PFD report

Graham FAULKNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 13 Jun 2024•Cheshire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
3

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Investigation selection criteria failing to include paraplegia injuries
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate safety incident investigations
  2. Failure to conduct prompt investigations of serious workplace incidents
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate safety incident investigations
  3. Investigation selection criteria failing to include RIDDOR 4(2) incidents
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate safety incident investigations
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. Action

    Consider specifically naming paraplegia in the Incident Selection Criteria at the next review.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 14 June 2024.
  2. Action

    Train staff to apply the Incident Selection Criteria pragmatically and obtain managerial advice when its application is uncertain.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 14 June 2024.
  3. Action

    Move Incident Selection Criteria review and incident prioritisation from harm-outcome selection toward risk-based selection.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 14 June 2024.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.3

  1. Position

    Omission of paraplegia from listed categories does not prevent staff from treating it as a severe injury and considering investigation.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Investigation selection criteria failing to include paraplegia injuries

Wider context from the report

“Summary: The absence any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. The incident occurred on 15 October 2015. The employer became aware of the incident shortly after 22 October 2015, but initially had limited details. The HSE were informed of the incident in early November 2015. The RIDDOR report to the HSE noted "Injury preventing the injured person from working for more than 7 days". Separate email correspondence to the HSE at around the same time informed the HSE that Mr Faulkner was in the ICU. By 4 November 2015, Mr Faulkner had developed paraplegia from the consequences of his initial injuries. Despite it being known to the HSE that Mr Faulkner had suffered some form of injury with serious consequences (ie ICU admission), the HSE did not investigate. Their records do not show a specific reason for this, but I am informed it did not meet the selection criteria. The selection criteria are dated 2014 and are still in place today. These 2014 criteria include incidents which engage the reporting requirements in RIDDOR 4(1). None of these criteria apply to Mr Faulkner. The investigation criteria does not include the criteria in RIDDOR 4(2) - namely "Where any person at work is incapacitated for routine work for more than seven consecutive days (excluding the day of the accident) because of an injury resulting from an accident arising out of or in connection with that work, ...." It is unclear why the 2014 selection criteria apply to RIDDOR 4(1) and not to 4(2), when both engage statutory reporting criteria. It is unclear why the criteria in RIDDOR 4(1) do not include injuries resulting in paraplegia, given the life changing severity of such injuries. If the reason the 2014 selection criteria are relatively narrowly drafted is to avoid excessive expansion of the HSE's duties, it is unclear why there is not a "discretionary" criteria which would allow for investigations where the known facts would suggest that an investigation would be appropriate in accordance with the HSE's wider statutory functions and purpose. As a result of the HSE decision not to investigate in 2015, various evidence was either not obtained or is no longer in existence. The first witness statement accounts from many eye witnesses date to 2021 or 2022 - some 5 years or more after the events in question. This has meant that it is challenging to establish the facts that led to Mr Faulkner's injury. Issues that have been in dispute in the evidence have included when the exposure took place, where it took place, the PPE he was wearing and the instructions as to PPE on the permit to work. It is likely that many of these issues would be factually clear(er) if evidence had been obtained in 2015, shortly after the incident, when memories were fresher and various paperwork still in existence. The absence of any or any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate safety incident investigations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to conduct prompt investigations of serious workplace incidents

Wider context from the report

“Summary: The absence any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. The incident occurred on 15 October 2015. The employer became aware of the incident shortly after 22 October 2015, but initially had limited details. The HSE were informed of the incident in early November 2015. The RIDDOR report to the HSE noted "Injury preventing the injured person from working for more than 7 days". Separate email correspondence to the HSE at around the same time informed the HSE that Mr Faulkner was in the ICU. By 4 November 2015, Mr Faulkner had developed paraplegia from the consequences of his initial injuries. Despite it being known to the HSE that Mr Faulkner had suffered some form of injury with serious consequences (ie ICU admission), the HSE did not investigate. Their records do not show a specific reason for this, but I am informed it did not meet the selection criteria. The selection criteria are dated 2014 and are still in place today. These 2014 criteria include incidents which engage the reporting requirements in RIDDOR 4(1). None of these criteria apply to Mr Faulkner. The investigation criteria does not include the criteria in RIDDOR 4(2) - namely "Where any person at work is incapacitated for routine work for more than seven consecutive days (excluding the day of the accident) because of an injury resulting from an accident arising out of or in connection with that work, ...." It is unclear why the 2014 selection criteria apply to RIDDOR 4(1) and not to 4(2), when both engage statutory reporting criteria. It is unclear why the criteria in RIDDOR 4(1) do not include injuries resulting in paraplegia, given the life changing severity of such injuries. If the reason the 2014 selection criteria are relatively narrowly drafted is to avoid excessive expansion of the HSE's duties, it is unclear why there is not a "discretionary" criteria which would allow for investigations where the known facts would suggest that an investigation would be appropriate in accordance with the HSE's wider statutory functions and purpose. As a result of the HSE decision not to investigate in 2015, various evidence was either not obtained or is no longer in existence. The first witness statement accounts from many eye witnesses date to 2021 or 2022 - some 5 years or more after the events in question. This has meant that it is challenging to establish the facts that led to Mr Faulkner's injury. Issues that have been in dispute in the evidence have included when the exposure took place, where it took place, the PPE he was wearing and the instructions as to PPE on the permit to work. It is likely that many of these issues would be factually clear(er) if evidence had been obtained in 2015, shortly after the incident, when memories were fresher and various paperwork still in existence. The absence of any or any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate safety incident investigations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Investigation selection criteria failing to include RIDDOR 4(2) incidents

