PFD report

Olaseni Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

Issued 28 Jun 2017•South London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
8

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
2

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
14

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

Open published report

Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised8

  1. Inadequate definition of prolonged restraint and restraint danger in ABD training
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute behavioural disturbancePart of recurring concern: Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesPart of recurring concern: Unreliable recognition and communication of restraint-related acute behavioural disturbance risks
  2. Lack of defined and understood respective roles and responsibilities between healthcare and police staff
    Part of recurring concern: Unclear healthcare and police responsibilities for safety-critical action
  3. Failure of ABD training to provide clear and understood recognition guidance
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute behavioural disturbancePart of recurring concern: Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crises
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.12

  1. Action

    Embed recognition and emergency treatment of suspected ABD in mandatory, assessed restraint training.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 28 July 2017.
  2. Action

    Maintain an ongoing partnership with independent healthcare experts to inform restraint and officer-safety training.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 28 July 2017.
  3. Action

    Continue the Mental Health Team’s work supporting development of the national police-healthcare memorandum of understanding.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 28 July 2017.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.5

  1. Position

    A specified restraint time limit will not be introduced because it lacks clinical basis and presents practical timekeeping difficulties.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceUnable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inadequate definition of prolonged restraint and restraint danger in ABD training

Wider context from the report

“(3) Police were taught that prolonged restraint was dangerous, but had no idea what “prolonged” meant, and were left to use their own judgement. They also seemed to think that prolonged restraint referred to time spent in a prone position and that as long as the detainee was held on his/her side the danger was ameliorated or removed. The pathological and psychiatric expert evidence clearly indicated that restraint in any position can lead to sudden death in patients who are highly agitated. The jury found that the police training was inadequate in its definition of “prolonged restraint” for people exhibiting signs of ABD. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute behavioural disturbance; Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crises; Unreliable recognition and communication of restraint-related acute behavioural disturbance risks.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of defined and understood respective roles and responsibilities between healthcare and police staff

Wider context from the report

“(5) There was no training or understanding about the respective roles and responsibilities of healthcare and police staff. There was (and still is) no Memorandum of Understanding. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unclear healthcare and police responsibilities for safety-critical action.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of ABD training to provide clear and understood recognition guidance

Wider context from the report

“(2) Officers had been taught about Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD) but most did not recognise that Mr Lewis was suffering from ABD. The training on ABD appeared unnecessarily complicated and was not fully understood by officers. They incorrectly assumed that it was a formal diagnosis of some sort and that healthcare professionals would be able to recognise and treat the condition. An expert psychiatrist indicated that the description might be helpful for police in the community, particularly when the condition is caused by drugs, but it causes difficulty when police and mental health services work together and where the underlying cause is related to mental illness. The question that arose was whether it is necessary to attach a label at all. It might be more easily understood if officers are taught that people who resist restraint and appear to be suffering from mental illness may not respond as expected, and are therefore more vulnerable to die suddenly during restraint. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute behavioural disturbance; Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crises.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of guidance and training for failure to achieve control within a given period

Wider context from the report

“(4) Police officers were given no advice or training what they could or should do if control was not achieved within a given period of time. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure police officers receive and retain required training and operational guidance.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of trained and physically able medical staff

Wider context from the report

“(6) The jury concluded that medical staff requested police assistance due to a lack of trained and physically able medical staff. The Trust had a policy for closing wards or placing them in special measures when training levels fell below a given level, but this was not followed and there was a lack of clarity around who was responsible for assessing compliance ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Insufficient medical staffing capacity for timely patient care.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of clarity about responsibility for assessing compliance

Wider context from the report

“(6) The jury concluded that medical staff requested police assistance due to a lack of trained and physically able medical staff. The Trust had a policy for closing wards or placing them in special measures when training levels fell below a given level, but this was not followed and there was a lack of clarity around who was responsible for assessing compliance ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to follow the policy for closing wards or placing them in special measures when training levels fall below the required level

Wider context from the report

“(6) The jury concluded that medical staff requested police assistance due to a lack of trained and physically able medical staff. The Trust had a policy for closing wards or placing them in special measures when training levels fell below a given level, but this was not followed and there was a lack of clarity around who was responsible for assessing compliance ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of required reading and ready reference on restraint techniques and dangers

