to face, the sepsis pathway was not followed, intravenous antibiotics were delayed, and the failure to escalate was not recognised. He died from sepsis at the hospital on 17 January 2022.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to flag deteriorating patients during handover

    Wider context from the report

    “2. As a consequence of the availability of doctors he was not reviewed face to face but via telephone. His notes were not seen. The seriousness of his condition was not recognised and he was not flagged up on handover; ”

    Source location

    Ernest Bacon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Xavier · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Xavier attended the emergency department on 21 October 2021 with a history of painful haemorrhoids and an accompanying history of constipation. A venous blood gas showed an abnormally high creatinine level, but the result was not considered before he was discharged; he later became increasingly unwell, suffered a cardiac arrest, and could not be resuscitated. The report identified concerns about the failure to act on the blood result, a chaotic referral and inadequate handover, and insufficient consideration of his learning disability when taking his history.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide effective referral communication and formal handover to the surgical team

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Mr Xavier’s referral to the surgical team by his GP was chaotic. No telephone contact was made between the GP and the on call surgical team. Mr Xavier was therefore triaged by a ED nurse and subsequently, a rapid assessment team junior doctor before he was brought to the attention of the surgical team. Despite these assessments, no formal handover was provided to the surgical team, setting out the extent of the history, clinical observations and diagnostic processes that had previously taken place. Despite these shortcomings, the surgical team accepted the referral without considering Mr Xavier’s clinical records beforehand. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Xavier · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with primary-care colleagues to improve the referral system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is working with senior colleagues from primary care to improve the system. Consideration is being given to introducing a single referral telephone line where calls are screened and accepted. We expect to have agreed a system by the end of October 2022. The principle will be that there is automatic acceptance of referrals from GPs.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider introducing a screened single referral telephone line with automatic acceptance of GP referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is working with senior colleagues from primary care to improve the system. Consideration is being given to introducing a single referral telephone line where calls are screened and accepted. We expect to have agreed a system by the end of October 2022. The principle will be that there is automatic acceptance of referrals from GPs.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2022

    Open published response
  4. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander George Theodossiadis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander George Theodossiadis, aged 25, died in hospital on 28 January 2020 after treatment for bacterial meningitis, a fall from a hospital bed, and a resulting head injury. Concerns included difficulty obtaining a timely GP appointment and insufficient symptom assessment, inadequate hospital transfer handover and care planning, uncertainty about meningitis management, and failure to assess or communicate his risk of falling.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate identified falls risk to the receiving ward

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Despite spending 10 hours in A&E and displaying increasing signs of confusion he was seen to be trying to get off his hospital bed which created a risk of falls, no assessment of the falls risk was carried out. In consequence, the receiving ward J27 at St James’s University Hospital, Leeds were not forewarned of the risk of falls. He fell from his hospital bed within approximately 10 minutes of being placed in a side room on his own. ”

    Source location

    Alexander George Theodossiadis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide written handover instructions or briefing notes during hospital transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence was taken at the Inquest which indicated Mr Theodossiadis was moved from one hospital within the Trust to another, close to midnight on 25th January 2020. Despite being severely unwell with bacterial meningitis and in a confused state he was not accompanied by a nurse escort, nor was any written handover instruction or briefing note provided for the nurses receiving him, in breach of the prevailing Trust handover guidance. ”

    Source location

    Alexander George Theodossiadis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require cross-city transfers to include a written nursing handover document recording the patient’s falls risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For cross-city transfers we must ensure a robust handover of care between nursing staff in the ED and on the receiving ward. This may take the form of a telephone conversation but this should always be accompanied by a written handover document. Currently in the Emergency Department this takes the form of a written document that is then scanned into the electronic patient record (PPM+). The Trust is currently trialling a stand-alone electronic transfer document and it is anticipated that this will be rolled out to all areas of the Trust in due course.”

    Source location

    2021-0412-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek an agreement with Yorkshire Ambulance Service not to accept transfers without a handover document recording falls risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “seeking an understanding with YAS that they will not accept patients for transfer without a handover document which clearly records the patient’s falls risk.”

    Source location

    2021-0412-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trial a standalone electronic transfer document for cross-city transfers and work towards Trust-wide rollout.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For cross-city transfers we must ensure a robust handover of care between nursing staff in the ED and on the receiving ward. This may take the form of a telephone conversation but this should always be accompanied by a written handover document. Currently in the Emergency Department this takes the form of a written document that is then scanned into the electronic patient record (PPM+). The Trust is currently trialling a stand-alone electronic transfer document and it is anticipated that this will be rolled out to all areas of the Trust in due course.”

