PFD report

Jean DYE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 21 Jul 2025•Greater Lincolnshire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
2

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
4

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Unavailability of an in-room EPO circuit reset control
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable hospital emergency-power controls
  2. Lack of guidance on remote siting of Emergency Power Off controls
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable hospital emergency-power controls
  3. Accidental activation of Emergency Power Off circuits overriding emergency power backup systems
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable hospital emergency-power controls
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. Action

    Update HTM 06-01, reviewing EPO content against the incident and HBN 06-01 to align the final guidance.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 13 August 2025.
  2. Action

    Amend HBN 06-01 to address emergency-stop button locations and incorporate the discussed changes to EPO guidance.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 13 August 2025.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.2

  1. Position

    Setting guidance or associated training requirements falls outside the regulator’s powers, so it cannot respond further on those matters.

    Stated by Care Quality CommissionOutside remitThe respondent said that this matter was outside its role or authority.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of an in-room EPO circuit reset control

Wider context from the report

“The circumstances of Mrs Dye's death are set out above. Her death arose as a consequence of the combination of an iatrogenic injury sustained during a clinical procedure and an untimely loss of power to the Catheter Lab where she was being treated for a period of approximately ten minutes at exactly the time at which her treating consultant required the benefits of real time x ray to facilitate a necessary emergency stenting procedure. The delay whilst power was restored was a critical factor in this death. The loss of power arose as a result of the Emergency Power Off (EPO) circuit activating. It overrode the emergency power back up system. The reason for that activation was unclear although a physical activation of any of the three EPO buttons was excluded on the evidence. All staff at the scene were unaware of the cause of the loss of power, never having experienced such a situation previously, and an engineer was summoned to attend to reinstate the power, which he did. There was no light or other indicator within the lab to confirm to those present that the EPO circuit had activated. Likewise there was no restart button within the lab to permit the EPO circuit to be reset. That lay within the plant room elsewhere within the hospital. I received evidence of a small number of accidental activations of EPO circuits nationally over a 12 month period. It is plainly something which can, and does, occur. Had staff been aware of the exact cause of the loss of power on this occasion and had they had the opportunity to reset the circuit without the need to await the arrival of an engineer, who inturn had to attend a separate plant room, the downtime would likely have been significantly reduced. Whilst it was not possible to say that the additional time spent on this occasion made a difference between the patient surviving or not, there may well be future cases within which such fine margins are time critical. I received evidence that there is no current guidance in relation to the siting of such controls remote from the affected room. I invite review of that guidance and of the need for any consequential training. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable hospital emergency-power controls.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of guidance on remote siting of Emergency Power Off controls

Wider context from the report

“The circumstances of Mrs Dye's death are set out above. Her death arose as a consequence of the combination of an iatrogenic injury sustained during a clinical procedure and an untimely loss of power to the Catheter Lab where she was being treated for a period of approximately ten minutes at exactly the time at which her treating consultant required the benefits of real time x ray to facilitate a necessary emergency stenting procedure. The delay whilst power was restored was a critical factor in this death. The loss of power arose as a result of the Emergency Power Off (EPO) circuit activating. It overrode the emergency power back up system. The reason for that activation was unclear although a physical activation of any of the three EPO buttons was excluded on the evidence. All staff at the scene were unaware of the cause of the loss of power, never having experienced such a situation previously, and an engineer was summoned to attend to reinstate the power, which he did. There was no light or other indicator within the lab to confirm to those present that the EPO circuit had activated. Likewise there was no restart button within the lab to permit the EPO circuit to be reset. That lay within the plant room elsewhere within the hospital. I received evidence of a small number of accidental activations of EPO circuits nationally over a 12 month period. It is plainly something which can, and does, occur. Had staff been aware of the exact cause of the loss of power on this occasion and had they had the opportunity to reset the circuit without the need to await the arrival of an engineer, who inturn had to attend a separate plant room, the downtime would likely have been significantly reduced. Whilst it was not possible to say that the additional time spent on this occasion made a difference between the patient surviving or not, there may well be future cases within which such fine margins are time critical. I received evidence that there is no current guidance in relation to the siting of such controls remote from the affected room. I invite review of that guidance and of the need for any consequential training. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable hospital emergency-power controls.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Accidental activation of Emergency Power Off circuits overriding emergency power backup systems

