Recurring concern

Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learning

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First reported 3 Dec 2013•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of reporting, review, investigation or organisational-learning processes to recognise substantive safety issues, retain learning from prior concerns, or ensure that identified recurring issues are addressed across the organisation.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing a specific already-defined safety action where no broader failure of organisational learning or issue recognition is identified.
  • Excludes failures of a named clinical, operational or safeguarding system where that system itself supplies the more specific parent boundary.
  • Excludes deficiencies limited to the quality of an individual incident investigation without evidence that safety issues or learning were not identified or addressed more broadly.
  • Excludes generic governance, culture or management concerns without a direct failure to identify, retain or address substantive safety issues.
Reports
62

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
68

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
163

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care14
NHS England10
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB4
Care Quality Commission4
Home Office3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Ministry of Defence2
Ministry of Justice2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2
Office of the Chief Coroner2
The Children's Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mr William Ivan McKibbin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr William Ivan McKibbin died at Trafford General Hospital on 20 August 2018 following complications of a traumatic brain injury sustained in an unwitnessed fall in hospital. The report raised concerns about bed-rail and bed-brake checks, the culture of openness and candour, communication between specialists and hospital sites, incident investigations, and the process for learning from deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Statutory Notification process to require timely submission of relevant evidence about deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “5. In order to enhance learning from deaths, consideration should be given to modifying the Statutory Notification process following death of a service-user so as to require Registered Providers to lodge specified relevant evidence as to how the death occurred within a defined period. ”

    Source location

    Mr William Ivan McKibbin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote appropriate reporting of deaths and patient safety incidents through regulatory activities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “our preferred option is to continue to receive this information through the NRLS /STEIS routes and promote the right level of reporting through our regulatory activities.”

    Source location

    2020-0185-Response-from-CQC-Redacted.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review notifications guidance to clarify reporting requirements concerning the circumstances of a person’s death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In general, we consider that the information received through NRLS/STEIS reports is adequate to enable CQC to fulfil its regulatory responsibilities. However, we will review our existing notifications guidance in light of the findings from Mr McKibbin’s death, to determine if it could be clearer about the reporting requirements relating to the circumstances of a person’s death. We have a programme to improve how we receive, analyse and assess the information we receive via NRLS and STEIS to monitor patient safety.”

    Source location

    2020-0185-Response-from-CQC-Redacted.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Current NRLS and STEIS reporting processes are considered adequate for the CQC to fulfil its regulatory responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to the matter of concern about notification requirements in relation to the deaths of service users and the information that is required of providers within a specified time period, I am aware that the CQC has written to you explaining the process for the reporting of deaths, or incidents of ‘severe harm’, to NHSE/I’s National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) and STEIS (the strategic executive information system), and the way in which the CQC can review, request and assess information relating to reported incidents.”

    Source location

    2020-0185-Response-from-Dept.-of-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NRLS/STEIS reporting is considered adequate for CQC’s regulatory responsibilities, so a separate direct death-notification requirement is not preferred.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current arrangements by which CQC receives notifications of deaths via the NRLS rather than directly from NHS Trusts was put in place to reduce the complexity of reporting routes and minimise burden on NHS providers. Although direct notifications to CQC contain questions which have the potential to elicit more detail about a specific incident, the quality of the data is equally dependent on staff reporting culture and practice.”

    Source location

    2020-0185-Response-from-CQC-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changing death-reporting arrangements would require legislative action brought forward by the Department of Health and Social Care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Any changes to the current arrangement for reporting of deaths would require legislative change brought forward by the Department of Health and Social Care. CQC’s view is that creating a separate, and potentially parallel reporting requirement for providers could create confusion and undermine appropriate reporting to both routes with an impact on national learning from patient safety incidents. Therefore,”

    Source location

    2020-0185-Response-from-CQC-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response
  2. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Bethan Naomi Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bethan Naomi Harris was born on 16 November 2018 and died at Shooting Star Hospice on 26 November 2018 after sustaining severe brain injury during a rapidly progressing labour. Concerns included inadequate handover arrangements, lack of specific training, an outstanding team debrief, and limited evidence of reflection or learning after her birth and death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to address important learning issues

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Inquest was held one year after Bethan Naomi Harris's death. During the course of the oral evidence it emerged that several, in my mind important, learning issues had not been addressed. ”

    Source location

    Bethan Naomi Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share anonymised learning from Bethan’s death through maternity meetings, governance study days, PROMPT, newsletters, staff forums, and mandatory fetal monitoring and skills training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Learning from Bethan’s death has been shared throughout the maternity unit via PROMPT, as outlined above. The case, appropriately anonymised, was presented at the maternity unit meeting on 15 November 2019 and at the Clinical Governance study day on 19 December 2019. Individual reflection and learning has also taken place with the support of the PMA team through verbal discussion and written reflection.”

