Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical handover processes

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First reported 27 Nov 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical handovers between healthcare staff, teams, wards or hospitals where the handover process is intended to transfer patient information, risks, concerns, responsibilities or required actions for safe ongoing care, including inadequate content, unclear standards, omission of key information, ineffective challenge and poor risk prioritisation.

Not included

  • Excludes non-clinical handovers, such as fire-and-rescue incident-role handovers or transport crew drop-off and pick-up handovers.
  • Excludes failures limited to retaining, reviewing or acting on information after an otherwise adequate clinical handover, unless the handover process itself is also deficient.
  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, training or documentation deficiencies not directly tied to a clinical handover.
  • Excludes the narrower shift-handover process where the assertion is confined to shift-change handover and does not support the wider clinical-handover condition.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway or system where that pathway provides the more specific supported parent boundary.
Reports
67

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
74

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
107

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England7
Care Quality Commission5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board2
General Medical Council2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust2
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists2
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Barry THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barry Thompson, an insulin-dependent diabetic, died on 27 February 2016 while a patient on the Acute Medical Unit, after being admitted with sepsis from diabetic foot ulcers and hyperglycaemia. The report identified concerns about failure to provide insulin, fluids, adequate monitoring, antibiotics and medical review, as well as inaccurate and incomplete records and ineffective information sharing during transfer between departments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the three-tier system to transfer key patient information quickly

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Record keeping. /Information sharing. I found on hearing the evidence that records from both departments from 16.52 onwards are inaccurate, infrequently made, disjointed and are incomplete causing them to be unreliable and affected continuity of care. Also this caused staff at the inquest not to be able to fully recall their actions. There was a 3 stage system in place to ensure transfer of important information about Mr Thompson when he moved from the ED to the AMU. a) A SBAR document is completed by the transferring nurse who accompanies the patient. In this case the document does not state (despite there being provision on the form) who that person was or who the receiving nurse was. It does not identify Mr Thompson as a diabetic nor state he has not had his insulin. It erroneously states he is not on a sepsis pathway. b) There is a computerised tracking system providing for doctors in the ED to transfer key information about a patient to the doctors on the AMU. This then serves as a live reference point for staff on the ward. In this case the information refers to Mr Thompson having cellulitis only and makes no reference to his diabetes. This affected the prioritisation of Mr Thompson on the AMU particularly when it came to observations and testing needed and review by a doctor. c) The evidence from the ED matron was that either the named nurse or department co-ordinator should share key information by telephone with the ward prior to transfer. I concluded this did not occur as neither said they could remember doing so nor was there a record. The remainder of case notes which had come into existence whilst Mr Thompson was in the ED did go to the ward with him and referred to his diabetes and earlier assessments but I am concerned that the 3 tier system put in place to share key information quickly is not working. ”

    Source location

    Barry THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    baby Dominic Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Baby Dominic Smith was born on 2 June 2015 after a prolonged labour and died at approximately 18 hours of life following a collapse. The report describes pneumonia as the cause of death and identifies concerns including failure to recognise possible rupture of membranes and infection risk, inadequate maternal and neonatal observations, failure to escalate deterioration, delayed antibiotic treatment, and communication and record-keeping problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate clinical communication and handover

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”

    Source location

    baby Dominic Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct rolling audits of communication and documentation to identify compliance gaps and remedial measures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Division of Women and Children’s is undertaking a programme of rolling audits on communication and documentation. The purpose is to ensure compliance with policy standards and to identify areas where there are challenges in order to implement remediating measures.”

    Source location

    2016-0240-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the commissioned improvement programme to embed reliable communication, handover and documentation processes in clinical practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The division has commissioned an improvement programme of work focusing on these three areas in order to fully embed effective and reliable processes into clinical practice.”

    Source location

    2016-0240-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The NHS Trust, rather than the College, is responsible for responding on local communication, record keeping, policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Given that we do not have all the details of the tragic death of Baby Smith, the RCPCH is unable to comment on the specifics of the case and the Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust has been asked to respond directly on local communication, record keeping and policies and procedures.”

