PFD report

Colin BLACKBURN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 17 Sep 2021•Worcestershire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
18

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
7

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

Open published report

Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised18

  1. Failure to review the Care Map at ACCT Case Reviews
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes
  2. Failure to hold an ACCT Case Review immediately before transfer
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfersPart of recurring concern: Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes
  3. Failure to hold an Initial ACCT Case Review within 24 hours of a concern
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.4

  1. Action

    Provide and operate an answerphone for urgent referrals when staff lack immediate computer access, with messages logged and forwarded by the administration team.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 September 2021.
  2. Action

    End paper TAG referrals and transition referrals to the electronic process.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 September 2021.
  3. Action

    Display posters explaining electronic and out-of-hours TAG referral pathways throughout the prison and disseminate the notice to prison staff by global email.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 September 2021.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.2

  1. Position

    Specific operational queries about mental health provision at HMP Hewell should be directed to Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to review the Care Map at ACCT Case Reviews

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to hold an ACCT Case Review immediately before transfer

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfers; Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to hold an Initial ACCT Case Review within 24 hours of a concern

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to carry out required ACCT observations

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to conduct multidisciplinary ACCT Case Reviews

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to hold an ACCT Case Review after a ligature incident

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of ACCT Case Review participants to familiarise themselves with the ACCT document

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Ineffective prison suicide and self-harm prevention systems; Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record triggers or warning signs on the ACCT inside cover

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of ACCT Case Manager involvement after prisoner transfer

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delays in holding scheduled ACCT Case Reviews

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Ineffective prison suicide and self-harm prevention systems; Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to document ligature incidents on the NOMIS record

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to ensure prison staff understand their ACCT obligations

Wider context from the report

“I am not satisfied that sufficient action has yet been taken to ensure that all members of prison staff understand their obligations in respect of prisoners who are subject to the ACCT process. This is because: (i) there is no evidence yet that the changes described above have led to a change in how prison staff deal with ACCT documents; and (ii) I heard evidence during the inquest from a number of senior officers who, even now, found it difficult to comprehend that their involvement with Mr. Blackburn and his ACCT document fell short of an acceptable standard. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of timely urgent TAG referral handling at weekends

Wider context from the report

“2) On 4.7.19, a prison officer, who had concerns about a significant deterioration in Mr. Blackburn’s mental state, submitted a paper TAG referral to the Mental Health team at the prison via the internal post. There was a delay in that referral reaching the Mental Team, with the result that it was not opened until after Mr. Blackburn’s death. Had it been opened sooner, the court was told that an urgent mental health assessment would have been carried out. I heard evidence from the Head of Healthcare at the prison that urgent TAG referrals currently are made by email, phone or on paper via internal post. If made late on a Friday or over a weekend, there was no guarantee that the mental health team would pick up the referral until after the weekend; instead, the referral should be made to a member of the healthcare team on duty that weekend, who would then phone Practice Plus Group’s regional on-call manager. I received no assurance that prison staff wanting to make an urgent TAG referral over a weekend knew that this was the process to follow, and heard that there is currently no divert service in place, so that if a member of staff tries to make an urgent referral by phone or email over the weekend, they are redirected to the correct pathway. The paper referral system, which relies upon the internal post at the prison, is still in place although, I am told, it can be stopped. In my view, there remains uncertainty amongst staff at the prison about the right way to make an urgent TAG referral to the mental health team, particularly at weekends. There is a risk therefore that a prisoner whose mental health deteriorates significantly during a weekend may not be properly assessed in time for action to be taken to address any risk of suicide or self-harm which he may present. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathways.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Reliance on internal post for urgent TAG referrals

Wider context from the report

“2) On 4.7.19, a prison officer, who had concerns about a significant deterioration in Mr. Blackburn’s mental state, submitted a paper TAG referral to the Mental Health team at the prison via the internal post. There was a delay in that referral reaching the Mental Team, with the result that it was not opened until after Mr. Blackburn’s death. Had it been opened sooner, the court was told that an urgent mental health assessment would have been carried out. I heard evidence from the Head of Healthcare at the prison that urgent TAG referrals currently are made by email, phone or on paper via internal post. If made late on a Friday or over a weekend, there was no guarantee that the mental health team would pick up the referral until after the weekend; instead, the referral should be made to a member of the healthcare team on duty that weekend, who would then phone Practice Plus Group’s regional on-call manager. I received no assurance that prison staff wanting to make an urgent TAG referral over a weekend knew that this was the process to follow, and heard that there is currently no divert service in place, so that if a member of staff tries to make an urgent referral by phone or email over the weekend, they are redirected to the correct pathway. The paper referral system, which relies upon the internal post at the prison, is still in place although, I am told, it can be stopped. In my view, there remains uncertainty amongst staff at the prison about the right way to make an urgent TAG referral to the mental health team, particularly at weekends. There is a risk therefore that a prisoner whose mental health deteriorates significantly during a weekend may not be properly assessed in time for action to be taken to address any risk of suicide or self-harm which he may present. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathways.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delays in reaching and opening urgent TAG referrals

