PFD report

Christine Valerie STREET · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 10 May 2016•Brighton and Hove

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
8

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
12

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

Open published report

Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised8

  1. Failure to recognise and appropriately manage the dying patient
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to recognise dying patients and initiate end-of-life care
  2. Failure to maintain required arm’s length observation
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to maintain required continuous patient observationPart of recurring concern: Failure to provide required speciallingPart of recurring concern: Unreliable observation of patients in specialist mental health units
  3. Inaccurate handover documentation
    Part of recurring concern: Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.10

  1. Action

    Audit every patient requiring constant observation and collate the findings for subsequent learning and action.

    Stated by University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 10 May 2016.
  2. Action

    Establish a ward practice educator role providing neuro-competency and general nursing training.

    Stated by University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 May 2016.
  3. Action

    Conduct senior-nurse records spot checks, remedy shortcomings and educate staff on improving records.

    Stated by University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 10 May 2016.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to recognise and appropriately manage the dying patient

Wider context from the report

“(3) From the 12th September 2015 the recording of doctor's visits, of nurses observations and the processes around the recognition of the dying patient were utterly flawed, unprofessional and unacceptable. I do not propose to rehearse all the things that went wrong since I am quite sure that there should now be a full investigation into what happened by the hospital. This is not the first Regulation 2 report that I have had to write recently (in the last few months) following Inquests and concerning the hospital's failure to recognise the dying patient and act appropriately and in accordance with their own and national guidance. This is a matter which exercises everyone these days particularly following the discussion which arose following the Liverpool Care Pathway AND IT MUST be addressed by this hospital Trust. This abject failure did not, the Jury accepted from the evidence, affect the care that Mrs. Street was given following her fall and head injury. The lack of recognition and the lack of procedures did not affect her and therefore did not either cause or more than minimally contribute to her death, which is why this Regulation 28 Report is so important. These failings did however have a huge impact on her large and loving family who were denied all the support that they should have been given as set out in the End of Life Care Protocols for this Hospital Trust. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to recognise dying patients and initiate end-of-life care.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to maintain required arm’s length observation

Wider context from the report

“(2) Mrs. Street was being specialised. She was on arm’s length observation and had been since just after her biopsy on the 28th August 2015. These observations had apparently been carried out successfully over the following days until early on the morning of the 11th September when an experienced HCA was specialling her. It was clear that he knew exactly how he should be specialling her, it was clear that the handover to him on the 10th September had been effective. It comprised a general handover, a bedside handover and a handover sheet. The handover sheet was flawed since it suggested that Mrs. Street had, had a fall already on the 9th September. There was no evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case. For some reason on the occasion when he escorted Mrs. Street to the toilet, a few steps from her bed in bay 9 on Level 8A West and indeed a few steps from the nurses station because bay 9 is a high dependency bay, he left her in the toilet, closed the door and did not wait outside. A few moments later she had an unwitnessed fall, the nurse at the nursing station heard the noise and rushed in to find her on the floor with a head injury which was immediately obvious. He looked after her and she was taken by wheelchair back to her bed once it had been established that she did not appear to have any injury other than the head injury. Thereafter, on the 11th she was appropriately managed. The Trust policy on observations for patients with mental health illness (this lady was deemed not to have mental capacity due to the extent of the symptoms produced by the brain tumour and was the subject of a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguarding Order put in place urgently on the 31st August 2015) was not adhered to by the HCA. The Trust policy on observations includes good paperwork for specialling including a specialling document which will stay with the care plan and daily documentation as to the specialling, plus an observation sheet. Apart from one or two observation sheets which appear to have been done on the 31st August, there was absolutely no documentation at all. This was in direct contravention of the Trust's own policy and indeed of the NICE guidance on observations, i.e., the national policy. There was another problem in connection with specialling and that is that the HCA involved was a bank employee and therefore the Trust has apparently no power over his training but must rely on the assurance of the agency that their staff have been appropriately trained for the tasks they are to perform. This gives no guarantee of course that they are trained to the standards set out in the Trust’s own policies and although the policies are handed to these members of staff or their existence made known to them, so that they can access them through the intranet, it seems highly unlikely that they would necessarily have had time or inclination to access every single one of the many protocols which exist in any acute hospital Trust. The problem was overcome here and was not a direct matter for the Jury to explore in this Article 2 Inquest because from the evidence, it was clear that the HCA concerned was experienced, had worked in the neurosurgical unit before and had done specialling on many occasions before and so would have known exactly what was expected of him. Nonetheless, important documentation such as this must be completed appropriately. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to maintain required continuous patient observation; Failure to provide required specialling; Unreliable observation of patients in specialist mental health units.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inaccurate handover documentation

