PFD report

Steven HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 24 Sep 2025•Bedfordshire and Luton

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
7

Raised in this report

Recipients
3

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 3 recipients

Stated actions
10

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised7

  1. Delays in addressing identified cell-safety concerns
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to implement identified safety actionsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable prison cell safety inspection and risk-assessment processes
  2. Failure to remove unsafe cells from use
  3. Failure to ensure observation panels cannot be opened from inside to create ligature opportunities
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to control ligature risks in inpatient and custodial environments
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.9

  1. Action

    Investigate serious incidents, document findings, and action and monitor resulting recommendations.

    Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 3 October 2025.
  2. Action

    Restore ligature-resistant cells to serviceable condition using approved lockable observation hatches.

    Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 3 October 2025.
  3. Action

    Remove cells with significant defects from use and document and monitor remedial work until they are serviceable.

    Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 3 October 2025.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delays in addressing identified cell-safety concerns

Wider context from the report

“1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to implement identified safety actions; Unreliable prison cell safety inspection and risk-assessment processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to remove unsafe cells from use

Wider context from the report

“1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to ensure observation panels cannot be opened from inside to create ligature opportunities

Wider context from the report

“1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to control ligature risks in inpatient and custodial environments.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to escalate risk after incidents requiring review of observations or ligature controls

Wider context from the report

“1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to take timely escalation action when safety thresholds are breached; Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to communicate relevant risk information through handovers and records

Wider context from the report

“1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable custody handovers; Unreliable handover of care information and responsibility; Unreliable shift handover processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to carry out required observations at the appropriate level and standard

Wider context from the report

“1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate supervision and monitoring of prisoners.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to report serious self-harm incidents and trigger further assessment

Wider context from the report

“1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Ineffective prison suicide and self-harm prevention systems.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Investigate serious incidents, document findings, and action and monitor resulting recommendations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“All serious incidents are now investigated thoroughly, with any findings documented. Recommendations arising from these investigations are actioned and monitored, ensuring improvement is implemented where appropriate. Any themes identified through investigations are used to inform staff training and where necessary performance management, ensuring continuous learning is taking place and embedded into practice.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 2 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Restore ligature-resistant cells to serviceable condition using approved lockable observation hatches.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I can confirm that interim measures have been put in place at HMP Bedford to ensure that the ligature-resistant (LR) cells are now serviceable. The LR cell observation panels have temporarily been replaced with an approved lockable observation hatch. A full review of all LR doors has been completed, alongside an urgent assessment of the current door and observation panel design. Additionally, Government Facilities Services Limited has undertaken a further review of the locking mechanism within the LR cell observation panels to ensure they remain fully serviceable. In the longer term, a proposal to replace the existing LR cell observation panels with a model that meets current safety specifications – designed to reduce the risk of prisoners from opening them inside the cell - has been issued for tender.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 1 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Remove cells with significant defects from use and document and monitor remedial work until they are serviceable.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Furthermore, the prison is taking a more proactive approach to identifying cell defects. Daily accommodation fabric checks (AFCs) are in place and carried out consistently throughout the establishment. AFCs are now subject to additional scrutiny and are designed to incorporate checks to identify any damage or deterioration of individual cells. Should a significant defect be identified during these checks, the cell will be immediately taken out of use until remedial work has been carried out and the cell is returned to a serviceable condition. Where a cell requires remedial work, the process is documented and monitored to ensure a timely resolution and accountability.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 2 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Remind staff and provide additional training and support on escalating incidents and conducting ACCT reviews when risk increases.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Staff have been reminded, and received additional training and support where necessary, on the importance of escalating incidents and ensuring that ACCT reviews take place when risk increases.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 2 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Issue a tender proposal to replace ligature-resistant observation panels with a model meeting current safety specifications.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I can confirm that interim measures have been put in place at HMP Bedford to ensure that the ligature-resistant (LR) cells are now serviceable. The LR cell observation panels have temporarily been replaced with an approved lockable observation hatch. A full review of all LR doors has been completed, alongside an urgent assessment of the current door and observation panel design. Additionally, Government Facilities Services Limited has undertaken a further review of the locking mechanism within the LR cell observation panels to ensure they remain fully serviceable. In the longer term, a proposal to replace the existing LR cell observation panels with a model that meets current safety specifications – designed to reduce the risk of prisoners from opening them inside the cell - has been issued for tender.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 1 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Strengthen shift handovers through clearer risk-information sharing expectations and allocated time for comprehensive handovers.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Handover procedures have also been strengthened to ensure that vital information is communicated effectively. Staff are supported through clearer expectations in relation to information sharing when there is evidence of a prisoners change to risk or presentation. Time has been allocated to facilitate comprehensive handovers between shifts, particularly in relation to those who are being supported by the Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) process.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 2 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Carry out daily accommodation fabric checks with additional scrutiny for cell damage or deterioration.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Furthermore, the prison is taking a more proactive approach to identifying cell defects. Daily accommodation fabric checks (AFCs) are in place and carried out consistently throughout the establishment. AFCs are now subject to additional scrutiny and are designed to incorporate checks to identify any damage or deterioration of individual cells. Should a significant defect be identified during these checks, the cell will be immediately taken out of use until remedial work has been carried out and the cell is returned to a serviceable condition. Where a cell requires remedial work, the process is documented and monitored to ensure a timely resolution and accountability.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 2 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Introduce quality assurance for ACCT observations through regular CCTV sampling and review, escalation and investigation of discrepancies.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In addition, a robust quality assurance process has been introduced for ACCT observations. This includes regular sampling and review of CCTV footage to confirm that ACCT observations are being completed and recorded in accordance with local policy. Where discrepancies are identified, they are escalated and investigated in line with the national protocol, with referrals to the police where appropriate.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 2 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Complete a full review of ligature-resistant doors and an urgent assessment of the door and observation-panel design.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I can confirm that interim measures have been put in place at HMP Bedford to ensure that the ligature-resistant (LR) cells are now serviceable. The LR cell observation panels have temporarily been replaced with an approved lockable observation hatch. A full review of all LR doors has been completed, alongside an urgent assessment of the current door and observation panel design. Additionally, Government Facilities Services Limited has undertaken a further review of the locking mechanism within the LR cell observation panels to ensure they remain fully serviceable. In the longer term, a proposal to replace the existing LR cell observation panels with a model that meets current safety specifications – designed to reduce the risk of prisoners from opening them inside the cell - has been issued for tender.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 1 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.1

  1. 1

    Use investigation themes to inform staff training and, where necessary, performance management.

    Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 3 October 2025.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Use investigation themes to inform staff training and, where necessary, performance management.

Verbatim wording from the response

“All serious incidents are now investigated thoroughly, with any findings documented. Recommendations arising from these investigations are actioned and monitored, ensuring improvement is implemented where appropriate. Any themes identified through investigations are used to inform staff training and where necessary performance management, ensuring continuous learning is taking place and embedded into practice.”

Source location

Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
Page 2 · response
Published 3 October 2025

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026