Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical safety-alert systems

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First reported 12 Oct 2013•Latest report 1 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical records, prescribing systems or related clinical information processes to create, retain, update, display or otherwise reliably surface safety alerts concerning patients, medicines or treatment.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to act on a clearly received alert where the alerting system itself operated as intended.
  • Excludes non-clinical alert systems such as police, custody, safeguarding or transport systems unless the report directly concerns a clinical safety-alert system.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping or communication deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the reliability of a clinical safety alert.
Reports
53

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
56

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
66

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England12
Department of Health and Social Care11
Egton Medical Information Systems Limited3
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
Care Quality Commission2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Wales2
Proprietary Association of Great Britain2
Royal College of General Practitioners2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust2
Welsh Government2
Adelaide Medical Centre, London1
Alliance Pharmaceuticals Limited1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Joyce Violet Rumming · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joyce Violet Rumming attended the Accident and Emergency Department on 11 December 2016 and was given Amoxicillin and Clarithromycin at 01.45 on 12 December 2016; she died just over half an hour later. The stated cause of death was respiratory failure, and the report says this did not appear to be related to an allergic reaction to Amoxicillin. The principal concern was that information about her recorded Amoxicillin allergy was not effectively communicated between systems and staff, resulting in the antibiotic being administered shortly before her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of software systems to communicate allergy markers to prescribing clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “The Route Cause Analysis in relation to items (bullet points) under contributory factors documents a number of areas that give rise for concern. It essentially amounts to right hand not communicating with the left hand in that for example unless a Doctor looks in a specific location due to issues as regards the communication between various software packages that the existence of an allergic marker could be missed as was the situation in relation to Joyce's case. ”

    Source location

    Joyce Violet Rumming · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a new electronic clinical note that includes patient allergies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action Two – Review of documentation of allergies The majority of documentation in the Emergency Department is electronic. On the electronic patient record system there is an alert section where drug allergies are to be noted. The alert notification tab is then flagged red on the patient’s home page.”

    Source location

    2017-0182-Response-by-Great-Western-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore the IT infrastructure interface between the electronic medication and patient record systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action Three – Explore the interface between IT systems The IT infrastructure did not and still does not support sharing of information between the electronic patient medication system and the electronic patient record system. Actions two and four are to bridge this gap and ensure patient safety.”

    Source location

    2017-0182-Response-by-Great-Western-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Migrate the Emergency Department onto the Trust-wide server to improve access to electronic medication records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to this, the Emergency Department are being migrated onto the same server which the rest of the Trust uses. This will make it easier for Emergency Department staff to have access to the electronic patient medication record to look up any allergies and with the potential to prescribe medication using this system.”

    Source location

    2017-0182-Response-by-Great-Western-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The electronic handover system cannot be tailored to place key information, such as allergies, at the top for individual organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Clinical Risk team had liaised with the local ambulance trust to see whether any changes can be made to the electronic system so that key information, such as allergies, is at the top of the handover document. Our local ambulance trust works with many acute hospitals in the South West region. We have been advised that it is not possible to make”

    Source location

    2017-0182-Response-by-Great-Western-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response
  2. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mr George Arthur Cheese · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr George Arthur Cheese, an 18-year-old man, was found hanging in woodland near his home on 9 April 2015. He had anxiety and depression with suicidal thoughts, and concerns were raised about the amount of Fluoxetine prescribed and the absence of a flag to limit repeat medication supplies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to flag suicidal thoughts and potential overdose risk in patient notes

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mr Cheese was prescribed Fluoxetine anti-depressant medication on the 3rd November 2014 by a treating GP, following admitting to fleeting suicidal thoughts. He was reviewed by ████████ on 14th January 2015 when Mr Cheese described daily episodes of intense low mood with suicidal thoughts which included taking an overdose. This led to a reference to the Mental Health Team. At an appointment with the Practice’s Nurse Practitioner on 3rd February, Mr Cheese was prescribed 112 tablets of Fluoxetine. In the course of her evidence, ████████ stated that the Nurse Practitioner was probably just repeating the same prescription that the previous Doctor had issued to Mr Cheese but that she, ████████, would not have done that. (3) ████████ also acknowledged, in the course of her evidence, that there was no “flag” on Mr Cheese’s notes to alert treating Clinicians within the GP Practice to limit the amount of medication provided to Mr Cheese in view of his history. She acknowledged that a flag, in such circumstances, was good practice. (4) The concerns arising from the evidence are therefore the amount of medication prescribed to a patient who was known to be suffering from mental health issues and describing suicidal thoughts and a potential overdose and the fact that this was not being flagged to prevent large amounts of medication being provided to him as a matter of repeat prescription. ”

