PFD report

Rickie Wai Kee POON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 30 Mar 2026•Inner North London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
12

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
2

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
12

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised12

  1. Premature closure of ACCT processes
    Part of recurring concern: Ineffective prison suicide and self-harm prevention systemsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes
  2. ACCT reviews lacking structure and consistency
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes
  3. Inappropriate reduction of ACCT observations
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.9

  1. Action

    Operate a structured ACCT quality-assurance framework covering opening checks, targeted case-review sampling, ongoing review assurance and final documentation compliance checks.

    Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 April 2026.
  2. Action

    Deliver continuous suicide and self-harm prevention training through the reintroduced Pentonville Speed School.

    Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 April 2026.
  3. Action

    Complete refresher and additional upskilling for all ACCT Case Coordinators.

    Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 April 2026.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.1

  1. Position

    Responsibility for the concerns about HMPPS and HMP Pentonville rests with separate organisations, so no response is proposed.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Premature closure of ACCT processes

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Ineffective prison suicide and self-harm prevention systems; Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

ACCT reviews lacking structure and consistency

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inappropriate reduction of ACCT observations

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to complete handovers between ACCT staff

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes; Unreliable custody handovers; Unreliable handover of care information and responsibility.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to implement and follow up agreed ACCT actions

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Expired ACCT training

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to read or follow up important ACCT-related emails

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Less-than-fully-competent CPR attempts

Wider context from the report

“The nurse’s actions could not have had an impact on the outcome because Mr Poon was already dead when she arrived. However, conducting CPR on a person who had clearly died was not professional or appropriate, it did not afford Mr Poon dignity or privacy, it was neither acceptable nor kind. What concerns me particularly for the future is that there might be an occasion when a CPR attempt that is less than fully competent does have the potential to impact on the outcome. I sent PFD reports to PPG’s earlier incarnation, Care UK, and/or HMP Pentonville about the nature of attempts at resuscitation in respect of the following deceased: • William Davies (2014) • Adil Habib (2015) • Samuel Blair (2016) • Tedros Kahssay (2016) • Amir Faizi (2018) • Robert Ginn (2019) I recognise that I made the last of these reports over six years ago and I have heard descriptions of many changes since then, but I consider that I would be failing in my duty if I were not to flag up this issue now. I hope that by doing so, such a situation will be less likely to arise in the future. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate staff competence to provide first aid; Unreliable resuscitation preparedness and response during cardiac arrest.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure of supervising officers to acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing ACCT reviews

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inaccurate ACCT sign-offs

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Over-reliance of prison staff on a single presentation for ACCT knowledge

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to investigate concerning presentations beyond initial appearance and self-report.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inadequate ACCT record keeping

Wider context from the report

“The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable ACCT suicide and self-harm prevention processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Operate a structured ACCT quality-assurance framework covering opening checks, targeted case-review sampling, ongoing review assurance and final documentation compliance checks.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The establishment has implemented a structured and robust ACCT Quality Assurance (QA) framework, designed to provide oversight across the full lifecycle of an ACCT, developed in line with national guidance and local risk appetite. The QA framework comprises four linked checks, providing end-to-end assurance, directly addressing the concerns you raise.”

Source location

Response from HMPPS
Page 2 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deliver continuous suicide and self-harm prevention training through the reintroduced Pentonville Speed School.

Verbatim wording from the response

“You will be aware that ACCT is the key tool by which staff manage and support those at risk of suicide or self-harm in custody. All newly recruited prison officers receive a full day of training on suicide and self-harm prevention as part of their initial prison officer training, which includes the ACCT process. A continuous learning approach is taken, and locally, HMP Pentonville has re-introduced the “Pentonville Speed School”, which is an initiative that”

Source location

Response from HMPPS
Page 1 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Complete refresher and additional upskilling for all ACCT Case Coordinators.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Further to this work, all ACCT Case Coordinators have now completed refresher training delivered by the London Group Safety Team, which included one to one sessions, and have also received additional upskilling from the National Safety Support Team. All newly promoted Senior Officers are automatically enrolled onto the national Case Review training to ensure that those undertaking this important role receive timely training.”

Source location

Response from HMPPS
Page 2 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Automatically enrol newly promoted Senior Officers in national ACCT Case Review training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Further to this work, all ACCT Case Coordinators have now completed refresher training delivered by the London Group Safety Team, which included one to one sessions, and have also received additional upskilling from the National Safety Support Team. All newly promoted Senior Officers are automatically enrolled onto the national Case Review training to ensure that those undertaking this important role receive timely training.”