Wider context from the report

“(1) The court was told that officers are not expected to read Standing Operating Procedures and the Officer Safety Manual, and there is little “required reading” or ready reference for police officers regarding restraint techniques and dangers. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable officer access to and familiarisation with required operational instructions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Embed recognition and emergency treatment of suspected ABD in mandatory, assessed restraint training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In addition, the Officer Safety Training Programme (OST), which is pass/fail and mandatory for all officers below the rank of superintendent, reinforces each of the significant areas of information during the instructor-led modules. For example, the complex issues surrounding the condition that has come to be known as Acute Behavioural Disorder (ABD) forms a golden thread through regularly taught, refreshed and assessed modules within restraint training. In this way, officers become”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 2 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain an ongoing partnership with independent healthcare experts to inform restraint and officer-safety training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Independent Medical Science Advisory Panel (IMSAP) is an ad hoc panel of leading independent healthcare professionals who advise the National Policing Lead for Personal Safety Training on medical matters relating to physical restraint and self-defence techniques and equipment. The MPS believes that this on-going partnership helps to ensure that its officers receive the best informed training on what remains a complex condition that can present in very challenging and often violent situations. The benefits of changing this approach, which is firmly embedded in national and MPS training, appear to be unclear and could undo much good work already achieved by the police service with medical partners.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue the Mental Health Team’s work supporting development of the national police-healthcare memorandum of understanding.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The potential confusion this term may cause when working with other mental health service providers highlighted in your report is however acknowledged. This barrier can be reduced through improved working relations with the police and health care professionals. Work in this area includes the production of the ‘Safer Restraint’ DVD by the MPS in partnership with South London and Maudsley NHS Trust (SLaM) and the ongoing work of the MPS Mental Health Team in support of the national Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) announced by the College of Policing in January 2017 (College of Policing, 2017). The MOU was provided to you as an appendix to ████████ statement dated 26/01/2017.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Produce safer-restraint training material jointly with South London and Maudsley NHS Trust.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The potential confusion this term may cause when working with other mental health service providers highlighted in your report is however acknowledged. This barrier can be reduced through improved working relations with the police and health care professionals. Work in this area includes the production of the ‘Safer Restraint’ DVD by the MPS in partnership with South London and Maudsley NHS Trust (SLaM) and the ongoing work of the MPS Mental Health Team in support of the national Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) announced by the College of Policing in January 2017 (College of Policing, 2017). The MOU was provided to you as an appendix to ████████ statement dated 26/01/2017.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Agree and implement a joint police-healthcare protocol covering police support in relevant mental-health settings.

Verbatim wording from the response

“5. The service level agreement (SLA) that had been in place since 6 September 2000 between SLaM/BRH and the MPS had fallen out of use by 2010 (C170, Holmes ref D20, pages 7563 – 7576). Although SLAs were agreed between SLaM and various MPS policing boroughs in 2004 - 6, one was not in place with Bromley. Following Mr. Lewis’ death, a new Joint Protocol was agreed between SLaM and relevant MPS policing boroughs (including Bromley), which came into effect in September 2012 (C280, Holmes ref D50, pages 8093 – 8134).”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Replace lengthy policing procedures with accessible toolkits, including a live Mental Health Toolkit.