Wider context from the report

“The circumstances of Mrs Dye's death are set out above. Her death arose as a consequence of the combination of an iatrogenic injury sustained during a clinical procedure and an untimely loss of power to the Catheter Lab where she was being treated for a period of approximately ten minutes at exactly the time at which her treating consultant required the benefits of real time x ray to facilitate a necessary emergency stenting procedure. The delay whilst power was restored was a critical factor in this death. The loss of power arose as a result of the Emergency Power Off (EPO) circuit activating. It overrode the emergency power back up system. The reason for that activation was unclear although a physical activation of any of the three EPO buttons was excluded on the evidence. All staff at the scene were unaware of the cause of the loss of power, never having experienced such a situation previously, and an engineer was summoned to attend to reinstate the power, which he did. There was no light or other indicator within the lab to confirm to those present that the EPO circuit had activated. Likewise there was no restart button within the lab to permit the EPO circuit to be reset. That lay within the plant room elsewhere within the hospital. I received evidence of a small number of accidental activations of EPO circuits nationally over a 12 month period. It is plainly something which can, and does, occur. Had staff been aware of the exact cause of the loss of power on this occasion and had they had the opportunity to reset the circuit without the need to await the arrival of an engineer, who inturn had to attend a separate plant room, the downtime would likely have been significantly reduced. Whilst it was not possible to say that the additional time spent on this occasion made a difference between the patient surviving or not, there may well be future cases within which such fine margins are time critical. I received evidence that there is no current guidance in relation to the siting of such controls remote from the affected room. I invite review of that guidance and of the need for any consequential training. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable hospital emergency-power controls.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of in-room indication of Emergency Power Off circuit activation

Wider context from the report

“The circumstances of Mrs Dye's death are set out above. Her death arose as a consequence of the combination of an iatrogenic injury sustained during a clinical procedure and an untimely loss of power to the Catheter Lab where she was being treated for a period of approximately ten minutes at exactly the time at which her treating consultant required the benefits of real time x ray to facilitate a necessary emergency stenting procedure. The delay whilst power was restored was a critical factor in this death. The loss of power arose as a result of the Emergency Power Off (EPO) circuit activating. It overrode the emergency power back up system. The reason for that activation was unclear although a physical activation of any of the three EPO buttons was excluded on the evidence. All staff at the scene were unaware of the cause of the loss of power, never having experienced such a situation previously, and an engineer was summoned to attend to reinstate the power, which he did. There was no light or other indicator within the lab to confirm to those present that the EPO circuit had activated. Likewise there was no restart button within the lab to permit the EPO circuit to be reset. That lay within the plant room elsewhere within the hospital. I received evidence of a small number of accidental activations of EPO circuits nationally over a 12 month period. It is plainly something which can, and does, occur. Had staff been aware of the exact cause of the loss of power on this occasion and had they had the opportunity to reset the circuit without the need to await the arrival of an engineer, who inturn had to attend a separate plant room, the downtime would likely have been significantly reduced. Whilst it was not possible to say that the additional time spent on this occasion made a difference between the patient surviving or not, there may well be future cases within which such fine margins are time critical. I received evidence that there is no current guidance in relation to the siting of such controls remote from the affected room. I invite review of that guidance and of the need for any consequential training. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable hospital emergency-power controls.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Update HTM 06-01, reviewing EPO content against the incident and HBN 06-01 to align the final guidance.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This guidance is focused on stopping accidental activation of the EPO, but does not currently state what to do if the EPO is activated in error. The NHS England Estate’s team advise that they will address this when the HTM 06-01 guidance document is next updated.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 13 August 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Amend HBN 06-01 to address emergency-stop button locations and incorporate the discussed changes to EPO guidance.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Earlier guidance, published in 2001 by the former NHS Estates (an Executive Agency of DHSC abolished in 2005) called HBN 06-01 “Facilities for diagnostic imaging and interventional radiology” is in the process of being updated, but excludes cardiac facilities covered separately in HBN 01-01. The draft updated HBN 06-01 currently includes the following text on EPO buttons:”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 3 · response
Published 13 August 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Setting guidance or associated training requirements falls outside the regulator’s powers, so it cannot respond further on those matters.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is important to highlight from the outset that CQC does not have the power to set guidelines or training expectations, rather we assess a registered provider’s ability to meet regulatory requirements. Whilst assessing regulatory compliance can involve the application of relevant guidelines, it is not within the scope of CQC’s regulatory powers to set the guidelines or associated training requirements.”

Source location

Response from Care Quality Commission
Page 2 · response
Published 13 August 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

An EPO control need not be located in the equipment room; a means to reset it is sufficient, subject to a room-design risk assessment.

Verbatim wording from the response

“NHS England’s Head of Hard Facilities Management has been contacted by an independent advisor to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) on electrical safety, who was involved in the inquest hearing. The MHRA advisor raised that:”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 13 August 2025

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. 1

    Continue monitoring the Trust through regulatory activity.

    Stated by Care Quality CommissionStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 13 August 2025.
  2. 2

    Include engineer competency and training requirements in the HTM 06-01 update.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 13 August 2025.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue monitoring the Trust through regulatory activity.

Verbatim wording from the response

“CQC will continue to monitor the Trust as part of our regulatory activity.”

Source location

Response from Care Quality Commission
Page 3 · response
Published 13 August 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Include engineer competency and training requirements in the HTM 06-01 update.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Competency and training for engineers will be included in the HTM update described above.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 4 · response
Published 13 August 2025

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
2/2

Data last updated 7 September 2026