    Source location

    2020-0133-Response-from-St.-Georges-University-Hospitals-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide yearly staff training updates through monthly practice-development training sessions, using the case as a reference for ongoing learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The issues identified have been communicated to staff via the governance newsletter and at staff forums. There is also on-going learning through mandatory training as Bethan’s case is used as a reference during the Fetal Monitoring and Skills and Drills study day. It is a requirement at the Trust that each member of staff attends a yearly training update with the practice development team facilitating monthly training sessions. As of February 2020 more than 90% of the midwives and doctors have attended this training.”

    Source location

    2020-0133-Response-from-St.-Georges-University-Hospitals-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2020

    Open published response
  3. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Billy James Jenkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Billy James Jenkins was found hanging by the neck in a hotel room bathroom on 12 August 2019, following a history of low mood, alcohol and cocaine abuse, suicidal ideation and previous suicide attempts. The concerns included limited information gathering during his mental health assessment, a decision that he did not have a mental health condition without further assessment, inadequate documentation and planning, and possible over-reliance on alcohol and drug use as the explanation for his suicidal ideation. The inquest concluded that he took his own life following an assessment after which he felt helpless because there had been no clear mental state examination and a potential missed opportunity to consider an appropriate referral.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish lessons learned by teams involved in care and treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) It was not known whether as a result of this death there had been any lessons learned by the teams involved in care and treatment of Billy Jenkins, or whether there had been any training or support requirements identified for the Community Mental Health Nurse. ”

    Source location

    Billy James Jenkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the root-cause analysis report and investigation learning with the involved team and across the Trust to support reflection by similar teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the death of Mr Jenkins the RCA report has been shared with the team and across the Trust so that similar Teams can reflect on the lessons learnt. The actions arising from the investigation have also been implemented including areas addressed above. Additional learning reflects the need to ensure that all service users who are receiving care and treatment from Oxleas mental health services and also use drugs and or alcohol have equal access to all strands of treatment available to those who are not using substances. Only if there is clear evidence that the use of substances will impact on the ability to clinically benefit from any treatment would a decision be made to withhold treatment and in these instances this would be reviewed regularly with the service user and the team.”

    Source location

    2020-0068-Response-from-Oxleas-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie Turay-Thomas ate hazelnuts on 18 September 2018 and died soon afterwards from acute anaphylaxis. The report identifies concerns about inadequate allergy care, advice and training concerning adrenaline auto-injectors, prescribing and clinical communication, and errors in the NHS 111 response and ambulance categorisation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of NHS Digital to retain and act on previously identified call-handling safety issues

    Wider context from the report

    “19. One of the errors made by the first 111 call handler was a failure to ask to speak direct to the patient. This was the error of an individual. However, this is not the first time that the issue has been brought to the attention of NHS Digital. At inquest, I asked the witness who appeared on behalf of NHS Digital, and indeed had been chosen by NHS Digital as the person best able to assist the court, if this had been an issue in the past. He said no. However, on 18 December 2018, Peter Harrowing, HM Assistant Coroner for Avon, sent a prevention of future deaths report to NHS Digital following the inquest touching the death of David Longden. It was only when I asked the witness appearing on behalf of NHS Digital specifically about Coroner Harrowing’s report in respect of Mr Longden, pointing out that Coroner Harrowing had raised the need for NHS Digital to place greater emphasis on the call handler speaking to the patient, that the witness remembered that he had indeed seen that report. I choose to characterise this as a memory lapse rather than as an intention wilfully to mislead the court. (A witness who lies whilst giving evidence on oath at inquest may be found in contempt of court and may even be prosecuted for the crime of perjury.) Nevertheless, if NHS Digital does not have a grasp of this sort of detail, specifically brought to its attention by a coroner in a prevention of future deaths report, it is difficult to see how there can be effective improvement. ”