Wider context from the report

“(2) Mrs. Street was being specialised. She was on arm’s length observation and had been since just after her biopsy on the 28th August 2015. These observations had apparently been carried out successfully over the following days until early on the morning of the 11th September when an experienced HCA was specialling her. It was clear that he knew exactly how he should be specialling her, it was clear that the handover to him on the 10th September had been effective. It comprised a general handover, a bedside handover and a handover sheet. The handover sheet was flawed since it suggested that Mrs. Street had, had a fall already on the 9th September. There was no evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case. For some reason on the occasion when he escorted Mrs. Street to the toilet, a few steps from her bed in bay 9 on Level 8A West and indeed a few steps from the nurses station because bay 9 is a high dependency bay, he left her in the toilet, closed the door and did not wait outside. A few moments later she had an unwitnessed fall, the nurse at the nursing station heard the noise and rushed in to find her on the floor with a head injury which was immediately obvious. He looked after her and she was taken by wheelchair back to her bed once it had been established that she did not appear to have any injury other than the head injury. Thereafter, on the 11th she was appropriately managed. The Trust policy on observations for patients with mental health illness (this lady was deemed not to have mental capacity due to the extent of the symptoms produced by the brain tumour and was the subject of a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguarding Order put in place urgently on the 31st August 2015) was not adhered to by the HCA. The Trust policy on observations includes good paperwork for specialling including a specialling document which will stay with the care plan and daily documentation as to the specialling, plus an observation sheet. Apart from one or two observation sheets which appear to have been done on the 31st August, there was absolutely no documentation at all. This was in direct contravention of the Trust's own policy and indeed of the NICE guidance on observations, i.e., the national policy. There was another problem in connection with specialling and that is that the HCA involved was a bank employee and therefore the Trust has apparently no power over his training but must rely on the assurance of the agency that their staff have been appropriately trained for the tasks they are to perform. This gives no guarantee of course that they are trained to the standards set out in the Trust’s own policies and although the policies are handed to these members of staff or their existence made known to them, so that they can access them through the intranet, it seems highly unlikely that they would necessarily have had time or inclination to access every single one of the many protocols which exist in any acute hospital Trust. The problem was overcome here and was not a direct matter for the Jury to explore in this Article 2 Inquest because from the evidence, it was clear that the HCA concerned was experienced, had worked in the neurosurgical unit before and had done specialling on many occasions before and so would have known exactly what was expected of him. Nonetheless, important documentation such as this must be completed appropriately. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to complete admission and fall documentation

Wider context from the report

“(1) Documentation with regard to the admission document (which was not completed) and the doctors pro forma to document the fall on the 11th September 2015 (was not completed). The lack of these documents did not affect the outcome, but it is bad practice that they were not completed and placed with Mrs. Street’s notes. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate control of falls risks; Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records; Unreliable completion of admission documentation; Unreliable documentation of falls and related clinical response.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of assurance that bank staff are trained to Trust standards

