PFD report

Devon Drew Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 16 Aug 2023•Berkshire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
7

Raised in this report

Recipients
5

Named on the report

Responses found
3

Of 5 recipients

Stated actions
11

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised7

  1. Failure to ensure that SATS machines are suitable and easy to use at home
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry
  2. Failure to train parents to use the particular SATS machine brand issued
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry
  3. Failure of SATS machine alarm volume to wake sleeping parents
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable patient-monitoring alarm systemsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.5

  1. Action

    Investigate reported monitor faults, send equipment for review or repair, issue replacements and maintain records of repairs and planned maintenance.

    Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.
  2. Action

    Provide families using saturation monitors with user training, equipment-loan documentation and instructions to report faults or damage.

    Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.
  3. Action

    Maintain a pool of replacement monitors and provide families with additional equipment so faults or scheduled maintenance do not leave them without monitoring capacity.

    Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.9

  1. Position

    No further action is needed to identify what happened regarding the SATS machines’ reliability and ease of use after review of the evidence.

    Stated by Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care BoardNo action considered necessaryThe respondent said that no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to ensure that SATS machines are suitable and easy to use at home

Wider context from the report

“Matter of Concern 1: 3. On 25 April 2022 this second SATS machine, stopped working. It had some sort of error message on the screen. The parents contacted the community nurse team and Devon’s mother had to attend the hospital that night to pick up a new SATS machine. 4. Therefore the first concern is regarding the reliability of such SATS machines sent home with vulnerable patients. 5. If a safety plan is put in place which includes the use of a SATS machine to monitor the wellbeing of the patient, and that machine is less than at least 99% reliable, or has software issues, or is unsuitable for home use, or is complicated to use, this may result in a false sense of security from the family who will rely on the machine to alert them if the oxygen levels drop below a certain figure. 6. Therefore there is a risk that future deaths will occur if hospital trusts do not ensure that the SATS machines are reliable and easy to use and that parents are trained to use the particular brand they are issued with. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to train parents to use the particular SATS machine brand issued

Wider context from the report

“Matter of Concern 1: 3. On 25 April 2022 this second SATS machine, stopped working. It had some sort of error message on the screen. The parents contacted the community nurse team and Devon’s mother had to attend the hospital that night to pick up a new SATS machine. 4. Therefore the first concern is regarding the reliability of such SATS machines sent home with vulnerable patients. 5. If a safety plan is put in place which includes the use of a SATS machine to monitor the wellbeing of the patient, and that machine is less than at least 99% reliable, or has software issues, or is unsuitable for home use, or is complicated to use, this may result in a false sense of security from the family who will rely on the machine to alert them if the oxygen levels drop below a certain figure. 6. Therefore there is a risk that future deaths will occur if hospital trusts do not ensure that the SATS machines are reliable and easy to use and that parents are trained to use the particular brand they are issued with. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of SATS machine alarm volume to wake sleeping parents

