Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical safety-alert systems

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First reported 12 Oct 2013•Latest report 1 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical records, prescribing systems or related clinical information processes to create, retain, update, display or otherwise reliably surface safety alerts concerning patients, medicines or treatment.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to act on a clearly received alert where the alerting system itself operated as intended.
  • Excludes non-clinical alert systems such as police, custody, safeguarding or transport systems unless the report directly concerns a clinical safety-alert system.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping or communication deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the reliability of a clinical safety alert.
Reports
53

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
56

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
66

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England12
Department of Health and Social Care11
Egton Medical Information Systems Limited3
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
Care Quality Commission2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Wales2
Proprietary Association of Great Britain2
Royal College of General Practitioners2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust2
Welsh Government2
Adelaide Medical Centre, London1
Alliance Pharmaceuticals Limited1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Lucy Jane PHELAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lucy Jane Phelan was found unresponsive at home after taking prescribed medications with a significant amount of alcohol and was later treated in hospital for likely aspiration pneumonia. She subsequently vomited, suffered cardiopulmonary arrest, and died shortly after midnight on 14 May 2025; the inquest concluded that her death was contributed to by neglect. The principal concern was that latching on Emergency Department monitoring equipment may contribute to alarm fatigue and hinder recognition of new alarms, with its use in other hospitals in England and Wales unknown.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of alarm monitoring equipment to record recurrent alarm conditions as new alarms

    Wider context from the report

    “While in the resuscitation bay within the Emergency Department at the Alexandra Hospital, Redditch, Ms. Phelan was attached to equipment which monitored her physical observations. These observations are visible on a screen at the patient’s bedside and on a screen at the main nursing station. If a patient’s observations rise or fall outside acceptable parameters, the equipment generates notes both on audible alarm and a visual alarm ( red - higher priority; yellow – lower priority ) on each monitor. The monitoring equipment has a facility known as “latching” which, if activated, means: (a) an alarm will continue to be displayed and sounded even after the conditions which generated it have ended, until it is acknowledged on the monitor, meaning that any alarm for a new or different indication cannot be distinguished audibly; and (b) if the alarm is not acknowledged on the monitor, and the same alarm condition occurs again, this new alarm is not listed in the alarm review or audit log as a new alarm. The inquest heard evidence that “alarm fatigue” is a recognized phenomenon, and that in a busy environment like a hospital’s Emergency Department, particularly when patient numbers are high, staff find it increasingly difficult to react and respond to the many different types of alarm in use. The use of the “latching” facility on monitoring equipment is likely to contribute to this phenomenon; this has been recognized by the equipment manufacturer which no longer recommends its use on Emergency Department monitors, and by Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust who have switched it off on monitors in its Emergency Departments. It is not known whether, and to what extent, the “latching” facility remains in use in Emergency Departments in other hospitals in England and Wales. ”

    Source location

    Lucy Jane PHELAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage the MHRA to establish the manufacturer’s position and understand how alarm-latching functionality should be managed clinically.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England’s National Patient Safety Team have advised that ‘alarm fatigue’ is a recognised phenomenon and the function ‘alarm latching’ is a setting that requires any triggered alarm to be manually acknowledged and resolved by a member of staff. There are however, other limitations relating to any secondary triggered alarm that may tailor use of this function. The suggestion that ‘the equipment manufacturer no longer recommends the use of alarm latching functionality on the Emergency Department monitors’ is currently subject to further investigation as such information would need to be officially communicated to all users and be part of the medical device manual and Instructions for Use (IFU) documents.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The MHRA is the appropriate authority to advise healthcare organisations on medical-device concerns involving alarm-latching capabilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MHRA are the correct authority to advise on concerns regarding medical devices with alarm latching capabilities healthcare organisations. The NHS England National Patient Safety team will continue to engage with the MHRA to understand how latching functionality is best managed in the clinical environment. The MHRA will be coming back to us once they have gathered further information from the manufacturer regarding this specific case.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 April 2026

