Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical safety-alert systems

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First reported 12 Oct 2013•Latest report 1 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical records, prescribing systems or related clinical information processes to create, retain, update, display or otherwise reliably surface safety alerts concerning patients, medicines or treatment.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to act on a clearly received alert where the alerting system itself operated as intended.
  • Excludes non-clinical alert systems such as police, custody, safeguarding or transport systems unless the report directly concerns a clinical safety-alert system.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping or communication deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the reliability of a clinical safety alert.
Reports
53

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
56

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
66

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England12
Department of Health and Social Care11
Egton Medical Information Systems Limited3
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
Care Quality Commission2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Wales2
Proprietary Association of Great Britain2
Royal College of General Practitioners2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust2
Welsh Government2
Adelaide Medical Centre, London1
Alliance Pharmaceuticals Limited1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Sally-Ann Few · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sally-Ann Few was found dead at home on 12 March 2022, after being discharged from hospital the previous day with both slow-release and faster-acting morphine; a post-mortem found that she died as a consequence of morphine toxicity. Concerns included the GP prescribing system not showing that Oromorph had been stopped, a discrepancy between inpatient morphine prescriptions that was not reviewed, and poor medical record keeping that did not document decision-making, discussions, or advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of electronic-record alerts for required medication discrepancy reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence was heard that Mrs. Few whilst an inpatient was prescribed Oromorph and not Zoromorph the drug she had been using at 20mg twice a day. The effect of which may have impacted upon her pain control but the evidence did not show she had high pain scores. A pharmacist recognised this discrepancy on 8th March and asked for this to be reviewed. No such review took place and it was difficult to see on the electronic records system that such a review needed to take place as apparently there were no highlights or flags to alert the doctors that such a review needed to take place. ”

    Source location

    Sally-Ann Few · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop auditable electronic prescribing functionality that alerts doctors when pharmacists identify issues requiring review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The EPMA system is being continuously developed and enhanced to improve patient safety, and whilst there is a section now included for Pharmacists to add notes to electronic prescriptions, the Trust is seeking to develop”

    Source location

    Response from Medway NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 November 2022

    Open published response
  2. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Natalie Mortimer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Natalie Mortimer died on 21 April 2022 at St Thomas' Hospital after an overdose of colchicine tablets prescribed for gout. She developed multiorgan failure. Concerns included that information about a previous overdose was not added to her GP record and that 100 tablets were prescribed because this was the system default, without an alert identifying the previous overdose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain coded overdose alerts in patient records

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) On the 25th November 2021 the patient attended the GP Practice and the GP on duty reviewed her most recent consultation which took place on the 22nd November 2021 and her records and prescribed the patient with ████████ to be taken 2-4 times a day until symptoms resolve for her gout. The GP detailed in evidence that she issued 100 tablets as this was the default quantity that came up on EMIS. The prescribing doctor stated that there were no alerts coding of a previous overdose in the patients records which may have been a contraindication for issuing a prescription of 100 tablets and therefore relied on the default quantity generated by the system. ”

    Source location

    Natalie Mortimer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Employ a full-time read-coder to ensure correspondence is read-coded and necessary patient alerts are added.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed this case in depth and have put the following steps in place to ensure that this does not happen in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Green Porch Medical Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement patient-record alerts that display relevant safety concerns at login until acknowledged.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. We now have a system in place to ensure that relevant important alerts are put on the system for individual patients. This will initiate as soon as somebody logs into the records and an alert message will inform the clinician/administration/reception team what the concerns are. This will be on the screen until it is confirmed as acknowledged. Alerts will be in place for overdose attempt/Safeguarding issues/suicidal ideation/domestic violence etc.”

    Source location

    Response from Green Porch Medical Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Encourage clinicians to use Arden depression-review templates incorporating self-harm questions and automatic risk alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. We have encouraged all clinicians to use the Arden templates for reviewing depression. Asking the patient about self-harm is incorporated as part of the template. This will also help to ensure patients safety as it automatically flags up as a red-code. i.e., history of self-harm/suicidal ideation/Overdose attempt etc.”