Wider context from the report

“2) On 4.7.19, a prison officer, who had concerns about a significant deterioration in Mr. Blackburn’s mental state, submitted a paper TAG referral to the Mental Health team at the prison via the internal post. There was a delay in that referral reaching the Mental Team, with the result that it was not opened until after Mr. Blackburn’s death. Had it been opened sooner, the court was told that an urgent mental health assessment would have been carried out. I heard evidence from the Head of Healthcare at the prison that urgent TAG referrals currently are made by email, phone or on paper via internal post. If made late on a Friday or over a weekend, there was no guarantee that the mental health team would pick up the referral until after the weekend; instead, the referral should be made to a member of the healthcare team on duty that weekend, who would then phone Practice Plus Group’s regional on-call manager. I received no assurance that prison staff wanting to make an urgent TAG referral over a weekend knew that this was the process to follow, and heard that there is currently no divert service in place, so that if a member of staff tries to make an urgent referral by phone or email over the weekend, they are redirected to the correct pathway. The paper referral system, which relies upon the internal post at the prison, is still in place although, I am told, it can be stopped. In my view, there remains uncertainty amongst staff at the prison about the right way to make an urgent TAG referral to the mental health team, particularly at weekends. There is a risk therefore that a prisoner whose mental health deteriorates significantly during a weekend may not be properly assessed in time for action to be taken to address any risk of suicide or self-harm which he may present. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathways.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delays in assigning an ACCT Case Manager

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Ineffective prison suicide and self-harm prevention systems; Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Uncertainty among prison staff about the urgent weekend TAG referral pathway

Wider context from the report

“2) On 4.7.19, a prison officer, who had concerns about a significant deterioration in Mr. Blackburn’s mental state, submitted a paper TAG referral to the Mental Health team at the prison via the internal post. There was a delay in that referral reaching the Mental Team, with the result that it was not opened until after Mr. Blackburn’s death. Had it been opened sooner, the court was told that an urgent mental health assessment would have been carried out. I heard evidence from the Head of Healthcare at the prison that urgent TAG referrals currently are made by email, phone or on paper via internal post. If made late on a Friday or over a weekend, there was no guarantee that the mental health team would pick up the referral until after the weekend; instead, the referral should be made to a member of the healthcare team on duty that weekend, who would then phone Practice Plus Group’s regional on-call manager. I received no assurance that prison staff wanting to make an urgent TAG referral over a weekend knew that this was the process to follow, and heard that there is currently no divert service in place, so that if a member of staff tries to make an urgent referral by phone or email over the weekend, they are redirected to the correct pathway. The paper referral system, which relies upon the internal post at the prison, is still in place although, I am told, it can be stopped. In my view, there remains uncertainty amongst staff at the prison about the right way to make an urgent TAG referral to the mental health team, particularly at weekends. There is a risk therefore that a prisoner whose mental health deteriorates significantly during a weekend may not be properly assessed in time for action to be taken to address any risk of suicide or self-harm which he may present. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable mental health referral pathways.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to make timely entries on the ACCT Care Map

Wider context from the report

“1) The Record of Inquest has recorded 14 separate failings in respect of Mr. Blackburn’s ACCT document and his risk of suicide/self-harm, all of which were accepted by H.M. Prison Service: (a) that no Initial ACCT Case Review was held within 24 hours of the Concern; (b) that no entries were made on the Care Map until 26.6.19; (c) that no triggers or warning signs have been entered on the ACCT’s inside cover; (d) that no ACCT Case Manager was assigned until 26.6.19; (e) that no ACCT Case Manager had any effective involvement after Mr. Blackburn was transferred from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on 2.7.19; (f) that ACCT Case Reviews were often not multi-disciplinary, with healthcare and mental healthcare sometimes not being invited to attend; (g) that the Care Map was not reviewed at some ACCT Case Reviews; (h) that those conducting ACCT Case Reviews did not familiarise themselves sufficiently with the ACCT document beforehand; (i) that on several occasions, over several hours, the level of observations required under the ACCT document were not carried out; (j) that the first ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; (k) that no ACCT Case Review took place after the first ligature incident on 2.7.19; (l) that there was no ACCT Case Review immediately before Mr. Blackburn’s transfer from the Inpatients unit to Houseblock 6 on the evening of 2.7.19, given particularly that Mr. Blackburn had been expecting a transfer to Houseblock 5; (m) that the second ligature incident on 2.7.19 was not documented on Mr. Blackburn’s NOMIS record; and (n) that the ACCT Case Review arranged for 3.7.19 did not in fact take place until 4.7.19. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide and operate an answerphone for urgent referrals when staff lack immediate computer access, with messages logged and forwarded by the administration team.