    Source location

    Mr George Arthur Cheese · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate the antidepressant prescribing policy to GPs and nurses or nurse practitioners.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Shortly after George died the partners introduced the requirement for the issue of repeat prescriptions and depression reviews to be conducted by GPs only; receptionists are aware that patients with anxiety and depression cannot be seen by nurse practitioners. This policy has been circulated to all our GPs and nurses/nurse practitioners. The addition of a flag - or ‘major alert’ - on the front screen of the patient’s record is the responsibility of the GP who initially assesses or reviews the patient should they have concerns at any time. This could include receiving a letter from Talking Therapies expressing concern about a patient’s suicidal thoughts.”

    Source location

    2017-0179-Response-by-Woodley-Centre-Surgery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the assessing or reviewing GP to add a major alert when concerned about a patient’s risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Shortly after George died the partners introduced the requirement for the issue of repeat prescriptions and depression reviews to be conducted by GPs only; receptionists are aware that patients with anxiety and depression cannot be seen by nurse practitioners. This policy has been circulated to all our GPs and nurses/nurse practitioners. The addition of a flag - or ‘major alert’ - on the front screen of the patient’s record is the responsibility of the GP who initially assesses or reviews the patient should they have concerns at any time. This could include receiving a letter from Talking Therapies expressing concern about a patient’s suicidal thoughts.”

    Source location

    2017-0179-Response-by-Woodley-Centre-Surgery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response
  3. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Mr John Higgs · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr John Higgs died at Barnsley General Hospital on 18 November 2015 from a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm. A CT scan in March 2011 had identified the aneurysm, but the finding was not communicated to Mr Higgs, other clinicians, or his general practitioner. The report raised concern that the Trust’s current system for communicating unexpected, significant non-cancerous radiological findings remained reliant on one doctor noticing and recording the information, with no red-flag facility or equivalent protocol.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of a system red flag for unexpected significant radiological findings

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard that the Trust now relies on an electronic system rather than the paper system as it did in 2011. However, any unexpected significant/serious radiological finding are still included in a report that is only sent to the Consultant in charge of the care and it is a matter for that doctor to notice that part of the report and to input this information on the system as a message. In essence, the process appears to be the same, it the mode of recording the information that had changed from paper to computer. No other measures have been put in place and the system is still reliant on one doctor noticing and recording the information. In addition, the Court heard there was no facility to place a “red flag” on the system to increase the likelihood of other clinicians being made aware of these unexpected and significant findings. The Trust has a radiology protocol for “unexpected cancer pathology” where the results are sent to the treating Consultant but also sent to the MDT Cancer Co-ordinator for action but no such protocol exists for non- cancerous but significant and potentially life threatening findings. The Secretary of State for Health is asked to consider whether it is appropriate for Trust to review its systems and procedures in place in relation to “unexpected (non-cancerous) radiological findings because HMAC ████████ is concerned that this situation could occur again. ”

    Source location

    Mr John Higgs · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Re-issue the radiological findings guidance to relevant clinical staff who joined after 2016.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will ensure that the Guidance is re-issued to the relevant clinical staff who have joined our organisation after 2016. We have included the Guidance as the basis of the Patient Safety Bulletin. In addition, the policy and Regulation 28 response will be reviewed and disseminated at the quarterly Quality and Governance Committee which is attended by senior medical, nursing and managerial staff.”

    Source location

    John-higgs-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain updated guidance for communicating critical or urgent unexpected significant radiological findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “By way of background the Guidance came in to existence on 16 January 2012 (EXH 1 and 1A) and was completely re-written and comprehensively updated in October 2015 by ████████ In line with Trust policy review requirements, this document has been re-reviewed and minor changes made in July 2016 (EXH 3). The versions of the Guidance from January 2012 to date are enclosed and for your information and consideration.”

    Source location

    John-higgs-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use electronic reporting systems to flag serious incidental radiological findings to treating clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ confirms the combination of the new Guidance, advice sought and the electronic reporting systems (ICE) now in place would significantly reduce the risk of a similar incident occurring in the future. The radiologist would be able to flag up a serious incidental finding to the treating clinician for their prompt action.”

