PFD report

Stephen WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 5 Sep 2022•West Sussex

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
5

Raised in this report

Recipients
3

Named on the report

Responses found
3

Of 3 recipients

Stated actions
12

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised5

  1. Lack of progress in reviewing or renegotiating the inter-Trust Service Level Agreement
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable operation of inter-provider healthcare service agreements
  2. Ongoing firewall problems between the two Trusts causing reliance on email rather than automatic electronic systems
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures
  3. Insufficient clarity about key contacts during inter-provider transfers between SASH and RSFT
    Part of recurring concern: Inadequate coordination between hospitals during patient carePart of recurring concern: Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processes
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.7

  1. Action

    Resolve the inter-Trust firewall problem and establish electronic data connections between the RSFT and SASH E-Tertiary systems.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 October 2022.
  2. Action

    Test the E-Tertiary data transfer technically and clinically during the planned oncology patient transfer.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 4 October 2022.
  3. Action

    Complete review and renegotiation of the inter-Trust SLA, incorporating learning from the inquest, and obtain final organisational sign-off.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 4 October 2022.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.4

  1. Position

    The incident occurred at SASH, so RSFT had no Datix incident and relevant letters were held by SASH rather than RSFT.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of progress in reviewing or renegotiating the inter-Trust Service Level Agreement

Wider context from the report

“b) I also heard evidence from SASH that they would not have expected Mr Wells to be transferred back to them after the liver surgery as further chemotherapy was needed. Conversely, RSFT were unable to explain why Mr Wells did not remain on the Somerset Cancer Registry (SCR) tracking system following discharge and the MDT discussion on 10 August 2020. I was told that the safety net to avoid a cancer patient such as Mr Wells failing to receive further treatment is an inter-provider transfer (IPT) to ensure the responsibility for care is further transferred. In this case, a local process of consultant-to- consultant referrals, in other words a workaround, had evolved and both the hardcopy letter between doctors and an email from the CNS to two separate doctor’s secretaries had failed resulting in no further appointment being made. It was accepted that the communication failure was not identified in a timely manner and that communication systems between both Trusts had blurred with the suggestion that these could be clarified by a renegotiation of the Service Level Agreement (SLA). I was provided with a copy of the current SLA dated 1 January 2015 and note that the particulars state the contract term was 36 months with an end date of 31 December 2017. Given the importance of good systems of communication between Trusts and the IPT system I remain concerned about: i. the lack of progress made in reviewing/renegotiating the SLA bearing in mind the difficulties in this case were drawn to the attention of the Trusts in September 2021. ii. an ongoing firewall problem between the two Trusts as this places a current reliance on email rather than automatic electronic systems especially given the failure of emails in this case to secure a much-needed appointment. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable operation of inter-provider healthcare service agreements.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Ongoing firewall problems between the two Trusts causing reliance on email rather than automatic electronic systems

Wider context from the report

“b) I also heard evidence from SASH that they would not have expected Mr Wells to be transferred back to them after the liver surgery as further chemotherapy was needed. Conversely, RSFT were unable to explain why Mr Wells did not remain on the Somerset Cancer Registry (SCR) tracking system following discharge and the MDT discussion on 10 August 2020. I was told that the safety net to avoid a cancer patient such as Mr Wells failing to receive further treatment is an inter-provider transfer (IPT) to ensure the responsibility for care is further transferred. In this case, a local process of consultant-to- consultant referrals, in other words a workaround, had evolved and both the hardcopy letter between doctors and an email from the CNS to two separate doctor’s secretaries had failed resulting in no further appointment being made. It was accepted that the communication failure was not identified in a timely manner and that communication systems between both Trusts had blurred with the suggestion that these could be clarified by a renegotiation of the Service Level Agreement (SLA). I was provided with a copy of the current SLA dated 1 January 2015 and note that the particulars state the contract term was 36 months with an end date of 31 December 2017. Given the importance of good systems of communication between Trusts and the IPT system I remain concerned about: i. the lack of progress made in reviewing/renegotiating the SLA bearing in mind the difficulties in this case were drawn to the attention of the Trusts in September 2021. ii. an ongoing firewall problem between the two Trusts as this places a current reliance on email rather than automatic electronic systems especially given the failure of emails in this case to secure a much-needed appointment. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Insufficient clarity about key contacts during inter-provider transfers between SASH and RSFT