Verbatim wording from the response

“7. As an alternative to the electronic referral route for such times when a prison staff member may not have immediate access to a computer, an answer phone has been purchased for the mental health team and has been in utilisation since 13th October 2021. Whilst those incoming messages will be recorded, the voicemail auto-message will be the same as the generic email out of office response (as above). The email signatures of all members of staff within the mental health team display the generic phone number, which reaches this phone (which now carries a voicemail facility). This ensures that irrespective of whether a member of the mental health team is away from his/her desk, the incoming call will be received by the admin team, for logging and forwarding as appropriate.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

End paper TAG referrals and transition referrals to the electronic process.

Verbatim wording from the response

“1. The end date for the acceptance of paper referrals is 31st October 2021. From 1st November 2021, paper TAGs (Threshold Assessment Grid)¹ will cease to be an option for referrals to the mental health team. The reason as to why this process could not immediately be stopped is to allow for the transition from paper referrals (and the communication thereof) without incurring the additional risk of patients’ referrals being missed. In this interim period paper TAGs are being accepted by the mental health team, however, the individual who sends the TAG referral is then being asked to provide their email address to which the electronic TAG is being sent along with guidance as to how to use it, for their future reference, beyond 31st October 2021.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 2 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Display posters explaining electronic and out-of-hours TAG referral pathways throughout the prison and disseminate the notice to prison staff by global email.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2. As part of this transition, posters have also been created to explain the process of making electronic TAG referrals. These are now on display (laminated, A3 size) throughout the prison. I enclose a copy of the poster with this response for your information. This work has been undertaken in conjunction with the Prison’s Health & wellbeing Governor.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 2 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Add urgent mental health referral routes, service hours and escalation contact details to mental health team email signatures.

Verbatim wording from the response

“5. All members of the mental health team have now added the following text to their email signatures:-”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 2 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Specific operational queries about mental health provision at HMP Hewell should be directed to Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Practice Plus Group is the main provider of healthcare services at HMP Hewell. There is a sub-contracting arrangement in place with Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (‘MPFT’) in respect of the provision of mental health services. The Regulation 28 report was not addressed to MPFT although it has had sight of your report. This response has been prepared with the input of members of staff working for MPFT at HMP Hewell. In the event that there are any further specific operational queries relating to the mental health provision at HMP Hewell, I respectfully request that such queries be directed to MPFT.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 1 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The paper referral process could not immediately be stopped because transition without communication risked referrals being missed.

Verbatim wording from the response

“1. The end date for the acceptance of paper referrals is 31st October 2021. From 1st November 2021, paper TAGs (Threshold Assessment Grid)¹ will cease to be an option for referrals to the mental health team. The reason as to why this process could not immediately be stopped is to allow for the transition from paper referrals (and the communication thereof) without incurring the additional risk of patients’ referrals being missed. In this interim period paper TAGs are being accepted by the mental health team, however, the individual who sends the TAG referral is then being asked to provide their email address to which the electronic TAG is being sent along with guidance as to how to use it, for their future reference, beyond 31st October 2021.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 2 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. 1

    Add a weekend out-of-office response to the mental health team’s generic email inbox and assign its management to the MPFT Administrator.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 September 2021.
  2. 2

    Enable evening and weekend out-of-office messages for mental health team members.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 September 2021.
  3. 3

    Implement lessons learned from the inquest across Practice Plus Group healthcare services.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 September 2021.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Add a weekend out-of-office response to the mental health team’s generic email inbox and assign its management to the MPFT Administrator.

Verbatim wording from the response

“6. An out of office response has been added to the mental health team’s generic email inbox at weekends, and is managed by the MPFT Administrator.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Enable evening and weekend out-of-office messages for mental health team members.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This implementation was carried out immediately further to the conclusion of the inquest touching upon the death of Mr Blackburn. In addition, all members of the mental health team turn on an Out of Office message every evening, as well as weekends.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement lessons learned from the inquest across Practice Plus Group healthcare services.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Practice Plus Group is committed to ensuring the high quality provision of healthcare services to all prisoners at HMP Hewell. We will also ensure that the lessons learnt as a result of this inquest are implemented not only at HMP Hewell but across all of Practice Plus Group’s services.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 23 September 2021

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

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Data last updated 7 September 2026