    Source location

    John-higgs-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work towards implementing the Royal College of Radiologists’ standards for radiological report communication and fail-safe alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition RCR’s Standards for the communication of radiological reports and fail-safe alert notification (2016) which contains 10 recommended standards, and which the Trust is working towards.”

    Source location

    John-higgs-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 May 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Guidance and ICE electronic reporting systems are considered sufficient to significantly reduce the risk of similar radiological communication failures and future deaths.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ confirms the combination of the new Guidance, advice sought and the electronic reporting systems (ICE) now in place would significantly reduce the risk of a similar incident occurring in the future. The radiologist would be able to flag up a serious incidental finding to the treating clinician for their prompt action.”

    Source location

    John-higgs-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited NHS resources and technical lack of uniformity prevent an electronic results workflow from being made fool-proof.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “legislation making it a legal duty of the requesting clinician to acknowledge and act on test results (Ireland and the US). The NHS has neither the resource and technical uniformity to make an electronic workflow fool-proof and does not have a track record of taking action in clear failures of NPSA 16.”

    Source location

    John-higgs-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 May 2017

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Patricia FLYNN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Patricia FLYNN was admitted to hospital with a urinary tract infection and later suffered a fall from her bedside chair, fracturing her left hip. She underwent surgery, subsequently developed a chest infection that did not respond to antibiotics, and died on 7 May 2016. Concerns included the incomplete falls risk assessment, staff not being alerted to this, and the Patient Safety Investigation not identifying the omission.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of alerts to staff when required patient safety assessments are incomplete

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence at the Inquest suggested that if, from the falls risk assessment, there were concerns as to Mrs Flynn’s mobilising in and out bed and/or in and out of her chair and her stability then these would have been highlighted in the nursing notes/care plan and discussed at any handover. However, as the assessment had not been completed out no-one knew, least of all the HCA. It is of concern to me that those caring for a patient were ignorant of the fact that Mrs Flynn’s falls risk assessment had not been completed. It is clear that the HCA was unaware. It is reasonable for staff, in my view, to assume that all assessments have been appropriately carried out and completed. Why would the HCA have thought otherwise given the high falls risk sign above Mrs Flynn’s bed? It would seem eminently sensible to adopt a system whereby staff are alerted to the fact that a falls risk assessment has not been completed. My concern extends to any other assessment required for a patient’s safety and well-being. I am further concerned that the Patient Safety Investigation did not identify the fact that the falls risk assessment had not been completed. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Patricia FLYNN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Peter Arthur Rowe · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Arthur Rowe was administered the penicillin-based antibiotic co-amoxiclav despite a GP referral letter recording a penicillin allergy. He developed a worsening rash, was admitted to hospital with toxic epidermal necrolysis, and died on 8 February 2016 following deterioration. Concerns included the deletion of recorded allergy information and reliance on allergy answers despite Mr Rowe’s poor memory and his wife’s lack of knowledge of his allergy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to preserve documented penicillin and aspirin allergy information on the inpatient prescription and administration record

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The fact of the GPs referral letter stating an allergy to both penicillin and aspirin appears to have been transferred on to the Adult Inpatient Prescription and Administration record and then deleted, albeit it is not clear by whom and when. ”

    Source location

    Peter Arthur Rowe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Robin Keith Brett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robin Keith Brett, an 18-year-old man with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, died on 14 June 2014 after being admitted with severe constipation and an addisonian crisis. He did not receive his prescribed steroids, and the concerns identified were that nursing staff failed to notice the missed dose and that prescribing systems lacked an alert for patients taking long-term steroids.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of alerts identifying patients on long-term steroids

    Wider context from the report

    “This patient was prescribed steroids appropriately but the nursing staff failed to notice a dose of steroids had been missed. There is no system on the paper drug chart or the electronic prescribing system for alerting medical staff to patients being on long term steroids. ”

    Source location

    Robin Keith Brett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Alec James MATHIAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alec James Mathias developed drug-induced jaundice after receiving Flucloxacillin in 2008, but this reaction was not communicated to his GP or highlighted in the hospital records. He was prescribed Flucloxacillin again in 2014 for an infected finger and died after developing Flucloxacillin-induced cholestatic liver injury and liver failure. The principal concerns were failures to send discharge information to the GP and to record the drug sensitivity in the hospital notes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to highlight hospital records with vital drug-sensitivity information

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That the hospital has not highlighted its own records with vital information on drug sensitivity discovered and diagnosed on an in-patient. ”

