PFD report

Michael Peter McMonigle · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 15 Aug 2016•County Durham and Darlington

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
7

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
0

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised7

  1. Delays in escalating contact with relatives, police, hospital staff and medical staff after a patient’s absence
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable missing-person response
  2. Delays in responding to a patient’s absence from leave
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable missing-person responsePart of recurring concern: Unsafe management of inpatient leave and absence
  3. Failure to update risk assessments, case notes and intervention plans with self-harm, suicide and escorted-leave information
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable recording of suicide-risk information
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements

No respondent-stated action or position is clearly linked to these concerns.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delays in escalating contact with relatives, police, hospital staff and medical staff after a patient’s absence

Wider context from the report

“(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular. (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover. (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives. See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLIN00025. (4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10th August 2015. Instead, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family. (5) Failure to respond to Michael’s absence until well after 19:20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively at 21:00hrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that was the normal time for return from leave. (6) The response to Michael’s absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure, ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally, a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users, check of CCTV footage. (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22:30hrs at earliest, an attempt to telephone Michael from 22:40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22:30 hrs at the earliest (Michael’s mother said 23.15), Police at 23:45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at 00:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12:20hrs at the earliest. Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Missing Patients Procedure was inadequate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable missing-person response.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delays in responding to a patient’s absence from leave

Wider context from the report

“(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular. (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover. (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives. See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLIN00025. (4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10th August 2015. Instead, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family. (5) Failure to respond to Michael’s absence until well after 19:20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively at 21:00hrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that was the normal time for return from leave. (6) The response to Michael’s absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure, ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally, a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users, check of CCTV footage. (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22:30hrs at earliest, an attempt to telephone Michael from 22:40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22:30 hrs at the earliest (Michael’s mother said 23.15), Police at 23:45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at 00:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12:20hrs at the earliest. Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Missing Patients Procedure was inadequate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable missing-person response; Unsafe management of inpatient leave and absence.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to update risk assessments, case notes and intervention plans with self-harm, suicide and escorted-leave information

Wider context from the report

“(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular. (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover. (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives. See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLIN00025. (4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10th August 2015. Instead, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family. (5) Failure to respond to Michael’s absence until well after 19:20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively at 21:00hrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that was the normal time for return from leave. (6) The response to Michael’s absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure, ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally, a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users, check of CCTV footage. (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22:30hrs at earliest, an attempt to telephone Michael from 22:40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22:30 hrs at the earliest (Michael’s mother said 23.15), Police at 23:45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at 00:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12:20hrs at the earliest. Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Missing Patients Procedure was inadequate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable recording of suicide-risk information.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to conduct an assessment before handover

Wider context from the report

“(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular. (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover. (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives. See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLIN00025. (4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10th August 2015. Instead, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family. (5) Failure to respond to Michael’s absence until well after 19:20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively at 21:00hrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that was the normal time for return from leave. (6) The response to Michael’s absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure, ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally, a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users, check of CCTV footage. (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22:30hrs at earliest, an attempt to telephone Michael from 22:40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22:30 hrs at the earliest (Michael’s mother said 23.15), Police at 23:45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at 00:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12:20hrs at the earliest. Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Missing Patients Procedure was inadequate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to ensure that leave arrangements are understood by patients and communicated to relatives

Wider context from the report

“(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular. (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover. (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives. See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLIN00025. (4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10th August 2015. Instead, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family. (5) Failure to respond to Michael’s absence until well after 19:20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively at 21:00hrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that was the normal time for return from leave. (6) The response to Michael’s absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure, ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally, a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users, check of CCTV footage. (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22:30hrs at earliest, an attempt to telephone Michael from 22:40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22:30 hrs at the earliest (Michael’s mother said 23.15), Police at 23:45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at 00:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12:20hrs at the earliest. Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Missing Patients Procedure was inadequate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable mental-health patient leave arrangements; Unsafe management of inpatient leave and absence.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to carry out required internal, grounds, staff and CCTV searches for a missing patient

Wider context from the report

“(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular. (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover. (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives. See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLIN00025. (4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10th August 2015. Instead, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family. (5) Failure to respond to Michael’s absence until well after 19:20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively at 21:00hrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that was the normal time for return from leave. (6) The response to Michael’s absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure, ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally, a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users, check of CCTV footage. (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22:30hrs at earliest, an attempt to telephone Michael from 22:40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22:30 hrs at the earliest (Michael’s mother said 23.15), Police at 23:45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at 00:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12:20hrs at the earliest. Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Missing Patients Procedure was inadequate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable missing-person response.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of staff knowledge of leave and missing-patient policies

Wider context from the report

“(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular. (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover. (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives. See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLIN00025. (4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10th August 2015. Instead, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family. (5) Failure to respond to Michael’s absence until well after 19:20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively at 21:00hrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that was the normal time for return from leave. (6) The response to Michael’s absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure, ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally, a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users, check of CCTV footage. (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22:30hrs at earliest, an attempt to telephone Michael from 22:40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22:30 hrs at the earliest (Michael’s mother said 23.15), Police at 23:45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at 00:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12:20hrs at the earliest. Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Missing Patients Procedure was inadequate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable AWOL response processes; Unreliable missing-person response; Unsafe management of inpatient leave and absence.

Open source report
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026

No official response is included in the current published snapshot.