PFD report

Brian Lyn Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 17 Sep 2025•Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
2

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
8

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

Open published report

Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised3

  1. Absence of a Police-HSE memorandum of understanding or protocol for domestic explosion evidence requirements
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable police investigative evidence gathering
  2. Failure to give orders securing evidence for domestic explosion investigations
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to retain safety-critical source records and evidence
  3. Lack of understanding of evidence requiring preservation during domestic explosion investigations
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to retain safety-critical source records and evidencePart of recurring concern: Inadequate safety incident investigationsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable police investigative evidence gathering
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. Action

    Raise the identified investigation concerns with the National Liaison Committee for consideration in the Protocol review.

    Stated by South Wales PoliceStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2025.
  2. Action

    Develop a proposed Suspected Gas Explosion checklist for consideration alongside the existing Carbon Monoxide checklist.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 19 December 2025.
  3. Action

    Prepare national training material on work-related aspects of investigations, including advice for first responders.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 19 December 2025.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.3

  1. Position

    The National Liaison Committee is responsible for deciding and implementing any appropriate amendments to the Protocols.

    Stated by South Wales PoliceRedirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Absence of a Police-HSE memorandum of understanding or protocol for domestic explosion evidence requirements

Wider context from the report

“During the course of the inquest it was established that the cause of the explosion could not be ascertained since the clean up operation removed debris from the scene which was subsequently disposed of. It was confirmed that evidence ascertaining the cause of that explosion may not be secured and as such was disposed of without an exercise to determine its significance to the investigation. The HSE’s Principal Gas Engineer commented that on viewing the television footage of the incident prior to attending the scene he feared that any investigation would be compromised due to evidence having been lost or disposed of. He also noted that the Police may not have come across a scene like this since gas explosions are rare. If the HSE are not involved then decisions made by Police in the interests of search and rescue that then hinder the investigation process and he would not expect them to understand the intricacies of what he would be looking for as part of his investigation. It is acknowledged that in search and rescue operations the preservation of life has to take precedence, however there should be an understanding the Police as to what evidence should be preserved due to them having the initial primacy of investigation, and the information to fuel that understanding as to what evidence should be preserved where possible should come from the HSE who have the experience of investigating such events. I am concerned that without thorough investigations into the causes of domestic explosions then those causes cannot be determined and steps put in place to prevent future deaths by way of recurrence. 1. There was no understanding of what evidence was required to be preserved for the purposes of an investigation as to the cause of the explosion; 2. There was no order given to secure such evidence; 3. There was no memorandum of understanding or protocol between the Police and the HSE to provide information on what the HSE would need to be able to identify the cause of the explosion as far as practicable without impacting upon the primary objective of preserving life undertaken by the search and rescue operation ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable police investigative evidence gathering.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to give orders securing evidence for domestic explosion investigations

Wider context from the report

“During the course of the inquest it was established that the cause of the explosion could not be ascertained since the clean up operation removed debris from the scene which was subsequently disposed of. It was confirmed that evidence ascertaining the cause of that explosion may not be secured and as such was disposed of without an exercise to determine its significance to the investigation. The HSE’s Principal Gas Engineer commented that on viewing the television footage of the incident prior to attending the scene he feared that any investigation would be compromised due to evidence having been lost or disposed of. He also noted that the Police may not have come across a scene like this since gas explosions are rare. If the HSE are not involved then decisions made by Police in the interests of search and rescue that then hinder the investigation process and he would not expect them to understand the intricacies of what he would be looking for as part of his investigation. It is acknowledged that in search and rescue operations the preservation of life has to take precedence, however there should be an understanding the Police as to what evidence should be preserved due to them having the initial primacy of investigation, and the information to fuel that understanding as to what evidence should be preserved where possible should come from the HSE who have the experience of investigating such events. I am concerned that without thorough investigations into the causes of domestic explosions then those causes cannot be determined and steps put in place to prevent future deaths by way of recurrence. 1. There was no understanding of what evidence was required to be preserved for the purposes of an investigation as to the cause of the explosion; 2. There was no order given to secure such evidence; 3. There was no memorandum of understanding or protocol between the Police and the HSE to provide information on what the HSE would need to be able to identify the cause of the explosion as far as practicable without impacting upon the primary objective of preserving life undertaken by the search and rescue operation ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to retain safety-critical source records and evidence.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of understanding of evidence requiring preservation during domestic explosion investigations