    Source location

    2021-0412-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit compliance with transfer-document use through a continuing rolling audit programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is working towards 100% compliance with use of the transfer document and a rolling audit programme has been taking place over for 12 months to monitor progress. The latest audit figures are encouraging but the Trust recognises that this improvement must be sustained and therefore the process of regular audit will continue. In addition, we are”

    Source location

    2021-0412-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 December 2021

    Open published response
  5. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Cherry Rosemary Dunn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Cherry Rosemary Dunn died after an acute episode at Kirby Ward on 5 November 2018, with the inquest recording pulmonary embolism, deep vein thrombosis and immobility as causes of death. Concerns included bilateral leg swelling not prompting sufficient consideration of deep vein thrombosis, ambiguity in VTE risk assessments, and confusing hospital discharge letters that affected decisions about prophylactic anticoagulation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of hospital discharge letters to communicate prophylactic anticoagulation requirements clearly

    Wider context from the report

    “• Hospital discharge letters The discharge letter used when Mrs Dunn was transferred from one hospital setting to another (attached) was confusing. The doctor at the receiving hospital read it to mean that prophylactic anticoagulation was not required and therefore the doctor was persuaded in part by this even though the risk assessment that was completed had a positive result. The University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust have now revised their discharge letter (attached) which more clearly reflects NICE Guidance and removes the previous confusion. However, there is a concern that the original discharge letter is used in other Trusts and therefore the confusion remains in other areas with the risk of what happened in this case happening elsewhere. ”

    Source location

    Cherry Rosemary Dunn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Margaret ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Susan Roberts died at Bradford Royal Infirmary on 15 July 2019 after being admitted two days earlier with necrotising fasciitis, without an appreciation of the diagnosis or need for surgical intervention. The concerns included ineffective handover between surgical specialties, the absence of a formal protocol, and lack of engagement by plastic surgeons during the incident and subsequent investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of timely and effective handover between surgical specialties

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There has been lack of timely and effective hand over been the different surgical specialties, with an absence of formal protocol. ”

    Source location

    Susan Margaret ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a formal handover protocol between surgical specialties

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There has been lack of timely and effective hand over been the different surgical specialties, with an absence of formal protocol. ”

    Source location

    Susan Margaret ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the referral protocol to require the leading specialty to document the agreed plan with the secondary specialty and identify who agreed it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To address the point regarding attendance in theatre, we refer back to the earlier statement that it is standard practice that the plastics team will become involved once primary management of abscesses are complete and reconstruction is required. We intend to revise the referral protocol to make it explicit that the leading specialty is responsible for clearly documenting in the patient record the agreed plan with the secondary speciality at the point in the procedure they become involved and who this was agreed with. It must noted that the orthopaedic specialist registrar and the plastics specialist registrar in this case were in direct telephone consultation regarding the treatment of the surgical debridement and further treatment.”

    Source location

    2021-0195-Response-from-Bradford-Teaching-Hospitals_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Plastic surgeons become involved after primary abscess management is complete, with the leading specialty documenting the agreed plan when plastics becomes involved.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To address the point regarding attendance in theatre, we refer back to the earlier statement that it is standard practice that the plastics team will become involved once primary management of abscesses are complete and reconstruction is required. We intend to revise the referral protocol to make it explicit that the leading specialty is responsible for clearly documenting in the patient record the agreed plan with the secondary speciality at the point in the procedure they become involved and who this was agreed with. It must noted that the orthopaedic specialist registrar and the plastics specialist registrar in this case were in direct telephone consultation regarding the treatment of the surgical debridement and further treatment.”

    Source location

    2021-0195-Response-from-Bradford-Teaching-Hospitals_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Azra Parveen HUSSAIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Azra Parveen HUSSAIN was found hanging from her en-suite bathroom door at Mary Seacole House on 6 May 2020 and could not be resuscitated. Concerns included that information from her family about a reported ligature attempt was not recorded, shared or used to reassess her risk, and that high-risk bathroom doors and other bedroom-area doors lacked adequate ligature mitigation. The inquest jury also identified missed opportunities concerning ECT treatment and suicide-risk management.

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate significant risk information in handovers and MDTs

    Wider context from the report

    “1. On the 4th May 2020 Azra's mother and daughter had been in telephone contact with the nurse in charge on the ward expressing concerns that Azra had messaged them to say she had attempted suicide using shoelaces as a ligature. The nurse spoke to Azra who denied making a ligature, Azra's neck was examined and she had no marks from ligature use. The shoelaces from one pair of shoes were removed but other shoelaces, clothing and bedding were left in her possession as it was felt that Azra was not at an immediate risk. She was not believed to be at immediate risk because, whilst it was a feature of her mental state common to many patients that she would regularly talk about not wanting to live and requesting an overdose, there was no evidence that she had made an active suicide attempt and she had no history of suicide or self-harm attempts. The fact that she was now saying that she had attempted to make a ligature was a change in her presentation (her previous suicidal ideation had centred around requesting assistance to overdose), it was also of significance that she was saying one thing to her family and something different to a clinician. BSMHT accepted that the information was significant and therefore there ought to have been consideration of it by her treating team with a review of her risk and observation levels. However, no record at all was made of the family's concerns and the account given by Azra. Her risk screen was not updated, an incident report was not raised, and the information was not included in handover to the next shift or at the next MDT on the 6th May 2020. Due to the COVID19 pandemic Azra's family could not attend that meeting and raise their concerns directly. Microsoft Teams was used by some clinicians to attend the MDT on the 6th May but was not made available to Azra's family nor was a telephone number to dial into the meeting. BSMHT has put in a system for a form to be completed in advance of an MDT which requires the family's input to be sought, placed on the form and considered in the MDT. It is my concern that this is equivalent to the family being included in the meeting (prior to COVID families were invited to attend MDTs): there is the potential that information will not be recorded accurately or will not be understood in written form, it also doesn't afford family the opportunity to hear the plan arising from the meeting and provide their views. There is no reason why attendance by a remote platform or telephone line at the meeting itself cannot be offered to family for all MDTs. ”