    Source location

    2016-0240-Response-by-RCPCH
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2016

    Open published response
  3. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Tommi-Ray Colin Vigrass · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tommi-Ray Colin Vigrass was born prematurely at 28+2 weeks’ gestation and developed respiratory distress requiring ventilator support. Following difficulties with changing and re-inserting his endotracheal tube, he suffered a hypoxic episode and significant brain damage, and died on 13 January 2016. Concerns included the decision-making around extubation and intubation, delayed contact with the tertiary unit, and inadequate handover and preparation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate handover for the arrival of a premature baby

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was also evidence of an inadequate handover and preparation for the arrival of the premature baby with insufficient care plan details or consultation taking place. ”

    Source location

    Tommi-Ray Colin Vigrass · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Formalise neonatal handover processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Serious Incident investigation was carried out following Tommi-Ray’s death and a Root Cause Analysis report was formulated with a specific action plan. Actions including the development of a Standard Operating Procedure related to the difficult airway kit had been completed and handover processes formalised.”

    Source location

    2016-0241-Response-by-Walsall-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2016

    Open published response
  4. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Amelia Celestine Calvo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amelia Celestine Calvo was born prematurely with Edwards Syndrome and oesophageal atresia with a tracheo-oesophageal fistula. During surgery, her endotracheal tube became dislodged, after which she developed severe airway problems, pneumothoraces and bleeding, and died despite resuscitation. Concerns included communication failures about the risk of a difficult airway and the absence of a national guideline for using the airway grading classification in neonatal practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over known or suspected difficult airway information to paediatric anaesthetists

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the inquest, I heard evidence from ████████ Consultant Neonatologist, the independent expert instructed by the court that the grading system used by anaesthetists to assess a patient's throat prior to carrying out a laryngoscopy and assessment generally, namely the view being classified as follows: o Grade I: Complete glottis visible o Grade II: Anterior glottis not seen o Grade III: Epiglottis seen, but not glottis o Grade IV: Epiglottis not seen is not a classification that is generally used in neonatal practice. ████████ advised that in fact this classification was ‘rarely’ used in neonatal practice and that there were discussions currently being undertaken as to creating a joint anaesthetic/neonatal guideline. In Amelia’s case, the issue was as to whether or not there was a ‘difficult/dangerous’ airway was not handed over by the neonatologists to the paediatric anaesthetist prior to the surgery on 28 March 2014 as the neonatologists did not consider 4 attempts at intubation at birth to be indicative of a difficult airway. ████████ additionally stated that in his Trust discussions were taking place in the neonatology department with regard to using this classification system, but there is no national guideline to this effect. ”

    Source location

    Amelia Celestine Calvo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and roll out a clinically revised Team Brief, including an Introductions Board, staff-presence checks, and reordered clinical discussion prompts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Work has been undertaken in RMCH to ensure clinical engagement with the Team Brief:”

    Source location

    2016-0192-Response-by-Central-Manchester-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 March 2016

    Open published response
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Colin Moulton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Colin Moulton was discovered deceased on 14 February 2013 near the perimeter wall of the Irwell Unit at Fairfield General Hospital, after leaving the Accident and Emergency Department the previous day. Concerns included ineffective communication during handover, incorrect triage, failure to recognise confusion, and the absence of a formal capacity assessment or other documented measures when he attempted to leave. The inquest narrative stated that his death was contributed to by neglect.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide the receiving triage nurse with access to and sight of the paramedic pro-forma

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When Mr Moulton was admitted to A & E on the 13th February 2013, critical information was conveyed by means of an audible handover from the paramedic to the receiving triage nurse. Following this incident, the Pennine Acute Trust now requires the receiving triage nurse to have access to and have sight of the paramedic pro-forma with the additional requirement that those actions be documented. It would be helpful if an additional copy of the paramedic pro-forma could be given to and remain with the receiving triage nurse. ”

    Source location

    Colin Moulton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department considers the concerns matters for local comment and resolution rather than national action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I consider that both of your concerns are for local comment and resolution and I note that you have sent a copy of your report to the NWAS. I am aware that NWAS has already responded, addressing the issues you raise and asking that you redirect your specific concerns to FGH for its consideration also.”