Wider context from the report

“c) I heard evidence that Mr Wells was told his key contact in SASH was a named Clinical Nurse Specialist. When his care transferred to RSFT, witnesses expected his key contact to be changed to a CNS based within the St Luke’s Cancer Centre in Guildford. During the inquest I asked to whom the CNS was at RSFT and following enquiries learnt that the St Luke’s staff believed the key contact was the SASH CNS. I remain concerned that there is insufficient clarity for both patients and staff when there is an IPT from SASH to RSFT and vice versa. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate coordination between hospitals during patient care; Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processes.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of clarity for GPs about where to raise concerns regarding hospital or tertiary-care treatment

Wider context from the report

“a) I heard evidence that Mr Wells GP wrote two urgent letters to the RSFT consultant oncologist and HPB surgeon dated 22 September 2021 raising concerns that the patient had heard nothing further after the liver surgery in September 2020. These letters were sent to the East Surrey hospital by the GP. I heard evidence that both consultants hold clinics in two East Surrey hospitals as well as within their own Trust area. Principally the letters were about lack of treatment for a cancer patient and I heard evidence during the inquest that the RSFT witness assisting the court on governance & risk issues did not know the doctors had received the letters and presumably were not logged on the Datix system thereby raising concerns regarding: i. whether additional guidance may be appropriate for GPs to know where to raise concerns about patient treatment in hospital or tertiary care; and ii. whether further guidance or refresher training is needed for hospital doctors regarding use of the relevant Datix system. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Insufficient guidance or refresher training for hospital doctors on use of the relevant Datix system

Wider context from the report

“a) I heard evidence that Mr Wells GP wrote two urgent letters to the RSFT consultant oncologist and HPB surgeon dated 22 September 2021 raising concerns that the patient had heard nothing further after the liver surgery in September 2020. These letters were sent to the East Surrey hospital by the GP. I heard evidence that both consultants hold clinics in two East Surrey hospitals as well as within their own Trust area. Principally the letters were about lack of treatment for a cancer patient and I heard evidence during the inquest that the RSFT witness assisting the court on governance & risk issues did not know the doctors had received the letters and presumably were not logged on the Datix system thereby raising concerns regarding: i. whether additional guidance may be appropriate for GPs to know where to raise concerns about patient treatment in hospital or tertiary care; and ii. whether further guidance or refresher training is needed for hospital doctors regarding use of the relevant Datix system. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable reporting of patient-safety incidents.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Resolve the inter-Trust firewall problem and establish electronic data connections between the RSFT and SASH E-Tertiary systems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The firewall problem has been resolved between the two Trusts and electronic data connections can be seen between the RSFT and SASH E-Tertiary systems. This data transfer is due to be further tested by the IT and Cancer teams in the week commencing the 7th November. The system will then be tested clinically as part of a planned move of Upper Gastrointestinal Oncology patients currently managed by SASH to the care of RSFT later in November when each patient will require a transfer of information.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 3 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Test the E-Tertiary data transfer technically and clinically during the planned oncology patient transfer.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The firewall problem has been resolved between the two Trusts and electronic data connections can be seen between the RSFT and SASH E-Tertiary systems. This data transfer is due to be further tested by the IT and Cancer teams in the week commencing the 7th November. The system will then be tested clinically as part of a planned move of Upper Gastrointestinal Oncology patients currently managed by SASH to the care of RSFT later in November when each patient will require a transfer of information.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 3 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Complete review and renegotiation of the inter-Trust SLA, incorporating learning from the inquest, and obtain final organisational sign-off.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Both Trusts recognise that greater progress should have been made in reviewing and renegotiating the SLA prior to the Inquest, particularly given that the Trusts were aware of the difficulties in this case in September 2021. We would like to thank you for bringing these issues to our attention both before and during the inquest. Since the inquest the Trusts have been working to ensure that the SLA has been reviewed and renegotiated and that the learning from”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 2 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement an inter-organisation transfer pathway that gives patients, GPs and receiving clinicians the receiving organisation’s nominated contact details.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Following the concerns identified during the inquest the Trusts have been working on an agreed pathway that will ensure that patients themselves receive a letter at the point when their care is due to be transferred to another organisation. This letter will contain the key contact details including a telephone number for the nominated point of contact at the receiving organisation. The patient will therefore always have the key contact details available to them. The letter will also be copied to the patients GP and to the receiving clinical nurse specialist at the receiving hospital. This ensures that the GP has access to the contact details of the nominated point of contact should they need to raise any concerns or otherwise make contact with the treating clinical team.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 3 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Ratify and use a proforma transfer letter, providing it to patients at their final face-to-face visit and copying it to their GP and receiving Clinical Nurse Specialist.