    Source location

    Response from Green Porch Medical Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add colchicine safety alerts to patient records, recommending quantity limitation and risk assessment for patients with relevant mental-health histories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. We have put alerts on patient records for anyone requesting colchicine (see example enclosed) regarding the toxicity to ensure that this is explained to the patient at their next review. The alert recommends limiting the colchicine to 12 tablets and if there is a history of Mental health, depression, Suicide attempt or self-harm, to carry out a risk assessment before issuing.”

    Source location

    Response from Green Porch Medical Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit Docman for coding, document routing, follow-up completion and escalation of concerns, with audits every three months.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. We are currently in the process of auditing Docman to ensure quality compliance i.e., read-code is appropriate, that the relevant team has seen the document, any follow ups completed, any concerns raised with the relevant department etc. Audits will be carried out every 3 months, starting 1st of December 2022.”

    Source location

    Response from Green Porch Medical Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Vijaykumar Girishbhai Gadhavi · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Vijaykumar Girishbhai Gadhavi died from a drug overdose while an in-patient at Whipps Cross Hospital under enhanced one-to-one care. The report raised concerns about breaches of the Enhanced Care Policy, the absence of an alert or risk-management plan, inadequate recording of property and medication, insufficient family involvement, and a lack of evidence that learning from earlier self-harming incidents had been implemented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to place alerts or flags on records about patient complexities and risks

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Despite the multiple risk incidents and foreseeability of future hospital admissions, there was no alert or flag placed on Mr Gadhavi’s records to alert new staff to the complexities and risk in his presentation. ”

    Source location

    Vijaykumar Girishbhai Gadhavi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Holden · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Thomas Holden was diagnosed with Covid-19 and subsequently developed a deep vein thrombosis in his left calf, which led to a pulmonary embolus. He collapsed at home on 26 February 2021 and attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful. Concerns included the lack of a face-to-face GP examination, failure of the electronic system to alert staff to a markedly raised D-Dimer, and NICE guidance not addressing Covid-19-related clotting risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Lorenzo electronic system to trigger alerts for markedly raised D-dimer results

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The D-Dimmer of over 10,000 did not trigger an alert on the Lorenzo electronic system due to how it was reported and the configuration of Lorenzo at that time at the Trust. The Trust have taken steps to change how the reports are input into Lorenzo to ensure a raised D- Dimmer such as this triggers an alert. It was unclear if that learning has been shared across the NHS to other trusts who use Lorenzo to ensure that alerts are triggered. ”

    Source location

    Mark Holden · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Benjamin Rajinder O’HARA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benjamin Rajinder O’Hara died after jumping from the fourth floor balcony of his home on 2 November 2020, following repeated contacts with mental health services and episodes of suicidal thoughts and psychosis. Concerns included that professionals did not ask permission to contact his family, an outdated hospital-admission alert was not reviewed, a review was not a formal mental health assessment, and he had no care co-ordinator or other community mental health team member overseeing his care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review medical-record alerts

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was an alert on Mr O’Hara’s medical record, saying that admission to hospital was unhelpful to him. However, this had been placed on the record 18 months before his death and had not been reviewed since. If it had been brought up to date, it could have affected the decision not to detain him on 3 October. ”

    Source location

    Benjamin Rajinder O’HARA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the Carenotes alert process, including agreed wording protocols linked to risk-assessment and suicide-prevention processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alerts should be reviewed regularly to ensure the information remains relevant. If the information in the alert suggests contacting a secondary care team, the secondary care team should review the alert accordingly on discharge to incorporate this change. In this instance the alert was not reviewed on discharge. Alerts should also provide important information and should refrain from being opinion orientated. On interview, numerous staff assessing Mr. O’Hara indicated that the alert on Carenotes influenced their review.”

