Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical handover processes

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First reported 27 Nov 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical handovers between healthcare staff, teams, wards or hospitals where the handover process is intended to transfer patient information, risks, concerns, responsibilities or required actions for safe ongoing care, including inadequate content, unclear standards, omission of key information, ineffective challenge and poor risk prioritisation.

Not included

  • Excludes non-clinical handovers, such as fire-and-rescue incident-role handovers or transport crew drop-off and pick-up handovers.
  • Excludes failures limited to retaining, reviewing or acting on information after an otherwise adequate clinical handover, unless the handover process itself is also deficient.
  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, training or documentation deficiencies not directly tied to a clinical handover.
  • Excludes the narrower shift-handover process where the assertion is confined to shift-change handover and does not support the wider clinical-handover condition.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway or system where that pathway provides the more specific supported parent boundary.
Reports
67

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
74

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
107

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England7
Care Quality Commission5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board2
General Medical Council2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust2
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists2
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Terence Ewart JAMES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terence Ewart JAMES, aged 85, was living in a residential home when he sustained an unwitnessed fall on 17 April 2019 and a further fall on 20 April, resulting in a neck of femur fracture. He underwent surgery but became delirious, did not thrive, and died in hospital on 14 May 2019. Concerns included failures to inform the GP of the first fall, hand over the fall history to care staff, and escalate pain and deterioration for further medical advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over fall histories to returning care staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The history of the fall on 17th April was not handed over to care staff who had returned from leave on 20th April. ”

    Source location

    Terence Ewart JAMES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a comprehensive review of the handover system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, due to the concerns raised by the Coroner, we are conducting a full review of our handover system. For the time being, we have reverted back to the paper based system for handovers, across all of our homes as it is a visual tool that can be read straight away rather than having to find the appropriate tab on a system to read back in the notes. The system was put in place at Chippendayle Lodge immediately after the inquest on 11 December 2019. It was communicated to staff in internal meetings, and we are ensuring that all staff understand the importance of ensuring the handover forms are completed in full. This is being done through team meetings, which have taken place, for example, on 11 December 2019 and 13 December 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement paper-based handover arrangements across all homes, including comprehensive sheets, senior sign-offs and ongoing monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, due to the concerns raised by the Coroner, we are conducting a full review of our handover system. For the time being, we have reverted back to the paper based system for handovers, across all of our homes as it is a visual tool that can be read straight away rather than having to find the appropriate tab on a system to read back in the notes. The system was put in place at Chippendayle Lodge immediately after the inquest on 11 December 2019. It was communicated to staff in internal meetings, and we are ensuring that all staff understand the importance of ensuring the handover forms are completed in full. This is being done through team meetings, which have taken place, for example, on 11 December 2019 and 13 December 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share inquest learning and reinforce escalation, handover and related procedures through manager communications, team meetings and supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A further staff meeting was held on Friday, 13 December 2019, and the manager shared the details of the inquest to ensure that all staff understood the importance of following the systems and protocols in place and to enforce expectations in this respect.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a specific audit of the handover process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As an organisation, we also conduct regular audits. We have a schedule in place in this respect. We are also in the process of introducing a specific audit relating to the handover process, and this will be in place from 29 January 2020, after the managers’ meeting, where it will be discussed. We have endeavoured to put robust systems in place to ensure that errors do not occur again. The above being said, we had in fact put a great deal of thought”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The errors were considered individual judgment calls rather than evidence of systemic failures in existing processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “into the processes in place before the inquest, and we do believe that where errors occurred, they were individual judgment calls, rather than systemic errors.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 5 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response
  2. London Inner (North)

    AI-generated summary

    Amy Allan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amy Allan underwent elective corrective spinal surgery on 4 September 2018 and subsequently suffered severe deterioration, requiring ECMO support before dying on 28 September 2018. Concerns included inadequate pre-operative planning for ECMO, poor communication and handover between departments, extubation while her condition was deteriorating, delayed ECMO support, and a lack of clear co-ordination of her post-operative care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably convey and record vital information during handover to PICU