    Source location

    Alec James MATHIAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Alan Vaughan Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Vaughan Jones had Addison’s disease and became unable to take his steroid medication after developing gastroenteritis. His condition deteriorated, and he died at 08.50 hours on 8 April 2011; the inquest concluded that Addison’s Disease resulted from neglect. Concerns included inadequate training in the use of electronic patient-record software and failures of the software to highlight important diagnosed conditions as alerts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of software programs to provide interruptive alerts for important diagnosed conditions

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) An apparent failure in the software programs themselves to highlight important diagnosed conditions as an alert, when the patient record is opened and to prevent any further steps being taken to navigate the program (and make any entries) without consciously closing the “alert” first. ”

    Source location

    Alan Vaughan Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Wales and the Welsh Assembly Government are the appropriate bodies to respond to concerns about this Welsh patient’s care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mr Jones was a patient in Wales. You have sent your report to NHS Wales and the Welsh Assembly Government as the appropriate bodies to respond to your concerns in this case. In addition, the Royal College of General Practitioners will be interested in the issues you raise.”

    Source location

    2015-0059-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 February 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational matters for general practice in Wales fall outside the Department of Health in England’s responsibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Department of Health in England has however no responsibility for operational matters for general practice in Wales. My comments therefore relate to the points you make about EMIS and GP record systems as they apply in England. Your concerns focus on both the capability and accessibility of EMIS as an electronic patient record system used in general practice, and the apparent lack of training for GPs in the use of this system and other such systems.”

    Source location

    2015-0059-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 February 2015

    Open published response
  9. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Yaser Saleh · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Yaser Saleh, aged 15, died on 13 September 2012 after collapsing with cardio-respiratory arrest from acute asthma. The report raised concerns that electronic systems did not identify asthma patients needing review when they were no longer receiving regular prescriptions, creating a risk of preventable deaths in people with chronic diseases.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of computerised recall systems to identify chronic disease patients requiring review beyond current prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “The GP reported that she believes that her EMIS computer system only called up people for review who were receiving regular prescriptions and thus a patient who had been on regular treatment but no longer was asking for inhalers was not identified as requiring call up for review. Whilst the court heard it was possible to customize the QOF system to call up patients, there was, according to the GP, no computerised system of calling up asthmatics who needed review unless they were currently on regular medication. She and the consultant in emergency medicine considered this created a risk of preventable deaths, that merited my making this report. The consultant in emergency medicine also said that this risk applied to other chronic diseases, such as epilepsy. This risk of not identifying those at risk of death because they no longer comply or have not been prescribed treatment taken in the past brought to the attention of EMIS and the Secretary of State, to consider whether EMIS has the potential or another electronic system should be commissioned to ensure that those with chronic disease requiring review and monitoring, are triggered for the attention of the GP, on wider criteria than current prescribing, or if such a system is available that the Department considers using it and other GPs are made aware of its use. ”

    Source location

    Yaser Saleh · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Warwickshire

    AI-generated summary

    Evelyn Mary Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Evelyn Mary Smith was 7 years old when she died after an acute deterioration in her breathing at home on 13 September 2013, following several healthcare consultations for croup-like symptoms. A post-mortem examination identified Parainfluenza Virus Type 2 and Staphylococcus Aureus, resulting in Acute Ulcerative Laryngotracheobronchitis. The principal concern was that a relatively inexperienced paediatric doctor was the only clinical contact for a child attending A&E, and that discussion with the paediatric team might have led to longer observation and consideration of non-viral causes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the GP computer system to alert clinicians to complete clinically relevant parameters

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The care provided to Miss Smith was reviewed by an independent paediatrician and a General Practitioner. I heard evidence that the accurate and consistent recording of Miss Smith’s vital signs may have allowed earlier recognition of the severity of her illness. I also heard that the use of the Paediatric Early Warning Scoring system in General Practice may be a useful way of documenting this information. However, it was clear that information in this form is not easy to enter into GP medical records. (2) From the evidence heard at Miss Smith’s inquest it was apparent that the scoring system for croup severity was not widely known amongst the clinicians involved in her care. However, her GP did learn of this scoring system after reviewing the ‘clinical mentor’ tool through the practice’s computer software. I heard evidence that systems are in place to prompt entry of certain clinical parameters in specific scenarios; predominantly chronic disease review consultations, such as for diabetes and asthma etc. I am concerned that the GP computer system contains important and clinically relevant information, such as the croup severity score but does not alert the clinician to complete it. I heard that it should be possible to prompt the entry of relevant clinical parameters after a diagnostic code has been entered into a consultation record. ”

    Source location

    Evelyn Mary Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026