Wider context from the report

“Matter of Concern 2: 8. The third machine was issued to the family on 25 April 2022, which remained with them until Devon’s death. It was manufactured by Medtronic (Model number MBB1920904). It is not known if this was the same brand as the second SATS machine mentioned above. 9. The concern is that this Medtronic machine was also either not functioning reliably or was not suitable for the home environment. 10. On 10 May 2022 Devon was given his 1am feed and the family settled down to sleep. At 4.30am Devon’s mother woke to find him unresponsive. The CPAP machine log confirms those two times. 11. The SATS machine was seized by the police on 10 May 2022. 12. Medtronic technician, ████████ made a statement dated 6/7/2022 which I append to this Report, in which he states that: • The testing of the SATS machine revealed that it was functioning properly • The data from the machine shows that from approximately 1.44am Devon’s oxygen saturations started to drop and continued to fall until approximately 2.00am when there was no pulse. • The alarm would have been sounding throughout that time and that at the loss of pulse, at 2.00am a further alarm would have sounded. • The machine alarm was at maximum volume • There is a silence button on the machine but that it only silences the alarm for 60 seconds, after which interval the alarm would sound again throughout the whole period that the saturation levels were low. 13. Given the crucial role a SATS machine has in monitoring a vulnerable baby at home, with non-medically trained carers who need to sleep, there should be no doubt but that the alarm sound will sound reliably, that its volume will wake sleeping exhausted parents and should provide an accurate log of events. 14. The conclusions that the data from the SATS machine appear to provide do not accord with the other evidence provided to the inquest about the events in question. That gives cause for concern that either the analysis of the SATS machine has not been accurate or the SATS machine has not correctly recorded the data or that this SATS machine is not a suitable device for use at home. 15. For example, the community nurses would have noticed if the SATS machine was not working in the first weeks of Devon being at home and yet it has recorded that it was not used at all until 31 May 2022. 16. Secondly in order for the SATS machine data to have been correct about events of 10 May 2022, either both the parents would have had to sleep through an alarm sounding for at least 15 minutes at full volume as well as a second alarm after 15 minutes at the loss of pulse, or the parents would have had to have used the silence button on the alarm system every 60 seconds for that 15 minute period. 17. The SATS machine silence button was not within reach of Devon’s mother unless she sat up and reached up and over baby Devon in his cot. Devon’s father would have had to get out of bed altogether. A copy of the police photographs of the bedroom on 10 May 2022 is attached to this report. It is inconceivable that these concerned and careful parents, who had taken such an active role in Devon’s care, would have turned off this alarm in this way several times and failed to notice his respiratory distress, and when he was found unresponsive, would have forgotten that they had silenced the alarm in this way. Therefore either the SATS machine did not function as it should or was not sufficiently loud to wake either of these careful parents. 18. The potential for future deaths is that future parents will also rely on the SATS machine to alert them to a vulnerable child stopping breathing and taking action will not be alerted because either the alarm is too quiet, or it cuts out automatically before waking the parents, or it simply does not sound at all. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable patient-monitoring alarm systems; Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to ensure the reliability of SATS machines sent home with vulnerable patients

Wider context from the report

“Matter of Concern 1: 3. On 25 April 2022 this second SATS machine, stopped working. It had some sort of error message on the screen. The parents contacted the community nurse team and Devon’s mother had to attend the hospital that night to pick up a new SATS machine. 4. Therefore the first concern is regarding the reliability of such SATS machines sent home with vulnerable patients. 5. If a safety plan is put in place which includes the use of a SATS machine to monitor the wellbeing of the patient, and that machine is less than at least 99% reliable, or has software issues, or is unsuitable for home use, or is complicated to use, this may result in a false sense of security from the family who will rely on the machine to alert them if the oxygen levels drop below a certain figure. 6. Therefore there is a risk that future deaths will occur if hospital trusts do not ensure that the SATS machines are reliable and easy to use and that parents are trained to use the particular brand they are issued with. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of SATS machine alarms to sound reliably