Verbatim wording from the response

“At the time of Mr. Lewis’ death in 2010 and at all times subsequently, all MPS SOPs and guidelines on mental health and officer safety have been available to officers on the MPS Intranet. A number of years ago it became accepted that the number and format of SOPs was overly burdensome on officers’ time and it was not realistic to expect them to be familiar with them. To make the guidance easier to access the MPS has reformatted its SOPs into much shorter, and more user-friendly “Toolkits”. The “Toolkits” have been designed to make information easier to locate and comprehend. They contain e- links to related information to provide additional depth and context where required. This change reflects previous learning. The Policing Mental Health SOP has been replaced with a Mental Health Toolkit, which went live in July this year.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 2 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deliver Trust-wide training on Operation Metallah, multi-agency emergency roles, and responsibilities for police assistance.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Training has been implemented across the Trust which teaches staff about the protocols of Operation Metallah. In addition, a training DVD called "Safety in Mind" has been and is being shown to staff. The film aims to demonstrate successful ways of working together, the roles, relationships and expectations that should feature when working in a multi-agency mental health emergency. Staff have also been and are continuing to be trained in their respective roles and responsibilities relating to police assistance at one of the Trust's hospital sites as a matter of routine.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Audit clinical-team training compliance monthly and apply improvement targets and formal performance management where required levels are not achieved.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Every member of a clinical team is allocated to a level of Promoting Safer and Therapeutic Services ('PSTS') training appropriate to their role. This allocation then forms part of their training requirements and is captured within our education and training database ('LEAP'). The LEAP system and the training delivery is the responsibility of the Trust's Education and Training Department.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Conduct recurring police liaison meetings to discuss interface issues, review incidents, monitor trends, and undertake thematic section 136 reviews.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Local police liaison meetings, chaired by local clinical service managers with local police representation present, occur every 2 months. In these meetings any local interface issues are discussed and all Operation Metallah incidents for that specific borough are reviewed. In addition, there is a Trust-wide police liaison meeting which is chaired by one of our service directors which brings the four borough representatives from both the police and the Trust together to discuss issues that cut across the four boroughs. Monitoring of all Operation Metallah incidents and relevant trends takes place at this meeting and they also undertake thematic reviews of section 136 use. This meeting occurs every three months.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement formal Operation Metallah protocols for police responses to hospital emergencies.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Following the death of Olaseni Lewis, the Trust and police have worked very closely together to develop formal working protocols when the police are called. This is currently called Operation Metallah and was described in my witness statement for the inquest dated 1 February 2017. Any emergency call received by the Central Control Centre ('CCC') originating from the Bethlem Royal Hospital, Maudsley Hospital, or Lambeth Hospital sites is”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Monitor staff unable to undertake PSTS physical-intervention training and redeploy unable staff to other work areas.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Through ward managers, directorate and Clinical Academic Group Leads and the Trust's Education and Training Department, the Trust is closely monitoring whether any of its staff members are unable to take part in any level of PSTS training either temporarily or in the long term. The Trust seeks to ensure that its services always have the minimum number of staff available to provide safe and therapeutic care to its patients which includes the ability of staff members to use PSTS physical interventions in the correct manner. The Trust has redeployed staff to other work areas on the basis that they are unable to perform PSTS physical interventions.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Formally discuss and sign off the Memorandum of Understanding with the Metropolitan Police at the scheduled 5 September 2017 meeting.

Verbatim wording from the response

“There is also a quarterly meeting with borough commanders which is chaired by our Chief Operating Officer where any significant issues are raised. The Memorandum of Understanding will be formally discussed and signed off at the next quarterly meeting on 5 September 2017, as issues have been clarified between the two organisations in the intervening period since the release of the draft document for comment in the early part of this year.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

A specified restraint time limit will not be introduced because it lacks clinical basis and presents practical timekeeping difficulties.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3. The introduction of time limits for prolonged restraint has been subject to much discussion in the police service. Advice from the Independent Medical Science Advisory Panel (IMSAP) was that there is no clinical basis for this due to the ‘many and various physiological factors that would preclude a firm medical basis for such an approach’ (Independent Medical Science Advisory Panel, 2014). The advice further cautioned that the introduction of a time limit could give rise to a misconception that restraint within this time period was safe. Doubts were also raised over the practicalities of accurate time keeping such events.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The sixth concern is directed to South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust rather than the police service.