Source location

Response from HMPPS
Page 2 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Hold a June 2026 meeting with regional and nursing directors to review guidance, consider further scoping, and assess safe ILS/ROLE staffing levels.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In light of the Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) report, the site has also requested a meeting with the Regional Director and the Director of Nursing, due to be held in June 2026. The purpose of this meeting is to:”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 4 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Publish and implement the purple-alert guidance clarifying BLS, ILS, ROLE, and CPR expectations, and remind staff of its application.

Verbatim wording from the response

“A purple alert (which is a companywide safety notification) was published for all Heads of Healthcare to action, which clarified the organisational position on cardiopulmonary resuscitation following updated guidance by NHSE on 19 March 2026, which is being actioned in line with the deadline given in the alert. A copy of this alert is attached to this response for ease of reference. The purple alert highlights to all services within Practice Plus Group (PPG) that we fully support the national HMPPS/NHS England guidance that cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should begin immediately when an individual is unresponsive, not breathing and/or has no pulse, unless there are unmistakable signs of irreversible death. However, it recognises that PPG’s clinical training model differs from the national assumption that prison healthcare staff are trained only to Basic Life Support (BLS) level.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 4 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deliver annual RCUK-accredited ILS training including ROLE, audit compliance, and restrict emergency-radio assignment for staff whose training is out of date.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is important to note that all clinical staff are trained to ILS (Immediate Life Support) standards. This is a RCUK accredited course for healthcare professionals to manage patients in cardiac arrest before the ambulance team arrives. It focuses on the ABCDE approach, airway management, and safe defibrillation. All staff are expected to complete this training which is done yearly to ensure ongoing competence. This is also subject to audit, which currently shows a 74% compliance rate. Anyone who does not have the training in date would not be assigned to an emergency radio and would be expected to book and complete the training as soon as possible. There is a session booked on the week commencing 25th June 2026 which will raise the compliance to over 90%.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Introduce multidisciplinary, scenario-based resuscitation training for healthcare, prison, and prison-officer staff by July 2026.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As a service, we are committed to further strengthening our resuscitation response following the issues highlighted in the PFD. To support this, we are introducing multidisciplinary, scenario-based training by July 2026. This programme will involve healthcare staff, prison staff, and prison officers where appropriate, ensuring that learning is shared across the whole custodial environment and that all parties understand their roles during a medical”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 4 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deliver the booked ILS training session to increase current training compliance above 90%.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is important to note that all clinical staff are trained to ILS (Immediate Life Support) standards. This is a RCUK accredited course for healthcare professionals to manage patients in cardiac arrest before the ambulance team arrives. It focuses on the ABCDE approach, airway management, and safe defibrillation. All staff are expected to complete this training which is done yearly to ensure ongoing competence. This is also subject to audit, which currently shows a 74% compliance rate. Anyone who does not have the training in date would not be assigned to an emergency radio and would be expected to book and complete the training as soon as possible. There is a session booked on the week commencing 25th June 2026 which will raise the compliance to over 90%.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Responsibility for the concerns about HMPPS and HMP Pentonville rests with separate organisations, so no response is proposed.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We do not propose to respond to the points raised above in respect of HMPPS and HMP Pentonville as these matters are for separate organisation.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. 1

    Deliver regional ROLE learning sessions and make bite-sized online learning available to staff.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 April 2026.
  2. 2

    Conduct hot and cold debriefs and reflective-practice sessions to reinforce learning about death verification, certification, and clinical decision-making.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 April 2026.
  3. 3

    Distribute updated Resuscitation Council and NICE guidance to staff.

    Stated by Practice Plus GroupStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 April 2026.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deliver regional ROLE learning sessions and make bite-sized online learning available to staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Head of Healthcare has also discussed this regionally and there will be further learning sessions delivered within the region on ROLE, for staff to join in bitesize learning sessions online, this had been delivered previously, so is already available.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 5 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Conduct hot and cold debriefs and reflective-practice sessions to reinforce learning about death verification, certification, and clinical decision-making.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In addition, we consistently reflect on relevant incidents through both hot and cold debriefs, as well as ongoing reflective practice sessions. These forums provide opportunities for staff to discuss the practical differences between verification, certification, and clinical decision-making, reinforcing learning and supporting continuous improvement.”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 4 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Distribute updated Resuscitation Council and NICE guidance to staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We also routinely distribute updated guidance from national bodies, including the Resuscitation Council and NICE, to ensure alignment with current best”

Source location

Response from Practice Plus Group
Page 3 · response
Published 10 April 2026

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026