    Source location

    2015-0267-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Specific concerns should be redirected to Fairfield General Hospital for consideration after North West Ambulance Service’s response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I consider that both of your concerns are for local comment and resolution and I note that you have sent a copy of your report to the NWAS. I am aware that NWAS has already responded, addressing the issues you raise and asking that you redirect your specific concerns to FGH for its consideration also.”

    Source location

    2015-0267-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing handover procedures should ensure triage staff access important patient information, so retaining paramedic notes is not required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NWAS has advised that its staff always leave a patient report form (PRF) at every hospital following a patient transfer. A copy of this form also remains with the patient following admission.”

    Source location

    2015-0267-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 July 2015

    Open published response
  6. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Brian Anthony Gillard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Anthony Gillard, who had asbestosis and required ambulatory oxygen, died at Royal Bolton Hospital on 20 March 2015 after collapsing and suffering a cardiac arrest while using the toilet. The concerns included a lack of handover about his oxygen requirement, transfer to the toilet without oxygen, and leaving him unsupervised in a toilet without an emergency pull-cord.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over patients’ continuing oxygen requirements during transfers between hospital departments

    Wider context from the report

    “iii. There was no handover in relation to Mr Gillard’s transfer from the Emergency Department at the Hospital to D1 Ward at the Hospital, particularly in relation to his need for Ambulatory Oxygen and subsequently he was taken to the toilet without the use of Oxygen. He was left in the toilet on his own, and without supervision by a Nurse outside the door, for approximately four minutes during which he suffered a cardiac arrest believed to be secondary to Hypoxia. iv. It was accepted that there was a facility to use a portable Oxygen supply for use between his bed and the toilet but the portable supply was not used because Mr Gillard was happy to go to the toilet without Oxygen and his need for Ambulatory Oxygen was not known to the Ward Staff on D1 Ward. ”

    Source location

    Brian Anthony Gillard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs. Evelyn KENNEDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs. Evelyn KENNEDY was an 89-year-old woman who died in hospital on 29 October 2014 after admission following recurrent falls. The inquest concluded that she died of hospital-acquired pneumonia and that her death was probably accelerated by a short time because of the effects of her five-day admission to the Acute Medical Unit. Concerns included incomplete handover and poor personal care, missing identification and risk bands, inadequate monitoring and documentation, missed medication and nutritional support, and failures to escalate clinical deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incomplete and ineffective clinical handover

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Once again my concerns involve the Acute Medical Unit (AMU). (2) Mrs. KENNEDY was transferred from AMU in a chair, not a trolley. (3) Handover was incomplete and unhelpful. (4) She arrived unkempt. (5) She had porridge leaking from her mouth; it took 20 mouth sponges to give her adequate mouth care. (6) She felt cold and said she was cold. (7) She had been incontinent of faeces and had not been cleaned for some time. (8) She had no name wrist band. (9) In spite of known allergies she had no allergy wrist band. (10) In spite of falling regularly she had no falls risk wrist band. (11) She still had an IV cannula in place; this should have been removed after 72 hours. (12) Her daily catheter care bundle had not been completed for 3 days. (13) She had no fluid charts for 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th or 20th. (14) Care plans were not completed for 17th, 18th, 19th or 20th. (15) Repositioning charts were incomplete or poor for 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th. (16) The handling assessment was not completed for 16th, 18th, 19th or 20th. (17) No food chart was completed for her entire time in AMU. (18) She had pressure damage to her hips and bottom. (19) No daily oral assessment was completed for her entire time on AMU. (20) She was not weighed. (21) The malnutrition tool was not completed. (22) Her bowel movements were not recorded. (24) NEWS scores of 4 to 9 had not been escalated to doctors nor filled in on her drug chart. PLUS (25) No personal care over the weekend of 18th and 19th. (26) No senior review over that weekend. (27) Not written up for her Sertraline, therefore not given (28) Not written up for any food supplements until 21st October. (29) She should have been specialled, but wasn’t. Once again AMU has been found to be chaotic and not fit for purpose. ”

    Source location

    Mrs. Evelyn KENNEDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve information quality and clinical handover when patients transfer from the Acute Medical Unit to specialist wards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Changes, introduced mainly before the inquest into Mrs Kennedy’s sad death as part of the ongoing programme of improvements, include:”