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that: (a) It appears there was a lack of awareness and sharing of information between departments at Great Ormond Street Hospital. In particular, the PICU had not been given any advance warning of Amy’s complex medical background and needs before she was admitted there post operation. As PICU staff were not invited to the Multi-Disciplinary Team meetings prior to the operation, they were not aware of the “critical time” which lay ahead for her; (b) There was no clear plan or instruction for the management of Amy post operation in relation to extubation and ECMO support on the PICU; (c) The handover between clinicians involved in Amy’s operation and those taking over her care in the PICU, was poorly executed with vital information either not properly conveyed or recorded or simply missed; (d) There was a delay in commencing ECMO support, and (e) No single properly informed clinician appeared to be co-ordinating Amy’s post-operative care in such a complex and high risk case. ”

    Source location

    Amy Allan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use Epic to record MDT outcomes and link clinician messages directly to patient records for cross-department information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In April 2019 the Trust launched a new electronic patient record system (Epic) that replaces the previous paper records and combines numerous existing electronic systems. Epic now enables the notes of MDT meetings to be recorded directly within the individual patient’s records. It is therefore much easier for all teams involved in caring for a patient to access the outcome of the MDT discussions. Epic also includes a messaging system (similar to email) within the patient’s records to support clinicians discussing the patient’s care and to ensure that those messages are directly linked to the patient’s records. This provides a much better awareness and sharing of information between departments.”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the spinal surgery ECMO pathway, including Joint Cardiac Conference review, postoperative location and consent planning, capacity checks, Epic documentation and multidisciplinary handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Spinal MDT TOR have been amended to include the specific responsibilities for clinicians attending the meeting in regards to ECMO. This is reiterated in the PICU guidance for managing spinal patients. A copy of this guidance is enclosed [Spinal Surgery Pathway PICU FINAL].”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop, test and launch a standardised electronic anaesthetic-to-ICU handover document with accompanying training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Electronic Patient Record department is currently supporting the Anaesthetic and ICU teams to develop a standardised electronic handover document which mirrors the paper form which has been developed for this purpose. The electronic handover document will ensure that all the relevant fields are together in one section so that they can be clearly and easily discussed as part of a structured verbal handover, and act as an ongoing plan to support the ICU team.”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce consultant-to-consultant handover requirements and record additional anaesthetic-PICU discussions in Epic.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust expects this handover to take place between the Anaesthetic Consultant and the PICU Consultant whenever possible. The Clinical Lead for PICU and the Clinical Lead for Anaesthetics have reminded all Consultants of this requirement again in November 2019. When it is not possible (e.g. PICU Consultant is busy with another patient), handover should be given to the most senior doctor on the unit, who will then share that information, alongside the handover document, with the PICU Consultant. Where further discussions about the patient between the Anaesthetic Consultant and the PICU Consultant are required, these are now recorded in Epic. It is the responsibility of the PICU Consultant to record this information.”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Karis Florence Braithwaite · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karis Florence Braithwaite, aged 24, died after stepping in front of a fast train on 24 September 2018 following discharge from a Section 136 mental health assessment. The concerns included important risk information from the paramedic and police not being available to the assessment team, and handover information not being adequately documented or transferred into the Trust’s records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document verbal first-responder handovers in patient records

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Important risk information was provided to the Trust by a first responder (paramedic) but was not available to the MHA assessment team. 2. A copy of the PRF form was left with staff but does not appear to have been uploaded to the electronic records or a paper copy provided to the assessing team. 3. The paramedic provided a verbal handover to staff which does not appear to have been documented in the patient’s records. 4. The police officer who attended with Karis also gave evidence as to difficulties in providing a handover to the receiving mental health team. 5. A PFD report was written to the Trust on the 2nd December 2016 noting: There was also relevant information available to the paramedics and police that was not elicited by the assessing team. It became apparent during the course of the Inquest that the police also had access to information which was relevant to the circumstances of the preceding events which would have been relevant to the mental state of the deceased. It would appear that inadequate questions were asked by the receiving hospital team in relation to the circumstances leading to admission. In light of the evidence heard at Ms Braithwaite’s inquest, there is a concern that insufficient steps have been taken by the Trust to improve the handover process from first responders to Trust staff following serious incidents in the community. ”

    Source location

    Karis Florence Braithwaite · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure first-responder risk information is available to the assessing mental health team

