PFD report

CHRISTOPHER TOKE AJAYI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 31 Oct 2014•Inner South London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
7

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
20

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

Open published report

Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised7

  1. Lack of adequate training and support for Care Coordinators
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate training and support for mental health Care Coordinators
  2. Lack of audit and assurance of departmental safety changes
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to verify compliance and effectiveness of implemented safety changesPart of recurring concern: Unsafe implementation and oversight of service changes
  3. Failure to ensure post-discharge follow-up visits
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to provide timely and adequate follow-up after discharge
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.13

  1. Action

    Develop capacity within community caseloads with primary-care and third-sector stakeholders to support lower care-coordinator caseloads.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  2. Action

    Audit implementation of discharge planning, follow-up and care-coordinator support, then report and review results through safeguarding and Trust governance committees.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  3. Action

    Prioritise community physical-health support in the next CQUIN commissioning round and consider primary-care outreach pilots.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 31 October 2014.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.1

  1. Position

    There are no systemic problems with discharge and community follow-up for patients with complex mental and physical health needs.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of adequate training and support for Care Coordinators

Wider context from the report

“Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate training and support for mental health Care Coordinators.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of audit and assurance of departmental safety changes

Wider context from the report

“Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to verify compliance and effectiveness of implemented safety changes; Unsafe implementation and oversight of service changes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to ensure post-discharge follow-up visits

Wider context from the report

“Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to provide timely and adequate follow-up after discharge.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inconsistent supervision of Care Coordinators

Wider context from the report

“Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to provide adequate supervision of care staff; Inadequate training and support for mental health Care Coordinators.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to comprehensively plan discharge arrangements

Wider context from the report

“Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure safe discharge planning for inpatient mental health admissions; Unreliable hospital discharge processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to secure appropriate accommodation and care support at discharge

Wider context from the report

“Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to ensure safe accommodation after discharge from mental health care; Unreliable hospital discharge processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to identify and act on high-risk patient needs

Wider context from the report

“Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to integrate complex health and social care needs.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop capacity within community caseloads with primary-care and third-sector stakeholders to support lower care-coordinator caseloads.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Case load management: Southwark community psychosis teams have active case-loads between 250-300 patients, resulting in average Care Co-ordinator case-loads of 25-30; the Trust continues to work with stakeholders in Primary care and the Third sector to develop capacity within the active case load, aiming ideally to reduce the average Care Co-ordinator case load to facilitate enhanced delivery of evidence based interventions; case loads are monitored on an ongoing basis, both within 1:1 supervision, and across the community as a whole.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 6 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Audit implementation of discharge planning, follow-up and care-coordinator support, then report and review results through safeguarding and Trust governance committees.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Robust discharge planning and follow up and support to care coordinators are supported by the actions outlined in this report. However, the Trust will undertake an audit in March 2015 to assure itself and partners that implementation has been effective.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 8 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Prioritise community physical-health support in the next CQUIN commissioning round and consider primary-care outreach pilots.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Commissioning intentions (2015/16): appropriately supporting community patients to manage their physical health are being prioritised in the next round of CQUINs; there is a range of collaborative initiatives including consideration of pilots with GPs undertaking outreach clinics in community team bases to increase the numbers of patients receiving appropriate physical health assessments, investigations and interventions.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Work with partners to secure community district-nurse provision for safe diabetes management.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Community District Nurses: the Trust is working with our partners to ensure District Nurse provision to ensure safe community diabetes management.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Debrief involved staff and remind Trust and local-authority staff about discharge planning, documentation and physical-health guidance.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• All Trust and London Borough of Southwark (LBS) staff involved in this specific case gave evidence, learnt lessons and have been de-briefed on the Coroner’s conclusions.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review housing and community-support needs with partners for patients managing physical health independently in the community.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Partnership working around social care and support: discussions are currently underway reviewing housing and community support needs for patients to appropriately address physical health once living independently in the community”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop an ICT portal enabling mutual access to key clinical information across Trust and acute electronic patient-record systems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• ICT harmony: there have been significant developments in increasing mutual access between the Trust and Acute electronic patient record systems, with the development of an ICT ‘Portal’ to review key clinical information; further developments are underway to link these secondary care systems with Primary care ICT (EMIS) systems; this work is further being supported by the Southwark CCG.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Revise, disseminate and publish the Trust supervision policy with clearer expectations for clinical and social-work staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Trust revised Supervision policy (Sept 2014); this recent policy update which covers Trust and LBS staff, has been sent out to all staff and available on the Trust intranet for reference, sets out clear expectations of staff supervision, recognising effective supervision as an integral aspect of the working lives of all NHS clinical and social work staff to support them to deliver the best care to patients and their carers, provide opportunity to develop competent parishioners and to develop their skills.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 6 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement updated action plans producing more robust systems and structures between Southwark inpatient and community teams.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• The breakdown in effective clinical communication and collaborative care planning was noted in the Trust’s SI investigation report (together with action plans) and further acknowledged and discussed in supporting evidence given at Inquest.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss scaling the diabetic liaison service for patients with severe mental-health disorders and develop additional community mental-health staff training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Southwark Diabetic services; discussions are underway to scale up the award winning Diabetic Liaison service currently running at KCH to assist patients with severe mental health disorders, with additional training being developed for community mental health staff.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Identify and support community multidisciplinary-team staff to lead physical-health assessment, treatment and patient support.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• MDT Physical Health leads within community MDTs: teams are being encouraged to identify and support individual team staff members to lead on developing support for patients to engage with the assessment, treatment and support around their physical health.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Audit seven-day follow-up and discharges involving patients with unstable diabetes to assess follow-up, communication and forward planning.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• The community team involved have undertaken two specific audits: (a) Team 7 day follow-up performance (Oct-Dec 2014) showed no missed reviews; (b) Discharge of two patients with unstable diabetes (Dec 2014) demonstrated extensive communication and forward planning prior to discharge, appropriately involving all partners.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Complete discharge notification proformas routinely and send them to community teams or team managers on the discharge day, with ongoing audit.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Discharge proforma (discharge notification): this is now routinely completed and copies sent to community team/team manager on the day of discharge (compliance is monitored through ongoing audit).”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