    Open published response
  2. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Roger Knight SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Roger Knight SMITH, who had cerebral amyloid angiopathy and a history of strokes, was readmitted to West Suffolk Hospital in August 2023 and received tinzaparin for venous thromboembolism prophylaxis. He later suffered a cerebral haemorrhage and died on 12 September 2023; the inquest narrative attributed his death to the effects of a stroke brought about by tinzaparin administration. The principal concerns were failures in the electronic records system to flag relevant anticoagulation advice, inadequate communication with the patient and his family, and insufficient timely specialist stroke-team input.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the patient records management system to accurately highlight important information for patient care and treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “Important information relating to advice concerning the prescription of anti-coagulation therapy (low weight molecular heparin - LWMH) for venous thromboembolism (VTE) prophylaxis and which was contained in Mr. Smith’s medical records, was not flagged for clinician attention as part of the electronic records management system in use at West Suffolk Hospital. This meant that when Mr. Smith was readmitted on the 25th August 2023, this information did not form part of the reviewing consultants considerations and would not be thought to precribe tinzaparin (LWMH) to Mr. Smith for VTE prophylaxis. He subsequently received 8 doses of tinzaparin which contributed to him suffering a catastrophic stroke that led to his death. ”

    Source location

    Roger Knight SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider adding an explicit CAA bleeding-risk prompt to the VTE assessment tool through the Thrombosis Committee and embed any agreed change in Trust guidelines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• WSFT will take forward a clinically-led change to strengthen the visibility of risk factors within the existing VTE assessment processes.”

    Source location

    2026-0069 - Response from West Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop the safer handovers quality-improvement project to improve highlighting of essential information during nurse-to-nurse transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There is also a Quality Improvement Project (QIP) on ‘safer handovers’ currently underway. Although this project is looking to improve the reported safety and effectiveness of nurse-to-nurse transfers between adult inpatient wards, part of this involves looking at how essential information is highlighted. It is hoped this project will improve the quality of records which is accessible to all healthcare teams and drive-up standards.”

    Source location

    2026-0069 - Response from West Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An automated CAA anticoagulation alert cannot be implemented because eCare lacks the necessary functionality and reliable evidence base.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This concern has been reviewed by the Digital and Medicine teams to explore if it is possible to create a digital solution for this issue and to consider the process of adding alerts to the electronic patient record system, known locally as eCare. Unfortunately, based on current system capabilities, it is not possible to create an automated digital alert within eCare to warn prescribers against anticoagulating patients with cerebral amyloid angiopathy (CAA).”

    Source location

    2026-0069 - Response from West Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  3. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Avery Jake Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Avery Jake Hall died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 13 November 2024, aged four days, after developing global hypoxia and diffuse alveolar damage following his birth. The report was concerned that his mother continued taking Candesartan during pregnancy because she was not given clear and definitive advice to stop it, and that the medication remained available on repeat prescription without warnings identifying her pregnancy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of system warnings identifying pregnancy during repeat prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that despite advice from the GP that it was best to stop all medication during pregnancy, Candesartan remained as a repeat prescription and, in addition to that, there were no warnings placed on the system which would have alerted the clinician approving the request for the repeat prescription that the patient was pregnant thus necessitating a review. ”