Wider context from the report

“(2) Mrs. Street was being specialised. She was on arm’s length observation and had been since just after her biopsy on the 28th August 2015. These observations had apparently been carried out successfully over the following days until early on the morning of the 11th September when an experienced HCA was specialling her. It was clear that he knew exactly how he should be specialling her, it was clear that the handover to him on the 10th September had been effective. It comprised a general handover, a bedside handover and a handover sheet. The handover sheet was flawed since it suggested that Mrs. Street had, had a fall already on the 9th September. There was no evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case. For some reason on the occasion when he escorted Mrs. Street to the toilet, a few steps from her bed in bay 9 on Level 8A West and indeed a few steps from the nurses station because bay 9 is a high dependency bay, he left her in the toilet, closed the door and did not wait outside. A few moments later she had an unwitnessed fall, the nurse at the nursing station heard the noise and rushed in to find her on the floor with a head injury which was immediately obvious. He looked after her and she was taken by wheelchair back to her bed once it had been established that she did not appear to have any injury other than the head injury. Thereafter, on the 11th she was appropriately managed. The Trust policy on observations for patients with mental health illness (this lady was deemed not to have mental capacity due to the extent of the symptoms produced by the brain tumour and was the subject of a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguarding Order put in place urgently on the 31st August 2015) was not adhered to by the HCA. The Trust policy on observations includes good paperwork for specialling including a specialling document which will stay with the care plan and daily documentation as to the specialling, plus an observation sheet. Apart from one or two observation sheets which appear to have been done on the 31st August, there was absolutely no documentation at all. This was in direct contravention of the Trust's own policy and indeed of the NICE guidance on observations, i.e., the national policy. There was another problem in connection with specialling and that is that the HCA involved was a bank employee and therefore the Trust has apparently no power over his training but must rely on the assurance of the agency that their staff have been appropriately trained for the tasks they are to perform. This gives no guarantee of course that they are trained to the standards set out in the Trust’s own policies and although the policies are handed to these members of staff or their existence made known to them, so that they can access them through the intranet, it seems highly unlikely that they would necessarily have had time or inclination to access every single one of the many protocols which exist in any acute hospital Trust. The problem was overcome here and was not a direct matter for the Jury to explore in this Article 2 Inquest because from the evidence, it was clear that the HCA concerned was experienced, had worked in the neurosurgical unit before and had done specialling on many occasions before and so would have known exactly what was expected of him. Nonetheless, important documentation such as this must be completed appropriately. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate competence assurance and induction for agency staff; Inadequate training and competence assurance for carers providing care.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record nurses’ observations adequately

Wider context from the report

“(3) From the 12th September 2015 the recording of doctor's visits, of nurses observations and the processes around the recognition of the dying patient were utterly flawed, unprofessional and unacceptable. I do not propose to rehearse all the things that went wrong since I am quite sure that there should now be a full investigation into what happened by the hospital. This is not the first Regulation 2 report that I have had to write recently (in the last few months) following Inquests and concerning the hospital's failure to recognise the dying patient and act appropriately and in accordance with their own and national guidance. This is a matter which exercises everyone these days particularly following the discussion which arose following the Liverpool Care Pathway AND IT MUST be addressed by this hospital Trust. This abject failure did not, the Jury accepted from the evidence, affect the care that Mrs. Street was given following her fall and head injury. The lack of recognition and the lack of procedures did not affect her and therefore did not either cause or more than minimally contribute to her death, which is why this Regulation 28 Report is so important. These failings did however have a huge impact on her large and loving family who were denied all the support that they should have been given as set out in the End of Life Care Protocols for this Hospital Trust. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to document specialling and observations