Wider context from the report

“Matter of Concern 2: 8. The third machine was issued to the family on 25 April 2022, which remained with them until Devon’s death. It was manufactured by Medtronic (Model number MBB1920904). It is not known if this was the same brand as the second SATS machine mentioned above. 9. The concern is that this Medtronic machine was also either not functioning reliably or was not suitable for the home environment. 10. On 10 May 2022 Devon was given his 1am feed and the family settled down to sleep. At 4.30am Devon’s mother woke to find him unresponsive. The CPAP machine log confirms those two times. 11. The SATS machine was seized by the police on 10 May 2022. 12. Medtronic technician, ████████ made a statement dated 6/7/2022 which I append to this Report, in which he states that: • The testing of the SATS machine revealed that it was functioning properly • The data from the machine shows that from approximately 1.44am Devon’s oxygen saturations started to drop and continued to fall until approximately 2.00am when there was no pulse. • The alarm would have been sounding throughout that time and that at the loss of pulse, at 2.00am a further alarm would have sounded. • The machine alarm was at maximum volume • There is a silence button on the machine but that it only silences the alarm for 60 seconds, after which interval the alarm would sound again throughout the whole period that the saturation levels were low. 13. Given the crucial role a SATS machine has in monitoring a vulnerable baby at home, with non-medically trained carers who need to sleep, there should be no doubt but that the alarm sound will sound reliably, that its volume will wake sleeping exhausted parents and should provide an accurate log of events. 14. The conclusions that the data from the SATS machine appear to provide do not accord with the other evidence provided to the inquest about the events in question. That gives cause for concern that either the analysis of the SATS machine has not been accurate or the SATS machine has not correctly recorded the data or that this SATS machine is not a suitable device for use at home. 15. For example, the community nurses would have noticed if the SATS machine was not working in the first weeks of Devon being at home and yet it has recorded that it was not used at all until 31 May 2022. 16. Secondly in order for the SATS machine data to have been correct about events of 10 May 2022, either both the parents would have had to sleep through an alarm sounding for at least 15 minutes at full volume as well as a second alarm after 15 minutes at the loss of pulse, or the parents would have had to have used the silence button on the alarm system every 60 seconds for that 15 minute period. 17. The SATS machine silence button was not within reach of Devon’s mother unless she sat up and reached up and over baby Devon in his cot. Devon’s father would have had to get out of bed altogether. A copy of the police photographs of the bedroom on 10 May 2022 is attached to this report. It is inconceivable that these concerned and careful parents, who had taken such an active role in Devon’s care, would have turned off this alarm in this way several times and failed to notice his respiratory distress, and when he was found unresponsive, would have forgotten that they had silenced the alarm in this way. Therefore either the SATS machine did not function as it should or was not sufficiently loud to wake either of these careful parents. 18. The potential for future deaths is that future parents will also rely on the SATS machine to alert them to a vulnerable child stopping breathing and taking action will not be alerted because either the alarm is too quiet, or it cuts out automatically before waking the parents, or it simply does not sound at all. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable patient-monitoring alarm systems; Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to provide accurate SATS machine event data and analysis

Wider context from the report

“Matter of Concern 2: 8. The third machine was issued to the family on 25 April 2022, which remained with them until Devon’s death. It was manufactured by Medtronic (Model number MBB1920904). It is not known if this was the same brand as the second SATS machine mentioned above. 9. The concern is that this Medtronic machine was also either not functioning reliably or was not suitable for the home environment. 10. On 10 May 2022 Devon was given his 1am feed and the family settled down to sleep. At 4.30am Devon’s mother woke to find him unresponsive. The CPAP machine log confirms those two times. 11. The SATS machine was seized by the police on 10 May 2022. 12. Medtronic technician, ████████ made a statement dated 6/7/2022 which I append to this Report, in which he states that: • The testing of the SATS machine revealed that it was functioning properly • The data from the machine shows that from approximately 1.44am Devon’s oxygen saturations started to drop and continued to fall until approximately 2.00am when there was no pulse. • The alarm would have been sounding throughout that time and that at the loss of pulse, at 2.00am a further alarm would have sounded. • The machine alarm was at maximum volume • There is a silence button on the machine but that it only silences the alarm for 60 seconds, after which interval the alarm would sound again throughout the whole period that the saturation levels were low. 13. Given the crucial role a SATS machine has in monitoring a vulnerable baby at home, with non-medically trained carers who need to sleep, there should be no doubt but that the alarm sound will sound reliably, that its volume will wake sleeping exhausted parents and should provide an accurate log of events. 14. The conclusions that the data from the SATS machine appear to provide do not accord with the other evidence provided to the inquest about the events in question. That gives cause for concern that either the analysis of the SATS machine has not been accurate or the SATS machine has not correctly recorded the data or that this SATS machine is not a suitable device for use at home. 15. For example, the community nurses would have noticed if the SATS machine was not working in the first weeks of Devon being at home and yet it has recorded that it was not used at all until 31 May 2022. 16. Secondly in order for the SATS machine data to have been correct about events of 10 May 2022, either both the parents would have had to sleep through an alarm sounding for at least 15 minutes at full volume as well as a second alarm after 15 minutes at the loss of pulse, or the parents would have had to have used the silence button on the alarm system every 60 seconds for that 15 minute period. 17. The SATS machine silence button was not within reach of Devon’s mother unless she sat up and reached up and over baby Devon in his cot. Devon’s father would have had to get out of bed altogether. A copy of the police photographs of the bedroom on 10 May 2022 is attached to this report. It is inconceivable that these concerned and careful parents, who had taken such an active role in Devon’s care, would have turned off this alarm in this way several times and failed to notice his respiratory distress, and when he was found unresponsive, would have forgotten that they had silenced the alarm in this way. Therefore either the SATS machine did not function as it should or was not sufficiently loud to wake either of these careful parents. 18. The potential for future deaths is that future parents will also rely on the SATS machine to alert them to a vulnerable child stopping breathing and taking action will not be alerted because either the alarm is too quiet, or it cuts out automatically before waking the parents, or it simply does not sound at all. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of SATS machine alarms to remain active or sound when required