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Important risk information was provided to the Trust by a first responder (paramedic) but was not available to the MHA assessment team. 2. A copy of the PRF form was left with staff but does not appear to have been uploaded to the electronic records or a paper copy provided to the assessing team. 3. The paramedic provided a verbal handover to staff which does not appear to have been documented in the patient’s records. 4. The police officer who attended with Karis also gave evidence as to difficulties in providing a handover to the receiving mental health team. 5. A PFD report was written to the Trust on the 2nd December 2016 noting: There was also relevant information available to the paramedics and police that was not elicited by the assessing team. It became apparent during the course of the Inquest that the police also had access to information which was relevant to the circumstances of the preceding events which would have been relevant to the mental state of the deceased. It would appear that inadequate questions were asked by the receiving hospital team in relation to the circumstances leading to admission. In light of the evidence heard at Ms Braithwaite’s inquest, there is a concern that insufficient steps have been taken by the Trust to improve the handover process from first responders to Trust staff following serious incidents in the community. ”

    Source location

    Karis Florence Braithwaite · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient improvement of handover processes from first responders to Trust staff

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Important risk information was provided to the Trust by a first responder (paramedic) but was not available to the MHA assessment team. 2. A copy of the PRF form was left with staff but does not appear to have been uploaded to the electronic records or a paper copy provided to the assessing team. 3. The paramedic provided a verbal handover to staff which does not appear to have been documented in the patient’s records. 4. The police officer who attended with Karis also gave evidence as to difficulties in providing a handover to the receiving mental health team. 5. A PFD report was written to the Trust on the 2nd December 2016 noting: There was also relevant information available to the paramedics and police that was not elicited by the assessing team. It became apparent during the course of the Inquest that the police also had access to information which was relevant to the circumstances of the preceding events which would have been relevant to the mental state of the deceased. It would appear that inadequate questions were asked by the receiving hospital team in relation to the circumstances leading to admission. In light of the evidence heard at Ms Braithwaite’s inquest, there is a concern that insufficient steps have been taken by the Trust to improve the handover process from first responders to Trust staff following serious incidents in the community. ”

    Source location

    Karis Florence Braithwaite · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. London (West)

    AI-generated summary

    Amir Siman-Tov · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amir Siman-Tov died at Colnbrook Immigration Removal Centre on 17 February 2016 after taking an overdose of codeine. The concerns included inconsistent involvement of healthcare staff in the ACDT self-harm reduction process, inconsistent medication checks, inadequate hospital discharge information and handover, insufficient monitoring after his return, and shortcomings in the emergency response.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide detailed written clinical information and directions on discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “8. On discharge Mr Siman-Tov in the early evening of the 16ᵗʰ February 2016 was returned to Colnbrook IRC with no accompanying clinical information at all and no advice or directions to the clinical staff at the Colnbrook IRC from the hospital. The only information provided was that one of the hospital doctors had spoken to one of the Colnbrook IRC on the telephone and that Mr Siman-Tov was “good to go”. Failure to provide detailed written information puts patients at risk. ”

    Source location

    Amir Siman-Tov · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide explicit clinical direction and handover to night staff

    Wider context from the report

    “10. Mr Siman-Tov’s care was then handed over to night staff. No explicit direction or handover was given. The explanation for this was that the observations should be second signature and did not need elaboration. ”

    Source location

    Amir Siman-Tov · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Fern-Marie CHOYA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Fern-Marie Choya died from hypovolaemic shock caused by massive intra-abdominal bleeding following rupture of the abdominal gravid uterus during a monochorionic diamniotic pregnancy. Concerns included failure to communicate her pregnancy during the pre-hospital alert and on hospital arrival, a 16-minute delay in recognising the pregnancy and calling the obstetric team, and treatment focused on possible pulmonary embolism before free fluid was identified.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate pregnancy information effectively on hospital arrival

    Wider context from the report

    “2. On arrival at the Whittington Hospital, the detail of the pregnancy was not communicated effectively. It is unclear whether the LAS crew did not mention the fact, or whether the emergency staff simply did not hear it. In any event, it took 16 minutes post arrival for the pregnancy to be recognised and the obstetric team to be called. ”