Wider context from the report

“(2) Mrs. Street was being specialised. She was on arm’s length observation and had been since just after her biopsy on the 28th August 2015. These observations had apparently been carried out successfully over the following days until early on the morning of the 11th September when an experienced HCA was specialling her. It was clear that he knew exactly how he should be specialling her, it was clear that the handover to him on the 10th September had been effective. It comprised a general handover, a bedside handover and a handover sheet. The handover sheet was flawed since it suggested that Mrs. Street had, had a fall already on the 9th September. There was no evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case. For some reason on the occasion when he escorted Mrs. Street to the toilet, a few steps from her bed in bay 9 on Level 8A West and indeed a few steps from the nurses station because bay 9 is a high dependency bay, he left her in the toilet, closed the door and did not wait outside. A few moments later she had an unwitnessed fall, the nurse at the nursing station heard the noise and rushed in to find her on the floor with a head injury which was immediately obvious. He looked after her and she was taken by wheelchair back to her bed once it had been established that she did not appear to have any injury other than the head injury. Thereafter, on the 11th she was appropriately managed. The Trust policy on observations for patients with mental health illness (this lady was deemed not to have mental capacity due to the extent of the symptoms produced by the brain tumour and was the subject of a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguarding Order put in place urgently on the 31st August 2015) was not adhered to by the HCA. The Trust policy on observations includes good paperwork for specialling including a specialling document which will stay with the care plan and daily documentation as to the specialling, plus an observation sheet. Apart from one or two observation sheets which appear to have been done on the 31st August, there was absolutely no documentation at all. This was in direct contravention of the Trust's own policy and indeed of the NICE guidance on observations, i.e., the national policy. There was another problem in connection with specialling and that is that the HCA involved was a bank employee and therefore the Trust has apparently no power over his training but must rely on the assurance of the agency that their staff have been appropriately trained for the tasks they are to perform. This gives no guarantee of course that they are trained to the standards set out in the Trust’s own policies and although the policies are handed to these members of staff or their existence made known to them, so that they can access them through the intranet, it seems highly unlikely that they would necessarily have had time or inclination to access every single one of the many protocols which exist in any acute hospital Trust. The problem was overcome here and was not a direct matter for the Jury to explore in this Article 2 Inquest because from the evidence, it was clear that the HCA concerned was experienced, had worked in the neurosurgical unit before and had done specialling on many occasions before and so would have known exactly what was expected of him. Nonetheless, important documentation such as this must be completed appropriately. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to provide required specialling; Unreliable recording of required observations in care and custody.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record doctors’ visits adequately

