PFD report

Mary Margaret Pomeroy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 1 Apr 2025•Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
3

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
8

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised3

  1. Failure to learn from serious incidents and consider recommendations for future care
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningPart of recurring concern: Inadequate safety incident investigationsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes
  2. Failure to assess and manage patients’ behavioural needs and provide enhanced observation of care
  3. Inadequate analysis of serious incidents
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate safety incident investigationsPart of recurring concern: Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.5

  1. Action

    Recruit two Learning Response Leads and provide them with mandatory training to conduct and support safety reviews.

    Stated by University Hospitals Plymouth NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 April 2025.
  2. Action

    Implement the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework process for recording, escalating, commissioning and overseeing system-based safety reviews with patient and family involvement.

    Stated by University Hospitals Plymouth NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 April 2025.
  3. Action

    Recruit two Patient Safety Partners to participate in governance and scrutinise safety investigations and final reports.

    Stated by University Hospitals Plymouth NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 April 2025.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to learn from serious incidents and consider recommendations for future care

Wider context from the report

“At the inquest, the author of UHP NHS’s investigation report (who was the Matron of the relevant ward) accepted, in evidence, that the patient who pushed Mary Pomeroy should, on 3 March 2022, have been subject to enhanced observations of care – this was on the basis that previous assessments in November 2021 and January 2022 had shown that this was required for him owing to his psychiatric and behavioural presentation (which had become more concerning by the end of February/beginning of March 2022) and also because of very recent and specific concerns regarding his behaviour which should have been obvious to ward staff following the incident on 1 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that had enhanced observation and care been in place for the patient (which could have taken a number of forms following assessment, depending on what would have been most clinically and therapeutically appropriate at the time) then he should have been prevented from being in a position where he was able to push Mary Pomeroy to the ground on 3 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that UHP NHS’s RCA report had been incorrect to conclude that the type of incident that occurred on 3 March 2022 could not have been foreseen. The Deputy Chief Nurse of UHP NHS accepted, in evidence, that the SI Panel Meeting should have interrogated the relevant facts and chronology more thoroughly. The inquest determined that the incident on the ward on 3 March 2022 was foreseeable, based on the concerns about the patient’s behaviour, the likely triggers for him becoming distressed and aggressive and the almost identical incident that had occurred on 1 March 2022. The inquest also determined that the lack of assessment and management of this patient’s behaviour and needs materially contributed to the incident which led to Mary Pomeroy suffering injuries and led to her death. It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of UHP NHS’s RCA report, that there was inadequate analysis of this serious incident by UHP NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided not being identified – therefore appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not given consideration as part of the RCA investigation/report. If UHP NHS do not identify concerning matters when carrying out internal investigations and do not take steps to try and learn from serious incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learning; Inadequate safety incident investigations; Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to assess and manage patients’ behavioural needs and provide enhanced observation of care

Wider context from the report

“At the inquest, the author of UHP NHS’s investigation report (who was the Matron of the relevant ward) accepted, in evidence, that the patient who pushed Mary Pomeroy should, on 3 March 2022, have been subject to enhanced observations of care – this was on the basis that previous assessments in November 2021 and January 2022 had shown that this was required for him owing to his psychiatric and behavioural presentation (which had become more concerning by the end of February/beginning of March 2022) and also because of very recent and specific concerns regarding his behaviour which should have been obvious to ward staff following the incident on 1 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that had enhanced observation and care been in place for the patient (which could have taken a number of forms following assessment, depending on what would have been most clinically and therapeutically appropriate at the time) then he should have been prevented from being in a position where he was able to push Mary Pomeroy to the ground on 3 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that UHP NHS’s RCA report had been incorrect to conclude that the type of incident that occurred on 3 March 2022 could not have been foreseen. The Deputy Chief Nurse of UHP NHS accepted, in evidence, that the SI Panel Meeting should have interrogated the relevant facts and chronology more thoroughly. The inquest determined that the incident on the ward on 3 March 2022 was foreseeable, based on the concerns about the patient’s behaviour, the likely triggers for him becoming distressed and aggressive and the almost identical incident that had occurred on 1 March 2022. The inquest also determined that the lack of assessment and management of this patient’s behaviour and needs materially contributed to the incident which led to Mary Pomeroy suffering injuries and led to her death. It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of UHP NHS’s RCA report, that there was inadequate analysis of this serious incident by UHP NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided not being identified – therefore appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not given consideration as part of the RCA investigation/report. If UHP NHS do not identify concerning matters when carrying out internal investigations and do not take steps to try and learn from serious incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inadequate analysis of serious incidents