    Source location

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue participating in ambulance user groups to share data, discuss cases, exchange learning, and support triage-system improvements through feedback mechanisms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS, as an MPDS user for its 999 services and an NHS Pathways user for its 111 services, attend the relevant user groups with other ambulance trusts and fully participate in such meetings, where there is the opportunity to share data back and forth, discuss cases of note and share learning in order to make continual improvements through the feedback mechanisms to NHS Digital and the Academy at PDC process. The LAS will discuss the findings of PFD report at such user groups. Ultimately, however, changes to how the triage system operates are a matter for the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED) where MPDS (owned by PDC) is concerned, or for NHS Digital under their national clinical governance group where NHS Pathways is concerned.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Established NHS Pathways governance systems capture, review and resolve clinical coding issues, including those raised through Prevention of Future Deaths reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to NHS Pathways specifically, I am advised that there are established governance systems in place to capture, review and resolve issues relating to clinical coding (including from Prevention of Future Deaths reports); and to ensure latest clinical advice and guidance is reflected in call categorisation. Independent clinical scrutiny of NHS Pathways is provided by a National Clinical Governance Group that includes representatives of medical Royal Colleges.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response
  5. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Gurdeep Singh Dundhal · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gurdeep Singh Dundhal, who had paranoid schizophrenia and used illicit substances, died after jumping from the fifth storey of a car park on 27 April 2019; he passed away in hospital on 28 April 2019. The concerns included delays and resource problems in arranging a mental health assessment, missing information during the assessment, the decision to use section 2 rather than the recommended section 3, and failure to investigate and learn lessons across agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to engage with other agencies to learn lessons from complex cases

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Walsall MBC has failed to undertake an internal investigation into the delays and resources concerns during the assessment in April 19. They have also failed to engage with other agencies to ensure lessons are learnt. It is essential in complex cases like this that all agencies work together after a tragedy to ensure lessons are learnt to protect others. ”

    Source location

    Gurdeep Singh Dundhal · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue engaging with other agencies to learn from incidents and improve patient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to engage with other agencies to enable the Trust to learn from incidents and improve patient care.”

    Source location

    2019-0294-Response-by-Birmingham-Womens-and-Childrens-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Meet regularly with other agencies to identify service improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is intended that Walsall Council should meet regularly with other agencies to identify areas where improvements can be made.”

    Source location

    2019-0294-Response-by-Walsall-Council
    Page 5 · response
    Published 1 November 2019

    Open published response
  6. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Evelyn Ann Swift · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Evelyn Ann Swift became increasingly unwell over several days and contacted her GP surgery repeatedly on 3 January 2019, but a home visit was not arranged until that evening. The assessment was incomplete, her condition was not recognised as severe, and she was not admitted to hospital; she was found deceased at home the following morning. The principal concerns related to unsafe procedures for triage, home-visit allocation, urgent clinical advice, documentation, clinical cover, and review of significant events.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of processes to review and learn from significant events

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The Beechdale group did not have processes in place to review a significant event, such as a sudden death when there was Practice involvement on the day prior to the death, with no understanding of the need to review and learn as a Practice from such events. ”

    Source location

    Evelyn Ann Swift · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Calary Fern Davis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Calary Fern Davis was delivered by emergency Caesarean Section on 31st December 2017 after fetal bradycardia caused hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and very serious brain damage, and she later died from that condition. The report identified concerns about failures in the induction pathway, including a lack of planned obstetric review, delay in artificial rupture of membranes, insufficient staffing and leadership, poor communication and safety briefings, and a culture against performing artificial rupture of membranes at night.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to analyse reviewed cases for common themes and trends

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There is a review of 43 such cases which was said to be considering them individually rather than analysing common themes and trends. ”

    Source location

    Calary Fern Davis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review 43 cases, identify common themes and trends, and incorporate the learning into the overarching maternity action plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. There is a review of 43 such cases which was said to be considering them individually rather than analysing common themes and trends. The 43 cases have been reviewed, common themes and trends identified and these have been incorporated into the overarching action plan for maternity services. A review of all neonatal and stillbirths from January 2016 was undertaken to offer assurance that all cases had been through the governance process and enabled learning. The review has been undertaken with a multidisciplinary approach and monitored weekly through the Maternity Assurance Group. The review of these cases has been overseen by the Welsh Government Delivery Unit. The Delivery Unit has undertaken a review of the methodology applied to ensure a system learning from the incidents.”