    Source location

    Avery Jake Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add pregnancy-stop warnings to electronic prescribing instructions so they appear on pharmacy-printed medication labels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. As set out in the SEA, a review of all female patients of child bearing age who are prescribed ARB medication was to be undertaken every 6 months and an alert added to their prescription to stop taking this medication if they become pregnant and to speak to their GP. The frequency of this review has now been increased to 3-monthly in light of the risks of this medication in later pregnancy. In addition, as most prescriptions are now electronic rather than paper copies, the alert will be added to the prescribing instructions section so that it is clearly shown on the label printed for the patient’s medication by the pharmacy when they collect their medication.”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all women of childbearing age taking ARB medicines and add prescription alerts advising immediate cessation and GP consultation if pregnancy occurs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. I reviewed all women of childbearing age taking Candesartan and indeed taking any ARB medication.”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 5 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manually reviewing every repeat medication request and creating linked pregnancy alerts is impractical due to workload and lack of technical IT skills.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have also considered further whether it is possible to identify or flag a pregnant patient when they request repeat medication. This would be an important safeguard for doctors reviewing the two hundred or so repeat medication requests received on a daily basis. Due to their volume and the other priorities for clinicians’ time, it is not practical for the doctor to review each patient’s records when authorising every request. We do not have the technical IT skills at the practice to make changes to the computerised records system and I have therefore contacted our system provider EMIS to ask for their advice and input on whether it is possible, and if so how, to introduce a flag which would identify the pregnancy coding on the patient’s record and link it to the repeat prescriptions for the patient (and ideally include the BNF advice for that medication as well).”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

    Open published response
  4. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Milos JANKOVIC · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Milos JANKOVIC had been diagnosed with Barrett’s Oesophagus in 2014 but was lost to follow-up surveillance after bowel cancer took priority. In 2020, he developed symptoms and was found to have brain metastases from primary oesophageal cancer. Concerns included inadequate processes for Barrett’s surveillance, particularly in primary care, and the absence of recall or prescribing prompts to identify patients needing surveillance or endoscopy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of prescribing prompts to assess Barrett’s-related red flags for endoscopy

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) When prescribing drugs such as omeprazole or other PPIs for symptoms which may relate to Barrett’s, there is no prompt for GPs to consider whether the patient hits the relevant red flags which may benefit from endoscopy rather than a course of medication, or whether they have previously been diagnosed with the condition and ought to be under surveillance. ”

    Source location

    Milos JANKOVIC · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Venetia Clarissa Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Venetia Clarissa Pierce, described as an elderly frail lady with recurrent urinary infections, was prescribed nitrofurantoin prophylactically in February 2024 and died in hospital on 30 December 2024. The inquest recorded nitrofurantoin-induced pneumonitis as the medical cause of death, with frailty contributing. Concerns included the absence of an MHRA safety alert on the surgery’s EMIS system and limited awareness among clinicians of the potential for pulmonary damage and respiratory failure from nitrofurantoin in elderly patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of nitrofurantoin safety alert criteria to cover patients without pre-existing pulmonary disease

    Wider context from the report

    “a. The MHRA issued a drug safety alert regarding the risks of pulmonary and hepatic adverse drug reactions in relation to nitrofurantoin in April 2023. However, no MHRA safety alert appeared on the surgery EMIS system when the drug was prescribed to Mrs Pierce. The court heard that the safety alert only arises when patients have a pre-existing pulmonary disease which Mrs Pierce did not have. ”

    Source location

    Venetia Clarissa Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the surgery EMIS system to display MHRA nitrofurantoin safety alerts

    Wider context from the report

    “a. The MHRA issued a drug safety alert regarding the risks of pulmonary and hepatic adverse drug reactions in relation to nitrofurantoin in April 2023. However, no MHRA safety alert appeared on the surgery EMIS system when the drug was prescribed to Mrs Pierce. The court heard that the safety alert only arises when patients have a pre-existing pulmonary disease which Mrs Pierce did not have. ”

    Source location

    Venetia Clarissa Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing EMIS Web functionality is considered sufficient to mitigate the specific MHRA Nitrofurantoin risk; no further software development is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this instance, based on the information provided in the Report, and our subsequent review, we do not believe there are any software developments beyond the existing functionality in the System that are required to mitigate the specific risk raised in the Report.”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 August 2025

