PFD report

Samuel Rodney Darren BLAIR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 19 May 2016•Inner North London

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
16

Raised in this report

Recipients
4

Named on the report

Responses found
3

Of 4 recipients

Stated actions
11

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised16

  1. Failure to refer antidepressant history to a prison GP
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to reliably reconcile mental-health and medication history in prison healthcare
  2. Failure to enter collateral history into the main clinical records
    Part of recurring concern: Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records
  3. Failure to record assessment of mood and suicidal thoughts during prison triage
    Part of recurring concern: Unreliable documentation of clinical triage decisions and advicePart of recurring concern: Unreliable recording of safety-critical mental health informationPart of recurring concern: Unreliable recording of suicide-risk information
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.8

  1. Action

    Continue working with the healthcare provider to ensure staff understand the steps required when responding to emergency calls.

    Stated by Pentonville PrisonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 19 May 2016.
  2. Action

    Ensure sufficient suitably trained first aiders are available through establishment first-aid risk assessments and current competency certification.

    Stated by Pentonville PrisonStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 19 May 2016.
  3. Action

    Require prison control rooms to provide the gate location at the beginning of ambulance calls and brief staff on the requirement.

    Stated by Pentonville PrisonStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 19 May 2016.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.7

  1. Position

    Existing risk-assessed first-aid staffing and 24-hour healthcare cover were considered sufficient, so CPR training was not mandatory for all prison staff.

    Stated by Pentonville PrisonExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to refer antidepressant history to a prison GP

Wider context from the report

“4. There is no record from that meeting or any other time, of any consideration of or management plan for Mr Blair’s depression. Most particularly, there is no record that it was ever recognised by the healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville that Mr Blair had been prescribed and had been compliant with the prescription of an anti depressant before his incarceration. The assistant psychologist who obtained the history of a prescription of anti depressant medication did not refer Mr Blair to a prison GP for consideration of this. Mr Blair was never offered any continuation of his citalopram prescription. The plan in the community had been to continue the prescription, but there is no record that this was ever considered by healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably reconcile mental-health and medication history in prison healthcare.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to enter collateral history into the main clinical records

Wider context from the report

“2. She later uploaded to the computer system the collateral history she had been sent as a Word document, but did not input any of it into the main body of the records, nor did the psychiatrist who made the note at the multi disciplinary team meeting in prison on 7 July 2015 at which Mr Blair was discussed. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record assessment of mood and suicidal thoughts during prison triage

Wider context from the report

“1. Although the assistant psychologist who triaged Mr Blair in prison on 2 July 2015 asked him about his alcohol dependency, she did not ask him about drug use, nor did she record asking him about his mood or any suicidal thoughts. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable documentation of clinical triage decisions and advice; Unreliable recording of safety-critical mental health information; Unreliable recording of suicide-risk information.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to assess drug use during prison triage

Wider context from the report

“1. Although the assistant psychologist who triaged Mr Blair in prison on 2 July 2015 asked him about his alcohol dependency, she did not ask him about drug use, nor did she record asking him about his mood or any suicidal thoughts. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable safety risk assessments for prisoners.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to consider continuation of prescribed citalopram

Wider context from the report

“4. There is no record from that meeting or any other time, of any consideration of or management plan for Mr Blair’s depression. Most particularly, there is no record that it was ever recognised by the healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville that Mr Blair had been prescribed and had been compliant with the prescription of an anti depressant before his incarceration. The assistant psychologist who obtained the history of a prescription of anti depressant medication did not refer Mr Blair to a prison GP for consideration of this. Mr Blair was never offered any continuation of his citalopram prescription. The plan in the community had been to continue the prescription, but there is no record that this was ever considered by healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to incorporate relevant clinical history and diagnoses into care decisions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record consideration or a management plan for depression

Wider context from the report

“4. There is no record from that meeting or any other time, of any consideration of or management plan for Mr Blair’s depression. Most particularly, there is no record that it was ever recognised by the healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville that Mr Blair had been prescribed and had been compliant with the prescription of an anti depressant before his incarceration. The assistant psychologist who obtained the history of a prescription of anti depressant medication did not refer Mr Blair to a prison GP for consideration of this. Mr Blair was never offered any continuation of his citalopram prescription. The plan in the community had been to continue the prescription, but there is no record that this was ever considered by healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delay in providing the ambulance with the prison gate location