    Source location

    Fern-Marie CHOYA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the crew’s learning from the EOC observation and confirm use of a structured information-sharing and handover approach.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prior to the Inquest, a meeting was held with the crew regarding this incident and feedback provided during this de-brief meeting. In addition, the crew are also to attend an observation session in the EOC for learning purposes (to be completed by 14 October 2019). Furthermore, the relevant Clinical Team Leader will be reviewing, with the crew, what they have learnt from that session and seeking confirmation that they will be following a structured approach every time they share information with the EOC about patients or hand them over to an emergency department in the future.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a comprehensive cardiac-arrest handover procedure with tertiary centres to ensure key clinical information reaches receiving teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS has liaised with tertiary centres to develop a comprehensive handover procedure in relation to cardiac arrests, ensuring that relevant and key important clinical information is shared with the receiving team.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out the cardiac-arrest handover procedure and ATMIST AMBO tool to all receiving centres.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of this handover procedure, receiving teams are expected to observe a 30 second “hands off eyes on time” period to ensure quiet whilst vital information is conveyed using the ATMIST AMBO (age, time, mechanism/medical complaint, injuries/information related to complaint, signs, treatment – allergies, medication, background/history, other information) mnemonics. The LAS will be rolling out the extension of this handover tool/procedure to all receiving centres, as per the attached handover documents. Work will also be done to ascertain the feasibility of establishing a handover audit mechanism in the specification of the Electronic Patient Care Record (EPCR) that is being developed by the LAS alongside the introduction of its replacement Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess the feasibility of adding a handover audit mechanism to the developing electronic patient care record specification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of this handover procedure, receiving teams are expected to observe a 30 second “hands off eyes on time” period to ensure quiet whilst vital information is conveyed using the ATMIST AMBO (age, time, mechanism/medical complaint, injuries/information related to complaint, signs, treatment – allergies, medication, background/history, other information) mnemonics. The LAS will be rolling out the extension of this handover tool/procedure to all receiving centres, as per the attached handover documents. Work will also be done to ascertain the feasibility of establishing a handover audit mechanism in the specification of the Electronic Patient Care Record (EPCR) that is being developed by the LAS alongside the introduction of its replacement Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include SBAR handover training in the Emergency Department junior doctors' induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Further work is being undertaken across the Trust in order to standardise handover between clinicians by using the “SBAR” format (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation). This has already been included in the new junior doctor’s induction to the Emergency Department and is being designed into the electronic clinical notes that are used to hand over a patient at any point from presentation to discharge.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-Whittington-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Design SBAR handover into electronic clinical notes used from patient presentation through discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Further work is being undertaken across the Trust in order to standardise handover between clinicians by using the “SBAR” format (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation). This has already been included in the new junior doctor’s induction to the Emergency Department and is being designed into the electronic clinical notes that are used to hand over a patient at any point from presentation to discharge.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-Whittington-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing SBAR handover tool is considered sufficient to help crews convey relevant information to emergency departments, including in stressful circumstances.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS currently utilises the SBAR tool for all patient handovers (Situation, Background, Assessment, and Recommendation). This enables crews to be confident that they have passed relevant information onto emergency departments when handing over patients, even in the most stressful scenarios. However, the importance of relaying the important medical information at handover has been stressed to the crew who provided care to Ms Choya, as a part of the feedback and de-brief meetings referred to above.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response
  6. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    James William Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James William Francis, who had a history of falls and balance difficulties, suffered an unwitnessed fall at his care home on 9 April 2017 and later developed repeated vomiting and deterioration. He was admitted to hospital with a large subdural haematoma and died on 11 April 2017. The principal concerns included failures in shift handover and monitoring, delays in seeking medical advice, inadequate information provided to paramedics, the patient’s positioning, staff training, and whether relevant guidelines sufficiently addressed this type of injury in elderly patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of an instantly transferable key-information patient document

    Wider context from the report

    “In addition, the paramedic suggested that other care homes have a key document that can be instantly handed over to them to speed up the handover procedure and ensure that clinical staff have a full history key information. This is often called a Hospital Passport and uses simple traffic light alerts to highlight key information. There was no evidence of this kind of simple document in this case ”

    Source location

    James William Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the adapted Hospital Passport Transport Traffic Light System across West Sussex homes and the wider company.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I also note that paramedic referred to the Hospital Passport. We have adapted the Hospital Passport - Transport Traffic Light System within all our West Sussex care homes initially and through the wider company. This is to provide the paramedic and hospital staff the most helpful information that isn't only about illness and health. This accompanies the Service User to inform and support. It is implemented within our Care Plan systems.”

