PFD report

Hayley Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 28 Mar 2022•North East Kent

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
2

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
0

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised2

  1. Failure to share crucial clinical information between healthcare organisations
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care
  2. Failure of separate clinical record systems to provide cross-organisational access to crucial information
    Part of recurring concern: Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionablePart of recurring concern: Unreliable consolidation and access to patients’ cross-service clinical risk information
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements

No respondent-stated action or position is clearly linked to these concerns.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to share crucial clinical information between healthcare organisations

Wider context from the report

“(1) Evidence given at the inquest revealed that there were seven different organisations involved in Hayley’s care all of whom had different systems for recording their clinical notes: I. South London and the Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLAM) II. North East London NHS Foundation Trust (NELFT locally known as the Kent and Medway Eating Disorders Team) III. The White House IV. Kings College NHS Foundation Trust (Kings) V. General Practitioner (GP) VI. East Kent Hospitals NHS Trust (EKHT for Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother) VII. South East Coast Ambulance Service (2) The evidence given at the inquest revealed that each of the organisations were reliant on being copied into correspondence or on specific information being shared by others. The White House were not sent copies of clinical correspondence and at the time did not have access to GP records although since Hayley’s death do now have access to GP records. The mental health team at NELFT were responsible for managing Hayley’s CTO despite the fact that she was placed out of their geographical area but were not aware she had been seen by either the ambulance service or by Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother hospital. (3) The evidence at the inquest revealed that communication between those involved in her short life was inadequate and, as each ran separate clinical records systems, they could not access crucial information which could have made a difference ultimately meaning Hayley may not have died when she did. It is highly likely that the paramedic at South East Coast Ambulance Trust who attended Hayley on 23rd December or the emergency department nurse who saw her at Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother hospital on 24th December 2019 been aware that Hayley was on a CTO they or her treating mental health team would have been able to take steps which would have saved her life. (4) Evidence was given at the inquest that locally some steps have been taken to try to share key data between acute hospitals but there have been significant hurdles which have impeded the process namely, the different information technology systems used, licensing issues for the software, Data Protection requirements, confidentiality and consent issues as well as training and funding. (5) Hayley died following an out of hospital cardiac arrest on Christmas day 2019. If information been shared between different health care organisations particularly crucial information about Hayley’s CTO it is highly likely she would still be alive today. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of separate clinical record systems to provide cross-organisational access to crucial information

Wider context from the report

“(1) Evidence given at the inquest revealed that there were seven different organisations involved in Hayley’s care all of whom had different systems for recording their clinical notes: I. South London and the Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLAM) II. North East London NHS Foundation Trust (NELFT locally known as the Kent and Medway Eating Disorders Team) III. The White House IV. Kings College NHS Foundation Trust (Kings) V. General Practitioner (GP) VI. East Kent Hospitals NHS Trust (EKHT for Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother) VII. South East Coast Ambulance Service (2) The evidence given at the inquest revealed that each of the organisations were reliant on being copied into correspondence or on specific information being shared by others. The White House were not sent copies of clinical correspondence and at the time did not have access to GP records although since Hayley’s death do now have access to GP records. The mental health team at NELFT were responsible for managing Hayley’s CTO despite the fact that she was placed out of their geographical area but were not aware she had been seen by either the ambulance service or by Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother hospital. (3) The evidence at the inquest revealed that communication between those involved in her short life was inadequate and, as each ran separate clinical records systems, they could not access crucial information which could have made a difference ultimately meaning Hayley may not have died when she did. It is highly likely that the paramedic at South East Coast Ambulance Trust who attended Hayley on 23rd December or the emergency department nurse who saw her at Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother hospital on 24th December 2019 been aware that Hayley was on a CTO they or her treating mental health team would have been able to take steps which would have saved her life. (4) Evidence was given at the inquest that locally some steps have been taken to try to share key data between acute hospitals but there have been significant hurdles which have impeded the process namely, the different information technology systems used, licensing issues for the software, Data Protection requirements, confidentiality and consent issues as well as training and funding. (5) Hayley died following an out of hospital cardiac arrest on Christmas day 2019. If information been shared between different health care organisations particularly crucial information about Hayley’s CTO it is highly likely she would still be alive today. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionable; Unreliable consolidation and access to patients’ cross-service clinical risk information.

Open source report
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026

No official response is included in the current published snapshot.