Wider context from the report

“Summary: The absence any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. The incident occurred on 15 October 2015. The employer became aware of the incident shortly after 22 October 2015, but initially had limited details. The HSE were informed of the incident in early November 2015. The RIDDOR report to the HSE noted "Injury preventing the injured person from working for more than 7 days". Separate email correspondence to the HSE at around the same time informed the HSE that Mr Faulkner was in the ICU. By 4 November 2015, Mr Faulkner had developed paraplegia from the consequences of his initial injuries. Despite it being known to the HSE that Mr Faulkner had suffered some form of injury with serious consequences (ie ICU admission), the HSE did not investigate. Their records do not show a specific reason for this, but I am informed it did not meet the selection criteria. The selection criteria are dated 2014 and are still in place today. These 2014 criteria include incidents which engage the reporting requirements in RIDDOR 4(1). None of these criteria apply to Mr Faulkner. The investigation criteria does not include the criteria in RIDDOR 4(2) - namely "Where any person at work is incapacitated for routine work for more than seven consecutive days (excluding the day of the accident) because of an injury resulting from an accident arising out of or in connection with that work, ...." It is unclear why the 2014 selection criteria apply to RIDDOR 4(1) and not to 4(2), when both engage statutory reporting criteria. It is unclear why the criteria in RIDDOR 4(1) do not include injuries resulting in paraplegia, given the life changing severity of such injuries. If the reason the 2014 selection criteria are relatively narrowly drafted is to avoid excessive expansion of the HSE's duties, it is unclear why there is not a "discretionary" criteria which would allow for investigations where the known facts would suggest that an investigation would be appropriate in accordance with the HSE's wider statutory functions and purpose. As a result of the HSE decision not to investigate in 2015, various evidence was either not obtained or is no longer in existence. The first witness statement accounts from many eye witnesses date to 2021 or 2022 - some 5 years or more after the events in question. This has meant that it is challenging to establish the facts that led to Mr Faulkner's injury. Issues that have been in dispute in the evidence have included when the exposure took place, where it took place, the PPE he was wearing and the instructions as to PPE on the permit to work. It is likely that many of these issues would be factually clear(er) if evidence had been obtained in 2015, shortly after the incident, when memories were fresher and various paperwork still in existence. The absence of any or any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate safety incident investigations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of discretionary investigation-selection criteria for incidents warranting investigation

Wider context from the report

“Summary: The absence any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. The incident occurred on 15 October 2015. The employer became aware of the incident shortly after 22 October 2015, but initially had limited details. The HSE were informed of the incident in early November 2015. The RIDDOR report to the HSE noted "Injury preventing the injured person from working for more than 7 days". Separate email correspondence to the HSE at around the same time informed the HSE that Mr Faulkner was in the ICU. By 4 November 2015, Mr Faulkner had developed paraplegia from the consequences of his initial injuries. Despite it being known to the HSE that Mr Faulkner had suffered some form of injury with serious consequences (ie ICU admission), the HSE did not investigate. Their records do not show a specific reason for this, but I am informed it did not meet the selection criteria. The selection criteria are dated 2014 and are still in place today. These 2014 criteria include incidents which engage the reporting requirements in RIDDOR 4(1). None of these criteria apply to Mr Faulkner. The investigation criteria does not include the criteria in RIDDOR 4(2) - namely "Where any person at work is incapacitated for routine work for more than seven consecutive days (excluding the day of the accident) because of an injury resulting from an accident arising out of or in connection with that work, ...." It is unclear why the 2014 selection criteria apply to RIDDOR 4(1) and not to 4(2), when both engage statutory reporting criteria. It is unclear why the criteria in RIDDOR 4(1) do not include injuries resulting in paraplegia, given the life changing severity of such injuries. If the reason the 2014 selection criteria are relatively narrowly drafted is to avoid excessive expansion of the HSE's duties, it is unclear why there is not a "discretionary" criteria which would allow for investigations where the known facts would suggest that an investigation would be appropriate in accordance with the HSE's wider statutory functions and purpose. As a result of the HSE decision not to investigate in 2015, various evidence was either not obtained or is no longer in existence. The first witness statement accounts from many eye witnesses date to 2021 or 2022 - some 5 years or more after the events in question. This has meant that it is challenging to establish the facts that led to Mr Faulkner's injury. Issues that have been in dispute in the evidence have included when the exposure took place, where it took place, the PPE he was wearing and the instructions as to PPE on the permit to work. It is likely that many of these issues would be factually clear(er) if evidence had been obtained in 2015, shortly after the incident, when memories were fresher and various paperwork still in existence. The absence of any or any prompt investigation by the HSE to establish the relevant facts and potential gaps in process could have an impact upon the ability to learn from one death and so avoid other deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate safety incident investigations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Consider specifically naming paraplegia in the Incident Selection Criteria at the next review.