Wider context from the report

“5. After Mr Blair was found hanging, the officer in the prison control room did not give the prison gate location for the ambulance at the very outset of the 999 call to London Ambulance Service, but instead did so part way through the call. The LAS controller did not ask at the very outset. The ideal would be for the information to be given at the very beginning of any emergency call. (I wrote to HMP Pentonville on 16 September 2016 in connection with the death of another prisoner about this issue. I appreciate that work on this matter is ongoing.) ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Ineffective communication during medical emergencies; Unsafe emergency call handling.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Inconsistent understanding of prison healthcare emergency procedures

Wider context from the report

“9. That nurse gave a description of the code blue and code red system of describing an emergency, that was markedly different from the understanding given by the prison governor and the London Ambulance Service. I heard that the codes blue and red are even described on posters within the prison. It therefore appears that a nurse within the prison healthcare team has the wrong understanding of basic prison healthcare emergency procedures. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable communication and understanding of emergency policies and procedures.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Out-of-date intermediate life support certification

Wider context from the report

“8. That nurse (a mental health, rather than general nurse) began resuscitation. He gave evidence that he started chest compressions and continued these for two minutes until a custodial manager arrived, without any intention of ever stopping to re-check Mr Blair’s pulse. He said that, whilst his basic life support certification was current at the time of Mr Blair’s death, his intermediate life support certification was not, and is still not; it is currently at least three years out of date. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Delay in emergency nurse attendance at the patient’s side

Wider context from the report

“6. The prison nurse on call for emergencies, call sign Hotel 7, who was called to attend Mr Blair after he had been found hanging, did not acknowledge the radio call for several minutes, despite numerous attempts by prison control. When she finally did acknowledge the emergency, there was a delay of up to approximately 15 minutes before she was at Mr Blair’s side. (I wrote to HMP Pentonville on 16 September 2016 in connection with the death of another prisoner about a different nurse, but also in the role of Hotel 7, who did not respond to an emergency alarm as soon as it was activated.) ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record discussion or a management plan for schizophrenia

Wider context from the report

“3. There is no record from that meeting of any discussion or management plan for Mr Blair’s schizophrenia. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to recognise prior compliant antidepressant treatment

Wider context from the report

“4. There is no record from that meeting or any other time, of any consideration of or management plan for Mr Blair’s depression. Most particularly, there is no record that it was ever recognised by the healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville that Mr Blair had been prescribed and had been compliant with the prescription of an anti depressant before his incarceration. The assistant psychologist who obtained the history of a prescription of anti depressant medication did not refer Mr Blair to a prison GP for consideration of this. Mr Blair was never offered any continuation of his citalopram prescription. The plan in the community had been to continue the prescription, but there is no record that this was ever considered by healthcare staff at HMP Pentonville. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to incorporate relevant clinical history and diagnoses into care decisions; Failure to reliably reconcile mental-health and medication history in prison healthcare.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Restricted immediate access to the emergency defibrillator

Wider context from the report

“7. The substance misuse nurse in the detoxification wing did respond immediately. He took his emergency bag with him to Mr Blair’s cell, but did not take the defibrillator stored in the same room as the bag. He later had to leave Mr Blair to retrieve the defibrillator, because it is stored in the nurses’ room and only nurses have the key. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to reliably respond to patient breathing emergencies; Unreliable availability and readiness of defibrillators for emergency response.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to promptly acknowledge emergency radio calls

Wider context from the report

“6. The prison nurse on call for emergencies, call sign Hotel 7, who was called to attend Mr Blair after he had been found hanging, did not acknowledge the radio call for several minutes, despite numerous attempts by prison control. When she finally did acknowledge the emergency, there was a delay of up to approximately 15 minutes before she was at Mr Blair’s side. (I wrote to HMP Pentonville on 16 September 2016 in connection with the death of another prisoner about a different nurse, but also in the role of Hotel 7, who did not respond to an emergency alarm as soon as it was activated.) ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable access to emergency communication.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of current mandatory basic life support and first aid training for all prison officers

Wider context from the report

“The prison officers who found Mr Blair hanging did not have current basic life support training and so were not able to commence cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) before the arrival of nurses. One officer tried to take Mr Blair’s pulse, but was unclear about the correct procedure for this. This is a situation that I have noted before at HMP Pentonville. I have not made a prevention of future deaths report in the past, because I am aware that the fact that there is no mandatory first aid (including CPR) training for all prison officers is a nationally made, resource led decision. However, it seems to me that you, as the decision maker regarding not providing such training, should be aware of the impact that this may have on the prison population. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Inadequate staff competence to provide first aid.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to re-check the pulse during resuscitation