Verbatim wording from the response

“RSFT have developed a proforma letter to use at the point when a patient’s care is due to be transferred to another organisation. This letter is due to be ratified by the RSFT Oncology department on the 4th November and will then be used for all patients where care is being transferred from RSFT to our referring hospitals. Patients will receive this letter in person at their final face to face visit, this will avoid any issues with the letter being lost or delayed in a postal process and ensure that the patient is clear on how and who to contact should they have concerns following their transfer of care. The letter will then be copied to the patient’s GP and to the Clinical Nurse Specialist at the receiving Trust who will taking on the role of the nominated point of contact for that patient.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 4 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Communicate the new nominated-contact process to RSFT GP partners through direct communications, the GP newsletter and the primary-secondary care meeting.

Verbatim wording from the response

“When this process is ready to go live RSFT will communicate this to all of our GP partners through direct communication, our regular monthly GP newsletter and our regular monthly ‘working together’ meeting held between primary and secondary care clinicians. This will ensure that all of our local GPs are aware of the new process and that should they wish to raise concerns about a specific patient they can do so using the contact details provided for”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 1 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Notify regional and ICB patient-safety teams about incidents occurring outside primary care for escalation to the other organisation.

Verbatim wording from the response

“NHS England can advise that it is routine practice in primary care to have local systems in place to monitor cancer cases among patients. By September 2023, every local risk management supplier including Datix will need to connect to the Learn from patient safety events (LFPSE) service. The reporter can log the incident as occurring elsewhere by completing the question: “Under which organisation’s care did the incident occur”. NHS England’s Regulation 28 Working Group will notify regions and ICB (Integrated Care Board) quality teams / ICB patient safety specialists of any incident of concern occurring outside of primary care, so that this can be escalated to the other organisation.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 1 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The incident occurred at SASH, so RSFT had no Datix incident and relevant letters were held by SASH rather than RSFT.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This concern was raised following evidence heard by yourself during the inquest that the RSFT witness assisting the court on governance and risk issues did not know that the doctors had received letters from Mr Wells’ GP raising concerns about the lack of ongoing follow up following his liver surgery.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 2 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Annual mandatory Datix training, governance discussions and appraisal processes provide sufficient awareness of incident-reporting requirements.

Verbatim wording from the response

“To provide assurance about the raising of Datix incidents when a significant problem in patient care is identified, both Trusts can confirm that all consultants undertake yearly mandatory training which includes the use of the Datix system and the expectation for Datix reporting of incidents. The consultants also attend departmental and divisional governance meetings at which incidents are discussed that have been reported using the Datix system. There is therefore a high level of knowledge and awareness across the consultant body of the requirement to report incidents using the Datix system and of how to do this. The consultants, and all other staff members, are also aware of the need to report any patient identified as potentially lost to follow up immediately and to complete a Datix incident report.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 2 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing local primary-care systems routinely monitor cancer cases, addressing the need for additional guidance when GPs raise concerns about hospital or tertiary treatment.