Verbatim wording from the response

“HSE guidance is reviewed to reflect emerging issues and concerns in response to learning and recommendations following incidents. Reviewing our ISC approach has been a recent area of work for HSE and we are moving away from selecting incidents by harm outcome and instead selecting by risk. So although I have passed your suggestion for ‘paraplegia’ to be specifically named in the ISC to HSE’s policy team for consideration at the time of the next ISC review, it is likely that we will focus more in future on risk rather than injury.”

Source location

Response from Health and Safety Executive
Page 3 · response
Published 14 June 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Train staff to apply the Incident Selection Criteria pragmatically and obtain managerial advice when its application is uncertain.

Verbatim wording from the response

“However, I can assure you that the Principal Inspectors who are reviewing such RIDDOR reports would not hesitate to consider paraplegia as being a severe injury just because it is not specifically listed. Our staff are trained to be pragmatic in the application of the ISC to ensure that we respond where appropriate to serious injury incidents and are not restricted solely by examples. HSE staff can seek advice from line managers should they be unsure of ISC application and regularly do so.”

Source location

Response from Health and Safety Executive
Page 3 · response
Published 14 June 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Move Incident Selection Criteria review and incident prioritisation from harm-outcome selection toward risk-based selection.

Verbatim wording from the response

“HSE guidance is reviewed to reflect emerging issues and concerns in response to learning and recommendations following incidents. Reviewing our ISC approach has been a recent area of work for HSE and we are moving away from selecting incidents by harm outcome and instead selecting by risk. So although I have passed your suggestion for ‘paraplegia’ to be specifically named in the ISC to HSE’s policy team for consideration at the time of the next ISC review, it is likely that we will focus more in future on risk rather than injury.”

Source location

Response from Health and Safety Executive
Page 3 · response
Published 14 June 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Omission of paraplegia from listed categories does not prevent staff from treating it as a severe injury and considering investigation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“However, I can assure you that the Principal Inspectors who are reviewing such RIDDOR reports would not hesitate to consider paraplegia as being a severe injury just because it is not specifically listed. Our staff are trained to be pragmatic in the application of the ISC to ensure that we respond where appropriate to serious injury incidents and are not restricted solely by examples. HSE staff can seek advice from line managers should they be unsure of ISC application and regularly do so.”

Source location

Response from Health and Safety Executive
Page 3 · response
Published 14 June 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The Incident Selection Criteria already permits investigation of any RIDDOR incident indicating a likely serious breach, including Regulation 4(2) notifications.

Verbatim wording from the response

“There is more information about the ISC’s application within HSE Investigation Procedure which is also publically available at Investigation - Stage 2: Decide whether to investigate (hse.gov.uk). The ISC is focussed on RIDDOR reports under Regulation 4(1) to ensure highest injury type incidents are prioritised for investigation consideration. However, the ISC also includes an option at section 4 which allows for any type of RIDDOR to be considered for investigation should it indicate a likelihood serious breach of health and safety law. Thus our view is that the ISC already has the type of flexibility you are suggesting to help learn lessons from incidents where standards are far from where they should be, including linked to a Reg 4(2) notification.”

Source location

Response from Health and Safety Executive
Page 2 · response
Published 14 June 2024

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

A meaningful investigation could not be conducted because too much time had passed and key evidence was unavailable.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We also considered whether there was any realistic possibility of conducting an investigation at that time in 2019, however concluded that unfortunately too much time had passed meaning key evidence was unavailable to be able to conduct a meaningful investigation. We updated both the Police and Coroner’s Office of that decision at that time. We also updated Mr Faulkner’s next of kin and more recently met them jointly with the Police, ahead of the inquest, to further respond to their questions.”

Source location

Response from Health and Safety Executive
Page 2 · response
Published 14 June 2024

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

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Data last updated 7 September 2026