PFD report

Charlotte Elizabeth Jacobs · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 7 Nov 2019•Manchester City

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
5

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
0

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised5

  1. Unavailability of completed guidance and protocol for transfers from Manchester Royal Infirmary to Park House
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processes
  2. Failure of relevant staff to be aware of internal investigation findings
  3. Risk of further inappropriate discharges or transfers from Ward 46 or Manchester Royal Infirmary
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements

No respondent-stated action or position is clearly linked to these concerns.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of completed guidance and protocol for transfers from Manchester Royal Infirmary to Park House

Wider context from the report

“1. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care (who authorised Ms Jacobs’ discharge on the 28th October 2016 to Maple Ward) indicated that – if similar circumstances arose again – he would make the same decision to transfer a patient to the Psychiatric Unit, despite the findings of the internal trust investigation that the discharge/transfer to Maple Ward should not have taken place. 2. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care still did not appear to understand that it was his role (and the role of those involved in treatment of Ms Jacobs’ physical illness) to consider whether a capacity assessment was required and to carry that out. This was not the role of the Psychiatric team. 3. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care and the Ward Manager for Ward 46 (at the time in 2016) did not appear to be aware of the findings of the Trust’s internal investigation. 4. Whilst I was informed that steps were being taken to put together guidance and a protocol for transfers of patients from Manchester Royal Infirmary to Park House, this had not been completed (despite Ms Jacobs’ death occurring some time ago in 2016). In light of this evidence, I am concerned that there could be further inappropriate discharges/transfers from Ward 46 and/or from Manchester Royal Infirmary generally, leading to a risk of future deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of relevant staff to be aware of internal investigation findings

Wider context from the report

“1. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care (who authorised Ms Jacobs’ discharge on the 28th October 2016 to Maple Ward) indicated that – if similar circumstances arose again – he would make the same decision to transfer a patient to the Psychiatric Unit, despite the findings of the internal trust investigation that the discharge/transfer to Maple Ward should not have taken place. 2. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care still did not appear to understand that it was his role (and the role of those involved in treatment of Ms Jacobs’ physical illness) to consider whether a capacity assessment was required and to carry that out. This was not the role of the Psychiatric team. 3. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care and the Ward Manager for Ward 46 (at the time in 2016) did not appear to be aware of the findings of the Trust’s internal investigation. 4. Whilst I was informed that steps were being taken to put together guidance and a protocol for transfers of patients from Manchester Royal Infirmary to Park House, this had not been completed (despite Ms Jacobs’ death occurring some time ago in 2016). In light of this evidence, I am concerned that there could be further inappropriate discharges/transfers from Ward 46 and/or from Manchester Royal Infirmary generally, leading to a risk of future deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Risk of further inappropriate discharges or transfers from Ward 46 or Manchester Royal Infirmary

Wider context from the report

“1. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care (who authorised Ms Jacobs’ discharge on the 28th October 2016 to Maple Ward) indicated that – if similar circumstances arose again – he would make the same decision to transfer a patient to the Psychiatric Unit, despite the findings of the internal trust investigation that the discharge/transfer to Maple Ward should not have taken place. 2. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care still did not appear to understand that it was his role (and the role of those involved in treatment of Ms Jacobs’ physical illness) to consider whether a capacity assessment was required and to carry that out. This was not the role of the Psychiatric team. 3. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care and the Ward Manager for Ward 46 (at the time in 2016) did not appear to be aware of the findings of the Trust’s internal investigation. 4. Whilst I was informed that steps were being taken to put together guidance and a protocol for transfers of patients from Manchester Royal Infirmary to Park House, this had not been completed (despite Ms Jacobs’ death occurring some time ago in 2016). In light of this evidence, I am concerned that there could be further inappropriate discharges/transfers from Ward 46 and/or from Manchester Royal Infirmary generally, leading to a risk of future deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of clinicians treating physical illness to undertake required capacity assessments

Wider context from the report

“1. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care (who authorised Ms Jacobs’ discharge on the 28th October 2016 to Maple Ward) indicated that – if similar circumstances arose again – he would make the same decision to transfer a patient to the Psychiatric Unit, despite the findings of the internal trust investigation that the discharge/transfer to Maple Ward should not have taken place. 2. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care still did not appear to understand that it was his role (and the role of those involved in treatment of Ms Jacobs’ physical illness) to consider whether a capacity assessment was required and to carry that out. This was not the role of the Psychiatric team. 3. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care and the Ward Manager for Ward 46 (at the time in 2016) did not appear to be aware of the findings of the Trust’s internal investigation. 4. Whilst I was informed that steps were being taken to put together guidance and a protocol for transfers of patients from Manchester Royal Infirmary to Park House, this had not been completed (despite Ms Jacobs’ death occurring some time ago in 2016). In light of this evidence, I am concerned that there could be further inappropriate discharges/transfers from Ward 46 and/or from Manchester Royal Infirmary generally, leading to a risk of future deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to recognise impaired decision-making capacity in care decisions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to learn from findings that a discharge or transfer should not take place

Wider context from the report

“1. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care (who authorised Ms Jacobs’ discharge on the 28th October 2016 to Maple Ward) indicated that – if similar circumstances arose again – he would make the same decision to transfer a patient to the Psychiatric Unit, despite the findings of the internal trust investigation that the discharge/transfer to Maple Ward should not have taken place. 2. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care still did not appear to understand that it was his role (and the role of those involved in treatment of Ms Jacobs’ physical illness) to consider whether a capacity assessment was required and to carry that out. This was not the role of the Psychiatric team. 3. The Consultant in charge of Ms Jacobs’ care and the Ward Manager for Ward 46 (at the time in 2016) did not appear to be aware of the findings of the Trust’s internal investigation. 4. Whilst I was informed that steps were being taken to put together guidance and a protocol for transfers of patients from Manchester Royal Infirmary to Park House, this had not been completed (despite Ms Jacobs’ death occurring some time ago in 2016). In light of this evidence, I am concerned that there could be further inappropriate discharges/transfers from Ward 46 and/or from Manchester Royal Infirmary generally, leading to a risk of future deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable clinical review and authorisation of discharge decisions.

Open source report
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026

No official response is included in the current published snapshot.