    Source location

    2021-0077-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 March 2021

    Open published response
  6. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Katie Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katie Emma Corrigan had a history of chronic pain, anxiety and depression, and developed an addiction to pain-relieving medication. She obtained medication from multiple sources, and the report raised concerns that doctors, pharmacists and alert systems did not prevent her from obtaining sufficient opiate medication to cause her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an effective national procedure for circulating Patient Alerts to pharmacies

    Wider context from the report

    “The GP who gave evidence at the inquest, Dr ████████ from Bodriggy Health Centre in Hayle, stated that she had never been contacted by any other doctor considering the prescription of opiate or other medication to Mrs Corrigan. She was able to procure the medication in sufficient quantities first to require an emergency admission to hospital and latterly to result in her death. Similarly, the registered GP was not contacted by any dispensing pharmacist checking whether the prescription was appropriate. After Dr ████████ became aware of the two on-line pharmacies who had dispensed the medication to Mrs Corrigan that led to her admission into hospital, she attempted to raise an alert through NHS England, in order that the unsuitability of prescribing opiate medication to Mrs Corrigan could be raised with clinicians. This was sent out regionally but Dr ████████ has since been advised there is no formal procedure for circulating Patient Alerts to pharmacies on a national level. I am further given to understand that non NHS contacts would only receive a redacted version of the alert in any event. What seems clear is that the alert proved ineffective in preventing Mrs Corrigan from improperly obtaining sufficient quantities of opiate medication to result in her death. ”

    Source location

    Katie Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHSEI is responsible for systems oversight of controlled-drug management and use, including the alert system’s operation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to the effectiveness of NHS England and NHS Improvement’s (NHSEI’s) alert system in preventing people from obtaining prescription-only medicines improperly, my officials have brought your concerns to the attention of NHSEI.”

    Source location

    2021-0045-Response-from-Dept-of-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response
  7. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Jerome Alexander Peat · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jerome Alexander Peat was found dead from an overdose of morphine at his student accommodation on 12 December 2019. The report identifies inadvertent duplication of morphine prescriptions, after the medical record failed to alert a practice that he had already registered with another GP, resulting in significantly more morphine being prescribed than intended.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the EMIS computer medical record to alert the medical centre to prior GP registration

    Wider context from the report

    “The EMIS computer medical record on 4.11.19 failed to alert ████████ at Long Furlong Medical Centre that Mr. Peat had already registered with the GP at the Student Medical Centre, as a result of which there was inadvertent duplication of his morphine prescription on 4.11.19 and 5.11.19 and Mr. Peat was prescribed significantly more morphine than was intended. He subsequently died from an overdose of prescribed morphine. ”

    Source location

    Jerome Alexander Peat · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Newcastle upon Tyne

    AI-generated summary

    Maia Hazel Ann Strachan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maia Hazel Ann Strachan was born on 6 July 2017 and died in hospital on 7 July 2017 after a complicated delivery involving shoulder dystocia, hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and severe macrosomia. The report identified concerns about inaccurate and suboptimal ultrasound assessment, inaccessible obstetric and diabetic records, missed opportunities for Caesarean delivery and joint decision-making, fetal scalp electrode use, documentation, and dissemination of expert findings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of patient-specific sequential scan data storage and sonographer alerts

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The ability to store sequential scan data specific to each patient and provide alerts to the Sonographer. This would facilitate comparison and prompt further investigation potentially altering a patient’s care plan and outcome. The Trust’s plan to procure software to facilitate the above should be urgently implemented. ”

    Source location

    Maia Hazel Ann Strachan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Richard HINTON attended A&E with right calf pain and swelling after being advised to attend because of a possible clot. He was discharged before a markedly raised D-Dimer result became available; the inquest recorded pulmonary embolus due to deep vein thrombosis and bleeding duodenal ulcer, with a conclusion of “Preventable Natural Cause”. Concerns included failures in recording and communicating the D-Dimer request and result, delayed testing, inadequate documentation, and other system and process failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of alerts for requested tests to the final decision maker

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) System failures. a) The system did not require or mandate the person who requested blood tests, specifically in this case a D-Dimer test, to record that request or the reason for it. There was no alert system which would have alerted the final decision maker of that request. At that time a health care assistant, staff nurse or doctor could have requested the tests. Only a doctor may do so now. b) The evidence indicated that agency nurses and locum doctors did not have access to the hospital systems in particular the “review” system for requesting and reporting on tests. It appears to have been common practice for those who could not do so to log on using a permanent member of staff’s pin number or access code, with or without their permission. The blood tests had been requested on nurse C’s ‘review’ account who denied doing so. c) If none of the witnesses who gave evidence requested the D-Dimer test it meant that another person did and could do so without any entry or note made in the A&E records. ”