Wider context from the report

“Matter of Concern 2: 8. The third machine was issued to the family on 25 April 2022, which remained with them until Devon’s death. It was manufactured by Medtronic (Model number MBB1920904). It is not known if this was the same brand as the second SATS machine mentioned above. 9. The concern is that this Medtronic machine was also either not functioning reliably or was not suitable for the home environment. 10. On 10 May 2022 Devon was given his 1am feed and the family settled down to sleep. At 4.30am Devon’s mother woke to find him unresponsive. The CPAP machine log confirms those two times. 11. The SATS machine was seized by the police on 10 May 2022. 12. Medtronic technician, ████████ made a statement dated 6/7/2022 which I append to this Report, in which he states that: • The testing of the SATS machine revealed that it was functioning properly • The data from the machine shows that from approximately 1.44am Devon’s oxygen saturations started to drop and continued to fall until approximately 2.00am when there was no pulse. • The alarm would have been sounding throughout that time and that at the loss of pulse, at 2.00am a further alarm would have sounded. • The machine alarm was at maximum volume • There is a silence button on the machine but that it only silences the alarm for 60 seconds, after which interval the alarm would sound again throughout the whole period that the saturation levels were low. 13. Given the crucial role a SATS machine has in monitoring a vulnerable baby at home, with non-medically trained carers who need to sleep, there should be no doubt but that the alarm sound will sound reliably, that its volume will wake sleeping exhausted parents and should provide an accurate log of events. 14. The conclusions that the data from the SATS machine appear to provide do not accord with the other evidence provided to the inquest about the events in question. That gives cause for concern that either the analysis of the SATS machine has not been accurate or the SATS machine has not correctly recorded the data or that this SATS machine is not a suitable device for use at home. 15. For example, the community nurses would have noticed if the SATS machine was not working in the first weeks of Devon being at home and yet it has recorded that it was not used at all until 31 May 2022. 16. Secondly in order for the SATS machine data to have been correct about events of 10 May 2022, either both the parents would have had to sleep through an alarm sounding for at least 15 minutes at full volume as well as a second alarm after 15 minutes at the loss of pulse, or the parents would have had to have used the silence button on the alarm system every 60 seconds for that 15 minute period. 17. The SATS machine silence button was not within reach of Devon’s mother unless she sat up and reached up and over baby Devon in his cot. Devon’s father would have had to get out of bed altogether. A copy of the police photographs of the bedroom on 10 May 2022 is attached to this report. It is inconceivable that these concerned and careful parents, who had taken such an active role in Devon’s care, would have turned off this alarm in this way several times and failed to notice his respiratory distress, and when he was found unresponsive, would have forgotten that they had silenced the alarm in this way. Therefore either the SATS machine did not function as it should or was not sufficiently loud to wake either of these careful parents. 18. The potential for future deaths is that future parents will also rely on the SATS machine to alert them to a vulnerable child stopping breathing and taking action will not be alerted because either the alarm is too quiet, or it cuts out automatically before waking the parents, or it simply does not sound at all. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable patient-monitoring alarm systems; Unreliable provision, reliability and use of pulse oximetry.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Investigate reported monitor faults, send equipment for review or repair, issue replacements and maintain records of repairs and planned maintenance.