    Source location

    Azra Parveen HUSSAIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Nadine Louise GIBBS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Gibbs died shortly after returning home following a PEG operation and discharge on 17 April 2019; she became unresponsive later that day and was pronounced dead at the scene. The medical cause of death included aspiration of gastric contents, vomiting, and acute peritonitis following recent insertion of the PEG tube. Concerns were raised about communication between teams, particularly the handover of information to night staff, and whether the SBARD communication tool was in use.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure effective communication and information handover between teams

    Wider context from the report

    “Concerns were raised during the inquest with regard to communication between teams, particularly to the staff on duty at night as to what information was handed over. Evidence was heard of an easy to use form of communication tool which enables information to be transferred accurately, especially at handover time, between nurses and clinicians, known as SBARD. This helps in reducing the likelihood of errors in communication information. It was not known whether this tool is in use although it was “hoped” it is being used. This is some eighteen months following Miss Gibb’s death. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Nadine Louise GIBBS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Integrate SBARD into every ward patient handover using a structured template completed by staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “SBARD is integrated into the patient handover used by the wards at every handover. There is a template document used with each section of the SBAR tool to be completed by staff. This has been in place at the Trust for approximately 18 months.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver SBARD training through staff induction, clinical courses and ad hoc ward training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The RRT lead in the education and training of Trust staff in the assessment and management of acutely unwell patients, providing basic, intermediate and advanced resuscitation courses and bespoke acute deteriorating patient courses for medical students, doctors, nurses, midwives and HCAs. The RRT teach SBARD on all new staff inductions: Assess, Communicate, Treat Courses; ALERT course; HCA study day; and BEACH course, as well as ad hoc ward training. The team are about to launch a new NEWS2 e-learning course which also teaches SBARD.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch a NEWS2 e-learning course teaching SBARD.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The RRT lead in the education and training of Trust staff in the assessment and management of acutely unwell patients, providing basic, intermediate and advanced resuscitation courses and bespoke acute deteriorating patient courses for medical students, doctors, nurses, midwives and HCAs. The RRT teach SBARD on all new staff inductions: Assess, Communicate, Treat Courses; ALERT course; HCA study day; and BEACH course, as well as ad hoc ward training. The team are about to launch a new NEWS2 e-learning course which also teaches SBARD.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response
  9. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Bethan Naomi Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bethan Naomi Harris was born on 16 November 2018 and died at Shooting Star Hospice on 26 November 2018 after sustaining severe brain injury during a rapidly progressing labour. Concerns included inadequate handover arrangements, lack of specific training, an outstanding team debrief, and limited evidence of reflection or learning after her birth and death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide specific handover training and update the handover process

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There were issues relating to handover of patients to midwives and at the time of Inquest there had been no further specific training in relation to handover. Indeed it was stated that the process in place at the time of Bethan’s delivery still pertained without alteration. This represented a risk to patients. ”

    Source location

    Bethan Naomi Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise SBAR handover teaching and use, incorporate practical scenarios into mandatory multidisciplinary training, update admission guidelines, and relaunch the tool.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following on from the Inquest the maternity governance team undertook an audit of the use of the clinical handover tool Situation Background Assessment Recommendation (SBAR) within the maternity unit. The result demonstrated poor compliance with the SBAR tool. The staff reported they were unclear on when and how to use the SBAR tool. This resulted in a review and update of how the SBAR tool is taught and used. The revised SBAR tool provides clarity on how, when and where the SBAR should be used; practical use of the tool has also been incorporated into the unit mandatory multi-disciplinary training which includes clinical scenarios. The updated version of the SBAR tool is included in the maternity unit Admission Guidelines. The updated version of the SBAR tool was re-launched in May 2020 through various forums including staff meetings, face to face teachings, newsletter and email.”

    Source location

    2020-0133-Response-from-St.-Georges-University-Hospitals-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2020

    Open published response
  10. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Rebecca Jane Hursey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rebecca Jane Hursey died at St George’s Hospital on 4 May 2018 after taking an aspirin overdose while detained under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act and receiving care on the Avalon Ward. The report identifies concerns about suicidal-risk information not being verbally communicated during handover, observations and searches not mitigating her self-harm risk, and the prolonged failure to find a suitable alternative placement.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to base staff handovers on clinical-record examination and update care plans for risk management

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That staff handovers be led by examination of the clinical record such that recent progress can be assessed especially in relation to risk management and care plans amended accordingly. ”

    Source location

    Rebecca Jane Hursey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026