    Source location

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The alert facility existed; failure to complete it was attributed to human factors rather than a system failure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a. The system did not require or mandate the person who requested blood tests, specifically in this case a D-Dimer test, to record that request or the reason for it. There was no alert system which would have alerted the final decision maker of that request. At that time a health care assistant, staff nurse or doctor could have requested the tests. Only a doctor may do so now.”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  10. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Thomas Smith Collings · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Thomas Smith Collings suffered unexpected ventricular fibrillation at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 2 August 2018 and was found several minutes later without effective cardiac output. The report identified failures to detect the ventricular fibrillation, including ECG monitoring not detecting the rhythm, the crisis alarm not sounding, artefact obscuring the trace, and delays in attendance. The substantive concern was whether improvements to monitoring algorithms could enable earlier alerts and better distinguish artefact from a life-threatening event.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the alert algorithm to provide earlier differentiation between detached-lead artefacts and life-threatening ventricular defibrillation

    Wider context from the report

    “I should be glad to be told about any additional learning arising from the evidence heard at the Inquest especially with regard to the evidence of your engineer ████████ and In particular, are there any improvements to the algorithm for earlier alerts, especially those that may differentiate sooner between any artefact, such as a detached lead, and a life-threatening event, such as a ventricular defibrillation, recognisable by the human eye? ”

    Source location

    Mr Thomas Smith Collings · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement escalating ECG technical alarms for “Arrhythmia Paused” and “Leads Off” states, including configurable escalation to a high-priority alarm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GE Healthcare has implemented ECG Technical Alarm notification improvements when the automated ECG algorithm detects noise and/or artifact. The current GE Healthcare CARESCAPE B850/B650/B450 Patient Monitoring platform provides escalating ECG Technical Alarms for “Arrhythmia Paused” and “Leads Off” states. These improvements allow clinicians to configure “Arrhythmia Paused” and “Leads Off” Technical Alarms to escalate to a high “red” alarm rather than a warning or advisory alarm. This functionality was introduced in the CARESCAPE product line in 2009. In Mr. Collings’ case, based on the ECG tracings and log file information, the “Arrhythmia Paused” Technical Alarm would have escalated to a high “red” alarm at approximately 01:21:53, alerting caregivers to the loss of ECG monitoring and arrhythmia alarm detection capability.”

    Source location

    2019-0260-Response-by-GE-Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement improved ventricular fibrillation detection using spectral analysis, faster alarm processing and data from all available ECG leads.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GE Healthcare has also implemented improvements in the signal processing specific to the detection of Ventricular Fibrillation. The current GE Healthcare CARESCAPE B850/B650/B450 Patient Monitoring platform uses a spectral analysis technique within the EK-Pro algorithm that was not possible in the previous generation platforms due to the computational demands. The primary performance benefits of the newer technology include a shorter average time to alarm and the capability to utilize the data in all available leads (e.g., I, II, III, V) when the analysis is updated each second. Testing of the algorithm improvements via the requirements of AAMI/ANSI EC-57 confirm the reduced alarm delay relative to the older technology.”

    Source location

    2019-0260-Response-by-GE-Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The automated ECG arrhythmia detection algorithm operated within specifications and industry standards; signal conditions and rare rhythm prevented the alarm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the case involving Mr. Thomas Collings, following an investigation, GE Healthcare concluded that the automated ECG arrhythmia detection algorithm (EK-Pro), being used to monitor Mr Collings performed within specifications and ECG monitoring industry standards based on the available information and Full Disclosure data captured. The signal acquisition conditions combined with the extremely rare “Torsades de Pointes” ECG rhythm Mr. Collings presented with on the morning of August 2, 2018 prevented the algorithm from asserting a Ventricular Fibrillation (“VF”) or Ventricular Tachycardia (“VT”) arrhythmia alarm. Unfortunately, ECG tracings for leads I, II and V were not available for review to further the assessment.”

    Source location

    2019-0260-Response-by-GE-Healthcare
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 April 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026