    Source location

    2019-0043-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Catherine Mary Gibbon suffered a seizure while swimming at a gym on 1 June 2018 and remained face down in the water for around ten minutes. She sustained a hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury following non-fatal drowning and died. Concerns included inadequate pool monitoring and CCTV arrangements, a broken camera, insufficient staff training and emergency equipment, and gaps in first-aid certification systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share and act on learning from comparable pool deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “Fitness First have taken steps to address some of these issues, and told me that such learning is shared at a national level. However, at inquest Fitness First national lead for health and safety told me that he was unaware that I sent a prevention of future deaths report to Bannatyne’s on 13 August 2018, regarding a death in similar circumstances in Maida Vale on 10 October 2017. I did copy this report to Swim England, but this does not appear to have prompted a national conversation among private pool providers. I leave that now with UK Active. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs. Joan Catherine BLABER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The report concerns the death of Mrs. Joan Catherine BLABER, with the circumstances referred to in the Record of Inquest. The principal concerns included failures to comply with COSHH requirements, inadequate training and supervision, confusion over staff roles, poor communication of practices, and failures to report and learn from dangerous or near-miss events.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from previous mistakes

    Wider context from the report

    “(8) Failure to identify "near miss" events, to disseminate these and to learn from previous mistakes. ”

    Source location

    Mrs. Joan Catherine BLABER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed COSHH management in operational meetings and safety huddles, with Food Improvement Group monitoring, governance escalation and organisation-wide communication of learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Owing to the culture change brought about by Mrs Blaber’s experience, COSHH management is a regular agenda item on many of our meeting agendas. For example, it is now routinely discussed at the Patient Led Assessments of the Care Environment (PLACE) meetings, the Weekly Operational Look Forward Meeting and teams’ safety huddles. Terence Walters is the Chair of the Food Improvement Group and Ms Walters has ensured the group monitor and maintain the systems and processes we have put in place and there is a clear governance reporting escalation channel up to the Executives and the Board, for any concerns. The Head of Nursing for Practice Development has become a member of this Group, to ensure that learning is spread across the organisation and any new initiatives are widely communicated to all groups of staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver and disseminate an inquest-learning presentation that explains system failures and instructs staff to report COSHH and patient-safety concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ also designed a presentation using the learning from Mrs Blaber’s inquest which she has delivered to her teams and a wider audience, being open and frank about what happened, the system failures and our organisational learning. This presentation encourages staff to report any concerns about patient safety / COSHH management immediately to their line manager and to report it as an incident on Datix.”

    Source location

    Response from Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss the incident at Board and Executive Committee meetings and continue promoting an open culture of learning across the Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you have said, it is unlikely that we will ever know how Flash cleaning fluid got into Mrs Blaber’s water jug, and I agree. However, I wish to reassure that we have discussed the tragic incident at very high level meetings, including our Board Meetings and Trust Executive Committee meetings, to ensure we have learnt and to embed this learning from the top down, as well as from the ‘hands on’ Housekeepers and Catering Assistants up, and we continue to encourage an open culture of learning at all levels.”

    Source location

    Response from Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rose Ball · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rose Ball, aged 82, was admitted to hospital in the early hours of 8 December 2016 and died later that day following acute peritonitis from a perforated duodenum. The report raised concerns that GP consultations on 6 and 7 December were conducted by telephone but were not recorded as such, that an abdominal examination was recorded although it did not take place, and that there was a wider pattern of diagnosing conditions by telephone without safety-netting or plans for examination.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of NHS investigations to identify the telephone consultation issue

    Wider context from the report

    “1. ████████ failed to record that the consultations of 6 and 7 December were by telephone – and in fact recorded an abdominal examination that never took place. 2. I was troubled by ████████ evidence in court that he considered his only failing was in relation to record-keeping. 3. It is clear that ████████ conduct goes well beyond poor record-keeping. I have referred to a pattern of diagnoses by telephone by this practice. I hold records from January 2015 onwards only. It is possible that this pattern may be repeated earlier in this patient’s records – or perhaps in the records of other patients. 4. I invite you to consider the fitness to practice of ████████, in view of the findings of this inquest. 5. I strongly urge the recipients of this report to listen to the recording of this inquest. This can be supplied electronically (via Cryptshare) or on a CD. The fact that a Regulation 28 report has been issued to the GMC should not be interpreted as a criticism of that organisation. This point has been made clearly in the case of R (Dr Siddiqui and Dr Paeprer-Rohricht) v Assistant Coroner for East London. I have raised my concerns using Regulation 28 of the Coroners Investigations Regulations 2013 in view of the serious nature of the concerns I have, and in view of the fact that previous NHS investigations have already taken place and not brought the telephone consultation point to light. I consider this a matter of concern for wider public safety. For the avoidance of doubt, whilst I would welcome replies from NHS England and the CQC to the issues I have raised, a formal response to this report is required only from the GMC. ”

    Source location

    Rose Ball · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026