Recipient

BAE Systems plc

First report 18 Jul 2018•Latest report 18 Jul 2018

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

Private and voluntary organisations · Public limited company. This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports: 2
Published responses: 0%
Concerns addressed: 0
Stated actions: 0

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

0%published responses found

0stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from BAE Systems plc linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

18 Jul2018
Birmingham and Solihull
Concerns raised3
1. Failure to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range
2. Lack of soldier clarity about Prove The Gun drill timing and terminology
3. Failure of risk assessments to actively consider drills and identify hazards during manufacture
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing a breech explosion, intense fire and blast-related injuries. The principal concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate communication about the condition of tanks and the absence of written procedures for checking, removing and storing the BVA assembly. The report also identified insufficient consideration of the hazard during the gun’s design and manufacture, inadequate communication about the opportunistic experience shoot, and routinely unstowed charges that caused a secondary explosion.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range
Wider context from the report
“2. One of the contributing factors to this tragedy was that the RCO, the person in charge of the live firing exercise, did not know the state of the tanks on the range and therefore allocated a stripped down tank for a live firing exercise. I remain concerned that it is vital that the person in charge of such exercises has up to date knowledge about the status of the tanks on the range. The MOD should look at what communication can be put in place to ensure the RCO is in fact in charge and has all the correct information to make decisions during the exercise. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of soldier clarity about Prove The Gun drill timing and terminology
Wider context from the report
“1. I remain concerned that soldiers are not clear about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of the word “work” in the drill. This was supported by the evidence of ████████ who stated there was still a lack of clarity. The MOD should ensure that soldiers are clear about the meaning of the word work in the drill and when the drill should be undertaken. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of risk assessments to actively consider drills and identify hazards during manufacture
Wider context from the report
“3. ████████ from the HSE confirmed that had applied advanced or developed risk assessment techniques when undertaken then it would have been identified in the design and manufacture of the gun that it could fire without the BVA assembly present when undertaking the TVEDU red drill. BAE and the MOD should look at their process to ensure that their risk assessments are suitable and importantly that drills are actively considered when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture. ”
Open source report
18 Jul2018
Birmingham and Solihull
Concerns raised4
1. Failure of the person in charge of live firing exercises to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range
2. Unsuitable risk assessments during gun design and manufacture
3. Failure to actively consider drills when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture
1. Lack of clarity among soldiers about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of “work” in the drill
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Cpls Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing hot pressurised gases to enter the turret, the breech block to explode and a subsequent fire. The substantive concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate information about tank status available to the Range Conducting Officer, and insufficient risk assessment of the gun’s ability to fire without the BVA assembly.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of the person in charge of live firing exercises to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range
Wider context from the report
“2. One of the contributing factors to this tragedy was that the RCO, the person in charge of the live firing exercise, did not know the state of the tanks on the range and therefore allocated a stripped down tank for a live firing exercise. I remain concerned that it is vital that the person in charge of such exercises has up to date knowledge about the status of the tanks on the range. The MOD should look at what communication can be put in place to ensure the RCO is in fact in charge and has all the correct information to make decisions during the exercise. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Unsuitable risk assessments during gun design and manufacture
Wider context from the report
“3. ████████ from the HSE confirmed that had applied advanced or developed risk assessment techniques when undertaken then it would have been identified in the design and manufacture of the gun that it could fire without the BVA assembly present when undertaking the TVEDU red drill. BAE and the MOD should look at their process to ensure that their risk assessments are suitable and importantly that drills are actively considered when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to actively consider drills when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture
Wider context from the report
“3. ████████ from the HSE confirmed that had applied advanced or developed risk assessment techniques when undertaken then it would have been identified in the design and manufacture of the gun that it could fire without the BVA assembly present when undertaking the TVEDU red drill. BAE and the MOD should look at their process to ensure that their risk assessments are suitable and importantly that drills are actively considered when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of clarity among soldiers about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of “work” in the drill
Wider context from the report
“1. I remain concerned that soldiers are not clear about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of the word “work” in the drill. This was supported by the evidence of ████████ who stated there was still a lack of clarity. The MOD should ensure that soldiers are clear about the meaning of the word work in the drill and when the drill should be undertaken. ”
Open source report

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Concerns raised3

Failure to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range

Lack of soldier clarity about Prove The Gun drill timing and terminology

Failure of risk assessments to actively consider drills and identify hazards during manufacture

Concerns raised4

Failure of the person in charge of live firing exercises to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range

Unsuitable risk assessments during gun design and manufacture

Failure to actively consider drills when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture

Lack of clarity among soldiers about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of “work” in the drill