PFD report

Francis Osborne Barnes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 27 Oct 2023•Berkshire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
7

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
11

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

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Report evidence summary

Concerns raised7

  1. Failure to identify proposed changes after a death
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to establish effective plans to address identified safety concernsPart of recurring concern: Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningPart of recurring concern: Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review
  2. Failure to record multidisciplinary team meeting minutes
    Part of recurring concern: Unsafe operation of multidisciplinary clinical meetings
  3. Failure to engage with other organisations to learn jointly from events
    Part of recurring concern: Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.10

  1. Action

    Maintain the OUH Medical Examiner office to scrutinize all non-Coronial deaths and feed concerns to governance and clinical teams.

    Stated by Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation TrustStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 6 November 2023.
  2. Action

    Disseminate the approved vascular emergency referral procedure to NHS and private Thames Valley providers.

    Stated by Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 6 November 2023.
  3. Action

    Amend the OUH Vascular Surgery monthly morbidity and mortality meeting to discuss non-OUH vascular-related deaths.

    Stated by Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 6 November 2023.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.2

  1. Position

    The existing clinical audit and research system cannot document referrals across the network because it requires an existing OUH electronic patient record.

    Stated by Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation TrustUnable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to identify proposed changes after a death

Wider context from the report

“The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to establish effective plans to address identified safety concerns; Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learning; Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record multidisciplinary team meeting minutes

Wider context from the report

“The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unsafe operation of multidisciplinary clinical meetings.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to engage with other organisations to learn jointly from events

Wider context from the report

“The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to investigate deaths and co-operate in joint investigations

Wider context from the report

“The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review; Inadequate safety incident investigations.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record morbidity and mortality meeting minutes

Wider context from the report

“The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable morbidity and mortality review processes; Unreliable recording of clinical governance meeting concerns and actions.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to record vascular surgery consultations

Wider context from the report

“The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Unclear vascular surgery referral pathways

Wider context from the report

“The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

Yes — Unreliable vascular surgery referral pathways.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain the OUH Medical Examiner office to scrutinize all non-Coronial deaths and feed concerns to governance and clinical teams.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3.2.3 OUH introduced the Medical Examiner (ME) office in June 2020. This is to provide greater safeguards for the public by ensuring proper scrutiny of all non-Coronial deaths. Currently 100% of Trust deaths are reviewed by the ME office who feedback any concerns directly to the Learning from Deaths team (part of the Clinical Governance team). Any concerns and compliments are also fed back to clinical teams for action.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 5 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Disseminate the approved vascular emergency referral procedure to NHS and private Thames Valley providers.

Verbatim wording from the response

“1.1 Following this inquest, a concise procedure for contacting the Vascular Team at OUH has been developed and approved by the TVVN which clearly sets out the referral process for patients who have a vascular emergency within the network. This will be sent to all NHS and private providers in Thames Valley and provides details on how to contact the on-call Vascular SpR and on-call Vascular Consultant.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Amend the OUH Vascular Surgery monthly morbidity and mortality meeting to discuss non-OUH vascular-related deaths.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3.1.4 The OUH Vascular Surgery monthly M&M meeting currently reviews all vascular deaths that occur within OUH. This meeting will be amended to discuss non-OUH vascular related deaths to enable learning to be disseminated within OUH.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 5 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Appraise options for documenting TVVN vascular referrals and consultant advice.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2. Consideration of an electronic referral system”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Update the OUH Mortality Review Policy with an appendix governing cross-system learning responses across the BOB ICB and Frimley.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3.2.8 In response to this inquest several new processes have also been introduced:”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 5 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Discuss and minute clinically concerning, potentially learnable TVVN vascular deaths at quarterly network morbidity and mortality meetings, sharing minutes across the Network.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3.1 Future Governance of cross-organisational incidents within TVVN”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Establish a weekly Patient Safety meeting with the BOB ICB to coordinate multi-organisational incident planning and progress.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3.2.8.2 A weekly Patient Safety meeting with Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West (BOB) Integrated Care Board (ICB) has been established for Patient Safety Teams to plan and liaise on the progress of multi-organisational Patient Safety Incidents. Ad-hoc arrangements can also be made in the event of significant Patient Safety incidents that require urgent planning and response.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 6 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement a Microsoft 365 Form to document emergency vascular referrals from across the TVVN.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2.3.1 The use of a Microsoft 365 Form which will enable all referrals to be documented in real time including a record of the patient’s name and NHS number. This does not require the patient to have an existing OUH medical record number (MRN) and so allows documentation of referrals of patients who are not currently under the care of OUH. This Form is currently used by the vascular surgical team to track patients from around the region who are awaiting discussion at the Multidisciplinary Team meetings. The data is stored within the OUH server on Sharepoint.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Develop and approve a concise TVVN vascular emergency referral procedure.

Verbatim wording from the response

“1. Clarification of vascular surgery hub pathways”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Introduce three forms for documenting vascular surgery-related concerns about patient deaths in the Thames Valley.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3.1.2 The M&M documentation will include three new forms which will require completion whenever there is a vascular surgery-related concern raised about a patient death in the Thames Valley region.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The existing clinical audit and research system cannot document referrals across the network because it requires an existing OUH electronic patient record.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2.3.2 A clinical audit and research system is currently used to document every inpatient encounter and vascular operation within Vascular Surgery in OUH. It could be used to document referrals to the vascular service; however, it is dependent on the patient having an existing OUH Electronic Patient Record (EPR) and so would not be suitable for documenting referrals from across the TVVN.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 3 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Telephone referral to the on-call vascular team is considered more timely and effective than any electronic referral system for vascular emergencies.

Verbatim wording from the response

“2.2 The TVVN have agreed that all vascular emergencies should continue to be referred by telephone to the on-call vascular surgical team at OUH. No electronic referral system would ensure as timely and effective a response to vascular emergencies.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 2 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.1

  1. 1

    Share the new mortality-review forms with Network medical examiners and request identification of clinically concerning, potentially learnable deaths.

    Stated by Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation TrustStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 6 November 2023.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Share the new mortality-review forms with Network medical examiners and request identification of clinically concerning, potentially learnable deaths.

Verbatim wording from the response

“3.1.3 These forms will be shared with the Medical Examiners in the hospitals within the Network. They will be asked to raise any deaths where there is a clinical concern and opportunity for learning.”

Source location

Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Page 4 · response
Published 6 November 2023

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026