    Source location

    2019-0202-Response-by-Shaw-Healthcare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response
  7. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Richard HINTON attended A&E with right calf pain and swelling after being advised to attend because of a possible clot. He was discharged before a markedly raised D-Dimer result became available; the inquest recorded pulmonary embolus due to deep vein thrombosis and bleeding duodenal ulcer, with a conclusion of “Preventable Natural Cause”. Concerns included failures in recording and communicating the D-Dimer request and result, delayed testing, inadequate documentation, and other system and process failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record and communicate relevant presenting symptoms and prior clinical advice

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The information chain. a) When Mark (as the family wish him to be referred to) attended A&E he informed the triage nurse (nurse A) that he had contacted 111 who advised to go to A&E due to possible ‘clot’. That information was not recorded or passed on to others. Recorded examination of Mark included pain and obvious swelling to right calf. b) The Staff Nurse (nurse B) who then carried out observations on Mark came to the view that he ‘could probably do with a D-Dimer’. That nurse states she passed that information to the next (third) nurse (nurse C). c) Nurse C states that information was not passed to her. She was unaware that Mark had pain in his calf and therefore had no reason to request bloods, particularly a D-Dimer test, and had no knowledge of them being requested. d) At or around 19:33 hours it appears that bloods, including a D-Dimer test were requested. However there is no record of these (8) test being recorded or who ordered them or why. e) When the attending doctor first saw Mark at 21:06 hours he saw the results of 7 blood tests none of which indicated to him the presence of a possible DVT. The 8th blood test (i.e. the D-Dimer test) was not shown and as there was no record of it having been requested he did not know it was outstanding and nor in his opinion, was it required. Upon the information before that doctor he medically discharged Mark from hospital. Following Marks’ discharge from hospital the result of the D-Dimer test became available which would have led to Mark being admitted with treatment which probably would have saved his life. ”

    Source location

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit ED staff compliance with documentation requirements and repeat the audit monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Agreed. The Trust relies on the integrity of individuals to maintain professional standards of completing documentation. There are clear guidelines issued by both the NMC and the GMC which should be adhered to. An action from the RCA was to audit whether the ED staff were compliant in completing documentation. The initial audit results showed poor compliance and the plan is for the audit to be repeated monthly. The results have been discussed by the senior ED management team who are tasked with bringing improvement.”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust was unaware of the suspected clot, and a painful leg alone was not necessarily indicative of a clot.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “g. Whilst D-Dimer tests were becoming routine rather than clinically required, Mark had come in with a possible ‘clot’ whether his earlier symptoms had improved or not.”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  8. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Frederick Richard GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Green died at Southmead Hospital on 3 October 2017 after falling while out socialising and subsequently being found in the road. He was initially treated as intoxicated, and his head injury was not diagnosed until he suffered a respiratory collapse; the report identifies concerns about ineffective handover and communication, failure to apply head-injury guidance, and assumptions that intoxication explained his condition.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of handovers to support effective communication and challenge

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The handover at around 8am resulted in a failure to challenge and communicate effectively. Handovers need to be considered across the whole of the trust not just the emergency department to ensure they are appropriate and effective. The reason I include this as a trust wide matter of concern is that I have recently dealt with another case where there were failures in the handover on another ward at the Royal United Hospital. I have been advised that other hospitals use the SBAR tool at handovers to assist in communication. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Frederick Richard GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a working group to standardise handovers through education and training, reporting to the Deteriorating Patient Steering Group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Medical Director has commissioned a working group with the Trust Medical Safety Lead to improve handovers through standardisation, education and training. This group reports into the Deteriorating Patient Steering Group, chaired by the Medical Director, with a focus on reducing avoidable harm. This is a Trust breakthrough Objective for 2019/20.”

    Source location

    2019-0117-Response-by-Royal-United-Hospitals-Bath-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review existing general medicine handover improvements to identify good practice for wider hospital adoption.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There has been a review of improvements already made in general medicine handovers to see how good practice can be built upon and spread throughout the hospital. A draft standard operating procedure that forms the core of all handovers has been approved. Paediatrics have made significant changes to standardise handovers and are piloting further improvements including use of a validated extended SBAR tool called ISOBAR. It is agreed that SBAR will be the core element for all patient level handovers across the hospital and an education and awareness campaign is about to be launched.”