Wider context from the report

“(3) From the 12th September 2015 the recording of doctor's visits, of nurses observations and the processes around the recognition of the dying patient were utterly flawed, unprofessional and unacceptable. I do not propose to rehearse all the things that went wrong since I am quite sure that there should now be a full investigation into what happened by the hospital. This is not the first Regulation 2 report that I have had to write recently (in the last few months) following Inquests and concerning the hospital's failure to recognise the dying patient and act appropriately and in accordance with their own and national guidance. This is a matter which exercises everyone these days particularly following the discussion which arose following the Liverpool Care Pathway AND IT MUST be addressed by this hospital Trust. This abject failure did not, the Jury accepted from the evidence, affect the care that Mrs. Street was given following her fall and head injury. The lack of recognition and the lack of procedures did not affect her and therefore did not either cause or more than minimally contribute to her death, which is why this Regulation 28 Report is so important. These failings did however have a huge impact on her large and loving family who were denied all the support that they should have been given as set out in the End of Life Care Protocols for this Hospital Trust. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Audit every patient requiring constant observation and collate the findings for subsequent learning and action.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Furthermore an audit has been carried out very recently of every patient being specialised. The findings are now being collated and action will be taken, including if necessary revision of the current policy, in the light of any learning points that emerge from this audit.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Establish a ward practice educator role providing neuro-competency and general nursing training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“A series of study days has been held for the nurses on L8AW, to help them understand fully their responsibilities and obligations. Topics addressed have included Deprivation of Liberty; falls prevention and management; one to one care; end of life care; and documentation. A practice educator took up post on the ward earlier this year, who provides training both on specific neuro-competencies for nurses and also on more general nursing skills.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Conduct senior-nurse records spot checks, remedy shortcomings and educate staff on improving records.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In order to improve the quality of documentation, the neurosurgeons have organised a monthly records audit. Senior nurses have also been performing spot checks of records and taking action to remedy any shortcomings identified, as well as educating those individuals concerned about how to improve the quality of their records.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Organise a monthly neurosurgical records audit to improve documentation quality.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In order to improve the quality of documentation, the neurosurgeons have organised a monthly records audit. Senior nurses have also been performing spot checks of records and taking action to remedy any shortcomings identified, as well as educating those individuals concerned about how to improve the quality of their records.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Correct staff understanding that the specialist care record applies to patients requiring constant observation, including neurological patients.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I am aware that the quality of documentation for Mrs Street was poor in several respects and this has been followed up with both nursing and medical staff. The staff had recognised that Mrs Street was at high risk of falls, and had intended her to have constant attention knowing that she lacked capacity to comprehend her risk of falling as a result of the tumour. It appears that the ward nurses had mistakenly thought that the ‘care record for patient requiring specialising’, which was available as an appendix to the Trust’s ‘policy for the observation of adult patients with mental health problems’, was not intended for use when caring for a patient who was suffering not from a mental illness but from a specific neurological condition - in this instance, a brain tumour. Rapid action was taken when this came to light, to correct their understanding.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inform bank staff about observation policy and documentation requirements for one-to-one care.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Since Mrs Street’s fall, more work has been done to ensure the bank staff are well-informed about the policy for the observation of adult patients with mental health problems, and the associated documentation to be used if they are asked to provide one to one care for a patient. Teaching sessions have also been run for the Trust’s health care assistants, to refresh their knowledge about what is required when they are asked to provide one to one care to any patient.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Hold L8AW nursing study days covering deprivation of liberty, falls prevention, one-to-one care, end-of-life care and documentation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“A series of study days has been held for the nurses on L8AW, to help them understand fully their responsibilities and obligations. Topics addressed have included Deprivation of Liberty; falls prevention and management; one to one care; end of life care; and documentation. A practice educator took up post on the ward earlier this year, who provides training both on specific neuro-competencies for nurses and also on more general nursing skills.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Follow up poor documentation with nursing and medical staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I am aware that the quality of documentation for Mrs Street was poor in several respects and this has been followed up with both nursing and medical staff. The staff had recognised that Mrs Street was at high risk of falls, and had intended her to have constant attention knowing that she lacked capacity to comprehend her risk of falling as a result of the tumour. It appears that the ward nurses had mistakenly thought that the ‘care record for patient requiring specialising’, which was available as an appendix to the Trust’s ‘policy for the observation of adult patients with mental health problems’, was not intended for use when caring for a patient who was suffering not from a mental illness but from a specific neurological condition - in this instance, a brain tumour. Rapid action was taken when this came to light, to correct their understanding.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Run refresher teaching for healthcare assistants on one-to-one care requirements.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Since Mrs Street’s fall, more work has been done to ensure the bank staff are well-informed about the policy for the observation of adult patients with mental health problems, and the associated documentation to be used if they are asked to provide one to one care for a patient. Teaching sessions have also been run for the Trust’s health care assistants, to refresh their knowledge about what is required when they are asked to provide one to one care to any patient.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Remind staff through weekly communications to follow observation policy, use the one-to-one care pathway and document care comprehensively and contemporaneously.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is particularly disappointing that Mrs Street was injured in a fall as this Trust has worked very hard indeed over several years to implement an active falls prevention programme. As a result the Trust has one of the lowest rates of inpatient falls of any acute Trust in the country. Nevertheless, in her weekly message to staff, the Chief Executive has”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.2

  1. 1

    Disseminate lessons from the events to senior nurses across the Trust through a formal presentation.

    Stated by University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 May 2016.
  2. 2

    Implement an active Trust-wide falls prevention programme.

    Stated by University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 10 May 2016.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Disseminate lessons from the events to senior nurses across the Trust through a formal presentation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Learning from these sad events is not limited to the Directorate of Neurosciences and Stroke Services. The Directorate Lead Nurse gave a formal presentation to her fellow senior nurses from across the whole Trust, after the inquest, to disseminate the lessons to be learned as widely as possible.”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement an active Trust-wide falls prevention programme.

Verbatim wording from the response

“It is particularly disappointing that Mrs Street was injured in a fall as this Trust has worked very hard indeed over several years to implement an active falls prevention programme. As a result the Trust has one of the lowest rates of inpatient falls of any acute Trust in the country. Nevertheless, in her weekly message to staff, the Chief Executive has”

Source location

2016-0177-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 10 May 2016

Open published response
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