Wider context from the report

“During the course of the inquest it was established that the cause of the explosion could not be ascertained since the clean up operation removed debris from the scene which was subsequently disposed of. It was confirmed that evidence ascertaining the cause of that explosion may not be secured and as such was disposed of without an exercise to determine its significance to the investigation. The HSE’s Principal Gas Engineer commented that on viewing the television footage of the incident prior to attending the scene he feared that any investigation would be compromised due to evidence having been lost or disposed of. He also noted that the Police may not have come across a scene like this since gas explosions are rare. If the HSE are not involved then decisions made by Police in the interests of search and rescue that then hinder the investigation process and he would not expect them to understand the intricacies of what he would be looking for as part of his investigation. It is acknowledged that in search and rescue operations the preservation of life has to take precedence, however there should be an understanding the Police as to what evidence should be preserved due to them having the initial primacy of investigation, and the information to fuel that understanding as to what evidence should be preserved where possible should come from the HSE who have the experience of investigating such events. I am concerned that without thorough investigations into the causes of domestic explosions then those causes cannot be determined and steps put in place to prevent future deaths by way of recurrence. 1. There was no understanding of what evidence was required to be preserved for the purposes of an investigation as to the cause of the explosion; 2. There was no order given to secure such evidence; 3. There was no memorandum of understanding or protocol between the Police and the HSE to provide information on what the HSE would need to be able to identify the cause of the explosion as far as practicable without impacting upon the primary objective of preserving life undertaken by the search and rescue operation ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to retain safety-critical source records and evidence; Inadequate safety incident investigations; Unreliable police investigative evidence gathering.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Raise the identified investigation concerns with the National Liaison Committee for consideration in the Protocol review.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In this respect, South Wales Police will take steps to raise your concerns with the National Liaison Committee in order that due regard may be had to such a possibility in the future, so that any amendments which are considered appropriate, may be made to the Protocol.”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 4 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop a proposed Suspected Gas Explosion checklist for consideration alongside the existing Carbon Monoxide checklist.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Provide an update to the NLC on other HSE on-going work to develop a proposed ‘Suspected Gas Explosion checklist’, to sit alongside the current ‘Carbon Monoxide checklist’ within Appendix 1 of the WRDP Practical Guide – ‘Additional duties of first officer – Domestic Gas Incidents’. This would be for the NLC to agree and update the guide.”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Prepare national training material on work-related aspects of investigations, including advice for first responders.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Provide an update to the NLC regarding work HSE has been doing in preparing national training material focussing on the work related elements of such investigations for those responding to incidents including more specific advice for those first on scene. This will in due course be put to the NLC for consideration and endorsement;”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The National Liaison Committee is responsible for deciding and implementing any appropriate amendments to the Protocols.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As would be expected, the Protocols contains provisions and guidance which provide full or partial answers to the issues you have raised. However, it remains important that the Protocols are reviewed and refreshed as appropriate. In this regard, it is significant that Detective Superintendent ████████ ████████ from South Wales Police attended the National Work Related Death Liaison Committee on 17 November 2025 which is the national multi agency meeting that oversees the Protocol and linked matters. At that meeting the Protocols, were discussed as it was universally agreed that these documents need to be updated. The motion to give effect to the same was carried, and the National Liaison Committee has committed to undertaking a review and update as appropriate.”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The National Liaison Committee owns the protocol and must agree proposed updates, including a suspected gas explosion checklist.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The purpose of the protocol and supporting (practical) guide is to ensure effective joint investigation of work-related deaths in England and Wales. The WRDP National Liaison Committee (NLC), ‘owns’ the protocol and HSE sits on the committee alongside the other signatories.”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 1 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The existing Work Related Death Protocol is considered fit for purpose and addresses evidence preservation, investigation coordination and information-sharing concerns.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In relation to the specific ‘Matters of Concern’ raised in your letter, it is HSE’s opinion that the Work Related Death Protocol (WRDP) addresses your points. I have responded to each of those points individually with excerpts from the protocol below.”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 2 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.5

  1. 1

    Re-establish and chair a Wales-region Work-Related Deaths Group with partner agencies, including the HSE.

    Stated by South Wales PoliceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 19 December 2025.
  2. 2

    Provide the National Liaison Committee with an update on work developing the proposed Suspected Gas Explosion checklist.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2025.
  3. 3

    Raise the concerns at an appropriate WRDP National Liaison Committee meeting.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2025.
  4. 4

    Recommend issuing refresher communications to WRDP signatories on requirements for staff involved in incidents.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2025.
  5. 5

    Provide the National Liaison Committee with an update on the national training material under preparation.

    Stated by Health and Safety ExecutiveStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2025.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Re-establish and chair a Wales-region Work-Related Deaths Group with partner agencies, including the HSE.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In addition, Detective Superintendent ████████ has also re-established which he chairs and chairs a Wales region Work-Related Deaths Group with partner agencies including the HSE.”

Source location

Response from South Wales Police
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide the National Liaison Committee with an update on work developing the proposed Suspected Gas Explosion checklist.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Provide an update to the NLC on other HSE on-going work to develop a proposed ‘Suspected Gas Explosion checklist’, to sit alongside the current ‘Carbon Monoxide checklist’ within Appendix 1 of the WRDP Practical Guide – ‘Additional duties of first officer – Domestic Gas Incidents’. This would be for the NLC to agree and update the guide.”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Raise the concerns at an appropriate WRDP National Liaison Committee meeting.

Verbatim wording from the response

“However, in response to the matters of concern you raised and to further improve the current WRDP and guidance, HSE will:”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Recommend issuing refresher communications to WRDP signatories on requirements for staff involved in incidents.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Raise your concerns at an appropriate WRDP National Liaison Committee (NLC) and recommend that refresher communications be issued to all signatory organisations, highlighting the need to ensure that all new and existing staff, who could be involved in WRDP incidents, are fully aware of its requirements;”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Provide the National Liaison Committee with an update on the national training material under preparation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“• Provide an update to the NLC regarding work HSE has been doing in preparing national training material focussing on the work related elements of such investigations for those responding to incidents including more specific advice for those first on scene. This will in due course be put to the NLC for consideration and endorsement;”

Source location

Response from HSE
Page 3 · response
Published 19 December 2025

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
2/2

Data last updated 7 September 2026