PFD report

Oliver Charles Major Shelley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 11 May 2026•Surrey

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
1

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Misleading public impression created by the Emergency Medical Advisor role title
  2. Failure to provide compliant and timely follow-up call management
  3. Lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway for emergency medical advisors during 111/999 calls
    Part of recurring concern: Telephone triage that is unreliable and can delay necessary carePart of recurring concern: Unreliable NHS 111 clinical triage algorithms and systemsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable ambulance call triage and re-triagePart of recurring concern: Unsafe emergency call handling
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.3

  1. Position

    A separate sepsis algorithm pathway is unnecessary because sepsis screening is embedded across multiple symptom-based NHS Pathways.

    Stated by NHS EnglandExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Misleading public impression created by the Emergency Medical Advisor role title

Wider context from the report

“2. Emergency Medical Advisors Other than some in-house training, Emergency Medical Advisors (EMA’s), generally have no qualifications in medicine or nursing. As such, the use of this title to describe their role raises a real concern they are misleading the public who use the 111/999 service. Oliver’s parents gave an extreme clear assessment of Oliver’s condition and also informed the EMA that they were concerned it was meningitis. However, this was not recognised by the EMA reaffirming their limited abilities. This reinforces the need to provide further assistance to all EMA’s who use NHS Pathways by providing an appropriate ‘sepsis’ algorithm to assist in their role. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to provide compliant and timely follow-up call management

Wider context from the report

“1. The lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway to assist the emergency medical advisor (EMA) during 111/999 calls At 14:51 hours on 22nd July 2024, Oliver’s parents called 999 indicating their concern that Oliver was suffering from meningitis as he was suffering from a non-blanching rash, vomiting and reduced level of consciousness. The EMA began a triage using NHS Pathways algorithm but as they were unable to prioritise any of the listed symptoms, they requested operational support at 14:57 hours, to ask if there was a meningitis pathway within the system. This call was concluded at 15:51 with the EMA indicating to Oliver’s parents that a call back was scheduled within 20 minutes. A call back was not undertaken until 1 hr and 41 minutes later and in the absence of a response a further unsuccessful call was made 2 hrs and 18 minutes later before Secamb closed the referral. In the meantime, Oliver’s parents made the decision to convey Oliver to hospital arriving there at around 15:55 hours. On attendance it was recognised that Oliver was gravely unwell and despite maximal supportive management sadly died from overwhelming meningococcal septicaemia 7.5 hours after his arrival. In their investigation, Secamb acknowledged that the EMA’s management of the 999 call was not compliant and have taken the opportunity to offer ongoing training. However, it was also recognised EMA’s found it challenging to triage individuals when multiple signs and symptoms were present in relation to a possible sepsis diagnosis and that having a dedicated sepsis algorithm would assist them in being able to provide an appropriate response to callers and to ensure appropriate management. This has important implications for prioritising ambulance disposition, which may also include the ability of a paramedic to attend at the earliest opportunity to give antibiotics. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway for emergency medical advisors during 111/999 calls

Wider context from the report

“1. The lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway to assist the emergency medical advisor (EMA) during 111/999 calls At 14:51 hours on 22nd July 2024, Oliver’s parents called 999 indicating their concern that Oliver was suffering from meningitis as he was suffering from a non-blanching rash, vomiting and reduced level of consciousness. The EMA began a triage using NHS Pathways algorithm but as they were unable to prioritise any of the listed symptoms, they requested operational support at 14:57 hours, to ask if there was a meningitis pathway within the system. This call was concluded at 15:51 with the EMA indicating to Oliver’s parents that a call back was scheduled within 20 minutes. A call back was not undertaken until 1 hr and 41 minutes later and in the absence of a response a further unsuccessful call was made 2 hrs and 18 minutes later before Secamb closed the referral. In the meantime, Oliver’s parents made the decision to convey Oliver to hospital arriving there at around 15:55 hours. On attendance it was recognised that Oliver was gravely unwell and despite maximal supportive management sadly died from overwhelming meningococcal septicaemia 7.5 hours after his arrival. In their investigation, Secamb acknowledged that the EMA’s management of the 999 call was not compliant and have taken the opportunity to offer ongoing training. However, it was also recognised EMA’s found it challenging to triage individuals when multiple signs and symptoms were present in relation to a possible sepsis diagnosis and that having a dedicated sepsis algorithm would assist them in being able to provide an appropriate response to callers and to ensure appropriate management. This has important implications for prioritising ambulance disposition, which may also include the ability of a paramedic to attend at the earliest opportunity to give antibiotics. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Telephone triage that is unreliable and can delay necessary care; Unreliable NHS 111 clinical triage algorithms and systems; Unreliable ambulance call triage and re-triage; Unsafe emergency call handling.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Limited clinical capability of Emergency Medical Advisors to recognise serious illness

Wider context from the report

“2. Emergency Medical Advisors Other than some in-house training, Emergency Medical Advisors (EMA’s), generally have no qualifications in medicine or nursing. As such, the use of this title to describe their role raises a real concern they are misleading the public who use the 111/999 service. Oliver’s parents gave an extreme clear assessment of Oliver’s condition and also informed the EMA that they were concerned it was meningitis. However, this was not recognised by the EMA reaffirming their limited abilities. This reinforces the need to provide further assistance to all EMA’s who use NHS Pathways by providing an appropriate ‘sepsis’ algorithm to assist in their role. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure NHS 111 health advisors are competent for safe clinical triage.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

A separate sepsis algorithm pathway is unnecessary because sepsis screening is embedded across multiple symptom-based NHS Pathways.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is noted that the health advisor sought advice from a Senior Non-Clinician as they wanted to know if there was a specific Pathway for meningitis before then passing the case to the clinical queue for inability to prioritise a main symptom. It is important to highlight that as NHS Pathways is a non-diagnostic clinical assessment tool 'Meningitis' (or any other condition) would not present as a pathway option, however, questions regarding septicaemia and meningitis are covered in a variety of symptom-based pathways and when answered positively result in an ambulance dispatch. In essence, rather than one ‘sepsis algorithm’ pathway, NHS Pathways has embedded a ‘sepsis’ algorithm into a wide range of symptom-based pathways where sepsis could”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 3 · response
Published 2 September 2026

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Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

NHS Pathways does not oversee local service delivery or response times, which must be managed locally.

Verbatim wording from the response

“NHS Pathways recognise there may be operational delays which must be managed locally. NHS Pathways is not able to take account of these as they and the local management of them can vary, and thus NHS Pathway’s expectations are based on what should happen in absence of such delays.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 2 September 2026

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Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Ambulance service providers locally determine alternative role titles, including whether to use “Emergency Medical Advisor.”

Verbatim wording from the response

“The terminology used to describe call-takers using the NHS Pathways system is described in the background and training section above. For clarity, the term Health Advisor is set by the NHS 111 service specification. 999 services can determine this per service.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 5 · response
Published 2 September 2026

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.1

  1. 1

    Discuss received Regulation 28 reports through the national working group and share learning across NHS national and regional services.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 September 2026.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss received Regulation 28 reports through the national working group and share learning across NHS national and regional services.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I would also like to provide further assurances on the national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of Oliver, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us to pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 6 · response
Published 2 September 2026

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
1/2

Data last updated 7 September 2026