Verbatim wording from the response

“6. The jury concluded that medical staff requested police assistance due to a lack of trained and physically able medical staff. The Trust had a policy for closing wards or placing them in special measures when training levels fell below a given level, but this was followed and there was a lack of clarity around who was assessing compliance.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 2 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing ABD terminology and embedded training are considered sufficient; changing the approach has unclear benefits and could undo established work.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2. It is widely recognised that the status of ABD remains a point of conjecture for many healthcare professionals. The police service in England recognised this but increasing phenomenon in the mid-90s and adopted the American terminology of Excited Delirium in mandatory training. The Senior Coroner heard evidence that the terminology was largely connected to the use of drugs, whereas behaviour manifesting in the same way and raising the same risk of sudden death during or following restraint became known to arise also from the misuse of drink, and/or related to certain health conditions, both physical and mental. Leading pathologists and other healthcare professionals advised the police service to adopt the wider umbrella term of ABD.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing training and prompt medical intervention are considered sufficient when officers fail to achieve control within a specified period.

Verbatim wording from the response

“4. As outlined above at 3, the advice received from IMSAP is that the attachment of any specified time value to the term “prolonged” would be without a clinical basis. Suggestions during the inquest in relation to the option of leaving Mr. Lewis in mechanical restraints only (i.e. handcuffs and leg restraint) were not supported by the expert evidence, as it would not have removed the basis for resistance/struggling and therefore would not have reduced the risk to life. Police training in respect of all suspected incidents of ABD is clear, consistent and unambiguous. Officers should treat all suspected incidents of ABD as a medical emergency. The emphasis is then on obtaining appropriate and timely medical intervention, whether from LAS or other health partners.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The decision to place a service on special measures for inadequate mandatory training rests with the relevant directorate and Clinical Academic Group leads.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I enclose a copy of Appendix 2 of the Trust's up-to-date Mandatory Training Policy entitled 'Escalation procedure for mandatory training levels. Escalation and action procedure should Tier 1 training levels fall below agreed standards', to be enacted by Directorate E&T committee or Directorate Performance management. It can be seen from this that it remains open to the Trust to place a service on special measures in relation to mandatory training levels and the decision to take this step rests in the hands of the relevant directorate and Clinical Academic Group Leads.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. 1

    Continue reviewing officer-safety and mental-health guidance to reflect learning and best practice.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 28 July 2017.
  2. 2

    Appoint a dedicated lead to ensure emergency-response nurses have appropriate training and experience.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 28 July 2017.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.2

  1. 1

    Using mechanical restraints alone would not reduce the risk to life because it would not remove the basis for resistance or struggling.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.
  2. 2

    Current safeguards, including vital-sign monitoring and treating suspected ABD as a medical emergency, are considered effective and appropriate controls.

    Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue reviewing officer-safety and mental-health guidance to reflect learning and best practice.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The content and format of SOPs/toolkits/guidance on officer safety and mental health policing is continually reviewed to reflect learning and best practice.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 3 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Appoint a dedicated lead to ensure emergency-response nurses have appropriate training and experience.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In addition, the Trust has appointed a dedicated lead for the nurses who are deployed in an emergency as the DSN or members of the Response Team. The lead is ensuring that our responding teams consistently have the right training and experience to perform this important duty.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Using mechanical restraints alone would not reduce the risk to life because it would not remove the basis for resistance or struggling.

Verbatim wording from the response

“4. As outlined above at 3, the advice received from IMSAP is that the attachment of any specified time value to the term “prolonged” would be without a clinical basis. Suggestions during the inquest in relation to the option of leaving Mr. Lewis in mechanical restraints only (i.e. handcuffs and leg restraint) were not supported by the expert evidence, as it would not have removed the basis for resistance/struggling and therefore would not have reduced the risk to life. Police training in respect of all suspected incidents of ABD is clear, consistent and unambiguous. Officers should treat all suspected incidents of ABD as a medical emergency. The emphasis is then on obtaining appropriate and timely medical intervention, whether from LAS or other health partners.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Current safeguards, including vital-sign monitoring and treating suspected ABD as a medical emergency, are considered effective and appropriate controls.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Furthermore IMSAP considered the safeguards incorporated into current police training represented effective and appropriate control measures. These include monitoring the persons’ vital signs and treating all suspected incidents of ABD as medical emergencies. Police training is designed to help officers make good decisions that protect the safety of the individual, the general public and officers. A copy of this report is attached as Appendix 1 for your reference.”

Source location

2017-0205-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
Page 4 · response
Published 28 July 2017

Open published response
Back to top

Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
2/2

Data last updated 7 September 2026