    Source location

    2015-0178-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2015

    Open published response
  8. Powys, Bridgend and Glamorgan Valleys

    AI-generated summary

    Howell Glyndwr Fisher · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Howell Glyndwr Fisher fell at home, sustained a fractured hip, and later died in hospital on 9 December 2014 after developing an ischemic leg, pneumonia and other health problems. The concerns included at least five falls while he was assessed as being at high risk, insufficient staffing to provide required one-to-one nursing, and inadequate handover and falls-risk assessments between and within hospitals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of transfer handover information about high falls risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was no “handover material” at the point of transfer between the two hospitals detailing that he was at high risk of falls and further more on readmission to the Princess of Wales Hospital on the 20th November no falls risk assessment was carried out – indeed, after each successive fall in the Princess of Wales Hospital no formal assessment appears to have been undertaken. Throughout he remained at high risk of falls. ”

    Source location

    Howell Glyndwr Fisher · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jane Marie Clark and Isobel Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jane Marie Clark died by suicide after leaving Berrywood Hospital on 22 August 2013 with an inadequate risk assessment, following recent suicide-related concerns and possession of a ligature. Isobel Griffin died after hanging herself on the ward on 17 August 2013, with death pronounced on 21 August 2013. The principal concerns included inadequate handover and risk assessments, failures to review relevant clinical information and treatment, and insufficient measures to minimise ligature risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate and review relevant clinical information before risk decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “Re Jane Marie Clark 1. The very challenging events of the previous evening and that morning do not appear to have been handed over and the nurse in charge did not read the notes before granting leave. Her risk assessment then was ill informed. It was not discussed with anyone nor properly documented. 2. She did not place any boundaries on the leave for example providing a time by which Jane was to return. 3. Risk assessment documentation generally was poor and appeared perfunctory. Re Isobel Griffin 1. Mrs Griffin was admitted on 1 August and was not allocated a key worker until 8th August. The key worker did not read the notes so was not aware of the events of the 7th. 2. The risk assessment was not updated with the events of the 7th. 3. Mrs Griffin’s responsible clinician saw her on only one occasion on 14 August 2013 at which time he did not read the notes so he was unaware of events on the 7th when she handed in a belt and scissors and said she had 3-4 times tried to hang herself using a ligature. 4. A planned review of medication, diagnosis and treatment never took place despite a number of references in the notes to it from 6 August 2013. Mrs Griffin had been substantially unmedicated for most of the admission despite concerns expressed by her family. 5. On 11 August Mrs Griffin started to express thoughts to harm others. These thoughts distressed her. She did not intend to act on them but they were something new and a measure of her distress. These thoughts and their significance were not included in any risk assessment. 6. A risk assessment concluded on the 18th, the day after she had hanged herself on the ward, purports to be made with her agreement. It was evidence that risk assessment documentation is cut and pasted rather than reflecting the true circumstances. 7. The doors do not appear to be ligature proof and little was made available by way of evidence as to what measures would now be taken to minimise this risk. ”

    Source location

    Jane Marie Clark and Isobel Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Agnes Mary Hannan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Agnes Mary Hannan, who had autoimmune hepatitis with cirrhosis, attended Tameside General Hospital several times with severe abdominal pain before being admitted. She was diagnosed with Superior Mesenteric Vein Thrombosis causing bowel infarction and died on 21 September 2013. The report identified concerns about delayed diagnosis, inadequate monitoring and hydration, poor communication and handover, incomplete records, lack of multidisciplinary involvement, and insufficient communication with her family about her condition and end-of-life care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over patient information between staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was extremely poor communication between hospital staff and the patient (and her family), and between and amongst hospital staff. There was evidence of a lack of handover between staff, and this was exacerbated by the fact that the medical and nursing notes were frequently inadequate. ”

    Source location

    Agnes Mary Hannan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review record-keeping training to reinforce communication, careful handover and avoidance of unclear abbreviations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response The Trust promotes safe handover of patient care by providing protected time, to enable handover of all relevant patient information, both at the beginning and end of shifts. The Trust is currently undertaking a review of its current training on record keeping standards which will include an emphasis on the importance of good communication between staff and the importance of careful handover.”

    Source location

    2014-0573-Response-by-Tameside-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 October 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026