    Source location

    2019-0117-Response-by-Royal-United-Hospitals-Bath-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Approve a draft standard operating procedure as the core standard for Trust handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There has been a review of improvements already made in general medicine handovers to see how good practice can be built upon and spread throughout the hospital. A draft standard operating procedure that forms the core of all handovers has been approved. Paediatrics have made significant changes to standardise handovers and are piloting further improvements including use of a validated extended SBAR tool called ISOBAR. It is agreed that SBAR will be the core element for all patient level handovers across the hospital and an education and awareness campaign is about to be launched.”

    Source location

    2019-0117-Response-by-Royal-United-Hospitals-Bath-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot further standardised paediatric handover improvements, including the validated ISOBAR tool.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There has been a review of improvements already made in general medicine handovers to see how good practice can be built upon and spread throughout the hospital. A draft standard operating procedure that forms the core of all handovers has been approved. Paediatrics have made significant changes to standardise handovers and are piloting further improvements including use of a validated extended SBAR tool called ISOBAR. It is agreed that SBAR will be the core element for all patient level handovers across the hospital and an education and awareness campaign is about to be launched.”

    Source location

    2019-0117-Response-by-Royal-United-Hospitals-Bath-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch an education and awareness campaign supporting SBAR as the core element of patient-level handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There has been a review of improvements already made in general medicine handovers to see how good practice can be built upon and spread throughout the hospital. A draft standard operating procedure that forms the core of all handovers has been approved. Paediatrics have made significant changes to standardise handovers and are piloting further improvements including use of a validated extended SBAR tool called ISOBAR. It is agreed that SBAR will be the core element for all patient level handovers across the hospital and an education and awareness campaign is about to be launched.”

    Source location

    2019-0117-Response-by-Royal-United-Hospitals-Bath-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate non-referred patients to an ED clinician expected to remain present throughout their ED stay, barring unforeseen circumstances.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Emergency Department have taken the following steps:”

    Source location

    2019-0117-Response-by-Royal-United-Hospitals-Bath-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate SBAR into paediatric, nursing, and Observation Unit handover documentation and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b) An SBAR tool has been added to the Paediatric proforma used to facilitate safe handover between clinicians, specifically focusing on outstanding concerns and actions to be taken.”

    Source location

    2019-0117-Response-by-Royal-United-Hospitals-Bath-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response
  9. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Ann Corfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ann Corfield was admitted to hospital with a urinary tract infection, low sodium levels and deteriorating mental health, later developing severe psychotic depression, poor oral intake and dehydration. She suffered a cardiac arrest and died after transfer between hospitals. Concerns included inadequate handover about anticoagulation, failure to administer prescribed prophylactic anticoagulation, poor completion of fluid balance charts, and the lack of suitably qualified staff to administer intravenous fluids at Park House.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide written handovers containing medication information during patient transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence at the Inquest staff at Park House were not aware that Mrs Corfield was receiving an anticoagulant in the form of enoxaparin whilst she was a patient at Royal Oldham Hospital to reduce the risk of her developing a VTE or that she had refused this medication whilst a patient ROH. I received written evidence from ████████ that the Pennine Acute Trust has in place an Adult Transfer Policy and a Form should be generated which includes details with regards the patient’s medication and most recent observations. However, the evidence I heard from ████████, Consultant Psychiatrist at Park House, was that this unit still does not receive a written handover. ”

    Source location

    Ann Corfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Calary Fern Davis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Calary Fern Davis was delivered by emergency Caesarean Section on 31st December 2017 after fetal bradycardia caused hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and very serious brain damage, and she later died from that condition. The report identified concerns about failures in the induction pathway, including a lack of planned obstetric review, delay in artificial rupture of membranes, insufficient staffing and leadership, poor communication and safety briefings, and a culture against performing artificial rupture of membranes at night.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor provision of information on patient handover

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) There was a poor standard of safety briefing, provision of information on patient handover and multi-disciplinary team assessment ”

    Source location

    Calary Fern Davis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver and audit the maternity quality improvement programme for safety briefings, handover and multidisciplinary assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. There was a poor standard of safety briefing, provision of information on patient handover and multi-disciplinary team assessment. A quality improvement programme to ensure handover and safety briefings are delivered to a high standard, has been incorporated into our maternity action plan. The action plan is monitored weekly through our Assurance meetings and audits are undertaken from the Senior Midwifery Team. All safety briefings are retained for audit purposes. These are working well and have a multidisciplinary focus, which is improving communication and team working.”

    Source location

    2019-0043-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026