Verbatim wording from the response

“6) Have there been any other reports from families/users or staff of faults with the type of saturation monitor supplied to the family on 22 April? If so, what actions have been taken to investigate/rectify these? Nellcor is the only make of oxygen saturation monitor that the CCN service provide to families. The parents’ report of a fault on 25 April regarding the machine supplied to them on 22 April is the only instance recorded of a fault of this kind with this type of equipment. All reported faults are listened to and acted upon by the team and equipment is sent for review and repair, and replacement equipment is issued. The team hold a pool of equipment to replace any items that need to be sent for repair or for annual maintenance. A clear record is kept of when oxygen saturation monitors have been brought in for”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 3 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide families using saturation monitors with user training, equipment-loan documentation and instructions to report faults or damage.

Verbatim wording from the response

“1) Did the family receive training, in line with recognised Trust processes, to use the saturation monitor that was given to them on 22 April? The Community Children’s Nurse [CCN] recorded in Devon’s clinical record that she had explained to the parent how to use the handheld and bedside oxygen saturation monitors on the day she gave them the equipment. This was in line with Trust processes. At the first home visit by the CCN all the equipment in use was reviewed, checked, and documented in Devon’s clinical record. Berkshire Healthcare's ‘Acknowledgement and terms of Equipment loan’ document was completed and signed by the parent and the CCN at the next home visit on 27 April 2022.”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 3 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain a pool of replacement monitors and provide families with additional equipment so faults or scheduled maintenance do not leave them without monitoring capacity.

Verbatim wording from the response

“6) Have there been any other reports from families/users or staff of faults with the type of saturation monitor supplied to the family on 22 April? If so, what actions have been taken to investigate/rectify these? Nellcor is the only make of oxygen saturation monitor that the CCN service provide to families. The parents’ report of a fault on 25 April regarding the machine supplied to them on 22 April is the only instance recorded of a fault of this kind with this type of equipment. All reported faults are listened to and acted upon by the team and equipment is sent for review and repair, and replacement equipment is issued. The team hold a pool of equipment to replace any items that need to be sent for repair or for annual maintenance. A clear record is kept of when oxygen saturation monitors have been brought in for”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 3 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain saturation monitors through visual and functional checks before allocation, annual planned preventative maintenance, service-date controls and an equipment inventory.

Verbatim wording from the response

“5) Was the saturation monitor supplied to the family by Berkshire Healthcare on 22 April checked and maintained in line with the Trust's maintenance specifications? All equipment supplied to Devon had been checked by the CCN before allocation, was within its service dates and had been serviced annually as per manufacturers guidelines.”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 3 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain formal verification and validation of software used to download device data accurately.

Verbatim wording from the response

“During the physical examination and functional testing of the PM100N device and subsequent data download, the Medtronic Service Technician, whose first language is Italian, explained to DC 7712 the test of his ability, the nature of the checks he was completing and the findings from the data download. He also emailed to DC 7712 a copy of the downloaded data from the device memory and an Excel spreadsheet of the same data that day.”

