PFD report

Patrick Soames · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 18 Apr 2023•South London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
4

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
0

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised4

  1. Failure to share or provide access to critical self-harm risk information for directly involved NHS Trusts
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated carePart of recurring concern: Unreliable interagency sharing of safeguarding risk information
  2. Lack of a single effective global focus for consolidating and retrieving cross-agency risk information
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate multi-agency safeguarding coordinationPart of recurring concern: Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care
  3. Unavailability of GP-held clinical history to accident and emergency departments outside surgery hours or across geographic areas
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable consolidation and access to patients’ cross-service clinical risk information
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements

No respondent-stated action or position is clearly linked to these concerns.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to share or provide access to critical self-harm risk information for directly involved NHS Trusts

Wider context from the report

“1. 5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with Patrick in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him. However, that information was by reason of the agencies falling into different geographic areas. There was no single effective global focus for the information being acquired piecemeal about Patrick’s pattern of serious self-harming behaviour. The various agencies were significantly impeded in forming a single clear picture of Patrick’s pattern of behaviour (which was particularly necessary in circumstances where he was not engaging and therefore not assisting in providing a complete history himself). 2. GPs act as a repository for information about contact with other clinical agencies (such as attendances at accident and emergency departments) and therefore serve as a point of contact for information about past history. However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP outside of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department. Several of Patrick’s attendances at accident and emergency departments were out of GP surgery hours. 3. I was informed at inquest that one local authority (in whose area Patrick resided) had been made aware by police of the risk to Patrick following one of his self-harm incidents (in respect of a particularly important piece of information) and had relayed that information to a 6th NHS Trust (not one of the 5 from which I heard evidence at inquest) but Patrick did not reside in that Trust area. Those Trusts which did have direct contact with Patrick were never made aware of that piece of information nor had any means of accessing it. 4. I heard evidence that there is no national ‘risk flagging’ system: for example, when a person attends an accident and emergency department having self-harmed, the fact of a previous self-harm attendance at a different accident and emergency department is not systematically flagged up. 5. In summary, there was no single effective global focus consolidating the information which was flowing into the various agencies about Patrick; no global focus to which those agencies could in turn refer in emergency to obtain the totality of information about Patrick’s recent pattern of behaviour; no national ‘risk flagging’ system to alert those agencies to his significant recent history. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care; Unreliable interagency sharing of safeguarding risk information.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of a single effective global focus for consolidating and retrieving cross-agency risk information

Wider context from the report

“1. 5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with Patrick in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him. However, that information was by reason of the agencies falling into different geographic areas. There was no single effective global focus for the information being acquired piecemeal about Patrick’s pattern of serious self-harming behaviour. The various agencies were significantly impeded in forming a single clear picture of Patrick’s pattern of behaviour (which was particularly necessary in circumstances where he was not engaging and therefore not assisting in providing a complete history himself). 2. GPs act as a repository for information about contact with other clinical agencies (such as attendances at accident and emergency departments) and therefore serve as a point of contact for information about past history. However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP outside of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department. Several of Patrick’s attendances at accident and emergency departments were out of GP surgery hours. 3. I was informed at inquest that one local authority (in whose area Patrick resided) had been made aware by police of the risk to Patrick following one of his self-harm incidents (in respect of a particularly important piece of information) and had relayed that information to a 6th NHS Trust (not one of the 5 from which I heard evidence at inquest) but Patrick did not reside in that Trust area. Those Trusts which did have direct contact with Patrick were never made aware of that piece of information nor had any means of accessing it. 4. I heard evidence that there is no national ‘risk flagging’ system: for example, when a person attends an accident and emergency department having self-harmed, the fact of a previous self-harm attendance at a different accident and emergency department is not systematically flagged up. 5. In summary, there was no single effective global focus consolidating the information which was flowing into the various agencies about Patrick; no global focus to which those agencies could in turn refer in emergency to obtain the totality of information about Patrick’s recent pattern of behaviour; no national ‘risk flagging’ system to alert those agencies to his significant recent history. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate multi-agency safeguarding coordination; Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unavailability of GP-held clinical history to accident and emergency departments outside surgery hours or across geographic areas

Wider context from the report

“1. 5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with Patrick in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him. However, that information was by reason of the agencies falling into different geographic areas. There was no single effective global focus for the information being acquired piecemeal about Patrick’s pattern of serious self-harming behaviour. The various agencies were significantly impeded in forming a single clear picture of Patrick’s pattern of behaviour (which was particularly necessary in circumstances where he was not engaging and therefore not assisting in providing a complete history himself). 2. GPs act as a repository for information about contact with other clinical agencies (such as attendances at accident and emergency departments) and therefore serve as a point of contact for information about past history. However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP outside of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department. Several of Patrick’s attendances at accident and emergency departments were out of GP surgery hours. 3. I was informed at inquest that one local authority (in whose area Patrick resided) had been made aware by police of the risk to Patrick following one of his self-harm incidents (in respect of a particularly important piece of information) and had relayed that information to a 6th NHS Trust (not one of the 5 from which I heard evidence at inquest) but Patrick did not reside in that Trust area. Those Trusts which did have direct contact with Patrick were never made aware of that piece of information nor had any means of accessing it. 4. I heard evidence that there is no national ‘risk flagging’ system: for example, when a person attends an accident and emergency department having self-harmed, the fact of a previous self-harm attendance at a different accident and emergency department is not systematically flagged up. 5. In summary, there was no single effective global focus consolidating the information which was flowing into the various agencies about Patrick; no global focus to which those agencies could in turn refer in emergency to obtain the totality of information about Patrick’s recent pattern of behaviour; no national ‘risk flagging’ system to alert those agencies to his significant recent history. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable consolidation and access to patients’ cross-service clinical risk information.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of a national risk-flagging system for previous self-harm attendances

Wider context from the report

“1. 5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with Patrick in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him. However, that information was by reason of the agencies falling into different geographic areas. There was no single effective global focus for the information being acquired piecemeal about Patrick’s pattern of serious self-harming behaviour. The various agencies were significantly impeded in forming a single clear picture of Patrick’s pattern of behaviour (which was particularly necessary in circumstances where he was not engaging and therefore not assisting in providing a complete history himself). 2. GPs act as a repository for information about contact with other clinical agencies (such as attendances at accident and emergency departments) and therefore serve as a point of contact for information about past history. However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP outside of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department. Several of Patrick’s attendances at accident and emergency departments were out of GP surgery hours. 3. I was informed at inquest that one local authority (in whose area Patrick resided) had been made aware by police of the risk to Patrick following one of his self-harm incidents (in respect of a particularly important piece of information) and had relayed that information to a 6th NHS Trust (not one of the 5 from which I heard evidence at inquest) but Patrick did not reside in that Trust area. Those Trusts which did have direct contact with Patrick were never made aware of that piece of information nor had any means of accessing it. 4. I heard evidence that there is no national ‘risk flagging’ system: for example, when a person attends an accident and emergency department having self-harmed, the fact of a previous self-harm attendance at a different accident and emergency department is not systematically flagged up. 5. In summary, there was no single effective global focus consolidating the information which was flowing into the various agencies about Patrick; no global focus to which those agencies could in turn refer in emergency to obtain the totality of information about Patrick’s recent pattern of behaviour; no national ‘risk flagging’ system to alert those agencies to his significant recent history. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care services; Failure to make previous self-harm and suicide-risk information available for safety assessments; Failure to provide emergency responders with readily accessible safety-critical patient information; Unreliable clinical safety-alert systems.

Open source report
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026

No official response is included in the current published snapshot.