PFD report

Juanita Boate Nti · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 18 Aug 2023•Inner South London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
5

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
3

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised5

  1. Failure to identify conflicting medication concentration and specify administration volume before dispensing
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to verify medication and dose before dispensingPart of recurring concern: Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication
  2. Failure to clearly record prescribed medication strength and administration volume
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication
  3. Failure to produce an unambiguous medication prescription when available prescribing strengths differ
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. Action

    Undertake further actions and discussions after receiving the paediatric medicines review’s statement on next steps.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 6 September 2023.
  2. Action

    Discuss liquid morphine safety with London ICB medication-safety representatives and provide regional oversight of action-plan implementation, including communications to GPs and community pharmacists.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 6 September 2023.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to identify conflicting medication concentration and specify administration volume before dispensing

Wider context from the report

“The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to verify medication and dose before dispensing; Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to clearly record prescribed medication strength and administration volume

Wider context from the report

“The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisions; Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to produce an unambiguous medication prescription when available prescribing strengths differ

Wider context from the report

“The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of an appropriate morphine strength as a prescribing choice on EMIS

Wider context from the report

“The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable EMIS clinical information and prescribing functions; Unreliable electronic medication-system controls for safe prescribing and administration.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of GP and pharmacist to communicate when prescription instructions are unclear or conflicting

Wider context from the report

“The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable communication between pharmacies and clinical teams.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Undertake further actions and discussions after receiving the paediatric medicines review’s statement on next steps.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The national Patient Safety Team at NHS England are aware of the issues and the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) and the Neonatal and Paediatric Pharmacy Group (NPPG) Joint Medicines Committee is currently undertaking a ‘Review of the Management of the Supply of Unlicensed Liquid Medicines to Children’, which includes the workstreams referenced above. NHS England awaits a statement from the Group as to next steps later in November 2023, and further actions and discussions will then take place. We can update the Coroner once we have an update.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 6 September 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss liquid morphine safety with London ICB medication-safety representatives and provide regional oversight of action-plan implementation, including communications to GPs and community pharmacists.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The London region Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer will also be discussing this issue with all London ICB medications safety representatives and ensure regional oversight of implementation of action plans which will include communications to GPs and community pharmacists.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 6 September 2023

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.1

  1. 1

    Discuss received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share key learning and insights across national and regional NHS services.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 6 September 2023.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share key learning and insights across national and regional NHS services.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I would also like to provide further assurances on national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around preventable deaths are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 6 September 2023

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026