Source location

Response from Medtronic
Page 2 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

No further action is needed to identify what happened regarding the SATS machines’ reliability and ease of use after review of the evidence.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Your Regulation 28 Report asked the ICB to take action to identify what happened in relation to the reliability and ease of use of the SATS machines being used. The ICB and the MHRA have been involved in the oversight of the review of the machine and, following a review of the evidence presented at the inquest, the ICB feel that there is no further action needed in order to Prevent Future Deaths.”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 2 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

No further action is needed to investigate events concerning the Medtronic SATS machine alarm’s loudness and reliability because the investigation has been undertaken.

Verbatim wording from the response

“You also ask that the trusts, ICB, MHRA, NHSE and Medtronic investigate the events leading up to the death in relation to the loudness and reliability of the alarm on the Medtronic SATS machine. This has been undertaken as described above and the ICB, on behalf of all partners, feel that there is no further action to be taken in order to Prevent Future Deaths.”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 2 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

There are no known patient-safety issues relating generally to SATS machine alarms, and no similar incidents are known.

Verbatim wording from the response

“On receipt of your Report, it was shared with colleagues from NHS England’s central Patient Safety (including medical device specialists) and Children & Young People teams as well as my regional Quality colleagues in the South East. The Patient Safety Team reviewed the concerns raised and have confirmed that they are not aware of similar incidents and that there are no known patient safety issues relating to SATS machine alarms in general.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 1 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The device specification, alarm settings, home suitability and functioning fall outside NHS England’s remit and within MHRA’s regulatory remit.

Verbatim wording from the response

“From your Report the underlying issue relates to the specification of the SATS machine used, its alarm settings and volume, whether it was suitable for use in a patient’s home and whether the machine in this case was working properly. These issues would fall under the remit of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), who are the regulator for all medical devices in the UK, who I note that you have also addressed your concerns to.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 1 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

MHRA is responsible for investigating the monitor concerns and ensuring that any identified actions are undertaken.

Verbatim wording from the response

“From your Report the underlying issue relates to the specification of the SATS machine used, its alarm settings and volume, whether it was suitable for use in a patient’s home and whether the machine in this case was working properly. These issues would fall under the remit of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), who are the regulator for all medical devices in the UK, who I note that you have also addressed your concerns to.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 1 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The healthcare provider is responsible for configuring device settings to meet each patient’s clinical needs and intended location of use.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The PM100N device is intended for use both in a hospital and (with a slightly adapted range of functionality) a home setting in the UK. This enables patients (and their carers) to have the comfort of living in their own homes whilst receiving care. From the photographs provided to HM Assistant Coroner by the police, the PM100N device was not set to operate in “homecare mode” at the time of death. This is because the photographs of the PM100N device display screen do not show a “house” symbol, which would have been displayed had home use setting been applied. Activating the “homecare mode” setting is for the healthcare provider to decide along with the appropriate settings for the individual patient in order to meet their medical needs (see below).”

Source location

Response from Medtronic
Page 5 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Because the device was considered appropriately functioning, accurate, and suitable for home use, no modification or change was considered necessary.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Based on the investigations carried out by Medtronic both before and following receipt of the Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 18 August 2023 and the subsequent documents received on 9 October 2023, it appears to Medtronic that the PM100N device used by the Deceased was functioning appropriately at all material times, that it was accurately recording data and was accordingly suitable for home use. In light of these conclusions, Medtronic does not consider that modification or change is required to the device in question.”

Source location

Response from Medtronic
Page 14 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing manuals, home-use guidance, and healthcare-professional training were considered sufficient to support safe hospital and home use.

Verbatim wording from the response

“PM100N devices are supplied by Medtronic to healthcare providers (i.e. hospitals) in the UK. They are supplied with an Operator’s Manual and also a Home Use Guide.”