Wider context from the report

“8. That nurse (a mental health, rather than general nurse) began resuscitation. He gave evidence that he started chest compressions and continued these for two minutes until a custodial manager arrived, without any intention of ever stopping to re-check Mr Blair’s pulse. He said that, whilst his basic life support certification was current at the time of Mr Blair’s death, his intermediate life support certification was not, and is still not; it is currently at least three years out of date. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable resuscitation preparedness and response during cardiac arrest.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue working with the healthcare provider to ensure staff understand the steps required when responding to emergency calls.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This report also brings to the attention of the Governor the inadequate response of a nurse to the emergency call from the control room. As you point out in your report, the local protocol on action to be taken in response to emergency response codes is well publicised throughout the prison. The prison will continue to work with the healthcare provider to ensure that all staff are aware of the steps that they are required to take when responding to an emergency call.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-NOMS
Page 2 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Ensure sufficient suitably trained first aiders are available through establishment first-aid risk assessments and current competency certification.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The report that you addressed to NOMS expresses concern that the staff who discovered Mr Blair had not received cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training. It correctly states that the NOMS position is that such training is not mandatory for all prison staff. However, it is not correct to characterise this as a ‘resource-led’ decision. NOMS is committed to ensuring that a sufficient number of suitably trained first aiders is always available in prisons to enable First Aid to be given to employees, prisoners and visitors. Prison Service Instruction 29/2015 First Aid, issued on 16 November 2015, requires every establishment to carry out a First Aid risk assessment to identify the number of trained first aiders required to provide cover throughout the day.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-NOMS
Page 1 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Require prison control rooms to provide the gate location at the beginning of ambulance calls and brief staff on the requirement.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The separate report addressed to the Governor raises concern about the fact that the prison’s control room did not immediately provide the London Ambulance Service (LAS) with the gate location when they requested the attendance of an ambulance. I can confirm that since Mr Blair’s death, colleagues at Pentonville have met the LAS to discuss this issue, and it has been agreed that the prison gate location will be”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-NOMS
Page 1 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deliver refresher training requiring emergency medical dispatchers to confirm the HMP Pentonville entrance at the start of each call.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I have been assured by ████████, the LAS’s Deputy Director of Operations (Control Services), ████████ that in early May 2016, when the refresher training for 2016/17 for staff in EOC began, a session was included that made specific reference to HMP Pentonville and of the requirement that when a call from HMP Pentonville was received, at the start of the call the emergency medical dispatcher was to seek confirmation of the gate the LAS should attend. This training is in process and due to be completed in November 2016.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Update the Computerised Gazetteer with both HMP Pentonville vehicular entrances and their postal addresses.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The letter to HMP Pentonville on 16 September 2015, relating to Mr H was also addressed to me. In my reply of 13 November 2015 I confirmed the actions taken by the London Ambulance Service NHS Trust (LAS) after the death of Mr H to ensure that the LAS attend the correct prison gate when called to HMP Pentonville. Shortly before the inquest into the death of Mr H changes were made to the LAS's Computerised Gazetteer, used in the Emergency Operations Control (EOC), to record that there was more than one vehicular entrance to HMP Pentonville, namely the Roman Way Gate and North Wall Gate. The postal address of both entrances, were added to the Gazetteer. Following the inquest into the death of Mr H it was requested that HMP Pentonville staff were prompted and reminded to say at the beginning of a 999 call which entrance LAS staff were to use.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Request HMP Pentonville staff to state the required ambulance entrance at the beginning of every 999 call.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The letter to HMP Pentonville on 16 September 2015, relating to Mr H was also addressed to me. In my reply of 13 November 2015 I confirmed the actions taken by the London Ambulance Service NHS Trust (LAS) after the death of Mr H to ensure that the LAS attend the correct prison gate when called to HMP Pentonville. Shortly before the inquest into the death of Mr H changes were made to the LAS's Computerised Gazetteer, used in the Emergency Operations Control (EOC), to record that there was more than one vehicular entrance to HMP Pentonville, namely the Roman Way Gate and North Wall Gate. The postal address of both entrances, were added to the Gazetteer. Following the inquest into the death of Mr H it was requested that HMP Pentonville staff were prompted and reminded to say at the beginning of a 999 call which entrance LAS staff were to use.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement the emergency-procedure actions outlined in the action table for all healthcare staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Response & Actions:”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 3 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Deliver an ILS training plan for most healthcare staff by December 2016 and provide annual refresher training.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Care UK Cardiopulmonary (CPR) Resuscitation Policy in the Training section (section 7) states:”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 4 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing risk-assessed first-aid staffing and 24-hour healthcare cover were considered sufficient, so CPR training was not mandatory for all prison staff.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The report that you addressed to NOMS expresses concern that the staff who discovered Mr Blair had not received cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training. It correctly states that the NOMS position is that such training is not mandatory for all prison staff. However, it is not correct to characterise this as a ‘resource-led’ decision. NOMS is committed to ensuring that a sufficient number of suitably trained first aiders is always available in prisons to enable First Aid to be given to employees, prisoners and visitors. Prison Service Instruction 29/2015 First Aid, issued on 16 November 2015, requires every establishment to carry out a First Aid risk assessment to identify the number of trained first aiders required to provide cover throughout the day.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-NOMS
Page 1 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