    Open published response
  6. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Jacqueline GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacqueline GREEN was admitted to Bedford Hospital after a fall and was found to be very weak, frail, cachectic and dehydrated. She received paracetamol at a dose intended for patients weighing over 50 kg despite weighing 33.6 kg, subsequently developed paracetamol-induced liver injury and died from liver failure. The concerns included inadequate safeguards for prescribing paracetamol to low-weight adults, unexplained variation in the administration of doses, and incomplete implementation of relevant safety measures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of electronic alerts for weight accuracy and liver-toxicity risk in oral paracetamol prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Despite the PSII report referencing the 2022 HSSIB report and recommending that this should be shared with staff, relevant Safety Observations made in the HSSIB Report appear to have been insufficiently addressed: (a) Although Bedford Hospitals NHS Trust are now using the Nevercentre electronic record system which, since 28th February 2024, has included the height and weight of patients and prevents a prescribing doctor from prescribing without a patient’s weight having first been entered, staff are still able to enter a estimated weight and there do not appear to be any alerts on this system to advise of the need for weight accuracy in the prescription of oral paracetamol and consideration of the risk of liver toxicity in those weighing under 50 kg (as advised in Safety Observation 02/2022/151); (b) Whilst the PSII report states as an Action that “Patients should be weighed on admission and the information documented”, other than the provision of a ‘pat slide’, no other practical actions are planned for actually achieving this outcome, particularly in respect of those adults at risk of an unintentional paracetamol overdose, such as an alert aimed at those administering medication as well as those prescribing it (as advised in Safety Observation 02/2022/151). ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add EPMA prescribing prompts requiring accurate weight recording and appropriate paracetamol dosing, including liver-toxicity warnings below 50 kilograms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is now a prompt when prescribing paracetamol (all routes) on EPMA that reminds prescribers of the need to ensure there is an accurate weight recorded and that the dose is appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedford Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response
  7. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Chloe Elizabeth Burgess · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Chloe Elizabeth Burgess was found deceased at home on 8 September 2023. The report states that interactions between amitriptyline, paroxetine and ivabradine, together with an episode of sleep apnoea, contributed to severe cardiac arrhythmia and sudden cardiac death. The principal concerns were that the potential dangers of this medication combination were not widely appreciated and did not trigger alerts in prescribing software, and that prescribers of ivabradine should have a full understanding of the potential interaction.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of prescribing software to trigger alerts for the interaction between amitriptyline, paroxetine and ivabradine

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence that the potential dangers of the combination of amitriptyline, paroxetine and ivabradine is not widely appreciated and does not trigger an alert on the prescribing software used in primary care or by pharmacists. The potential dangers related to a failure to metabolise amitriptyline which can, incrementally, lead to toxicity. I am also concerned that those prescribing ivabradine should have a full understanding of the potential interaction with amitriptyline and paroxetine. ”

    Source location

    Chloe Elizabeth Burgess · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prescribing software alerts are determined by independent commercial providers, which choose the reference materials informing alert content.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Royal Pharmaceutical Society, as joint publishers of the BNF, have advised that pharmacokinetic (drug metabolism) interactions are included within the BNF, but that all theoretical compound effects of combinations of medications through their mode of action cannot be included. Furthermore, prescribing software for primary care and pharmacies is provided by independent commercial organisations, who will choose which reference materials they use to inform alerts. This software and its application is currently not regulated.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Physicians
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prescribers are responsible for understanding medicine interactions and applying appropriate caution or monitoring rather than relying solely on software alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is the role of all prescribers to understand the overarching mechanisms of action of medicines they may prescribe, and where similar actions occur by more than one medicine, or might exacerbate pathology in individual patients, particular caution or monitoring should be instituted. It is important that they do not rely on prescribing software, but use recognised reference materials.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Physicians
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BNF publishers, rather than NICE, are best placed to address concerns about drug interactions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reflected on the circumstances surrounding Chloe’s death, and the concerns raised in your report regarding drug interactions. The British National Formulary (BNF) provides key information on the selection, prescribing, dispensing and administration of medicines and we believe that they would be best placed to address your concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NICE cannot comment on drug-interaction concerns because BNF content responsibility remains with its publishers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The BNF is a joint publication of the BMJ Group and Pharmaceutical Press, the publishing division of the Royal Pharmaceutical Society. While we make the BNF available on the NICE website, responsibility for the content remains with the publishers and therefore NICE cannot comment on the concerns you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2025