Verbatim wording from the response

“NHS England can advise that it is routine practice in primary care to have local systems in place to monitor cancer cases among patients. By September 2023, every local risk management supplier including Datix will need to connect to the Learn from patient safety events (LFPSE) service. The reporter can log the incident as occurring elsewhere by completing the question: “Under which organisation’s care did the incident occur”. NHS England’s Regulation 28 Working Group will notify regions and ICB (Integrated Care Board) quality teams / ICB patient safety specialists of any incident of concern occurring outside of primary care, so that this can be escalated to the other organisation.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 1 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Annual mandatory consultant training already covers Datix use and incident reporting, addressing the need for refresher training for hospital doctors.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The Royal Surrey County Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (RSFT) have assured us that all consultants undertake yearly mandatory training, which includes the use of the Datix system and the expectation for Datix reporting of incidents.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 1 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.5

  1. 1

    Review RSFT processes for Serious Incident review and inquest preparation, including document identification, Datix inclusion and witness review.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 4 October 2022.
  2. 2

    Work with hospitals referring cancer patients to RSFT to ensure they follow the Inter Provider Transfer policy.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 4 October 2022.
  3. 3

    Review RSFT Cancer and Oncology SLAs with other Trusts and incorporate learning from the event into renegotiations.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 4 October 2022.
  4. 4

    Ensure cancer patient information transfers comply with the Surrey and Sussex Cancer Alliance Inter Provider Transfer policy.

    Stated by Royal Surrey NHS Foundation Trust and Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 4 October 2022.
  5. 5

    Discuss received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share their patient-safety learning across national and regional NHS teams.

    Stated by NHS EnglandStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 October 2022.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review RSFT processes for Serious Incident review and inquest preparation, including document identification, Datix inclusion and witness review.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The RSFT Medical Director has asked the Deputy Medical Director and the Lead Consultant for Clinical Governance to conduct a review into the RSFT processes for Serious Incident Review and preparation for Inquest. This review will include ensuring that all relevant documents, such as letters, are identified and correctly contained within Datix and the Serious Incident review documentation, all documentation should then be reviewed by any witness attending an inquest to assist the court on governance and risk issues. There is a similar process at SASH.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 2 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Work with hospitals referring cancer patients to RSFT to ensure they follow the Inter Provider Transfer policy.

Verbatim wording from the response

“RSFT is also working with all of the hospitals who refer patients into the Trust for cancer services to ensure that they also follow the practice laid out in the Surrey and Sussex Cancer Alliance policy.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 3 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Review RSFT Cancer and Oncology SLAs with other Trusts and incorporate learning from the event into renegotiations.

Verbatim wording from the response

“RSFT are also reviewing their Cancer and Oncology SLAs with other Trusts and incorporating the learning from this event into those SLA renegotiations.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 3 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Ensure cancer patient information transfers comply with the Surrey and Sussex Cancer Alliance Inter Provider Transfer policy.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Both Trusts have agreed to ensure that the transfer of information for all cancer patients should be in line with the ‘Cancer Waiting Times: Inter Provider Transfer Policy’ which has been developed by the Surrey and Sussex Cancer Alliance. This policy has been developed over the time period including this inquest and the lessons and concerns identified during this inquest have been considered during the development of the policy. A copy of the policy is enclosed with this response for your information.”

Source location

Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
Page 3 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share their patient-safety learning across national and regional NHS teams.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I would also like to provide further assurances on the national NHSE work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of Stephen, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level, and helps us to pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.”

Source location

Response from NHS England
Page 2 · response
Published 4 October 2022

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

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Data last updated 7 September 2026