PFD report

Jonathan Paul Bost Mann and Margaret Jean Costa · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 24 Aug 2023•Somerset

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
5

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
0

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised5

  1. Failure to obtain critical information about the pilot’s capabilities
  2. Failure to maintain accurate shared understanding and communication between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures
  3. Failure to obtain critical information about the plane’s capabilities
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements

No respondent-stated action or position is clearly linked to these concerns.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to obtain critical information about the pilot’s capabilities

Wider context from the report

“The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to maintain accurate shared understanding and communication between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control

Wider context from the report

“The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to obtain critical information about the plane’s capabilities

Wider context from the report

“The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to use checklists and aide memoires for ground-based assistance

Wider context from the report

“The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to obtain critical weather information about the selected diversion aerodrome

Wider context from the report

“The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
0/2

Data last updated 7 September 2026

No official response is included in the current published snapshot.