Source location

Response from Medtronic
Page 5 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The device was functioning reliably, accurately recording data, and suitable for home use; retained data and testing did not support the reported concerns.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Alarms were tested and found to be functioning according to the device specification. The device patient mode was in paediatric mode and the ‘nurse call’ appeared to function normally (albeit this is a function which can only be used with a nurse call infrastructure, usually in a healthcare setting and not in the home). The PM100N device was tested with a SpO2 simulator and passed the tests as per manufacturer service instructions. The PM100N device was also tested with a spotlight SpO2 functional tester at its maximum values BPM 240 and SpO2 100% and passed all tests. The PM100N device monitor was fully checked for functionality and electrical safety and passed all tests successfully as per the manufacturer guideline.”

Source location

Response from Medtronic
Page 10 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.6

  1. 1

    Give families a named Community Children’s Nurse and team contact numbers for advice or concerns about their child’s care and equipment.

    Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.
  2. 2

    Summarise received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Learning from Deaths system Network Group and share learning across health and social care organisations.

    Stated by Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care BoardStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.
  3. 3

    Share the report’s concerns with central patient safety, medical device, children’s and regional quality teams.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.
  4. 4

    Discuss received prevention-of-future-death reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share resulting learnings nationally and regionally.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.
  5. 5

    Seek assurances from Berkshire Integrated Care Board that identified local learnings are acted upon.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 5 October 2023.
  6. 6

    Report the incident to the MHRA and provide follow-up information in response to regulatory queries.

    Stated by Medtronic LimitedStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 5 October 2023.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Give families a named Community Children’s Nurse and team contact numbers for advice or concerns about their child’s care and equipment.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2) Did the family have a designated contact and/or contact number to use if they identified any issues with the saturation monitor? During the first home visit on 22 April 2022 the CCN explained the CCN service. She also discussed her role as named CCN in supporting Devon’s care in the home. Parents are encouraged and advised to contact the CCN team with any queries or concerns they have about their child or their child’s care and are given contact numbers for the team. There is evidence in the clinical record to show that the family contacted the CCN team when they needed advice around Devon’s care, and also when they had concerns about the monitor being faulty on 25 April 2022.”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 3 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Summarise received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Learning from Deaths system Network Group and share learning across health and social care organisations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I would also like to provide further assurances taking place within BOB ICB around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are summarised within the Learning from Deaths system Network Group. This ensures that key learnings and insights around preventable deaths are shared widely across our Health and Social Care organisations and helps us pay close attention to any emerging trends or themes that may require further review and action.”

Source location

Response from Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West Integrated Care Board
Page 2 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Share the report’s concerns with central patient safety, medical device, children’s and regional quality teams.

Verbatim wording from the response

“On receipt of your Report, it was shared with colleagues from NHS England’s central Patient Safety (including medical device specialists) and Children & Young People teams as well as my regional Quality colleagues in the South East. The Patient Safety Team reviewed the concerns raised and have confirmed that they are not aware of similar incidents and that there are no known patient safety issues relating to SATS machine alarms in general.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 1 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss received prevention-of-future-death reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share resulting learnings nationally and regionally.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I would also like to provide further assurances on national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around preventable deaths are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Seek assurances from Berkshire Integrated Care Board that identified local learnings are acted upon.

Verbatim wording from the response

“My regional colleagues in the South East have also been engaging with Berkshire Integrated Care Board (ICB) on the circumstances of this case, and NHS England will be seeking assurances that any identified local learnings are acted upon. I understand that they have been in touch with you separately on some of the concerns raised.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Report the incident to the MHRA and provide follow-up information in response to regulatory queries.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This incident was initially reported to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (“MHRA”) on 20 May 2022 with follow-up on 20 August 2022. Further correspondence in response to MHRA queries was provided on 18 July 2022, 10 October 2023, 27 October 2023 and 17 November 2023. Based on the conclusions following testing of the PM100N device on 6 July 2022, shortly after the Deceased’s death, and the review of the”

Source location

Response from Medtronic
Page 2 · response
Published 5 October 2023

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
3/5

Data last updated 7 September 2026