BEH-MHT is responsible for concerns relating to its mental health services and will provide the relevant response and action plan.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Response: We refer to the response provided by BEH-MHT and we will collaborate with them to ensure that the action plan outlined in their response is implemented and that all healthcare staff are aware of the plan.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 1 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The prison is responsible for concern 5 and must provide the response.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Response: This concern is a matter for the prison and accordingly, we will leave it for them to respond.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 1 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Concerns 2, 3 and 4 relate to BEH-MHT services rather than the services addressed by this response.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Response: We refer you to the response provided by BEH-MHT as these concerns are relating to their services rather than the services of Care UK.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 1 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Any emergency response delay was justified because the nurse was treating another patient and another clinician was already attending.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In any event, any delay on the part of Hotel 7 was as a result of her being located in a different wing and treating another patient following another incident. It would therefore have been entirely correct to ensure that her patient was clinically stable before leaving to attend another incident where a clinician was already in attendance.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 3 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The emergency nurse’s response took less than 15 minutes, contrary to the concern’s stated delay.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Response: We set out below a timeframe which we have compiled from the written evidence and with reference to the evidence heard at the inquest hearing and which suggests that the time taken was less than 15 minutes.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 2 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The nurse acted within his competence because BLS-trained staff were not expected to check a pulse under applicable guidance.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The nurse concerned was trained in Basic Life Support (BLS) but not Intermediate Life Support (ILS). As such, staff trained to BLS level are not expected to check a pulse as per the Resuscitation Council UK 2015 guideline. The nurse was therefore acting within the scope of his practice and competence. However, as detailed in the table below, we have implemented a training plan to ensure that, by December 2016, most healthcare staff will be ILS trained and that refresher trainings will occur yearly.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 4 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. 1

    Continue meetings with HMP Pentonville staff to promote effective communication and joint working.

    Stated by London Ambulance Service NHS TrustStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 19 May 2016.
  2. 2

    Share the Regulation 28 Report with the National Ambulance Service Medical Directors Group to facilitate wider learning.

    Stated by London Ambulance Service NHS TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 May 2016.
  3. 3

    Collaborate with BEH-MHT to implement its action plan and ensure all healthcare staff are aware of it.

    Stated by Care UKStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 May 2016.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Continue meetings with HMP Pentonville staff to promote effective communication and joint working.

Verbatim wording from the response

“On 26 May 2016 our Senior Quality Assurance Manager, Control Services, and other LAS senior managers, met senior prison staff to discuss matters of mutual interest for the LAS and HMP Pentonville to promote effective communication and joint working. I am advised that these meetings will continue.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Share the Regulation 28 Report with the National Ambulance Service Medical Directors Group to facilitate wider learning.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Our Medical Director, ████████ has confirmed that the Regulation 28 Report from the inquest into death of Mr Blair will be shared with the National Ambulance Service Medical Directors Group to facilitate wider learning by UK Ambulance Services.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Collaborate with BEH-MHT to implement its action plan and ensure all healthcare staff are aware of it.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Response: We refer to the response provided by BEH-MHT and we will collaborate with them to ensure that the action plan outlined in their response is implemented and that all healthcare staff are aware of the plan.”

Source location

2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
Page 1 · response
Published 19 May 2016

Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026