There are no systemic problems with discharge and community follow-up for patients with complex mental and physical health needs.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Trust acknowledges that important lessons have been learnt from this specific case that are being taken forward in improving integrated working; the Trust is otherwise confident that there is no systemic problems with regard to discharge and community follow up of similar patients with complex mental and physical health problems.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 8 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.7

  1. 1

    Develop daily and weekly multidisciplinary review structures, zoning and team-based caseload oversight.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  2. 2

    Undertake a further Serious Case Review through the Safeguarding Adult Partnership Board to understand the issues and develop learning.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  3. 3

    Maintain an appointed physical-health lead in King’s Health Partners discussions and develop service-level agreements with acute and primary-care partners.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  4. 4

    Discuss with Southwark Clinical Commissioners changes to commissioned services, including structured reviews and stronger interface-working systems.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  5. 5

    Issue policy guidance assigning inpatient clinicians and receiving-community practitioners responsibility for initiating discharge Community Treatment Orders.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  6. 6

    Link secondary-care electronic records with primary-care systems to improve shared clinical information access.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 31 October 2014.
  7. 7

    Brief senior Trust staff on the Inquest concerns and advance partnership arrangements for patients with severe mental illness and serious physical-health problems.

    Stated by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 31 October 2014.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop daily and weekly multidisciplinary review structures, zoning and team-based caseload oversight.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Multidisciplinary team discussions: daily review meetings, ‘zoning’ systems and more structured weekly clinical team review meetings have been developed ensuring effective team-based case load reviews and to improve oversight and monitoring or individual Care Co-ordinators work.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Undertake a further Serious Case Review through the Safeguarding Adult Partnership Board to understand the issues and develop learning.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Additionally, there is a further Serious Case Review underway, managed through the Safeguarding Adult Partnership Board, which will further understand the issues raised by this case and develop our learning.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain an appointed physical-health lead in King’s Health Partners discussions and develop service-level agreements with acute and primary-care partners.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• King’s Health Partners Physical Health developments; the Trust has an appointed Physical Head Lead who is actively engaged in King’s Health partnership discussions and developing service level agreements (SLAs) with our Acute and Primary sector partners.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss with Southwark Clinical Commissioners changes to commissioned services, including structured reviews and stronger interface-working systems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Clinical Commissioning: the Trust is currently involved in discussions with Southwark Clinical Commissioners with respect to changing the emphasis of services commissioned, embedding principles of the Trust Adult Mental Health model (recently introduced in Lambeth and Lewisham boroughs) including teams undertaking more structured clinical reviews and developing robust systems to improve collaborative interface working with in-patient services, crisis services, local”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 6 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Issue policy guidance assigning inpatient clinicians and receiving-community practitioners responsibility for initiating discharge Community Treatment Orders.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Community Treatment Order (CTO) initiation at discharge: the Trust issued policy guidance (Sept 2013) clarifying that the In-Patient Responsible Clinician (RC) undertakes the CTO initiation, together with an Approved Mental Health Practitioner (AMHP) from the receiving community team, setting CTO conditions that have previously been discussed with the receiving community RC.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 5 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Link secondary-care electronic records with primary-care systems to improve shared clinical information access.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• ICT harmony: there have been significant developments in increasing mutual access between the Trust and Acute electronic patient record systems, with the development of an ICT ‘Portal’ to review key clinical information; further developments are underway to link these secondary care systems with Primary care ICT (EMIS) systems; this work is further being supported by the Southwark CCG.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 7 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Brief senior Trust staff on the Inquest concerns and advance partnership arrangements for patients with severe mental illness and serious physical-health problems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Trust Board feedback: Senior Trust staff have been extensively briefed both in preparation, during and after this Inquest; concerns raised have been acknowledged and taken forward, particularly around the area of planning, instigating and joint working partnership arrangements for patients with severe mental health problems and co-morbid (serious) physical health problems.”

Source location

2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
Page 5 · response
Published 31 October 2014

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

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Data last updated 7 September 2026