PFD report

James Kerry Fox · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 2 Feb 2017•North London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
7

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
6

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised7

  1. Unavailability of a less lethal firearm for disabling subjects
  2. Failure to use maximum available protection in firearms incident responses
  3. Differences and apparent contradictions within police officer training curricula
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.6

  1. Action

    Provide London armed officers with recently purchased enhanced ballistic shields incorporating ballistic-rated observation windows.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 February 2017.
  2. Action

    Research and develop less-lethal technologies suitable for police use through UK policing and Home Office collaboration.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 2 February 2017.
  3. Action

    Review MPS firearms training material to make wording explicit and reduce judicial misinterpretation.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 2 February 2017.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.9

  1. Position

    Generic training and rehearsed scenario-based responses are considered sufficient for officers to react appropriately as armed incidents develop.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of a less lethal firearm for disabling subjects

Wider context from the report

“3, That there is no less lethal firearm available to disable rather than cause fatal injury. A larger calibre less lethal firearm is available for use in other circumstances. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to use maximum available protection in firearms incident responses

Wider context from the report

“5, A concern that if the presumption is that every firearm has the potential to kill or cause serious injury to officers, and members of the public, who attend or are present, at a firearms incident then the response to each incident does not utilise that maximum available protection ie, two officer team one with a full length shield and the other carrying a short carbine. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Differences and apparent contradictions within police officer training curricula

Wider context from the report

“6, The differences between, and apparent contradictions within the curriculum used for the training of police officers. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of detailed contingency planning at briefings

Wider context from the report

“2, The need for contingency planning. There was no detailed contingency plan formulated at the briefing to cover the very real prospect that Mr Fox might at the very least open his door. It was left to the officers to apply their generic training. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inaccuracy of shots fired at close range

Wider context from the report

“1, The accuracy of shots fired at close range. A number of shots were fired at close range, (about 1 meter), resulting in a range if injuries spread over a large area including a gunshot wound to the head. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unsafe close-range firearms operations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of standard central national training

Wider context from the report

“7, That there is no standard central training provided on a national basis. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of a shield with enhanced ballistic protection and a visible section

Wider context from the report

“4, That there is no currently available shield with enhanced ballistic protection and a visible section that officer’s might use to safely shelter behind. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide London armed officers with recently purchased enhanced ballistic shields incorporating ballistic-rated observation windows.

Verbatim wording from the response

“25. The MPS acknowledges the value of portable ballistic protection (shields), and the ability to see through such protection. As this inquest commenced the MPS had already taken delivery of recently purchased shields of this design, and continues to make them available to armed officers in London. The purchase of these particular shields came about as a result of a general capability review for the MPS in light of the recent global terrorist incidents.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 7 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Research and develop less-lethal technologies suitable for police use through UK policing and Home Office collaboration.

Verbatim wording from the response

“23. As technology advances it may be possible to revisit the policy with regard to deploying less lethal weapons during certain firearms incidents. However, currently there is no less lethal weapon approved for police use which is guaranteed to incapacitate, and could therefore be considered for use as a primary response against a person believed to be in possession of a firearm. The MPS will continue to in work within the UK policing structure and in conjunction with the Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST), to research and develop all less lethal technologies that are suitable for police use.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 6 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review MPS firearms training material to make wording explicit and reduce judicial misinterpretation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“38. In respect of this particular incident the MPS does not accept there is training delivered to officers contrary to that required or permitted by the NPFTC. It is true to say that some MPS content in respect of a particular formation around a door as a point of entry no longer appears in the relevant section of the NPFTC. The MPS believes this will be rectified when the module in question is reviewed, and is currently working with the College of Policing to ensure this review is completed in a timely fashion. The MPS is also reviewing its own training material to ensure the wording contained is explicit and can be better understood during judicial processes. This is done with the aim to avoid future misinterpretation.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 10 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue reviewing and developing firearms tactics to prioritise the safety of subjects and officers.

Verbatim wording from the response

“46. The MPS recognises that there will be lessons learnt from each and every occasion an officer discharges their weapon. The MPS is committed to continually reviewing and developing tactics to ensure the safety of subjects and officers is of the highest priority.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 12 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Work with the College of Policing to complete a timely review of the national firearms training curriculum module.

Verbatim wording from the response

“38. In respect of this particular incident the MPS does not accept there is training delivered to officers contrary to that required or permitted by the NPFTC. It is true to say that some MPS content in respect of a particular formation around a door as a point of entry no longer appears in the relevant section of the NPFTC. The MPS believes this will be rectified when the module in question is reviewed, and is currently working with the College of Policing to ensure this review is completed in a timely fashion. The MPS is also reviewing its own training material to ensure the wording contained is explicit and can be better understood during judicial processes. This is done with the aim to avoid future misinterpretation.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 10 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain national armed-officer weapon-handling and shooting-accuracy standards, with regular reviews of training sufficiency.