    Open published response
  8. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Ramon JERVIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Ramon Jervis died at Royal Cornwall Hospital Truro on 16 July 2023 from neutropenic sepsis, a recognised complication of chemotherapy for testicular cancer. The report found a 20-hour delay in administering antibiotics after observations indicated they were required, and identified the absence of a digital alert that could have alerted staff to implement the Sepsis Six bundle.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a digital alert for the need to implement sepsis six

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Repeated observations and NEWS scores were taken by numerous staff members which indicated that sepsis six should be triggered and that antibiotics were required but this did not happen. (2) There was an absence of a digital alert on hospital software, which could have alerted staff to the need to implement sepsis six. ”

    Source location

    Michael Ramon JERVIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a sepsis alert within the new e-Care system to digitally flag when the sepsis six should be actioned.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, NerveCentre (a national system) does not allow for this. However, RCHT is implementing a new e-Care digital electronic patient record (EPR) system and the sepsis lead nurse will be involved in the implementation to develop a sepsis alert/trigger to digitally ‘flag’ when the ‘sepsis six’ needs to be actioned.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Cornwall Hospital Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 9 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The current NerveCentre system cannot support a digital sepsis alert, although an alert is planned for the replacement EPR system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There was an absence of a digital alert on hospital software, which could have alerted staff for the need to implement sepsis six:”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Cornwall Hospital Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 9 January 2025

    Open published response
  9. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Locket Ure Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Locket Williams, aged 15, died from injuries after leaving home and jumping to the road below on the night of 27 September 2021; their death was recognised at 00:01 on 28 September 2021. The report identified concerns about insufficient child psychiatric inpatient capacity, the recording and communication of suicide risk, and CAMHS engagement with multi-agency safeguarding meetings. The inquest found that the death was more than minimally contributed to by delays in assessment, underestimation of suicide risk, and delayed therapeutic treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear and obvious suicide-risk alert in children’s medical records

    Wider context from the report

    “Concern 2 On the basis of the evidence I heard at the inquest hearing, I found that Locket’s death was contributed to by the Trust’s underestimation of their risk of suicide. At the prevention of future deaths hearing, I was told that the Trust has introduced a new risk assessment system. The new system is in accordance with NICE guidelines and relies on a fuller description of the nature and level of the risk rather than its classification as low, medium, or high. It is clear from the evidence that there is good reason to move away from the three-tier classification, but I am concerned that the new system does not include any clear and obvious alert, on the medical records, that there is a risk of suicide in relation to the child in question. Although the intention of the new system is to encourage each clinician to read the narrative of the fuller risk assessment, there is currently a risk that, if they do not do so (and it is foreseeable that they will not always do so or be able to do so), they will be unaware of the risk of suicide. It was accepted in the evidence that an alert for a risk of suicide could be included in a child’s record without undermining the move away from the three-tier classification of that risk as low, medium or high. ”

    Source location

    Locket Ure Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust considers its needs-based risk assessment and reduction process sufficient, so will not introduce a binary suicide-risk flag.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is recognised that risk prediction in suicide has been shown repeatedly to be ineffective¹. As recognised in your letter to us, the Trust has recently revised its risk assessment approach to align with NICE Guidelines² and NHS England’s recommendations. This approach emphasises addressing patient needs rather than predicting future risk through the previously used ‘low/medium/high’ categorisation.”