Wider context from the report

“At the inquest, the author of UHP NHS’s investigation report (who was the Matron of the relevant ward) accepted, in evidence, that the patient who pushed Mary Pomeroy should, on 3 March 2022, have been subject to enhanced observations of care – this was on the basis that previous assessments in November 2021 and January 2022 had shown that this was required for him owing to his psychiatric and behavioural presentation (which had become more concerning by the end of February/beginning of March 2022) and also because of very recent and specific concerns regarding his behaviour which should have been obvious to ward staff following the incident on 1 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that had enhanced observation and care been in place for the patient (which could have taken a number of forms following assessment, depending on what would have been most clinically and therapeutically appropriate at the time) then he should have been prevented from being in a position where he was able to push Mary Pomeroy to the ground on 3 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that UHP NHS’s RCA report had been incorrect to conclude that the type of incident that occurred on 3 March 2022 could not have been foreseen. The Deputy Chief Nurse of UHP NHS accepted, in evidence, that the SI Panel Meeting should have interrogated the relevant facts and chronology more thoroughly. The inquest determined that the incident on the ward on 3 March 2022 was foreseeable, based on the concerns about the patient’s behaviour, the likely triggers for him becoming distressed and aggressive and the almost identical incident that had occurred on 1 March 2022. The inquest also determined that the lack of assessment and management of this patient’s behaviour and needs materially contributed to the incident which led to Mary Pomeroy suffering injuries and led to her death. It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of UHP NHS’s RCA report, that there was inadequate analysis of this serious incident by UHP NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided not being identified – therefore appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not given consideration as part of the RCA investigation/report. If UHP NHS do not identify concerning matters when carrying out internal investigations and do not take steps to try and learn from serious incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate safety incident investigations; Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Recruit two Learning Response Leads and provide them with mandatory training to conduct and support safety reviews.

Verbatim wording from the response

“4. Recruitment to x2 Learning Response Lead posts.”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 2 April 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework process for recording, escalating, commissioning and overseeing system-based safety reviews with patient and family involvement.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In June 2024, in line with other NHS Organisations across England, University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust (UHP) transitioned to the use of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) and ceased the use of the Serious Incident Framework (SIF).”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 2 April 2025

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Recruit two Patient Safety Partners to participate in governance and scrutinise safety investigations and final reports.

Verbatim wording from the response

“5. Recruitment of two Patient Safety Partners. The remit of the Patient Safety Partner role is set out in the National Patient Safety Strategy through the Framework for Involving Patients in Patient Safety. Patient Safety Partners are lay people, who have extensive experience of receiving care and on occasion, may have been involved in safety incidents. As such, they provide a different perspective on patient safety, removing the potential of influence by organisational bias or historical systems.”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 2 April 2025

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Redesign quality-concern governance to support transparent multidisciplinary review and assurance of resulting improvement actions.

Verbatim wording from the response

“7. Redesigned our governance processes to further promote transparency and proactive multidisciplinary review of quality concerns and undertaking assurance work on any actions implemented as a result of those concerns. We have done this by ensuring:”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 2 April 2025

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Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop and implement a new safety-incident investigation policy incorporating new investigation methods.

Verbatim wording from the response

“6. Developed a new policy for the investigation of safety incidents, which includes new investigation methods”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 2 April 2025

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. 1

    Create and provide a patient communication handbook for patients and families involved in safety incidents.

    Stated by University Hospitals Plymouth NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 April 2025.
  2. 2

    Embed ongoing development of a Just and Restorative culture within Care Improvement Group governance, with delegated authority and board-level progress updates.

    Stated by University Hospitals Plymouth NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 April 2025.
  3. 3

    Create a staff leaflet explaining safety investigation purposes, processes and available support.

    Stated by University Hospitals Plymouth NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 2 April 2025.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Create and provide a patient communication handbook for patients and families involved in safety incidents.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In support of the above elements, the Trust has taken the following actions:”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 2 April 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Embed ongoing development of a Just and Restorative culture within Care Improvement Group governance, with delegated authority and board-level progress updates.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3. The ongoing development of a Just and Restorative culture has been added to the Terms of Reference for a Key Quality sub-committee (the Care Improvement Group)”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 2 April 2025

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Create a staff leaflet explaining safety investigation purposes, processes and available support.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In support of the above elements, the Trust has taken the following actions:”

Source location

Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
Page 1 · response
Published 2 April 2025

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026