Verbatim wording from the response

“11. The MPS continues to maintain national standards in respect of armed officers weapon handling and shooting accuracy, and additionally reviews these standards regularly to ensure officers are trained sufficiently to meet the operational requirement based on threats encountered.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Generic training and rehearsed scenario-based responses are considered sufficient for officers to react appropriately as armed incidents develop.

Verbatim wording from the response

“13. Officers are taught to react to circumstances as they unfold and read visual stimulus to inform threat assessment and take appropriate action / reaction. This would be the case for a door unexpectedly opening and a person posing an immediate threat. Armed officers are trained to assess and respond to threat appropriately, and this is a constant feature in training where numerous differing scenarios are rehearsed.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

College-led training governance, common standards, good-practice sharing and flexible local delivery are considered the best model for UK firearms training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“40. There are 51 separate police forces and law enforcement organisations (E.g. The National Crime Agency) in the UK. These organisations all have differing levels of armed capability. Whilst some Forces operate within a training collaboration, some Forces deliver training independently. The link is provided by the College of Policing who licence training centres, and training delivery is completed with the NPFTC as a guide to ensure common national standards and interoperability.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 10 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

A full-length shield and carbine are not accepted as the maximum protective configuration for every circumstance because equipment limitations and operational environments vary.

Verbatim wording from the response

“31. The full-length enhanced ballistic shield referred to has a weight of more than 30Kg. This prevents most police officers from being able to easily manoeuvre or indeed even hold this equipment for more than a few minutes at a time. This equipment therefore has limitations despite its enhanced protective capabilities. The advantages of greater degrees of ballistic protective equipment have to be balanced with the practicalities of wearing and moving in such equipment. Armed response officers must also be capable of carrying such equipment in vehicles, and responding to incidents quickly and effectively.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 8 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The College of Policing owns and manages the national firearms training curriculum, including its content and role-profile requirements.

Verbatim wording from the response

“35. The National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC) has been developed within a framework of integrated modules and units that together represent a whole programme of skills to be incorporated into armed officer training. The NPFTC is owned and managed by the College of Policing. It determines the training content for all firearms officer and Firearms Commander role profiles. The NPFTC is a reference document that is used to deliver a consistent standard of training, and a nationally understood catalogue of tactical deployments and capabilities for armed policing. The NPFTC is not a training manual for armed police. It is utilised as a guide to provision of common National standards, method of standardised assessment, and performance criteria.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 9 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The available evidence does not establish that officers’ shooting accuracy was poor or that the head wound resulted from deliberately aiming at the head.

Verbatim wording from the response

“9. It is possible one or both officers’ aim was adversely affected by the requirement to act quickly and instinctively. However, based upon the evidence available, no definite conclusion can be arrived at which would suggest either of the officer’s aim was poor. It is possible and plausible that the movement of James Fox’s body as he was hit may account for the location of the wounds. For example, the wound to head may have been the final shot fired which was directed into the torso but actually hit the head as James Fox fell backwards. Without any detailed and evidentially reliable reconstruction providing a basis for further examination, it would not be a fair conclusion that the officer’s accuracy was poor.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 3 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

National standards and regular review of armed-officer weapons handling and shooting accuracy are considered sufficient to meet operational requirements.

Verbatim wording from the response

“11. The MPS continues to maintain national standards in respect of armed officers weapon handling and shooting accuracy, and additionally reviews these standards regularly to ensure officers are trained sufficiently to meet the operational requirement based on threats encountered.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Less-lethal weapons cannot be used unless approved by the Secretary of State, limiting independent police adoption of new systems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“22. In terms of development of technologies, UK police cannot use less lethal weapons unless approved by the Secretary of State. Chief Police officers have a responsibility to ensure that police weaponry is fit for purpose and …where appropriate adopt effective less lethal weapon systems where they might reduce reliance on conventional firearms or ammunition without compromising the safety of police officers or others who might be affected. For this purpose, Chief Officers co-operating with each other (normally through ACPO) should monitor the availability of new weapon systems. The police service should maintain the capability centrally to assess, evaluate and where ACPO regard new weapon systems as suitable for further evaluation and testing they should consult the Secretary of State.⁵”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 6 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Centralised firearms training for all organisations is currently logistically impracticable and would prevent necessary regional and organisational variations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“41. There are regional and organisational variations across the country in respect of detailed content of training, weaponry, and in general capacity and capability. These variations are seen across the world between different law enforcement agencies within the same country. The provision of central training to all organisations requiring it would at present not be logistically possible, and would not allow for regional or organisations variations based upon strategic threat and risk assessments.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 10 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Detailed contingency plans for every possible eventuality are impractical because briefings would become excessively long, confusing and difficult to remember.

Verbatim wording from the response

“12. During this inquest police officers gave evidence around training received in relation to generic contingencies. Expert evidence was also attested by the Chief Firearms Instructor for the MPS around the impracticality of formulating (either verbal or written) detailed contingency plans for all possible eventualities. If this were to occur operational briefings would be overly long and lose value, as the myriad of contingencies would be confusing and unlikely to be remembered in detail.”

Source location

2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 2 February 2017

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026