    Source location

    Response from Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2024

    Open published response
  10. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    William Richard STOCKIL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Richard Stockil was admitted to hospital after being found on the floor at home following a long lie, with rhabdomyolysis and dehydration. An electronic prescription error and ineffective alerts resulted in his antibiotics stopping before further antibiotics were prescribed when signs of infection developed; he died from pneumonia. The report identified a risk that medications may cease when they should be continued if no prescribing clinician accesses the patient’s records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the medication-ending alert system to draw attention to prescription review when no prescribing clinician accesses the patient’s record

    Wider context from the report

    “The system has been changed since the death of Mr Stockil in that alerts of medication ending are now only sent to clinicians who have the right to prescribe in order that alerts are seen by the correct staff. It is no longer the case that the alerts can be sent to any clinicians who do not have the ability to address prescriptions. The current version of the system generates alerts when anyone with a prescribing right accesses the patient’s records. This means that an alert will only be shown to a prescriber and only if they access the patient’s records. Therefore, it was accepted that there was a risk that the alerting system would not operate to draw attention to the need for prescription review before the medication ceases if no prescribing clinician accesses a patient’s record. This creates a risk that medications will cease when they should be continued and creates a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    William Richard STOCKIL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore with Royal Surrey whether configuration or other changes could facilitate adherence to the clinical workflow, including broadening alert recipients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “19. Oracle Health considers that the anti-infective alert notification features are appropriate and functioning as designed. To the extent the Area Coroner’s concern relates to prescribers not accessing the EPR, this is respectfully an issue in the clinical workflow which cannot be addressed through further alert notifications. Nevertheless, Oracle Health will:”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 7 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss with Royal Surrey establishing an alert-notifications committee to review existing alerts and identify new alerts for development.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “19.2. More generally, Oracle will also discuss with RSFT the benefits of: (a) establishing an alert notifications committee as part of its healthcare information technology governance, to review existing alert notifications or identify new alert notifications for development; (b) defining, documenting and regularly reviewing how it works with alert notifications in digital solutions through a published Standard Operating Practice; and (c) working more closely with Oracle Health’s ‘Apps Services’ team for future configuration changes.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 7 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage Oracle Corporation UK Limited on the electronic prescribing alerting concerns raised in the Report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England will be engaging with Oracle Corporation UK Limited on the issues raised. I note that you have also addressed your Report to Oracle Corporation UK Limited, and we have been sighted on their response to you dated 27 June 2024. We note that they state they have not found any defect or fault with their software, and that they are open to exploring with RSFT whether any configuration changes, alterations to working practices and additional training may assist to further mitigate any clinical risks. Any identified learnings could be facilitated through their dedicated User Groups and/or general guidance could also be provided on how to best design”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider incorporating a test script addressing the prescribing alerting issue into future ePRaSE iterations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS Digital Medicines Programme commissions a system called the e-Prescribing Risk and Safety Evaluation (ePRaSE), which is a tool that supports NHS Trusts in configuring their Electronic Prescribing and Medicines Administration (ePMA) systems, to mitigate prescribing risks and improve safety. There could be scope to incorporate a test script to explore this issue in future iterations of ePRaSE, and this will be considered by the team.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No evidence indicates a software defect; Millennium was working as designed and configured, including subsequent independent modifications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. While there is no suggestion that the software at issue was in anyway at fault or contributed to the Deceased’s death, Oracle Health conducted a review as described more fully in this Response and concludes as follows (key findings are highlighted in bold throughout):”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Alerts are appropriately displayed within patient records and cannot substitute for clinicians following established clinical workflows and standards of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.4. The alert notification system is not intended to serve as a substitute in place of the clinical protocol to access individual patient EPRs daily and it would be improper for it to do so. To the extent that there is concern about prescribers not accessing their EPR, this is a clinical workflow issue. Ultimately, no amount of alert notifications can address the shortcomings of a prescriber failing to follow a clinical workflow or not observing underlying standards of care.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Login-based or external email alerts are considered unworkable because they risk alert fatigue, workflow disruption, lost acknowledgement monitoring and data-security breaches.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “15.2. Electronic alert notifications must operate within the confines of the Millennium system and having alert notifications sent externally (e.g., by e-mail) would be less effective and risks unacceptable data security breaches.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The client retains responsibility for deciding whether to adopt code or configuration enhancements, including their clinical and commercial implications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “D. POTENTIAL ENHANCEMENTS TO MEDICATIONS MANAGEMENT AS DEPLOYED AT RSFT”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026