BAE Systems plc

Private and voluntary organisations · Public limited company

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First report 18 Jul 2018•Latest report 18 Jul 2018

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
2

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from BAE Systems plc linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing a breech explosion, intense fire and blast-related injuries. The principal concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate communication about the condition of tanks and the absence of written procedures for checking, removing and storing the BVA assembly. The report also identified insufficient consideration of the hazard during the gun’s design and manufacture, inadequate communication about the opportunistic experience shoot, and routinely unstowed charges that caused a secondary explosion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range

    Wider context from the report

    “2. One of the contributing factors to this tragedy was that the RCO, the person in charge of the live firing exercise, did not know the state of the tanks on the range and therefore allocated a stripped down tank for a live firing exercise. I remain concerned that it is vital that the person in charge of such exercises has up to date knowledge about the status of the tanks on the range. The MOD should look at what communication can be put in place to ensure the RCO is in fact in charge and has all the correct information to make decisions during the exercise. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of soldier clarity about Prove The Gun drill timing and terminology

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I remain concerned that soldiers are not clear about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of the word “work” in the drill. This was supported by the evidence of ████████ who stated there was still a lack of clarity. The MOD should ensure that soldiers are clear about the meaning of the word work in the drill and when the drill should be undertaken. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of risk assessments to actively consider drills and identify hazards during manufacture

    Wider context from the report

    “3. ████████ from the HSE confirmed that had applied advanced or developed risk assessment techniques when undertaken then it would have been identified in the design and manufacture of the gun that it could fire without the BVA assembly present when undertaking the TVEDU red drill. BAE and the MOD should look at their process to ensure that their risk assessments are suitable and importantly that drills are actively considered when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture. ”
    Open source report

  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Cpls Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing hot pressurised gases to enter the turret, the breech block to explode and a subsequent fire. The substantive concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate information about tank status available to the Range Conducting Officer, and insufficient risk assessment of the gun’s ability to fire without the BVA assembly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the person in charge of live firing exercises to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range

    Wider context from the report

    “2. One of the contributing factors to this tragedy was that the RCO, the person in charge of the live firing exercise, did not know the state of the tanks on the range and therefore allocated a stripped down tank for a live firing exercise. I remain concerned that it is vital that the person in charge of such exercises has up to date knowledge about the status of the tanks on the range. The MOD should look at what communication can be put in place to ensure the RCO is in fact in charge and has all the correct information to make decisions during the exercise. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unsuitable risk assessments during gun design and manufacture

    Wider context from the report

    “3. ████████ from the HSE confirmed that had applied advanced or developed risk assessment techniques when undertaken then it would have been identified in the design and manufacture of the gun that it could fire without the BVA assembly present when undertaking the TVEDU red drill. BAE and the MOD should look at their process to ensure that their risk assessments are suitable and importantly that drills are actively considered when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to actively consider drills when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture

    Wider context from the report

    “3. ████████ from the HSE confirmed that had applied advanced or developed risk assessment techniques when undertaken then it would have been identified in the design and manufacture of the gun that it could fire without the BVA assembly present when undertaking the TVEDU red drill. BAE and the MOD should look at their process to ensure that their risk assessments are suitable and importantly that drills are actively considered when assessing risk and identifying hazards during manufacture. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to BAE Systems plc; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity among soldiers about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of “work” in the drill

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I remain concerned that soldiers are not clear about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of the word “work” in the drill. This was supported by the evidence of ████████ who stated there was still a lack of clarity. The MOD should ensure that soldiers are clear about the meaning of the word work in the drill and when the drill should be undertaken. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026